(SS)Clark v. Commissioner of Social Security ( 2020 )

1 2 3 4 5 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 6 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 7 8 CASEY L. CLARK, 1:19-cv-00196-JDP 9 Plaintiff, ORDER ON SOCIAL SECURITY APPEAL 10 11 v. ORDER DENYING APPEAL AND ORDERING THAT THE CLERK’S OFFICE COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL 12 SECURITY, ENTER JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF RESPONDENT AND CLOSE THIS CASE 13 Defendant. 14 15 16 Claimant has requested judicial review of the Social Security Administration’s (“SSA”) 17 denial of his application for disability insurance benefits. On March 12, 2020, we heard argument 18 from the parties. Because the parties appeared to contest the appropriate standard of review, we 19 requested additional briefing on that issue on March 19, 2020. ECF No. 20. We received the 20 parties’ additional briefs on May 13 and May 18, 2020. Because we conclude that the ALJ 21 provided clear and convincing reasons for discounting claimant’s symptom testimony, we affirm 22 the decision below and order that the clerk’s office enter judgment in favor of respondent. 23 DISCUSSION 24 Claimant filed a disability application in August 2014, citing a variety of back 25 impairments caused by an automobile accident, including degenerative disc disease. In January 26 2018, following a hearing, the ALJ found that claimant retained the residual functional capacity 27 to perform light work. AR 18. But Clark’s own testimony described more intense symptoms: he 28 testified, for example, that he needed to lay down constantly; that he was regularly dropping 1 things; and that his motor skills were deteriorating. See AR 43-47. The sole issue before us is 2 whether the ALJ improperly discounted claimant’s testimony. We have jurisdiction under 42 3 U.S.C. § 405(g), pursuant to which we ask whether substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s 4 factual findings and whether the ALJ’s decision conformed with applicable law. 5 As an initial matter, the parties’ original briefing appeared to contest the appropriate 6 standard of review. Claimant’s opening brief argued that, “in the absence of any affirmative 7 evidence of malingering, the ALJ must articulate clear and convincing reasons for rejecting a 8 claimant’s testimony.” ECF No. 13 at 7. Respondent’s brief, on the other hand, argued that the 9 “clear and convincing” standard is a “judicially created standard [that] is inconsistent with the 10 deferential substantial evidence standard set forth in 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) and with agency 11 regulations and rulings specifying the rationale its adjudicators should provide in support of their 12 findings.” ECF No. 16 at 5. Respondent’s supplemental brief, however, acknowledged that 13 recent administrative actions have not undone the Ninth Circuit’s standard; thus, “[b]ecause the 14 courts (and the parties) have to follow Circuit precedent, it appears that the agency is bound by 15 ‘clear and convincing reasons’ for the time being.”1 ECF No. 24 at 3. 16 In any event, we agree with respondent that the outcome here does not hinge on the 17 standard: the ALJ’s reasons were “clear and convincing.” While “[t]he clear and convincing 18 standard is the most demanding required in Social Security cases,” Moore v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. 19 Admin., 278 F.3d 920, 924 (9th Cir. 2002), the ALJ’s discussion in this instance contained 20 sufficient depth and clarity to meet its demands. Indeed, much of the ALJ’s discussion of the 21 residual functional capacity finding, see AR 18-21, concerns claimant’s own testimony. The 22 ALJ’s point was not that claimant’s symptom testimony was tout court false, but that “the 23 claimant’s statements concerning the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of these 24 symptoms are not entirely consistent with the medical evidence and other evidence in the record 25 1 A different approach was not inconceivable. Under the principles of Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. 26 Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984), and National Cable & 27 Telecommunications Association v. Brand X Internet Services, 545 U.S. 967 (2005), a court’s interpretation of a statutory provision can be undone by an agency’s subsequent interpretation, 28 unless the judicial interpretation held that the provision was unambiguous at Chevron’s first step. 1 for the reasons explained throughout this decision.” AR 19. Some of those reasons include the 2 ALJ’s determination that “there is no medical opinion supporting greater limitations,” AR 19; that 3 the “[o]bjective findings on clinical examination were generally within normal limits,” AR 20; 4 that claimant “testified he was able to generally maintain an independent lifestyle,” AR 20; and 5 that “[t]reating records note that despite the claimant’s complaints, he did not follow up with his 6 neurosurgeon, suggesting that his symptoms were not so severe as to seek further evaluation or 7 treatment,” AR 21. Moreover, it was not simply that the ALJ gave preference to evidence that 8 contradicted claimant’s testimony; instead, in limiting claimant to light work, she gave “the 9 maximum benefit of the doubt” to claimant’s subjective symptoms over a medical opinion that 10 suggested he could engage in medium exertion. AR 21. These reasons are sufficiently specific, 11 clear, and convincing to pass muster under Ninth Circuit law. See Adams v. Saul, 808 F. App’x 12 457 (9th Cir. 2020) (“The ALJ gave specific, clear and convincing reasons for discounting 13 [claimant’s] testimony regarding the severity of his symptoms, including that it was not supported 14 by the longitudinal objective medical record, and that [the] testimony was inconsistent with his 15 reports to medical providers.”); Rollins v. Massanari, 261 F.3d 853, 857 (9th Cir. 2001) (“While 16 subjective pain testimony cannot be rejected on the sole ground that it is not fully corroborated by 17 objective medical evidence, the medical evidence is still a relevant factor in determining the 18 severity of the claimant’s pain and its disabling effects.”); Morgan v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. 19 Admin., 169 F.3d 595, 599 (9th Cir. 1999) (“The ALJ pointed to specific evidence in the record . . 20 . in identifying what testimony was not credible and what evidence undermined [claimant’s] 21 complaints.”). 22 In sum, we find that the ALJ’s decision offered clear and convincing reasons for 23 discounting claimant’s testimony. The clerk of court is directed to (1) enter judgment in against 24 claimant and in favor of the Commissioner and (2) close this case. 25 26 27 28 wow 4:40 EYE MIMIC oO Pe AY 5 IT IS SO ORDERED. ; Dated: July 1, 2020 N ppssenn RSE 4 UNI STATE AGISTRATE JUDGE 5 6 | No. 205. 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28