(PC) McCoy v. Kelso ( 2020 )


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  • 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 JOSEPH RAYMOND MCCOY, ) Case No.: 1:12-cv-000983-AWI-SAB (PC) ) 12 Plaintiff, ) ) FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION 13 v. ) RECOMMENDING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR A TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER 14 STRONACH, et al., ) BE DENIED ) 15 Defendants. ) [ECF No. 241] ) 16 ) 17 Plaintiff Joseph Raymond McCoy is appearing pro se and in forma pauperis in this civil rights 18 action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 19 Currently before the Court is Plaintiff’s motion for a temporary restraining order, filed on July 20 20, 2020. 21 I. 22 RELEVANT BACKGROUND 23 This action is proceeding against Defendants Stronach, Gonzales, LeMay, Beltran, Fisher, 24 Snell and Tann for deliberate indifference to a serious medical need in violation of the Eighth 25 Amendment. 26 On April 25, 2019, the Court issued an amended scheduling order, and the deadline for 27 completion of all discovery is October 2, 2019. (ECF No. 129.) 28 The dispositive motion deadline is June 29, 2020. (ECF No. 222.) 1 As previously stated, on July 20, 2020, Plaintiff filed a motion for a temporary restraining 2 order. (ECF No. 241.) 3 II. 4 LEGAL STANDARD 5 The purpose of a temporary restraining order or a preliminary injunction is to preserve the 6 status quo if the balance of equities so heavily favors the moving party that justice requires the court to 7 intervene to secure the positions until the merits of the action are ultimately determined. University of 8 Texas v. Camenisch, 451 U.S. 390, 395 (1981). “A plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction [or 9 temporary restraining order] must establish that he is likely to succeed on the merits, that he is likely 10 to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips in his 11 favor, and that an injunction is in the public interest.” Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 12 Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008). 13 “[A] preliminary injunction is an extraordinary and drastic remedy, one that should not be 14 granted unless the movant, by a clear showing, carries the burden of persuasion.” Mazurek v. 15 Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968, 972 (1997) (quotations and citations omitted) (emphasis in original). A party 16 seeking a temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction simply cannot prevail when that motion 17 is unsupported by evidence. 18 Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction and in considering a request for preliminary 19 injunctive relief, the Court is bound by the requirement that as a preliminary matter, it have before it an 20 actual case or controversy. City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 102 (1983); Valley Forge 21 Christian Coll. V. Ams. United for Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 471 (1982). If 22 the Court does not have an actual case or controversy before it, it has no power to hear the matter in 23 question. Id. Requests for prospective relief are further limited by 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(1)(A) of the 24 Prison Litigation Reform Act, which requires that the Court find the “relief [sought] is narrowly drawn, 25 extends no further than necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right, and is the least intrusive 26 means necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right.” 27 /// 28 /// 1 A federal court may issue emergency injunctive relief only if it has personal jurisdiction over 2 the parties and subject matter jurisdiction over the lawsuit. See Murphy Bros., Inc. v. Michetti Pipe 3 Stringing, Inc., 526 U.S. 344, 350 (1999) (noting that one “becomes a party officially, and is required 4 to take action in that capacity, only upon service of summons or other authority-asserting measure stating 5 the time within which the party served must appear to defend.”). The Court may not attempt to 6 determine the rights of persons not before it. See Hitchman Coal & Coke Co. v. Mitchell, 245 U.S. 229, 7 234-35 (1916); Zepeda v. INS, 753 F.2d 719, 727-28 (9th Cir. 1983). 8 III. 9 DISCUSSION 10 Plaintiff seeks a temporary restraining order to prevent his transfer to non-designated 11 programming facility. (ECF No. 241.) Based on the analysis below, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s 12 motion for a temporary restraining order should be denied. 13 A. Court Lacks Standing to Issue Temporary Restraining Order 14 As previously stated, Plaintiff seeks an order preventing his transfer to a non-designated 15 programming facility. However, an injunction is only available when the “complaint states a sound 16 basis for equitable relief,” a determination that implicates “case or controversy considerations[.]” City 17 of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. at (citation omitted). In his complaint, the events giving rise to the 18 claims in this action occurred between June and December 2009. Plaintiff alleges Defendants did not 19 provide him adequate treatment for a foot infection and denied him use of a wheelchair. However, the 20 issues raised by Plaintiff in his motion for a temporary restraining order concern a possible transfer to 21 an alleged non-designated facility several years after the allegations in the complaint. That issue is 22 not being litigated in this case. Because the injunctive relief sought—order prohibiting a transfer— 23 would not remedy his claims and has no connection to them, plaintiff has not “demonstrate[d] a case 24 or controversy ... that would justify the equitable relief sought,” depriving the court of jurisdiction. 25 City of Los Angeles, 461 U.S. at 105. Accordingly, the Court lacks jurisdiction to issue an order 26 preventing Plaintiff’s transfer. 27 /// 28 /// 1 B. Plaintiff’s Motion is Not Ripe and Lack of Irreparable Harm 2 “While standing is primarily concerned with who is a proper party to litigate a particular 3 matter, ripeness addresses when litigation may occur.” Lee v. Oregon, 107 F.3d 1382, 1387 (9th Cir. 4 1997). “A claim is not ripe for adjudication if it rests upon ‘contingent future events that may not 5 occur as anticipated, or indeed many not occur at all.’” Texas v. United States, 523 U.S. 296, 300 6 (1998) (quoting Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568, 580-81 (1985)). “The 7 ripeness doctrine demands that litigants state a claim on which relief can be granted and that litigants’ 8 asserted harm is ‘direct and immediate’ rather than speculative or hypothetical.” Hillbloom v. United 9 States, 896 F.2d 426, 430 (9th Cir. 1990) (citing to Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 152 10 (1967)). 11 Although Plaintiff may have been endorsed for a transfer to a non-designated programming 12 facility, whether the recommendation for Plaintiff’s transfer will be approved is unknown at this time. 13 Thus, Plaintiff’s motion is based on events that have not yet happened and may never happen. In addition, 14 Plaintiff has not demonstrated that he faces imminent and irreparable harm if transferred to a non- 15 designated programming facility. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s motion is not ripe for judicial intervention, and 16 he has failed to demonstrate irreparable injury. Therefore, Plaintiff’s motion should be denied. 17 IV. 18 RECOMMENDATION 19 Based on the foregoing, it is HEREBY RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff’s motion for 20 temporary restraining order, filed on July 20, 2020 (ECF No. 241) be DENIED. 21 This Findings and Recommendation will be submitted to the United States District Judge 22 assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within fourteen (14) days 23 after being served with this Findings and Recommendation, the parties may file written objections 24 with the Court. The document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and 25 Recommendation.” The parties are that failure to file objections within the specified time may result 26 /// 27 /// 28 /// wOow 4:40 YOUU SPAR MMU Sete PIO eee TOY VI 1 || in the waiver of rights on appeal. Wilkerson v. Wheeler, 772 F.3d 834, 838-39 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing 2 || Baxter v. Sullivan, 923 F.2d 1391, 1394 (9th Cir. 1991)). 3 4 IS SO ORDERED. ot fe Sl! Dated: _ July 22, 2020 OF 6 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28

Document Info

Docket Number: 1:12-cv-00983

Filed Date: 7/22/2020

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 6/19/2024