(PC) Hayde v. Zamora ( 2020 )

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 ERIC RYAN HAYDE, No. 2:19-cv-0432 DB P 12 Plaintiff, 13 v. ORDER 14 E. ZAMORA, et al., 15 Defendants. 16 17 Plaintiff, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, seeks relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 18 has requested authority pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915 to proceed in forma pauperis. (ECF Nos. 1, 19 2, 5). This proceeding was referred to this court by Local Rule 302 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 20 636(b)(1)(B). 21 For the reasons stated below, the court shall grant plaintiff’s request to proceed in forma 22 pauperis. Plaintiff will also be given an opportunity to amend the complaint. 23 I. IN FORMA PAUPERIS APPLICATION 24 Plaintiff has submitted a declaration that makes the showing required by 28 U.S.C. § 25 1915(a). (See ECF Nos. 2, 5). Accordingly, the request to proceed in forma pauperis will be 26 granted. 27 Plaintiff is required to pay the statutory filing fee of $350.00 for this action. 28 U.S.C. §§ 28 1914(a), 1915(b)(1). By this order, plaintiff will be assessed an initial partial filing fee in 1 accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). By separate order, the court will direct 2 the appropriate agency to collect the initial partial filing fee from plaintiff’s trust account and 3 forward it to the Clerk of Court. Thereafter, plaintiff will be obligated for monthly payments of 4 twenty percent of the preceding month’s income credited to plaintiff’s prison trust account. 5 These payments will be forwarded by the appropriate agency to the Clerk of Court each time the 6 amount in plaintiff’s account exceeds $10.00, until the filing fee is paid in full. 28 U.S.C. § 7 1915(b)(2). 8 II. SCREENING REQUIREMENT 9 The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a 10 governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The 11 court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally 12 “frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek 13 monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1)-(2). 14 A claim is legally frivolous when it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact. 15 Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989); Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1227-28 (9th 16 Cir. 1984). The court may, therefore, dismiss a claim as frivolous where it is based on an 17 indisputably meritless legal theory or where the factual contentions are clearly baseless. Neitzke, 18 490 U.S. at 327. The critical inquiry is whether a constitutional claim, however inartfully 19 pleaded, has an arguable legal and factual basis. See Jackson v. Arizona, 885 F.2d 639, 640 (9th 20 Cir. 1989); Franklin, 745 F.2d at 1227. 21 A complaint, or portion thereof, should only be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon 22 which relief may be granted if it appears beyond doubt that plaintiff can prove no set of facts in 23 support of the claim or claims that would entitle him to relief. Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 24 U.S. 69, 73 (1984) (citing Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957)); Palmer v. Roosevelt 25 Lake Log Owners Ass’n, 651 F.2d 1289, 1294 (9th Cir. 1981). In reviewing a complaint under 26 this standard, the court must accept as true the allegations of the complaint in question, Hosp. 27 Bldg. Co. v. Rex Hosp. Trustees, 425 U.S. 738, 740 (1976), construe the pleading in the light 28 //// 1 most favorable to the plaintiff, and resolve all doubts in the plaintiff’s favor, Jenkins v. 2 McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421 (1969). 3 III. PLEADING STANDARD 4 A. Generally 5 Section 1983 “provides a cause of action for the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or 6 immunities secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States.” Wilder v. Virginia Hosp. 7 Ass'n, 496 U.S. 498, 508 (1990) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1983). Section 1983 is not itself a source 8 of substantive rights, but merely provides a method for vindicating federal rights conferred 9 elsewhere. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393-94 (1989). 10 To state a claim under Section 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: (1) 11 that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated and (2) that the 12 alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. See West v. 13 Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Ketchum v. Alameda Cty., 811 F.2d 1243, 1245 (9th Cir. 1987). 14 A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the 15 pleader is entitled to relief . . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not 16 required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere 17 conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell 18 Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). Plaintiff must set forth “sufficient factual 19 matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. Facial 20 plausibility demands more than the mere possibility that a defendant committed misconduct and, 21 while factual allegations are accepted as true, legal conclusions are not. Id. at 677-78. 