(PC) Davis v. Jones ( 2020 )

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 MICHAEL SCOTT DAVIS, No. 2:19-CV-2072-DMC-P 12 Plaintiff, 13 v. ORDER 14 SCOTT JONES, et al., 15 Defendants. 16 17 Plaintiff, a prisoner proceeding pro se, brings this civil rights action pursuant to 18 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Pending before the Court is plaintiff’s second amended complaint (ECF No. 8). 19 The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief 20 against a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C. 21 § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if it: (1) is frivolous or 22 malicious; (2) fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted; or (3) seeks monetary relief 23 from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2). Moreover, 24 the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require that complaints contain a “. . . short and plain 25 statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). This 26 means that claims must be stated simply, concisely, and directly. See McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d 27 1172, 1177 (9th Cir. 1996) (referring to Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(e)(1)). These rules are satisfied if the 28 complaint gives the defendant fair notice of the plaintiff’s claim and the grounds upon which it 1 rests. See Kimes v. Stone, 84 F.3d 1121, 1129 (9th Cir. 1996). Because plaintiff must allege 2 with at least some degree of particularity overt acts by specific defendants which support the 3 claims, vague and conclusory allegations fail to satisfy this standard. Additionally, it is 4 impossible for the Court to conduct the screening required by law when the allegations are vague 5 and conclusory. 6 7 I. PLAINTIFF’S ALLEGATIONS 8 Plaintiff, Michael Scott Davis, is an inmate at Sacramento County Main Jail. 9 Plaintiff names the following defendants: (1) Scott Jones, Sheriff, (2) Doctor Robert Padilla, 10 (3) J. Holt, Nurse Practitioner, and (4) Sacramento County Main Jail’s Chief Medical Officer.1 11 Plaintiff claims that defendants violated his Eighth Amendment rights by denying 12 him medical treatment after he was arrested. Plaintiff has a spinal cord disorder and suffers from 13 severe chronic pain in his lower back and hips. Plaintiff also suffers from a chronic shoulder 14 condition. Plaintiff claims that two men assaulted him on September 3, 2019 and exacerbated his 15 injuries in his lower back and shoulder. Plaintiff sought treatment in an emergency room on 16 September 4, 2019. Plaintiff alleges that the emergency room report stated that plaintiff should 17 see his surgeon within three days and prescribed plaintiff a seven-day supply of Norco, a narcotic, 18 for severe acute and chronic pain. Plaintiff was arrested and booked into Sacramento County 19 Main Jail on September 5, 2019. Plaintiff claims he told an intake nurse about his medical 20 conditions, and she told him he would be placed on the doctor’s call list. Plaintiff alleges that his 21 doctor’s appointments on September 10th, 17th, and 24th of 2019 were cancelled without 22 explanation. Plaintiff also claims that on September 30, 2019, a judge ordered that plaintiff see a 23 doctor because plaintiff had not yet been to a surgeon per emergency room orders or received 24 treatment for his pain condition. 25 /// 26 /// 27 1 Plaintiff also makes various allegations against Sacramento County Main Jail, 28 however, plaintiff does not name Sacramento County Main Jail as a defendant in his complaint. 1 Plaintiff alleges that he saw defendant Holt, a nurse practitioner, on October 1, 2 2019. Plaintiff claims defendant Holt also violated his Eighth Amendment rights by being 3 deliberately indifferent to plaintiff’s medical needs and exacerbating plaintiff’s existing medical 4 injury. Plaintiff requested Norco from defendant Holt, who allegedly responded by explaining to 5 plaintiff that Sacramento County Main Jail had a policy that prevented medical professionals 6 from prescribing narcotic pain medication unless a patient is dying of cancer. Plaintiff also alleges 7 that despite having knowledge of plaintiff’s shoulder condition, defendant Holt forcibly pulled 8 plaintiff’s right arm forward until it was at a ninety-degree angle to plaintiff’s torso. Plaintiff 9 claims he started screaming for Holt to stop, but Holt nevertheless forcibly pushed plaintiff’s arm 10 backward behind his torso. Plaintiff alleges that he continued to scream while defendant Holt 11 lifted plaintiff’s arm high above his shoulder’s range of motion and rotated it twice. Plaintiff 12 claims he is in worse pain than ever before due to defendant Holt’s actions. Plaintiff also alleges 13 that his shoulder now