(PC) Green v. McFarlane ( 2020 )

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 ALDEUNTE GREEN, No. 2:20-CV-0923-DMC-P 12 Plaintiff, 13 v. ORDER 14 R. McFARLANE, 15 Defendant. 16 17 Plaintiff, a prisoner proceeding pro se, brings this civil rights action pursuant to 18 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Pending before the court is plaintiff’s complaint. See ECF No. 1. 19 The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief 20 against a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C. 21 § 1915A(a). The court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if it: (1) is frivolous or 22 malicious; (2) fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted; or (3) seeks monetary relief 23 from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2). Moreover, 24 the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require that complaints contain a “. . . short and plain 25 statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). This 26 means that claims must be stated simply, concisely, and directly. See McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d 27 1172, 1177 (9th Cir. 1996) (referring to Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(e)(1)). These rules are satisfied if the 28 complaint gives the defendant fair notice of the plaintiff’s claim and the grounds upon which it 1 rests. See Kimes v. Stone, 84 F.3d 1121, 1129 (9th Cir. 1996). Because plaintiff must allege 2 with at least some degree of particularity overt acts by specific defendants which support the 3 claims, vague and conclusory allegations fail to satisfy this standard. Additionally, it is 4 impossible for the court to conduct the screening required by law when the allegations are vague 5 and conclusory. 6 7 I. PLAINTIFF’S ALLEGATIONS 8 The plaintiff, Aldeunte Green, is a prisoner at Folsom State Prison who was 9 previously incarcerated at Sierra Conservation Center. Plaintiff names the following defendants: 10 (1) Officer R. McFarlane, a corrections officer department employee at Sierra Conservation 11 Center, and (2) the Warden of Sierra Conservation Center. 12 Plaintiff claims that defendant McFarlane nudged him while escorting to the 13 recreation yard, causing plaintiff to fall down the flight of stairs. Plaintiff sustained a sprained 14 ankle and abrasions to his knee and left shoulder due to the fall. Plaintiff alleges the nudge 15 violated his Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment by 16 threatening his safety and using excessive force. 17 18 II. DISCUSSION 19 The Court finds that plaintiff’s claim suffers three defects. First, plaintiff’s claim 20 against defendant Warden does not establish the necessary causal connection between the Warden 21 and the alleged events that transpired. Second, plaintiff’s allegation that Officer McFarlane 22 nudged him near a staircase cannot establish the conditions necessary for an Eighth Amendment 23 threat to safety claim. Third, plaintiff has failed to allege claims that support a finding of 24 excessive force in violation of the Eighth Amendment. 25 /// 26 /// 27 /// 28 /// 1 A. Claims Against the Warden of Sierra Conservation Center 2 Supervisory personnel are generally not liable under § 1983 for the actions of their 3 employees. See Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding that there is no 4 respondeat superior liability under § 1983). A supervisor is only liable for the constitutional 5 violations of subordinates if the supervisor participated in or directed the violations. See id. The 6 Supreme Court has rejected the notion that a supervisory defendant can be liable based on 7 knowledge and acquiescence in a subordinate’s unconstitutional conduct because government 8 officials, regardless of their title, can only be held liable under § 1983 for his or her own conduct 9 and not the conduct of others. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676 (2009). Supervisory 10 personnel who implement a policy so deficient that the policy itself is a repudiation of 11 constitutional rights and the moving force behind a constitutional violation may, however, be 12 liable even where such personnel do not overtly participate in the offensive act. See Redman v. 13 Cnty of San Diego, 942 F.2d 1435, 1446 (9th Cir. 1991) (en banc). 14 When a defendant holds a supervisory position, the causal link between such 15 defendant and the claimed constitutional violation must be specifically alleged. See Fayle v. 16 Stapley, 607 F.2d 858, 862 (9th Cir. 1979); Mosher v. Saalfeld, 589 F.2d 438, 441 (9th Cir. 17 1978). Vague and conclusory allegations concerning the involvement of supervisory personnel in 18 civil rights violations are not sufficient. See Ivey v. Board of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th 19 Cir. 1982). “[A] plaintiff must plead that each Government-official defendant, through the 20 official’s own individual actions, has violated the constitution.” Iqbal, 662 U.S. at 676. 21 Here, plaintiff fails to establish any specific causal link between the Defendant 22 Warden and the alleged constitutional violation. Plaintiff does not allege that the Warden was 23 present when Office McFarlane escorted the plaintiff to the recreation yard. Therefore, the 24 Warden could not have directed or participated in Office McFarlane’s activity. Because 25 supervisory personnel are only considered liable for their own conduct, plaintiff’s § 1983 action is 26 not the appropriate vehicle for relief and any further amendment would be futile. 