(SS)Fajardo v. Commissioner of Social Security ( 2020 )

1 2 3 4 5 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 6 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 7 8 REYNALDO FAJARDO, Case No. 1:19-cv-1167-JDP 9 Plaintiff, ORDER ON SOCIAL SECURITY APPEAL 10 v. 11 12 C ommissioner of Social Security, Defendant. 13 14 Claimant has requested judicial review of the Social Security Administration’s (“SSA”) 15 denial of his application for disability insurance benefits. On February 13, 2020, I heard 16 argument from the parties.1 Having reviewed the record and considered arguments raised by the 17 parties, I will affirm the decision of the administrative law judge (“ALJ”). 18 On appeal, this court asks whether substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s factual 19 findings and whether the ALJ applied the correct legal standards. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The 20 court will uphold the ALJ’s decision if it is rational, even if there is another rational interpretation 21 of the evidence; the court will not substitute its judgment for that of the Commissioner. See 22 Revels v. Berryhill, 874 F.3d 648, 654 (9th Cir. 2017). 23 The ALJ found claimant to have one severe impairment, consisting of the combined effect 24 of fourteen impairments, none of which the ALJ found to be severe standing alone. AR 18. 25 Claimant now argues that (1) the ALJ’s decision should be vacated because some aspects of it 26 were not directly supported by the opinion of a medical doctor, and (2) the ALJ erred in 27 28 1 Both parties are represented by counsel. 1 discounting claimant’s own testimony about his symptoms and degree of limitations. 2 On the first issue, the ALJ found that, although claimant’s combination of impairments 3 limited his residual functional capacity (“RFC”), it was not disabling. In reaching the conclusion, 4 the ALJ considered the assessments of various medical services providers, who characterized as 5 generally normal aspects of claimant’s condition including his ambulatory capacity, balance, 6 strength, range of motion, sensation and coordination, respiratory abilities, blood pressure, and 7 glucose levels. Claimant characterizes the ALJ’s analysis as “based upon speculation, because 8 the record lacks an assessment from any medical professional regarding the impact Plaintiff’s 9 impairments would have upon functionality.” Pl. Op. Br., ECF No. 15, at 11. 10 An individual seeking disability insurance benefits bears the burden of proving that he is 11 disabled. See 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(5)(A) (“An individual shall not be considered to be under a 12 disability unless he furnishes such medical and other evidence of the existence thereof as the 13 Commissioner of Social Security may require.”); Meanel v. Apfel, 172 F.3d 1111, 1113 (9th Cir. 14 1999), as amended (June 22, 1999) (“The claimant bears the burden of proving that she is 15 disabled.”). The ALJ, however, is not a mere observer of the administrative process; the Social 16 Security Act requires ALJs to be active participants, responsible for coordinating the non- 17 adversarial evaluation process and for undertaking a certain amount of investigation. See 18 Tonapetyan v. Halter, 242 F.3d 1144, 1150 (9th Cir. 2001) (“The ALJ in a social security case 19 has an independent duty to fully and fairly develop the record and to assure that the claimant’s 20 interests are considered.”). The Act requires ALJs to “make every reasonable effort to obtain” all 21 medical evidence necessary to determine disability. 42 U.S.C. § 423(b)(5). In a case in which 22 benefits are denied, the Act further requires the ALJ to “develop a complete medical history of at 23 least the preceding twelve months.” Id. This responsibility is not limited to pursuing pre-existing 24 information; in some cases, the ALJ “may need” to request the collection of additional 25 information, for example by asking the claimant to undergo a consultative examination. 20 26 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520b(b), (b)(2)(iii); see also id. § 404.1512(b) (defining SSA’s responsibility to 27 2 Claimant frames his argument as a single issue, but in the interest of completeness I frame it as 28 two discrete issues. 1 develop medical history). 2 But ALJs are not required in every case to obtain a medical opinion or otherwise to 3 “further develop the record.” Such a duty exists “only when there is ambiguous evidence or when 4 the record is inadequate to allow for proper evaluation of the evidence” by the ALJ. Mayes v. 5 Massanari, 276 F.3d 453, 459-60 (9th Cir. 2001); see 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520b(b) (addressing 6 ALJ’s responsibilities when the “record is insufficient or inconsistent”—meaning when the record 7 “does not contain all the information [SSA needs] to make [its] determination or decision,” or 8 when the evidence “conflicts with other evidence, contains an internal conflict, is ambiguous, or 9 when the medical evidence does not appear to be based on medically acceptable clinical or 10 laboratory diagnostic techniques”). A record may be insufficient, for example, if it contains 11 crucial medical information that is too technical to be understood or evaluated by an ALJ. See 12 Molina v. Berryhill, No. 2:17-CV-01991 CKD, 2018 WL 6421287, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 6, 2018) 13 (faulting ALJ for failing to further develop the record where ALJ, without the benefit of a medical 14 expert, based her conclusion on her “lay interpretation” of “x-rays, MRIs, and clinical findings”). 15 I am not convinced that the record here contains the sort of ambiguities or inadequacies 16 that necessitate further development. An ALJ need not obtain a medical opinion on functionality 17 when a claimant’s conditions or capabilities are described as broadly normal. This is not a case 18 where the ALJ required assistance from a medical expert to interpret crucial medical information 19 beyond the ken of an SSA ALJ. 20 Likewise, I see no fault in the ALJ’s evaluation of claimant’s testimony. Per the Court of 21 Appeals, “[u]nless there is affirmative evidence showing that the claimant is malingering, the 22 ALJ’s reasons for rejecting pain testimony must be clear and convincing.” Burch v. Barnhart, 23 400 F.3d 676, 680 (9th Cir. 2005).3 In this case, they were. In partially discounting claimant’s 24 3 Factors that may be considered in assessing a claimant’s subjective pain and symptom testimony include the claimant’s daily activities; the location, duration, intensity and frequency of the pain 25 or symptoms; factors that cause or aggravate the symptoms; the type, dosage, effectiveness or side effects of any medication; other measures or treatment used for relief; functional restrictions; 26 and other relevant factors. Lingenfelter v. Astrue, 504 F.3d 1028, 1040 (9th Cir. 2007); Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 958-59 (9th Cir. 2002). In assessing the claimant’s credibility, the ALJ 27 may also consider “(1) ordinary techniques of credibility evaluation, such as the claimant’s reputation for lying, prior inconsistent statements concerning the symptoms, and other testimony 28 by the claimant that appears less than candid; (2) unexplained or inadequately explained failure to woe 4:40 EVR MIMIC OIC ee AY OT Mt ] | testimony, the ALJ cites claimant’s delay in applying for disability benefits, AR 24-25, and || numerous inconsistencies that the ALJ perceived between claimant’s testimony and the objective 3 | medical evidence, AR 22-24. The ALJ supported his opinion with specific, detailed explanations, 4 | and cited evidence in the administrative record. 5 In sum, I find that the ALJ’s decision is supported by substantial evidence and that 6 | claimant has identified no reversible error in the ALJ’s analysis. For the reasons stated in this 7 | order and on the record at oral argument, I deny claimant’s appeal from the administrative g | decision of the Commissioner of Social Security and direct the clerk of court (1) to enter g | judgment in favor of defendant and against claimant Reynaldo Fajardo and (2) to close this case. 10 IT IS SO ORDERED. 2 Dated: _ June 24, 2020 \ prssanp Rae — 13 UNI STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 14 15 | No. 200. 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 | — SSS seek treatment or to follow a prescribed course of treatment; and (3) the claimant’s daily 27 | activities.” Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).