clicks, pops, and glides whenever he tries to move it. 14 Plaintiff claims he saw Sacramento County Main Jail’s orthopedic surgeon on or 15 around October 26, 2019, who told plaintiff that he needed surgery. Plaintiff alleges that he did 16 not see defendant Doctor Robert Padilla until November 6, 2019, which was 33 days after a 17 superior court judge ordered that plaintiff immediately be seen by a doctor. Plaintiff claims 18 Padilla told him that the Sacramento County Jail’s Chief Medical Officer denied the surgeons’ 19 order for plaintiff to get an MRI. Plaintiff requested Norco from defendant Padilla, who reiterated 20 the jail’s policy that prevented prescribing narcotics unless the patient was dying from cancer. 21 Plaintiff alleges that the policy violates his Fourteenth Amendment rights to equal protection 22 because it goes against the provisions set out in the Pain Patient’s Bill of Rights. Plaintiff also 23 claims that the delay in seeing Doctor Padilla caused him to suffer unnecessary severe pain in 24 violation of his Eighth Amendment right to be free of cruel and unusual punishment. 25 /// 26 /// 27 /// 28 /// 1 Plaintiff requests all defendants be charged with misdemeanors for violating 2 California Penal Code § 673 by inflicting cruel, corporal, and unusual punishment. Plaintiff also 3 requests that defendant Holt be charged with battery causing serious injury, assault and battery 4 with force to produce great bodily injury, gross negligence, medical malpractice, and cruel and 5 unusual punishment. Plaintiff requests compensatory damages for his injury as well as his pain 6 and suffering, with the exact amount to be determined after plaintiff has his right shoulder 7 replaced. Plaintiff also requests punitive damages from defendant Holt due to Holt’s alleged 8 indifference to plaintiff’s serious medical needs and exacerbation of plaintiff’s existing medical 9 injury. 10 11 II. DISCUSSION 12 The Court finds that plaintiff states a cognizable Eighth Amendment medical 13 mistreatment claim against defendant Holt in respect to Holt painfully manipulating the plaintiff’s 14 arm during a medical procedure. However, the Court finds that plaintiff’s claim nevertheless 15 suffers five defects. First, plaintiff has failed to establish a cognizable claim against defendant 16 Sheriff Jones because plaintiff has not alleged any specific causal connection between Sheriff 17 Jones and the alleged constitutional violations. Second, plaintiff has failed to state a cognizable 18 claim against defendant Padilla because plaintiff fails to allege that Padilla’s behavior amounted 19 to the deliberate indifference required to successfully establish a cognizable Eighth Amendment 20 medical treatment claim. Third, plaintiff has failed to state a cognizable claim against defendant 21 Sacramento County Main Jail Chief Medical Officer because plaintiff did not establish a 22 sufficient causal link between the CMO and any of the alleged constitutional violations. Fourth, 23 plaintiff cannot allege a cognizable Fourteenth Amendment equal protection claim regarding the 24 prison’s anti-narcotics policy because the policy has a legitimate penological purpose. Fifth, 25 plaintiff has failed to request appropriate damages for defendants’ alleged constitutional 26 violations. 27 /// 28 /// 1 A. Claims Against Sheriff Jones 2 Supervisory personnel are generally not liable under § 1983 for the actions of their 3 employees. See Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding that there is no 4 respondeat superior liability under § 1983). A supervisor is only liable for the constitutional 5 violations of subordinates if the supervisor participated in or directed the violations. See id. The 6 Supreme Court has rejected the notion that a supervisory defendant can be liable based on 7 knowledge and acquiescence in a subordinate’s unconstitutional conduct because government 8 officials, regardless of their title, can only be held liable under § 1983 for his or her own conduct 9 and not the conduct of others. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676 (2009). Supervisory 10 personnel who implement a policy so deficient that the policy itself is a repudiation of 11 constitutional rights and the moving force behind a constitutional violation may, however, be 12 liable even where such personnel do not overtly participate in the offensive act. See Redman v. 13 Cnty of San Diego, 942 F.2d 1435, 1446 (9th Cir. 1991) (en banc). 