27 /// 28 /// 1 B. Eighth Amendment Threat to Safety Claim 2 The treatment a prisoner receives in prison and the conditions under which the 3 prisoner is confined are subject to scrutiny under the Eighth Amendment, which prohibits cruel 4 and unusual punishment. See Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 31 (1993); Farmer v. Brennan, 5 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994). The Eighth Amendment “. . . embodies broad and idealistic concepts 6 of dignity, civilized standards, humanity, and decency.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102 7 (1976). Conditions of confinement may, however, be harsh and restrictive. See Rhodes v. 8 Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981). Nonetheless, prison officials must provide prisoners with 9 “food, clothing, shelter, sanitation, medical care, and personal safety.” Toussaint v. McCarthy, 10 801 F.2d 1080, 1107 (9th Cir. 1986). A prison official violates the Eighth Amendment only when 11 two requirements are met: (1) objectively, the official’s act or omission must be so serious such 12 that it results in the denial of the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities; and (2) 13 subjectively, the prison official must have acted unnecessarily and wantonly for the purpose of 14 inflicting harm. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. Thus, to violate the Eighth Amendment, a prison 15 official must have a “sufficiently culpable mind.” See id. 16 Under these principles, prison officials have a duty to take reasonable steps to 17 protect inmates from physical abuse. See Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d 1237, 1250-51 (9th Cir. 18 1982); Farmer, 511 U.S. at 833. Liability exists only when two requirements are met: (1) 19 objectively, the prisoner was incarcerated under conditions presenting a substantial risk of serious 20 harm; and (2) subjectively, prison officials knew of and disregarded the risk. See Farmer, 511 21 U.S. at 837. The very obviousness of the risk may suffice to establish the knowledge element. 22 See Wallis v. Baldwin, 70 F.3d 1074, 1077 (9th Cir. 1995). Prison officials are not liable, 23 however, if evidence is presented that they lacked knowledge of a safety risk. See Farmer, 511 24 U.S. at 844. The knowledge element does not require that the plaintiff prove that prison officials 25 know for a certainty that the inmate’s safety is in danger, but it requires proof of more than a 26 mere suspicion of danger. See Berg v. Kincheloe, 794 F.2d 457, 459 (9th Cir. 1986). Finally, the 27 plaintiff must show that prison officials disregarded a risk. Thus, where prison officials actually 28 knew of a substantial risk, they are not liable if they took reasonable steps to respond to the risk, 1 even if harm ultimately was not averted. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 844. 2 The court recognizes that plaintiff attempts to allege an Eighth Amendment threat 3 to safety claim, however, plaintiff’s allegations do not support this claim. Plaintiff’s allegation 4 that Officer McFarlane nudged him near a staircase on one occasion do not establish that plaintiff 5 was incarcerated under conditions that presented a serious risk of physical abuse. Further, because 6 plaintiff cannot establish there was a condition that created a risk of danger, plaintiff cannot 7 establish that Office McFarlane knew of the risk of danger to plaintiff. Thus, a threat to safety 8 claim is not the appropriate vehicle for relief and any further amendment would be futile. 9 C. Eighth Amendment Excessive Force Claim 10 The treatment a prisoner receives in prison and the conditions under which the 11 prisoner is confined are subject to scrutiny under the Eighth Amendment, which prohibits cruel 12 and unusual punishment. See Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 31 (1993); Farmer v. Brennan, 13 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994). The Eighth Amendment “. . . embodies broad and idealistic concepts 14 of dignity, civilized standards, humanity, and decency.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102 15 (1976). Conditions of confinement may, however, be harsh and restrictive. See Rhodes v. 16 Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981). Nonetheless, prison officials must provide prisoners with 17 “food, clothing, shelter, sanitation, medical care, and personal safety.” Toussaint v. McCarthy, 18 801 F.2d 1080, 1107 (9th Cir. 1986). A prison official violates the Eighth Amendment only when 19 two requirements are met: (1) objectively, the official’s act or omission must be so serious such 20 that it results in the denial of the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities; and (2) 21 subjectively, the prison official must have acted unnecessarily and wantonly for the purpose of 22 inflicting harm. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. Thus, to violate the Eighth Amendment, a prison 23 official must have a “sufficiently culpable mind.” See id. 24 When prison officials stand accused of using excessive force, the core judicial 25 inquiry is “. . . whether force was applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, 26 or maliciously and sadistically to cause harm.” Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 6-7 (1992); 27 Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 320-21 (1986). The “malicious and sadistic” standard, as 28 opposed to the “deliberate indifference” standard applicable to most Eighth Amendment claims, 1 is applied to excessive force claims because prison officials generally do not have time to reflect 2 on their actions in the face of risk of injury to inmates or prison employees. See Whitley, 475 3 U.S. at 320-21. In determining whether force was excessive, the court considers the following 4 factors: (1) the need for application of force; (2) the extent of injuries; (3) the relationship 5 between the need for force and the amount of force used; (4) the nature of the threat reasonably 6 perceived by prison officers; and (5) efforts made to temper the severity of a forceful response. 7 See Hudson, 503 U.S. at 7. The absence of an emergency situation is probative of whether force 8 was applied maliciously or sadistically. See Jordan v. Gardner, 986 F.2d 1521, 1528 (9th Cir. 9 1993) (en banc). The lack of injuries is also probative. See Hudson, 503 U.S. at 7-9. Finally, 10 because the use of force relates to the prison’s legitimate penological interest in maintaining 11 security and order, the court must be deferential to the conduct of prison officials. See Whitley, 12 475 U.S. at 321-22. 13 Here, plaintiffs fails to establish that Officer McFarlane acted with the malicious 14 mental state necessary for an excessive force claim. Nothing in plaintiff’s claim suggests Officer 15 McFarlane intended to harm plaintiff. Rather, plaintiff’s medical reports indicate that plaintiff 16 himself stated Officer McFarlane nudged him to encourage him to move faster. See ECF No. 1, 17 pg. 7. Thus, plaintiff’s current complaint cannot establish that Officer McFarlane possessed the 18 “sufficiently culpable mind” required by the Eighth Amendment. At present, there are insufficient 19 details showing that Officer McFarlane intentionally nudged plaintiff with the purpose of 20 inflicting harm. 21 /// 22 /// 23 /// 24 /// 25 /// 26 /// 27 /// 28 /// 1 III. CONCLUSION 2 Because it is possible that some of the deficiencies identified in this order may be 3 cured by amending the complaint, plaintiff is entitled to leave to amend prior to dismissal of the 4 entire action. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126, 1131 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). Plaintiff 5 is informed that, as a general rule, an amended complaint supersedes the original complaint. See 6 Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1262 (9th Cir. 1992). Thus, following dismissal with leave to 7 amend, all claims alleged in the original complaint which are not alleged in the amended 8 complaint are waived. See King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565, 567 (9th Cir. 1987). Therefore, if 9 plaintiff amends the complaint, the court cannot refer to the prior pleading in order to make 10 plaintiff's amended complaint complete. See Local Rule 220. An amended complaint must be 11 complete in itself without reference to any prior pleading. See id. 12 If plaintiff chooses to amend the complaint, plaintiff must demonstrate how the 13 conditions complained of have resulted in a deprivation of plaintiff’s constitutional rights. See 14 Ellis v. Cassidy, 625 F.2d 227 (9th Cir. 1980). The complaint must allege in specific terms how 15 each named defendant is involved, and must set forth some affirmative link or connection 16 between each defendant’s actions and the claimed deprivation. See May v. Enomoto, 633 F.2d 17 164, 167 (9th Cir. 1980); Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). 18 Plaintiff now has the following choices: (1) plaintiff may file an amended 19 complaint which does not allege the claims identified herein as defective, in which case the 20 defective claims identified herein will be deemed abandoned and the court will address the 21 remaining claims; or (2) plaintiff may file an amended complaint which continues to allege 22 claims identified as deficient, in which case the court will issue findings and recommendations 23 that such claims be dismissed from this action, as well as such other orders and/or findings and 24 recommendations as may be necessary to address the remaining claims. 25 Finally, plaintiff is warned that failure to file an amended complaint within the 26 time provided in this order may be grounds for dismissal of this action. See Ferdik, 963 F.2d at 27 1260-61; see also Local Rule 110. Plaintiff is also warned that a complaint which fails to comply 28 with Rule 8 may, in the court’s discretion, be dismissed with prejudice pursuant to Rule 41(b). MAIS 2 EUV YOUU EAINT RAIVING UC IO ee OY UMD 1 | See Nevijel v. North Coast Life Ins. Co., 651 F.2d 671, 673 (9th Cir. 1981). 2 Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: 3 1. Plaintiff's complaint is dismissed with leave to amend; and 4 2. Plaintiff shall file an amended complaint within 30 days of the date of 5 | service of this order. 6 7 | Dated: June 10, 2020 Ssvcqo_ 8 DENNIS M. COTA 9 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28