(SS) Vaenkham v. Commissioner of Social Security ( 2020 )

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 AMY VAENKHAM ) Case No.: 1:16-cv-01756-BAM ) 12 Plaintiff, ) ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR ) ATTORNEYS’ FEES PURSUANT TO 42 U.S.C. 13 v. ) § 406(b) ) 14 ANDREW M. SAUL,1 Commissioner of ) (Doc. No. 20) ) Social Security, 15 ) ) Defendant. 16 17 Pending before the Court is counsel for Plaintiff Amy Vaenkham’s (“Plaintiff”) motion for 18 attorneys’ fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 406(b). (Doc. No. 20). The Commissioner of Social Security 19 (the “Commissioner”) has filed a response to the motion analyzing the fee request but taking no 20 position as to its reasonableness. (Doc. No. 22). Having reviewed the motion and its supporting 21 documentation, as well as the case file, the Court GRANTS the motion and awards attorneys’ fees in 22 the amount of $20,745.00. 23 I. Relevant Background 24 The Law Offices of Lawrence D. Rohlfing entered into a written contingent fee agreement with 25 Plaintiff dated October 27, 2016, which provided that “[i]n consideration of the services to be 26 27 1 Andrew M. Saul is now the Commissioner of Social Security. Pursuant to Rule 25(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil 28 Procedure, Andrew M. Saul is substituted for Acting Commissioner Nancy A. Berryhill as the defendant in this suit. 1 performed by the Attorney and it being the desire of the Claimant to compensate Attorney out of the 2 proceeds . . . the fee for successful prosecution of this matter is . . . 25% of the past due benefits 3 awarded upon reversal of any unfavorable ALJ decision for work before the Social Security 4 Administration” and “a separate 25% of the past due benefits awarded upon reversal of any unfavorable 5 ALJ decision for work before the court.” (Doc. No. 20-1). 6 On November 18, 2016, Plaintiff filed this action seeking judicial review of the Commissioner’s 7 denial of benefits. (Doc. No. 1). On March 27, 2018, the Court issued an order reversing the 8 Commissioner’s denial of benefits and ordering remand pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 9 405(g). (Doc. No. 16.) On May 3, 2018, the Court approved the parties’ stipulation to award Plaintiff 10 $4,500.00 in attorneys’ fees pursuant to the Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2412. (Doc. No. 11 19.) On remand, the Commissioner issued a decision to grant Plaintiff’s application for benefits and, on 12 May 8, 2019, issued a notice indicating that Plaintiff was entitled to receive $82,980.00 in retroactive 13 benefits. (Doc. No. 20-3.) 14 In the present Motion, Plaintiff’s counsel asks the Court to award attorneys’ fees in the amount 15 of $20,745.00. (Doc. No. 20.) Plaintiff’s counsel contends this fee is reasonable in light of the services 16 rendered and results achieved, as counsel prepared and participated in obtaining a favorable result and 17 the manner and approach to the case saved time and reduced the accumulation of past-due benefits. 18 (Doc. No. 20 at 4-5.) Additionally, the fee counsel seeks is twenty percent of the past-due benefits 19 payable to Plaintiff. (Id. at 5.) The Commissioner filed a statement in response to the Motion providing 20 an analysis of the fee request but taking no position regarding its reasonableness. (Doc. No. 22.) 21 II. Legal Standard 22 An attorney may seek an award of fees for representation of a Social Security claimant who is 23 awarded benefits: 24 Whenever a court renders a judgment favorable to a claimant . . . who was represented before the court by an attorney, the court may determine and allow as part of its 25 judgment a reasonable fee for such representation, not in excess of 25 percent of the total of the past-due benefits to which the claimant is entitled by reason of such 26 judgment. . .. 27 42 U.S.C. § 406(b)(1)(A); see also Gisbrecht v. Barnhart, 535 U.S. 789, 794 (2002) (Section 406(b) 28 controls fees awarded for representation of Social Security claimants). A contingency fee agreement is 1 unenforceable if it provides for fees exceeding twenty-five percent of past-due benefits. Gisbrecht, 2 supra, 535 U.S. at 807. 3 III. Discussion and Analysis 4 District courts “have been deferential to the terms of contingency fee contracts § 406(b) cases.” 5 Hern v. Barnhart, 262 F.Supp.2d 1033, 1037 (N.D. Cal. 2003). However, the Court must review 6 contingent-fee arrangements “as an independent check, to assure that they yield reasonable results in 7 particular cases.” Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 807. In doing so, the Court should consider “the character of 8 the representation and the results the representative achieved.” Id. at 808. In addition, the Court should 9 consider whether the attorney performed in a substandard manner or engaged in dilatory conduct or 10 excessive delays, and whether the fees are “excessively large in relation to the benefits received.” 11 Crawford v. Astrue, 586 F.3d 1142, 1149 (9th Cir. 2009) (en banc). 12 In this case, after carefully considering the fee agreement and the applicable law, the Court 13 finds Plaintiff’s counsel’s requested fees to be reasonable. In support of the motion for attorneys’ fees 14 under 42 U.S.C. § 406(b), Plaintiff’s counsel attached the contingent fee agreement which provided 15 for a contingent fee of twenty-five percent of any awarded retroactive benefits. (Doc. No. 20-1.) 16 Plaintiff’s counsel accordingly accepted the risk of loss in the representation. Plaintiff’s counsel 17 additionally expended a total of 21.2 hours of attorney time and 3.9 hours of paralegal time while 18 representing Plaintiff before the District Court. (Doc. No. 20-4.) The requested fee amount represents 19 approximately twenty-five percent of past-due benefits and is within the applicable maximum. As a 20 result of counsel’s work, the matter was remanded for further proceedings before an Administrative 21 Law Judge, who issued a fully favorable decision and awarded Plaintiff benefits. 22 Plaintiff’s counsel provided a copy of the notice of award and the motion for attorney’s fees to 23 Plaintiff. (Doc. No. 20). Although served with the motion, Plaintiff did not challenge the requested 24 fees which attests to their reasonableness. Likewise, the Commissioner, in its advisory capacity, also 25 declined to dispute the propriety of the amount of the fees requested by Plaintiff’s counsel. (Doc. No. 26 22.) 27 Additionally, there is no indication counsel performed in a substandard manner or engaged in 28 severe dilatory conduct to the extent that a reduction in fees is warranted. To the contrary, Plaintiff 1 was able to secure a fully favorable decision and remand for further proceedings, including an award 2 of past-due benefits. Accordingly, the Court finds the fees sought by counsel are reasonable in light 3 the results achieved in this action, and the amount does not exceed twenty-five percent maximum 4 permitted under 42 U.S.C. § 406(b). 5 IV. Conclusion and Order 6 Based upon the foregoing, the Court ORDERS: 7 1. Plaintiff’s counsel’s motion for attorneys’ fees under 42 U.S.C. § 406(b) (Doc. No. 20) 8 is GRANTED; 9 2. Plaintiff’s counsel is awarded $20,745.00 in attorneys’ fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 10 406(b); and 11 3. Plaintiff’s counsel shall compensate Plaintiff in the amount of $4,500.00 for fees 12 previously awarded pursuant to the EAJA. 13 14 IT IS SO ORDERED. 15 Dated: June 9, 2020 /s/ Barbara A. McAuliffe _ 16 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28