(PC) Branson v. Trinity County Sheriff's Department ( 2020 )

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 8 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 9 10 KIP BRANSON, No. 2:19-cv-2452 AC P 11 Plaintiff, 12 v. ORDER 13 TRINITY COUNTY SHERIFF’S DEPARTMENT, et al., 14 Defendants. 15 16 17 I. Introduction 18 Plaintiff Kip Branson is a state prisoner currently incarcerated at Valley State Prison under 19 the authority of the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR).1 Plaintiff 20 proceeds pro se with a civil rights complaint filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and a request to 21 proceed in forma pauperis. This case was transferred to this court from the United States District 22 Court for the Northern District of California in December 2019. This action is referred to the 23 undersigned United States Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Rule 24 302(c). For the reasons that follow, the court grants plaintiff’s request to proceed in forma 25 pauperis, declines to direct service of plaintiff’s original complaint, and accords plaintiff leave to 26 file a First Amended Complaint. 27 28 1 Plaintiff filed this action while incarcerated at CDCR’s Sierra Conservation Center. ECF No. 1. 1 II. In Forma Pauperis Application 2 Plaintiff has submitted an affidavit and prison trust account statement that together make 3 the showing required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). See ECF Nos. 2, 8. Accordingly, plaintiff’s 4 request to proceed in forma pauperis, ECF No. 2, will be granted.2 5 Plaintiff must nevertheless pay the statutory filing fee of $350.00 for this action with 6 periodic deductions from his prison trust account. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1914(a), 1915(b)(1). By this 7 order, plaintiff will be assessed an initial partial filing fee in accordance with the provisions of 28 8 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). By separate order, the court will direct the appropriate agency to collect the 9 initial partial filing fee from plaintiff’s trust account and forward it to the Clerk of the Court. 10 Thereafter, plaintiff will be obligated to make monthly payments of twenty percent of the 11 preceding month’s income credited to plaintiff’s trust account. These payments will be 12 forwarded by the appropriate agency to the Clerk of the Court each time the amount in plaintiff’s 13 account exceeds $10.00, until the filing fee is paid in full. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). 14 III. Screening of Plaintiff’s Complaint 15 A. Legal Standards for Screening Prisoner Complaints 16 The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a 17 governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The 18 court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally 19 “frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek 20 monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1),(2). 21 A claim is legally frivolous when it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact. Neitzke v. 22 Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989); Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1227-28 (9th Cir. 23 1984). 24 Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure “requires only ‘a short and plain statement 25 of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,’ in order to ‘give the defendant fair 26 notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. 27 2 Plaintiff’s subsequently filed motion to proceed in forma pauperis, ECF No. 11, will be denied 28 as moot. 1 Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). 2 “[T]he pleading standard Rule 8 announces does not require ‘detailed factual allegations,’ but it 3 demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. 4 Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly at 555). To survive dismissal for failure to 5 state a claim, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to “state a 6 claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Iqbal at 678 (quoting Twombly at 570). “A claim 7 has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the 8 reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. 9 “A document filed pro se is ‘to be liberally construed,’ and ‘a pro se complaint, however 10 inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by 11 lawyers.’” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 12 106 (1976) (internal quotation marks omitted)). See also Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(e) (“Pleadings shall be 13 so construed as to do justice.”). Additionally, a pro se litigant is entitled to notice of the 14 deficiencies in the complaint and an opportunity to amend, unless the complaint’s deficiencies 15 cannot be cured by amendment. See Noll v. Carlson, 809 F.2d 1446, 1448 (9th Cir. 1987). 16 B. The Complaint 17 Plaintiff alleges that he was denied adequate medical care when previously incarcerated in 18 the Trinity County Sheriff’s Detention Facility (Facility). Plaintiff alleges that in February 2017 19 he tore his left bicep which required “immediate medical attention/surgery,” which was denied by 20 the Facility, resulting in “irreparable harm.” ECF No. 1 at 3. Plaintiff further alleges that from 21 December 2017 until August 2018 he required dental care, which the Facility denied, requiring 22 that plaintiff have “all” of his teeth removed. Id. Plaintiff seeks 2.8 million dollars in damages. 23 C. Failure to State a Claim 24 The complaint does not specify whether plaintiff was incarcerated at the Facility as a pre- 25 trial detainee or pursuant to a judgment of conviction. The legal standards for assessing 26 plaintiff’s claims are different depending on his incarceration status at the time of the challenged 27 events. 