14 When a defendant holds a supervisory position, the causal link between such 15 defendant and the claimed constitutional violation must be specifically alleged. See Fayle v. 16 Stapley, 607 F.2d 858, 862 (9th Cir. 1979); Mosher v. Saalfeld, 589 F.2d 438, 441 (9th Cir. 17 1978). Vague and conclusory allegations concerning the involvement of supervisory personnel in 18 civil rights violations are not sufficient. See Ivey v. Board of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th 19 Cir. 1982). “[A] plaintiff must plead that each Government-official defendant, through the 20 official’s own individual actions, has violated the constitution.” Iqbal, 662 U.S. at 676. 21 Here, plaintiff has failed to allege any specific causal link between Sheriff Jones 22 and the alleged constitutional violations. Plaintiff does not explain or even mention Sheriff 23 Jones’s role in the alleged events. As a result, plaintiff has failed to establish that Sheriff Jones 24 condoned or directly participated in the alleged constitutional violations. Plaintiff has also failed 25 to establish that Sheriff Jones implemented a policy that caused the alleged constitutional 26 violations to occur. Plaintiff’s claims against Sheriff Jones’s subordinates are not sufficient to 27 /// 28 /// 1 establish a cognizable § 1983 against Sheriff Jones because supervisory personnel are only 2 responsible for their own actions under § 1983. Therefore, plaintiff has failed to allege a 3 cognizable claim against Sheriff Jones. B. Eighth Amendment Delay in Medical Treatment Claim Against 4 Doctor Padilla 5 The treatment a prisoner receives in prison and the conditions under which the 6 prisoner is confined are subject to scrutiny under the Eighth Amendment, which prohibits cruel 7 and unusual punishment. See Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 31 (1993); Farmer v. Brennan, 8 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994). The Eighth Amendment “. . . embodies broad and idealistic concepts 9 of dignity, civilized standards, humanity, and decency.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102 10 (1976). Conditions of confinement may, however, be harsh and restrictive. See Rhodes v. 11 Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981). Nonetheless, prison officials must provide prisoners with 12 “food, clothing, shelter, sanitation, medical care, and personal safety.” Toussaint v. McCarthy, 13 801 F.2d 1080, 1107 (9th Cir. 1986). A prison official violates the Eighth Amendment only when 14 two requirements are met: (1) objectively, the official’s act or omission must be so serious such 15 that it results in the denial of the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities; and (2) 16 subjectively, the prison official must have acted unnecessarily and wantonly for the purpose of 17 inflicting harm. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. Thus, to violate the Eighth Amendment, a prison 18 official must have a “sufficiently culpable mind.” See id. 19 Deliberate indifference to a prisoner’s serious illness or injury, or risks of serious 20 injury or illness, gives rise to a claim under the Eighth Amendment. See Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105; 21 see also Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. This applies to physical as well as dental and mental health 22 needs. See Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d 1237, 1253 (9th Cir. 1982), abrogated on other grounds by 23 Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472 (1995). An injury or illness is sufficiently serious if the failure to 24 treat a prisoner’s condition could result in further significant injury or the “. . . unnecessary and 25 wanton infliction of pain.” McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1059 (9th Cir. 1992), overruled 26 on other grounds by WMX Techs., Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc); see 27 /// 28 /// 1 also Doty v. County of Lassen, 37 F.3d 540, 546 (9th Cir. 1994). Factors indicating seriousness 2 are: (1) whether a reasonable doctor would think that the condition is worthy of comment; (2) 3 whether the condition significantly impacts the prisoner’s daily activities; and (3) whether the 4 condition is chronic and accompanied by substantial pain. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 5 1131-32 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). 6 The requirement of deliberate indifference is less stringent in medical needs cases 7 than in other Eighth Amendment contexts because the responsibility to provide inmates with 8 medical care does not generally conflict with competing penological concerns. See McGuckin, 9 974 F.2d at 1060. Thus, deference need not be given to the judgment of prison officials as to 10 decisions concerning medical needs. See Hunt v. Dental Dep’t, 865 F.2d 198, 200 (9th Cir. 11 1989). Delay in providing medical treatment, or interference with medical treatment, may also 12 constitute deliberate indifference. See Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1131. Where delay is alleged, 13 however, the prisoner must also demonstrate that the delay led to further injury. See McGuckin, 14 974 F.2d at 1060. 