22 B. Linkage Requirement 23 Under Section 1983, a plaintiff bringing an individual capacity claim must demonstrate 24 that each defendant personally participated in the deprivation of his rights. See Jones v. 25 Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 2002). There must be an actual connection or link between 26 the actions of the defendants and the deprivation alleged to have been suffered by plaintiff. See 27 Ortez v. Washington County, State of Oregon, 88 F.3d 804, 809 (9th Cir. 1996); see also Taylor 28 v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989). 1 Government officials may not be held liable for the actions of their subordinates under a 2 theory of respondeat superior. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676 (stating vicarious liability is inapplicable in 3 Section 1983 suits). Since a government official cannot be held liable under a theory of vicarious 4 liability in Section 1983 actions, plaintiff must plead sufficient facts showing that the official has 5 violated the Constitution through his own individual actions. This is done by linking each named 6 defendant with some affirmative act or omission that demonstrates a violation of plaintiff's 7 federal rights. Id. at 676. 8 IV. PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT 9 A. Plaintiff’s Claims 10 Plaintiff’s complaint is convoluted and repetitive. Nevertheless, construing the complaint 11 liberally,1 the court believes that plaintiff is attempting to allege claims against Orange County 12 Jail (“OCJ”), Wasco State Prison (“WSP”) and High Desert State Prison (“HDSP”) officials. 13 Plaintiff’s claims against OCJ officials originate from when he was a pretrial detainee. 14 They include cruel and unusual punishment and the denial of due process in violation of his 15 Fourteenth Amendment2 rights, as well as retaliation in violation of his First Amendment rights. 16 (See generally ECF No. 1). His claims against WSP and HDSP officials while a prisoner include 17 retaliation in violation of his First Amendment rights; failure to follow department policy related 18 to written disciplinary reports; conspiracy with jail employees to falsify evidence; conspiracy to 19 deprive him of equal protection and privileges, and deliberate indifference to his serious medical 20 needs in violation of his Eighth Amendment rights. (See generally id. at 3-13). 21 //// 22 23 1 This court is obligated to liberally construe the pleadings of pro se litigants. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976) (stating pro se documents are to be liberally construed); see also 24 Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972) (stating pro se pleadings are held to less stringent standard than those drafted by lawyers). 25 2 As a pretrial detainee, plaintiff’s right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment derives from the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 537 26 n.16 (1979); Simmons v. Navajo Cty., Ariz., 609 F.3d 1011, 1017 (9th Cir. 2010). Nevertheless, 27 the same standards apply as those used in Eighth Amendment cruel and unusual punishment claims. See Simmons, 609 F.3d at 1017 (citing Clouthier v. Cty. of Contra Costa, 591 F.3d 1232, 28 1243-44 (9th Cir. 2010)). 1 B. Resulting Harm 2 Plaintiff asserts that as a result of defendants’ actions and inaction, he has experienced 3 post-traumatic stress disorder and mental anguish. He also accuses defendants of intentional 4 infliction of emotional distress and infliction of psychological harm. (See ECF No. 1 at 3, 8). 5 C. Remedies Sought 6 Plaintiff seeks nominal damages in the amount of $20.00. (See ECF No. 1 at 15). He also 7 seeks $24,000.00 in compensatory damages and $500.00 in punitive damages. (See id. at 15). 8 These amounts, plaintiff asserts, will compensate him for his pain and suffering and for the 9 violation of his civil rights. (See id. at 15). 10 V. DISCUSSION 11 A. Orange County Jail Officials 12 1. Facts 13 Plaintiff alleges that when he was a pretrial detainee at Orange County Jail, officials there3 14 subjected him to minimal out-of-cell time, virtually non-existent medical care,4 inedible food, and 15 filthy living conditions. (See ECF No. 1 at 3-4). In addition, plaintiff alleges that at times, he 16 was also deprived of a shower or razor a week at a time. (See id. at 3-4). He further alleges that 17 after he complained about these conditions, officials retaliated against him by searching and 18 ransacking his cell several times and by throwing his legal documents in the trash. (See id. at 3- 19 4). Plaintiff also claims that because he filed grievances about the retaliation, he was retaliated 20 against again when defendants placed him in disciplinary segregation for months without notice 21 and without being given a hearing. (See id. at 3-4). These violations of right, plaintiff contends, 22 continued off and on for a period of three years until he was convicted and transferred to state 23 prison. (See id. at 3-4). 