(PC) Thompson v. Omari ( 2020 )

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 ANDRE LaSHAUN THOMPSON, No. 2:19-CV-2565-DMC-P 12 Plaintiff, 13 v. ORDER 14 WARDEN, et al., 15 Defendants. 16 17 Plaintiff, a prisoner proceeding pro se, brings this civil rights action pursuant to 18 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Pending before the Court is plaintiff’s amended complaint (ECF No. 1). 19 The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief 20 against a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C. 21 § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if it: (1) is frivolous or 22 malicious; (2) fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted; or (3) seeks monetary relief 23 from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2). Moreover, 24 the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require that complaints contain a “. . . short and plain 25 statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). This 26 means that claims must be stated simply, concisely, and directly. See McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d 27 1172, 1177 (9th Cir. 1996) (referring to Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(e)(1)). These rules are satisfied if the 28 complaint gives the defendant fair notice of the plaintiff’s claim and the grounds upon which it 1 rests. See Kimes v. Stone, 84 F.3d 1121, 1129 (9th Cir. 1996). Because plaintiff must allege 2 with at least some degree of particularity overt acts by specific defendants which support the 3 claims, vague and conclusory allegations fail to satisfy this standard. Additionally, it is 4 impossible for the Court to conduct the screening required by law when the allegations are vague 5 and conclusory. 6 Plaintiff names the following as defendants: (1) Omari, a prison nurse at Mule 7 Creek State Prison; and (2) Rudas, a doctor at Mule Creek State Prison. See ECF No. 1. Plaintiff 8 also names “John/Jane Doe,” who is alleged to be the warden at Mule Creek State Prison. See id. 9 Plaintiff’s claims against all three concern medical care. Plaintiff claims the unidentified prison 10 warden is liable for the conduct of Omari and Rudas. See id. at 3. Plaintiff claims Omari 11 violated his Eighth Amendment right to adequate medical care when he “denied me medical 12 treatment while stating ‘I do not care about your medical needs.’” Id. at 4. Plaintiff claims Rudas 13 similarly violated his Eighth Amendment rights when he told plaintiff that his pain was “no 14 concern to me.” Id. at 5. 15 The Court finds plaintiff’s complaint is sufficient to state claims for relief under 16 the Eighth Amendment against defendants Omari and Rudas. Plaintiff’s complaint, however, is 17 insufficient as to the unnamed prison warden. 18 Supervisory personnel – such as the prison warden – are generally not liable under 19 § 1983 for the actions of their employees. See Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 20 1989) (holding that there is no respondeat superior liability under § 1983). A supervisor is only 21 liable for the constitutional violations of subordinates if the supervisor participated in or directed 22 the violations. See id. The Supreme Court has rejected the notion that a supervisory defendant 23 can be liable based on knowledge and acquiescence in a subordinate’s unconstitutional conduct 24 because government officials, regardless of their title, can only be held liable under § 1983 for his 25 or her own conduct and not the conduct of others. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676 26 (2009). Supervisory personnel who implement a policy so deficient that the policy itself is a 27 repudiation of constitutional rights and the moving force behind a constitutional violation may, 28 however, be liable even where such personnel do not overtly participate in the offensive act. See 1 Redman v. Cnty of San Diego, 942 F.2d 1435, 1446 (9th Cir. 1991) (en banc). 2 When a defendant holds a supervisory position, the causal link between such 3 defendant and the claimed constitutional violation must be specifically alleged. See Fayle v. 4 Stapley, 607 F.2d 858, 862 (9th Cir. 1979); Mosher v. Saalfeld, 589 F.2d 438, 441 (9th Cir. 5 1978). Vague and conclusory allegations concerning the involvement of supervisory personnel in 6 civil rights violations are not sufficient. See Ivey v. Board of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th 7 Cir. 1982). “[A] plaintiff must plead that each Government-official defendant, through the 8 official’s own individual actions, has violated the constitution.” Iqbal, 662 U.S. at 676. 9 Here, even if plaintiff identifies the warden, such individual would still not be 10 liable under plaintiff’s theory. According to plaintiff, the warden is liable for the conduct of 11 Omari and Rudas. As explained above, however, supervisory personnel cannot be liable solely 12 based on the conduct of subordinates. Rather, they may only be liable for their own conduct. In 13 this case, plaintiff has not identified any conduct by the unidentified warden. 14 Because it is possible that the deficiencies identified in this order may be cured by 15 amending the complaint, plaintiff is entitled to leave to amend. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 16 1122, 1126, 1131 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). Plaintiff is informed that, as a general rule, an 17 amended complaint supersedes the original complaint. See Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 18 1262 (9th Cir. 1992). Therefore, if plaintiff amends the complaint, the court cannot refer to the 19 prior pleading in order to make plaintiff's amended complaint complete. See Local Rule 220. An 20 amended complaint must be complete in itself without reference to any prior pleading. See id. 21 If plaintiff chooses to amend the complaint, plaintiff must demonstrate how the 22 conditions complained of have resulted in a deprivation of plaintiff’s constitutional rights. See 23 Ellis v. Cassidy, 625 F.2d 227 (9th Cir. 1980). The complaint must allege in specific terms how 24 each named defendant is involved, and must set forth some affirmative link or connection 25 between each defendant’s actions and the claimed deprivation. See May v. Enomoto, 633 F.2d 26 164, 167 (9th Cir. 1980); Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). 27 / / / 28 / / / 2 LDV MEGUMI MUU IR ON AY Tt 1 Because the complaint appears to otherwise state cognizable claims, if no amended 2 | complaint is filed within the time allowed therefor, the court will issue findings and 3 || recommendations that the claims identified herein as defective be dismissed, as well as such 4 | further orders as are necessary for service of process as to the cognizable claims. 5 Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that plaintiff may file a first amended 6 | complaint within 30 days of the date of service of this order. 4 8 | Dated: June 4, 2020 Ssvcqo_ ? DENNIS M. COTA 10 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28