(PC) Ardds v. Hicks ( 2020 )

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 ANTOINE L. ARDDS, ) Case No.: 1:19-cv-01738-DAD-SAB (PC) ) 12 Plaintiff, ) ) FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION 13 v. ) RECOMMENDING PLAINTIFF’S FOURTH MOTION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING 14 D. HICKS, et.al., ) ORDER BE DENIED ) 15 Defendants. ) [ECF No. 33] ) 16 ) ) 17 ) 18 Plaintiff Antoine L. Ardds is appearing pro se and in forma pauperis in this civil rights action 19 pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 20 Currently before the Court is Plaintiff’s fourth motion for a temporary restraining order, filed 21 August 24, 2020. Plaintiff seeks a court order directing prison officials to provide his legal property 22 and materials in order to litigate his current cases. 23 I. 24 DISCUSSION 25 The purpose of a temporary restraining order or a preliminary injunction is to preserve the 26 status quo if the balance of equities so heavily favors the moving party that justice requires the court to 27 intervene to secure the positions until the merits of the action are ultimately determined. University of 28 Texas v. Camenisch, 451 U.S. 390, 395 (1981). “A plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction [or 1 temporary restraining order] must establish that he is likely to succeed on the merits, that he is likely 2 to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips in his 3 favor, and that an injunction is in the public interest.” Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 4 Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008). 5 “[A] preliminary injunction is an extraordinary and drastic remedy, one that should not be 6 granted unless the movant, by a clear showing, carries the burden of persuasion.” Mazurek v. 7 Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968, 972 (1997) (quotations and citations omitted) (emphasis in original). A party 8 seeking a temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction simply cannot prevail when that motion 9 is unsupported by evidence. 10 Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction and in considering a request for preliminary 11 injunctive relief, the Court is bound by the requirement that as a preliminary matter, it have before it an 12 actual case or controversy. City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 102 (1983); Valley Forge 13 Christian Coll. V. Ams. United for Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 471 (1982). If 14 the Court does not have an actual case or controversy before it, it has no power to hear the matter in 15 question. Id. Requests for prospective relief are further limited by 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(1)(A) of the 16 Prison Litigation Reform Act, which requires that the Court find the “relief [sought] is narrowly drawn, 17 extends no further than necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right, and is the least intrusive 18 means necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right.” 19 A federal court may issue emergency injunctive relief only if it has personal jurisdiction over 20 the parties and subject matter jurisdiction over the lawsuit. See Murphy Bros., Inc. v. Michetti Pipe 21 Stringing, Inc., 526 U.S. 344, 350 (1999) (noting that one “becomes a party officially, and is required 22 to take action in that capacity, only upon service of summons or other authority-asserting measure stating 23 the time within which the party served must appear to defend.”). The Court may not attempt to 24 determine the rights of persons not before it. See Hitchman Coal & Coke Co. v. Mitchell, 245 U.S. 229, 25 234-35 (1916); Zepeda v. INS, 753 F.2d 719, 727-28 (9th Cir. 1983). 26 /// 27 /// 28 /// 1 As an initial matter, this action is proceeding against Defendant Hicks for excessive force. However, 2 Plaintiff’s motion for injunctive relief is aimed at preventing actions by other prison officials who are 3 not parties to this action. The Court’s jurisdiction is limited to the parties before it in this action and to 4 Plaintiff’s claim for damages arising from an incident of alleged excessive force on June 27, 2009. 5 See, e.g., Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 103-04 (1998) (“[The] triad of injury in 6 fact, causation, and redressability constitutes the core of Article III’s case-or-controversy requirement, 7 and the party invoking federal jurisdiction bears the burden of establishing its existence.”) (citation 8 omitted); American Civil Liberties Union of Nevada v. Masto, 670 F.3d 1046, 1061-62 (9th Cir. 2012) 9 (“[F]ederal courts may adjudicate only actual, ongoing cases or controversies.”) (citation and internal 10 quotation marks omitted). Thus, Plaintiff’s motion addresses conduct that that is not a subject of this 11 action, and therefore Plaintiff fails to demonstrate either a likelihood of success on the merits or a 12 serious question on the merits. Generally, such allegations must be pursued through the prison 13 administrative process and then litigated in a separate action. See McKinney v. Carey, 311 F.3d 1198, 14 1199-1201 (9th Cir. 2002) (per curiam) and Rhodes v. Robinson, 621 F.3d 1002, 1004-07 (9th Cir. 15 2010) (together holding that claims must be exhausted prior to the filing of the original or 16 supplemental complaint); Jones v. Felker, No. CIV S-08-0096 KJM EFB P, 2011 WL 533755, at *4-6 17 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 11, 2011). Plaintiff has not shown that he cannot obtain relief from the alleged 18 misconduct of prison staff at Corcoran State Prison through the administrative appeals process and, if 19 necessary, by challenging it in a separate lawsuit. 20 Further, it appears that Plaintiff believes because the Court has ordered service on Defendant 21 Hicks, he is now entitled to injunctive relief. However, federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, 22 Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of America, 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994), and the Court lacks the 23 jurisdiction to issue any orders regarding Plaintiff’s current conditions of confinement, including his 24 property status, 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(1)(A); Summers v. Earth Island Institute, 555 U.S. 488, 493 (2009); 25 Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992); Mayfield v. United States, 599 F.3d 964, 26 969 (9th Cir. 2010). 