(PC)Webster v. Garrett ( 2020 )

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 MARK KEITH WEBSTER, No. 2:20-CV-0668-JAM-DMC-P 12 Plaintiff, 13 v. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 14 STEVEN M. GARRETT, et al., 15 Defendants. 16 17 Plaintiff, a prisoner proceeding pro se, brings this civil rights action pursuant to 18 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Pending before the court is plaintiff’s complaint. See ECF No. 1. 19 The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief 20 against a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C. 21 § 1915A(a). The court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if it: (1) is frivolous or 22 malicious; (2) fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted; or (3) seeks monetary relief 23 from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2). Moreover, 24 the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require that complaints contain a “. . . short and plain 25 statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). This 26 means that claims must be stated simply, concisely, and directly. See McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d 27 1172, 1177 (9th Cir. 1996) (referring to Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(e)(1)). These rules are satisfied if the 28 complaint gives the defendant fair notice of the plaintiff’s claim and the grounds upon which it 1 rests. See Kimes v. Stone, 84 F.3d 1121, 1129 (9th Cir. 1996). Because plaintiff must allege 2 with at least some degree of particularity overt acts by specific defendants which support the 3 claims, vague and conclusory allegations fail to satisfy this standard. Additionally, it is 4 impossible for the court to conduct the screening required by law when the allegations are vague 5 and conclusory. 6 7 I. PLAINTIFF’S ALLEGATIONS 8 Plaintiff, Mark Keith Webster, is an inmate at Rio Cosumnes Correctional Center. 9 Plaintiff names the following defendants: (1) Steven M. Garrett1 and (2) Sara Bannerman, 10 Sacramento Public Defender’s Office. 11 Plaintiff alleges that Bannerman violated his Fifth Amendment right to be free 12 from self-incrimination by disclosing confidential information. Plaintiff claims he told 13 Bannerman information about a stolen truck located outside his home because she was his 14 attorney. Plaintiff alleges that defendant Bannerman later disclosed that information to the judge. 15 Plaintiff also alleges that Bannerman violated his Fifth Amendment rights by 16 allowing plaintiff’s protected statement to officers to be used in court. Plaintiff claims that while 17 Bannerman assured him that the statement would not be used in court, the judge cited that 18 statement while sentencing plaintiff to jail. 19 Plaintiff claims that he called Bannerman’s supervisor every day for two weeks to 20 request that Bannerman be removed from his case after the preliminary hearing. Bannerman’s 21 supervisor denied plaintiff’s request. 22 /// 23 /// 24 /// 25 /// 26 1 Steven M. Garrett is the Sacramento Public Defender. Plaintiff does not elaborate 27 on Garrett’s role in the alleged events but asks for $250,000 in damages from Garrett and the Sacramento Public Defender’s office. Plaintiff is presumably attempting to sue Garrett under a 28 respondeat superior theory of liability. 1 II. DISCUSSION 2 The Court finds that plaintiff’s claim suffers three defects. First, defendant 3 Bannerman has immunity for actions arising from her role as an advocate. Second, plaintiff’s 4 claim against defendant Garrett cannot establish the necessary causal connection between Garrett 5 and the alleged events that transpired. Third, § 1983 is not the appropriate vehicle for relief for 6 plaintiff’s claims because plaintiff challenges the nature and duration of his confinement. 7 A. Plaintiff’s Claims Against Bannerman 8 When public defenders are acting in their role as advocate, they are not acting 9 under color of state law for § 1983 purposes. See Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 53 (1992); 10 Polk Cty. v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 320-25 (1981); Jackson v. Brown, 513 F.3d 1057, 1079 (9th 11 Cir. 2008); Miranda v. Clark Cty., Nev., 319 F.3d 465, 468 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc); United 12 States v. De Gross, 960 F.2d 1433, 1442 n.12 (9th Cir. 1992) (en banc); see also Vermont v. 13 Brillon, 556 U.S. 81, 91 (2009) (assigned public defender is ordinarily not considered a state 14 actor); Kirtley v. Rainey, 326 F.3d 1088, 1093-94 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing Polk Cty. to determine 15 that a state-appointed guardian ad litem does not act under color of state law for purposes of § 16 1983); Cox v. Hellerstein, 685 F.2d 1098, 1099 (9th Cir. 1982) (relying on Polk Cty. to determine 17 that federal public defenders are not acting under color of federal law for purposes of Bivens 18 action). 19 The Supreme Court has concluded that public defenders do not act under color of 20 state law because their conduct as legal advocates is controlled by professional standards 21 independent of the administrative direction of a supervisor. See Brillon, 556 U.S. at 92; Polk Cty., 22 454 U.S. at 321; see also Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1008-09 (1982) (applying similar 23 rationale to determine that administrators of nursing home were not state actors); Mathis v. Pac. 24 Gas & Elec. Co., 891 F.2d 1429, 1432 (9th Cir. 1989) (applying similar rationale to determine 25 that employees conducting psychiatric evaluation were not state actors). But cf. Gonzalez v. 26 Spencer, 336 F.3d 832, 834 (9th Cir. 2003) (per curiam) (explaining that a private attorney who is 27 retained to represent state entities and their employees in litigation acts under color of state law 28 because his or her role is “analogous to that of a state prosecutor rather than a public defender” 1 (citing Polk Cty., 454 U.S. at 323 n.13)), abrogated by Filarsky v. Delia, 132 S. Ct. 1657, 1667-68 2 (2012). 3 Here, plaintiff cannot establish a § 1983 claim against Bannerman because her 4 actions as his public defender were not under the color of law for the purposes of § 1983. 