28 //// 1 If plaintiff was a pretrial detainee at the time of the events described in the complaint, his 2 claim is governed by the more stringent “objective” standards of the Fourteenth Amendment: 3 [C]laims for violations of the right to adequate medical care brought by pretrial detainees against individual defendants under the 4 Fourteenth Amendment must be evaluated under an objective deliberate indifference standard. Based thereon, the elements of a 5 pretrial detainee’s medical care claim against an individual defendant under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment are: (i) 6 the defendant made an intentional decision with respect to the conditions under which the plaintiff was confined; (ii) those 7 conditions put the plaintiff at substantial risk of suffering serious harm; (iii) the defendant did not take reasonable available measures 8 to abate that risk, even though a reasonable official in the circumstances would have appreciated the high degree of risk 9 involved – making the consequences of the defendant’s conduct obvious; and (iv) by not taking such measures, the defendant caused 10 the plaintiff's injuries. With respect to the third element, the defendant's conduct must be objectively unreasonable, a test that will 11 necessarily turn on the facts and circumstances of each particular case. The mere lack of due care by a state official does not deprive 12 an individual of life, liberty, or property under the Fourteenth Amendment. Thus, the plaintiff must prove more than negligence 13 but less than subjective intent – something akin to reckless disregard. 14 Gordon v. County of Orange, 888 F.3d 1118, 1124-25 (9th Cir. 2018) (citations and internal 15 quotation marks omitted). 16 If plaintiff was serving a criminal sentence at the time of the events described in the 17 complaint, his claim is governed by the Eight Amendment. “[D]eliberate indifference to serious 18 medical needs of prisoners constitutes the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain, proscribed 19 by the Eighth Amendment. This is true whether the indifference is manifested by prison doctors 20 in their response to the prisoner’s needs or by prison guards in intentionally denying or delaying 21 access to medical care or intentionally interfering with the treatment once prescribed.” Estelle v. 22 Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104-05 (1976) (internal citations, punctuation and quotation marks 23 omitted). 24 In the Ninth Circuit, the test for deliberate indifference consists of two parts. First, the plaintiff must show a serious medical need by 25 demonstrating that failure to treat a prisoner’s condition could result in further significant injury or the unnecessary and wanton infliction 26 of pain. Second, the plaintiff must show the defendant’s response to the need was deliberately indifferent. This second prong ... is 27 satisfied by showing (a) a purposeful act or failure to respond to a prisoner’s pain or possible medical need and (b) harm caused by the 28 indifference. 1 Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 2006) (internal citations, punctuation and quotation 2 marks omitted). 3 To state a cognizable Eighth Amendment claim, a prisoner must plausibly allege that a 4 prison official “kn[ew] of and disregard[ed] an excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the 5 official must both be aware of the facts from which the inference could be drawn that a 6 substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.” Farmer v. Brennan, 7 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994). Because “only the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain 8 implicates the Eighth Amendment,” the evidence must show the defendant acted with a 9 “sufficiently culpable state of mind.” Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 297 (1991) (internal 10 quotation marks, emphasis and citations omitted). 11 The instant complaint does not provide enough factual information to assess whether 12 plaintiff’s putative claims are cognizable under either set of these legal standards. For this reason, 13 the court will not direct service of the complaint at this time. Plaintiff will be provided the 14 opportunity to prepare and file an amended complaint that conforms to the appropriate legal 15 standards and, as set forth below, identifies appropriate defendants. 16 2. Defendants 17 The complaint identifies as defendants the “Trinity County Sheriff Department” and 18 “Does 1 to 20.” ECF No. 1 at 1. No specific individual defendants are named. 19 A suit against the Trinity County Sheriff’s Department is effectively a suit against Trinity 20 County. To state a cognizable claim against a local governmental entity (i.e. Trinity County), a 21 plaintiff must allege that a specific “policy or custom” of the entity was the “moving force” 22 behind the alleged constitutional violation. Monell v. Dept. of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 694 23 (1978) (a local governmental entity may be sued as a “person” under Section 1983 only if the 24 challenged conduct reflects a policy, practice or custom of the entity). “A policy or custom may 25 be found either in an affirmative proclamation of policy or in the failure of an official to take any 26 remedial steps after the violations.” Gomez v. Vernon, 255 F.3d 1118, 1127 (9th Cir. 2001) 27 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). A suit against a specific governmental officer in 28 his official capacity (e.g. the Trinity County Sheriff) is equivalent to a suit against the 1 governmental entity itself. Id. The instant complaint does not identify a County policy or custom 2 supporting the denial of medical care to plaintiff or, therefore, supporting Trinity County or its 3 Sheriff as an appropriate defendant. 