27 Moreover, even if the Court had personal jurisdiction over the individuals named in the 28 complaint, Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate imminent irreparable harm necessary to support a 1 preliminary injunction. See Winter, 555 U.S. at 20; Alliance for the Wild Rockies v. Cottrell, 632 2 F.3d 1127, 1131 (9th Cir. 2011). “The fact that plaintiff has met the pleading requirements allowing 3 him to proceed with the complaint does not, ipso facto, entitle him to a preliminary injunction.” 4 Claiborne v. Blauser, No. CIV S-10-2427 LKK, 2011 WL 3875892, at *8 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 31, 2011), 5 report and recommended adopted, No. CIV S-10-2427 LKK, 2011 WL 4765000 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 29, 6 2011). Instead, to meet the “irreparable harm” requirement, Plaintiff must do more than simply allege 7 imminent harm; he must demonstrate it. Caribbean Marine Servs. Co., Inc. v. Baldridge, 844 F.2d 8 668, 674 (9th Cir. 1988). Mere “[s]peculative injury does not constitute irreparable injury sufficient to 9 warrant granting a preliminary injunction.” Id. at 674-75. 10 Plaintiff seeks a court order preventing prison officials from depriving him of access to his 11 legal property and to prevent them from destroying his property. Inmates have a fundamental 12 constitutional right of access to the courts. Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 346 (1996); Silva v. Di 13 Vittorio, 658 F.3d 1090, 1101 (9th Cir. 2011); Phillips v. Hust, 588 F.3d 652, 655 (9th Cir. 2009). 14 However, to state a viable claim for relief, Plaintiff must show that he suffered an actual injury, which 15 requires “actual prejudice to contemplated or existing litigation.” Nevada Dep’t of Corr. v. Greene, 16 648 F.3d 1014, 1018 (9th Cir. 2011) (citing Lewis, 518 U.S. at 348) (internal quotation marks 17 omitted); Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 415 (2002); Lewis, 518 U.S. at 351; Phillips, 588 18 F.3d at 655. To prevail on a claim regarding denial of access to the courts, it is not enough for an 19 inmate to show some sort of denial Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate actual injury. Plaintiff has not 20 shown that without an injunction he will miss a deadline or have this action dismissed. In addition, 21 Plaintiff’s complaints about access and destruction of his legal property are not related to his 22 underlying claims in this action. Thus, an injunction is not proper. See Pacific Radiation Oncology, 23 LLC v. Queen’s Medical Center, 810 F.3d 631, 636 (9th Cir. 2015) (holding there must be a 24 “sufficient nexus between the request in a motion for injunctive relief and the underlying claim 25 itself”). Thus, Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that in the absence of preliminary injunctive relief he 26 is likely to suffer actual injury in prosecuting his case. “Speculative injury does not constitute 27 irreparable injury sufficient to warrant granting a preliminary injunction.” Caribbean Marine Servs. 28 1 Co. v. Baldridge, 844 F.2d 668, 674 (9th Cir. 1988), citing Goldies Bookstore, Inc. v. Superior Court, 2 739 F.2d 466, 472 (9th Cir. 1984). 3 Plaintiff is further advised that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the 4 United States Constitution protects Plaintiff from being deprived of property without due process of 5 law, Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556 (1974), and Plaintiff has a protected interest in his 6 personal property, Hansen v. May, 502 F.2d 728, 730 (9th Cir. 1974). Authorized, intentional 7 deprivations of property are actionable under the Due Process Clause, see Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 8 517, 532, n.13 (1984); Quick v. Jones, 754 F.2d 1521, 1524 (9th Cir. 1985), but the Due Process 9 Clause is violated only when the agency “prescribes and enforces forfeitures of property without 10 underlying statutory authority and competent procedural protections,” Nevada Dept. of Corrections v. 11 Greene, 648 F.3d 1014, 1019 (9th Cir. 2011) (citing Vance v. Barrett, 345 F.3d 1083, 1090 (9th Cir. 12 2003)) (internal quotations omitted). The Due Process Clause is not violated by the random, 13 unauthorized deprivation of property so long as the state provides an adequate post-deprivation 14 remedy. Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 533 (1984); Barnett v. Centoni, 31 F.3d 813, 816-17 (9th 15 Cir. 1994). Here, Plaintiff alleges an unauthorized taking of his property which is not actionable under 16 the Due Process Clause because California provides an adequate post-deprivation remedy. Barnett v. 17 Centoni, 31 F.3d at 816-17 (citing Cal. Gov’t Code §§810-895). In this instance, Plaintiff has alleged 18 an unauthorized deprivation of his property which is not cognizable by way of section 1983, as he has 19 an adequate remedy under California law. 20 Moreover, 21 II. 22 RECOMMENDATION 23 Based on the foregoing, it is HEREBY RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff’s fourth motion for a 24 temporary restraining order be denied. 25 This Findings and Recommendation will be submitted to the United States District Judge 26 assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of Title 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within fourteen (14) 27 days after being served with this Findings and Recommendation, Plaintiff may file written objections 28 with the court. The document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and wOoOe 4:£0 UV VE MALE SEAR MUO Or PO Ore eo POY VI 1 || Recommendation.” Plaintiff is advised that the failure to file objections within the specified time ma 2 || result in the waiver of the “right to challenge the magistrate’s factual findings” on appeal. Wilkerson 3 || v. Wheeler, 772 F.3d 834, 839 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Baxter v. Sullivan, 923 F.2d 1391, 1394 (9th Ci 4 |} 1991)). 5 6 || IT IS SO ORDERED. A (Fe 7 |! Dated: _ August 25, 2020 OF 8 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28