15 Here, plaintiff has failed to state a cognizable Eighth Amendment claim against 16 Doctor Padilla because it is not clear from plaintiff’s allegations that Doctor Padilla’s behavior 17 amounted to deliberate indifference. Plaintiff claims he did not see Doctor Padilla until 33 days 18 after a judge ordered plaintiff be seen by a doctor. See ECF No. 1, p. 4. However, plaintiff does 19 not allege that Doctor Padilla was responsible for that delay or knew that plaintiff had been 20 waiting for 33 days. Doctor Padilla could not have shown deliberate indifference to plaintiff’s 21 needs if he was not responsible for the delay in seeing plaintiff or if he did not previously know of 22 plaintiff’s need for medical treatment. Therefore, plaintiff’s allegation that he did not see Doctor 23 Padilla until 33 days after a judge ordered plaintiff be seen by a doctor is not, in and of itself, 24 sufficient to state a cognizable Eighth Amendment claim against Doctor Padilla. 25 /// 26 /// 27 /// 28 /// 1 C. Plaintiff’s Claims Against Sacramento County Jail’s CMO 2 To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the plaintiff must allege an actual 3 connection or link between the actions of the named defendants and the alleged deprivations. See 4 Monell v. Dep’t of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976). “A 5 person ‘subjects’ another to the deprivation of a constitutional right, within the meaning of 6 § 1983, if he does an affirmative act, participates in another's affirmative acts, or omits to perform 7 an act which he is legally required to do that causes the deprivation of which complaint is made.” 8 Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). Vague and conclusory allegations 9 concerning the involvement of official personnel in civil rights violations are not sufficient. See 10 Ivey v. Board of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). Rather, the plaintiff must set forth 11 specific facts as to each individual defendant’s causal role in the alleged constitutional 12 deprivation. See Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 634 (9th Cir. 1988). 13 Here, plaintiff has failed to state a cognizable claim against Sacramento County 14 Main Jail’s CMO because plaintiff’s allegations do not clearly explain the CMO’s link to the 15 causal events. Plaintiff’s only reference to the CMO is that defendant Padilla told plaintiff that the 16 CMO denied the orthopedic surgeon’s MRI order for plaintiff. See ECF No. 1, p. 4. However, 17 plaintiff does not explain if or why he believes this action amounted to a constitutional violation. 18 Based on plaintiff’s complaint, it is unclear whether plaintiff is attempting to sue the CMO for an 19 Eighth Amendment medical care claim, a Fourteenth Amendment equal protection claim based 20 on the drug policy in Sacramento County Main Jail, or for other constitutional violations under a 21 theory of respondeat superior similar to plaintiff’s allegations against Sheriff Jones. Because 22 plaintiff has not established a sufficient causal connection between the CMO and any 23 constitutional violation, he has failed to allege a cognizable § 1983 complaint against the 24 Sacramento County Main Jail CMO. 25 /// 26 /// 27 /// 28 /// 1 D. Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Claim 2 Equal protection claims arise when a charge is made that similarly situated 3 individuals are treated differently without a rational relationship to a legitimate state purpose. See 4 San Antonio School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1972). Equal protection claims are not 5 necessarily limited to racial and religious discrimination. See Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 6 F.3d 668, 686-67 (9th Cir. 2001) (applying minimal scrutiny to equal protection claim by a 7 disabled plaintiff because the disabled do not constitute a suspect class); see also Tatum v. Pliler, 8 2007 WL 1720165 (E.D. Cal. 2007) (applying minimal scrutiny to equal protection claim based 9 on denial of in-cell meals where no allegation of race-based discrimination was made); Hightower 10 v. Schwarzenegger, 2007 WL 732555 (E.D. Cal. March 19, 2008).2 11 In order to state a § 1983 claim based on a violation of the Equal Protection Clause 12 of the Fourteenth Amendment, a plaintiff must allege that defendants acted with intentional 13 discrimination against plaintiff, or against a class of inmates which included plaintiff, and that 14 such conduct did not relate to a legitimate penological purpose. See Village of Willowbrook v. 15 Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000) (holding that equal protection claims may be brought by a “class 16 of one”); Reese v. Jefferson Sch. Dist. No. 14J, 208 F.3d 736, 740 (9th Cir. 2000); Barren v. 17 Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998); Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Henderson, 940 18 F.2d 465, 471 (9th Cir. 1991); Lowe v. City of Monrovia, 775 F.2d 998, 1010 (9th Cir. 1985). 