(HC) Kokolios v. Diaz ( 2020 )

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 GEORGE JOHN KOKOLIOS, No. 2:20-cv-0933-KJM-EFB P 12 Petitioner, 13 v. ORDER 14 RALPH DIAZ, 15 Respondent. 16 17 Petitioner, proceeding pro se, seeks a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. 18 In his initial petition, he argued that habeas relief was warranted because the California 19 Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (“CDCR”) was not taking adequate steps to protect 20 him from Coronavirus infection. ECF No. 1. In its initial screening order, the court determined 21 that such concerns might state a cognizable habeas claim, but that petitioner had failed to plead 22 his claims with sufficient specificity. ECF No. 5. It noted that petitioner had not explained how 23 CDCR’s response to pandemic conditions were insufficient, or how his own health was 24 specifically at risk. Id. The court dismissed the petition with leave to amend in order to allow 25 petitioner to remedy these deficiencies. Id. 26 Now, petitioner has filed a one-page motion for reconsideration, wherein he offers two 27 arguments. ECF No. 8. First, he contends that counsel should be appointed to represent him 28 because he has numerous, unspecified “ADA disabilities.” Id. at 1. But there is not, as petitioner 2 □□□ YOUNG VIE MUO OPI Ne AY ee 1 || argues, any constitutional entitlement to counsel in non-capital federal habeas proceedings. See, 2 | e.g., Bonin v. Vasquez, 999 F.2d 425, 430 (9th Cir. 1993) (noting that “the protections of the 3 || Sixth Amendment right to counsel do not extend to either state collateral proceedings or federal 4 | habeas corpus proceedings.”). And, at this point, petitioner appears capable of articulating his 5 || claims on his own. His initial petition was deficient only for want of specificity, not for lack of 6 | intelligibility. 7 Second, petitioner contends that the undersigned’s screening order cannot stand because 8 || he has declined to consent to magistrate judge jurisdiction. ECF No. 8 at 1. Petitioner 9 || misunderstands the procedural import of his decision to decline magistrate judge jurisdiction. His 10 | decision entitles him to have all dispositive matters in the case resolved by the assigned district 11 || judge. See Gilmore v. Lockard, 936 F.3d 857, 862 (9th Cir. 2019). It does not, as he seems to 12 || believe, entitle him to have all non-dispositive matters handled by the district judge. Here, the 13 || court’s screening order was non-dispositive insofar as it dismissed his petition with leave to 14 | amend. See McKeever v. Block, 932 F.2d 795, 797 (9th Cir. 1991) (“While the magistrate can 15 || dismiss complaints with leave to amend, the district court necessarily must review that decision 16 || before dismissing the entire action.) (emphasis added). 17 Thus, petitioner’s motion for reconsideration (ECF No. 8) is DENIED. 18 | DATED: July 6, 2020. 19 tid, PDEA 0 EDMUND F. BRENNAN UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28