5 Bannerman’s decisions regarding statements to the judge on plaintiff’s behalf were part of her 6 role as plaintiff’s advocate. Therefore, plaintiff cannot seek relief for Bannerman’s actions under 7 § 1983. 8 B. Plaintiff’s Claims Against Garrett 9 Supervisory personnel are generally not liable under § 1983 for the actions of their 10 employees. See Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding that there is no 11 respondeat superior liability under § 1983). A supervisor is only liable for the constitutional 12 violations of subordinates if the supervisor participated in or directed the violations. See id. The 13 Supreme Court has rejected the notion that a supervisory defendant can be liable based on 14 knowledge and acquiescence in a subordinate’s unconstitutional conduct because government 15 officials, regardless of their title, can only be held liable under § 1983 for his or her own conduct 16 and not the conduct of others. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676 (2009). Supervisory 17 personnel who implement a policy so deficient that the policy itself is a repudiation of 18 constitutional rights and the moving force behind a constitutional violation may, however, be 19 liable even where such personnel do not overtly participate in the offensive act. See Redman v. 20 Cnty of San Diego, 942 F.2d 1435, 1446 (9th Cir. 1991) (en banc). 21 When a defendant holds a supervisory position, the causal link between such 22 defendant and the claimed constitutional violation must be specifically alleged. See Fayle v. 23 Stapley, 607 F.2d 858, 862 (9th Cir. 1979); Mosher v. Saalfeld, 589 F.2d 438, 441 (9th Cir. 24 1978). Vague and conclusory allegations concerning the involvement of supervisory personnel in 25 civil rights violations are not sufficient. See Ivey v. Board of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th 26 Cir. 1982). “[A] plaintiff must plead that each Government-official defendant, through the 27 official’s own individual actions, has violated the constitution.” Iqbal, 662 U.S. at 676. 28 /// 1 Plaintiff cannot establish a cognizable claim against Garrett because Garrett is not 2 responsible for Bannerman’s actions under § 1983. Plaintiff does not allege that Garrett had any 3 involvement in his case. Because Garrett was not involved in plaintiff’s case, Garrett could not 4 have participated in or directed any violations against plaintiff. Thus, plaintiff cannot recover 5 from Garrett under § 1983. 6 C. Plaintiff’s Fifth Amendment Claims 7 When a state prisoner challenges the legality of his custody and the relief he seeks 8 is a determination that he is entitled to an earlier or immediate release, such a challenge is not 9 cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the prisoner’s sole federal remedy is a petition for a writ 10 of habeas corpus. See Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 500 (1973); see also Neal v. Shimoda, 11 131 F.3d 818, 824 (9th Cir. 1997); Trimble v. City of Santa Rosa, 49 F.3d 583, 586 (9th Cir. 12 1995) (per curiam). Thus, where a § 1983 action seeking monetary damages or declaratory relief 13 alleges constitutional violations which would necessarily imply the invalidity of the prisoner’s 14 underlying conviction or sentence, or the result of a prison disciplinary hearing resulting in 15 imposition of a sanction affecting the overall length of confinement, such a claim is not 16 cognizable under § 1983 unless the conviction or sentence has first been invalidated on appeal, by 17 habeas petition, or through some similar proceeding. See Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 483- 18 84 (1994) (concluding that § 1983 claim not cognizable because allegations were akin to 19 malicious prosecution action which includes as an element a finding that the criminal proceeding 20 was concluded in plaintiff’s favor); Butterfield v. Bail, 120 F.3d 1023, 1024-25 (9th Cir. 1997) 21 (concluding that § 1983 claim not cognizable because allegations of procedural defects were an 22 attempt to challenge substantive result in parole hearing); cf. Neal, 131 F.3d at 824 (concluding 23 that § 1983 claim was cognizable because challenge was to conditions for parole eligibility and 24 not to any particular parole determination); cf. Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74 (2005) 25 (concluding that § 1983 action seeking changes in procedures for determining when an inmate is 26 eligible for parole consideration not barred because changed procedures would hasten future 27 parole consideration and not affect any earlier parole determination under the prior procedures). 28 /// wOASe 2 □□□ □□□ EAINTT RAIVING MUU OIC EN PY OV VIN 1 Here, plaintiff cannot recover under § 1983 because his claims fundamentally 2 | challenge the nature and duration of his sentence. Plaintiff alleges that Bannerman’s actions as his 3 | legal counsel caused him to be sentenced to jail time. This allegation necessarily invalidates 4 | plaintiffs underlying sentence. Plaintiff's only federal remedy for such an action is a petition for 5 | writ of habeas corpus. Thus, § 1983 is not the appropriate vehicle for relief. 6 7 I. CONCLUSION 8 Because it does not appear possible that the deficiencies identified herein can be 9 | cured by amending the complaint, plaintiff is not entitled to leave to amend prior to dismissal of 10 | the entire action. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126, 1131 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). 11 Based on the foregoing, the undersigned recommends that plaintiffs claims 12 || against all defendants be dismissed. 13 These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District 14 | Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(). Within 14 days 15 | after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written 16 | objections with the court. Responses to objections shall be filed within 14 days after service of 17 | objections. Failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal. See 18 | Martinez v. Yist, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991). 19 20 | Dated: June 15, 2020 1 DENNIS M. COTA 7 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 23 24 25 26 27 28