19 Here, plaintiff cannot establish a cognizable Fourteenth Amendment claim because 20 the prison’s ban on narcotics prescriptions serves a legitimate penological purpose. The state has 21 a legitimate interest in deterring substance abuse within the prison system. See Overton v. 22 Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126, 134 (2003). Narcotics are among the most frequently abused substances. 23 Therefore, a policy that strictly regulates the distribution of narcotics within the prison system has 24 a legitimate penological interest. Plaintiff does not allege that Doctor Padilla refused to treat his 25 pain condition. Rather, plaintiff alleges that defendants refused to provide him with his preferred 26 2 Error! Main Document Only.Strict scrutiny applies to equal protection claims 27 alleging race-based or religious discrimination (i.e., where the plaintiff is member of a “protected class”); minimal scrutiny applies to all other equal protection claims. See Lee v. City of Los 28 Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 686-67 (9th Cir. 2001). 1 treatment. See ECF No. 8, p. 4. Differences in medical opinion do not amount to constitutional 2 violations. See Toguchi v. Young, 391 F.3d 1051, 1059-60 (9th Cir. 2004). Plaintiff cannot 3 establish a cognizable Fourteenth Amendment claim because the regulation in question serves a 4 legitimate penological purpose. 5 E. Plaintiff’s Damages Request 6 “Under § 1983, damages for violations of constitutional rights are determined 7 according to principles derived from the common law or torts.” Cummings v. Connell, 402 F.3d 8 936, 942 (9th Cir. 2005). 9 The Court acknowledges that plaintiff requests that defendants be criminally 10 charged for their alleged treatment of plaintiff. However, the imposition of criminal charges on 11 defendants is not an available form of relief for § 1983 actions or any other type of civil suit. 12 Criminal charges can only be brought in a criminal proceeding. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI. A 13 § 1983 action is not a criminal proceeding. Thus, plaintiff cannot recover damages in the form of 14 criminal charges against defendants. 15 /// 16 /// 17 /// 18 /// 19 /// 20 /// 21 /// 22 /// 23 /// 24 /// 25 /// 26 /// 27 /// 28 /// wOAOe 2 LUV OMNI UEIOT OPIR □ 1 I. CONCLUSION 2 Because it is possible that the deficiencies identified in this order may be cured by 3 | amending the complaint, plaintiff is entitled to leave to amend. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 4 | 1122, 1126, 1131 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). Plaintiff is informed that, as a general rule, an 5 | amended complaint supersedes the original complaint. See Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 6 1262 (9th Cir. 1992). Therefore, if plaintiff amends the complaint, the Court cannot refer to the 7 | prior pleading in order to make plaintiff's amended complaint complete. See Local Rule 220. An 8 | amended complaint must be complete in itself without reference to any prior pleading. See id. 9 If plaintiff chooses to amend the complaint, plaintiff must demonstrate how the 10 | conditions complained of have resulted in a deprivation of plaintiffs constitutional rights. See 11 Ellis v. Cassidy, 625 F.2d 227 (9th Cir. 1980). The complaint must allege in specific terms how 12 || each named defendant is involved, and must set forth some affirmative link or connection 13 || between each defendant’s actions and the claimed deprivation. See May v. Enomoto, 633 F.2d 14 | 164, 167 (9th Cir. 1980); Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). 15 Because the complaint appears to otherwise state cognizable claims, if no amended 16 | complaint is filed within the time allowed therefor, the Court will issue findings and 17 || recommendations that the claims identified herein as defective be dismissed, as well as such 18 | further orders as are necessary for service of process as to the cognizable claims. 19 Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that plaintiff may file a third amended 20 | complaint within 30 days of the date of service of this order. Also, the Clerk of the Court is 21 | directed to update the docket heading to reflect all named defendants. 22 23 24 |) Dated: June 25, 2020 Sx