4 On the other hand, if plaintiff was denied medical care by specific medical providers, or 5 prevented from obtaining available medical care by custodial staff, they may be sued for damages 6 in their personal capacities based on their own allegedly unconstitutional conduct without 7 reference to a county policy or practice. 8 Finally, inclusion of “Doe” defendants is disfavored in the Ninth Circuit. See Gillespie v. 9 Civiletti, 629 F.2d 637, 642 (9th Cir. 1980). When the identity of alleged defendants cannot be 10 known prior to the filing of a complaint, plaintiff should be given an opportunity through 11 discovery to identify them. Gillespie, 629 F.2d at 642. Failure to afford the plaintiff such 12 opportunity is error. Wakefield v. Thompson, 177 F.3d 1160, 1163 (9th Cir. 1999). Here, 13 however, the complaint makes no charging allegations against any specific Doe defendant. 14 Plaintiff should seek to discover the identity of Doe defendants and move to substitute them into 15 the case, together with appropriate factual allegations, as soon as is possible. Failure to identify a 16 Doe defendant and serve him or her prior to the close of discovery may result in the dismissal of 17 that defendant. 18 To summarize, plaintiff may continue to name the Trinity County Sheriff’s Department 19 (aka Trinity County) as a defendant in this action if and only if he identifies a specific county 20 policy or custom as the moving force behind the denial of medical care to plaintiff. Plaintiff may 21 also, or alternatively, identify specific medical providers as defendants in this action without 22 reference to a policy or custom. (However, if a medical provider informed plaintiff that a county 23 policy or custom prevented him or her from providing plaintiff with medical care, that is evidence 24 of the challenged policy or custom, not of the individual practitioner’s allegedly unconstitutional 25 conduct.) Finally, to name a Doe defendant, plaintiff must identify the defendant to the best of 26 his ability and explain the defendant’s challenged conduct in this case. 27 //// 28 //// 1 IV. Leave to File an Amended Complaint 2 Plaintiff will be granted leave to file a proposed First Amended Complaint (FAC) within 3 thirty days, in which he may attempt to state cognizable federal claims against appropriate 4 defendants consistent with the legal standards set forth herein. The FAC must be on the form 5 provided herewith, labeled “First Amended Complaint,” and provide the case number assigned 6 this case. The FAC must be complete in itself without reference to the original complaint. See 7 Local Rule 15-220; Loux v. Rhay, 375 F.2d 55, 57 (9th Cir. 1967). 8 The FAC will be screened by the court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Failure to timely 9 file a FAC will result in a recommendation that this action be dismissed without prejudice. 10 V. Plain Language Summary for Pro Se Litigant 11 You have been granted in forma pauperis status and will pay the filing fee in small 12 amounts over time. 13 The court has screened your complaint and found that it does not contain facts that are 14 enough to state a claim. Instead of serving the complaint, the court is giving you the chance to 15 file an amended complaint. In order to be served, an amended complaint should: (1) state 16 whether you were in the jail pretrial or post-conviction, and therefore whether your claim of 17 inadequate medical care is governed by the Fourteenth or Eighth Amendment; (2) provide 18 detailed factual allegations about your specific medical needs and identify “how, what, when, 19 where and by whom” you were denied care or mistreated; and (3) identify appropriate defendants 20 consistent with your factual allegations and according to the standards explained above. 21 If you file an amended complaint, the court will screen it pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. 22 You are not obligated to file an amended complaint. If you do not file an amended complaint, 23 this court will recommend that your action be dismissed without prejudice. 24 VI. Conclusion 25 For the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: 26 1. Plaintiff’s request to proceed in forma pauperis, ECF No. 2, is granted; plaintiff’s 27 subsequent motion to proceed in forma pauperis, ECF No. 11, is denied as moot. 28 //// MASS 2 ETI LENS MUO I Ee AY UNM O 1 2. Plaintiff is obligated to pay the statutory filing fee of $350.00 for this action. Plaintiff 2 || is assessed an initial partial filing fee in accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. 3 | § 1915(b)C1). All fees shall be collected and paid in accordance with this court’s order to the 4 || Director of the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation filed concurrently 5 || herewith. 6 3. The complaint, ECF No. 1, is found not to state a claim upon which relief may be 7 || granted. 8 4. Plaintiff is granted leave to file a First Amended Complaint (FAC) within thirty (30) 9 | days after service of this order, subject to the legal standards set forth herein. Failure to timely 10 || file a FAC will result in a recommendation that this action be dismissed without prejudice. 11 5. The Clerk of Court is directed to send plaintiff, together with a copy of this order, a 12 || copy of the form complaint used by prisoners in this district to pursue a civil rights action under 13 | 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 14 IT IS SO ORDERED. 15 || DATED: July 8, 2020 ~ 16 Chtten— Lhane ALLISON CLAIRE 17 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28