24 //// 25 //// 26 3 Plaintiff has not identified the OCJ officials. 27 4 Because plaintiff’s allegation related to the denial of medical care is so vague (see generally ECF No. 1 at 3-4), the court does not address it herein. If, however, plaintiff chooses to amend 28 the complaint, he is free to provide more information in support of a deliberate indifference claim. 1 2. Relevant Law and Analysis 2 a. Cruel and Unusual Punishment: Living Conditions 3 Prison officials may not deprive prisoners of basic necessities of life including adequate 4 food, clothing, shelter, sanitation, medical care and personal safety. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 5 825, 832 (1994); Hoptowit v. Spellman, 753 F.2d 779, 784 (9th Cir. 1985) (stating prisoners have 6 constitutional right to safe conditions of confinement and adequate level of personal safety); see 7 Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d 1237, 1258 (9th Cir. 1982) overruled on other grounds by Sandin v. 8 Conner, 515 U.S. 472 (1995). Such deprivations violate an inmate’s constitutional rights. See 9 Hoptowit, 682 F.2d at 1258. In other words, harsh conditions of confinement may constitute 10 cruel and unusual punishment unless such conditions are part of the penalty that criminal 11 offenders pay for their offenses against society. Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319 (1986) 12 (citing Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981)). 13 To establish that Orange County Jail officials’ treatment of plaintiff violated his 14 constitutional right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment when they: (1) deprived him of 15 showers a week a time over a three to four-and-a-half-year period; (2) only gave him two hours of 16 outdoor recreation per week, and (3) served him inedible food and forced him to live in 17 unsanitary conditions (see ECF No. 1 at 3), plaintiff must show that specific OCJ officials were 18 subjectively aware of plaintiff’s needs and failed to adequately respond to them. See Farmer, 511 19 U.S. at 828; Simmons, 609 F.3d at 1017-18. 20 Here, plaintiff fails to identify which OCJ officials deprived him of these basic necessities. 21 He also fails to state a link between specific individuals and specific deprivations. (See generally 22 ECF No. 1). For these reasons, plaintiff’s cruel and unusual punishment claim is not cognizable. 23 Plaintiff will, however, be given the opportunity to amend this claim and provide this 24 information. 25 b. Retaliation 26 Prisoners have a First Amendment right to file grievances against prison officials and a 27 right to be free from retaliation for doing so. Brodheim v. Cry, 584 F.3d 1262, 1269 (9th Cir. 28 //// 1 2009); see Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 566 (9th Cir. 2005) (stating of fundamental import 2 to prisoners are their First Amendment rights to file prison grievances). 3 Plaintiff’s claims that during his years as a pretrial detainee, OCJ officials retaliated 4 against him on several occasions when they: (1) ransacked his cell and deprived him of showers 5 for days at a time; (2) threw away his legal documents, and (3) placed him in disciplinary 6 segregation without due process simply because he had filed grievances (see ECF No. 1 at 3-4) 7 also potentially raises cognizable claims of violations of his First Amendment right against 8 retaliation. However, once again, plaintiff has failed to identify the specific jail officials who 9 participated in these deprivations. 10 Plaintiff will be given an opportunity to correct the deficiencies in this claim as well. 11 Should he choose to amend, he must identify each defendant actor, the specific actions each one 12 took against him and/or failed to take, as well as the specific harm he experienced as a result. 13 c. No Procedural Due Process: Disciplinary Isolation 14 Plaintiff states that after he filed grievances against OCJ personnel, they retaliated against 15 him again by placing him in “disciplinary isolation” for months on end. (See ECF No. 1 at 3). 16 He further states that prior to this placement, he “never received any notice or reasons for any 17 charges; he never had a hearing, and he never spoke with a hearing officer.” (See id. at 3-4). 18 Plaintiff also claims that prior to being forced into isolation “there was never any finding by a 19 factfinder,” despite the fact that he was a pretrial detainee. (See id. at 3-4). 20 Pretrial detainees may be subjected to disciplinary segregation only with a due process 21 hearing to determine whether they have in fact violated any rule.5 Mitchell v. Dupnik, 75 F.3d 22 517, 524 (9th Cir. 1996). Plaintiff s allegation that he was punished without due process, on its 23 5 In Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974), the Supreme Court determined that a litigant has 24 received adequate procedural due process during prison disciplinary proceedings when he has been given the following: (1) advance, written notice of violation; (2) provision of at least 24 25 hours to prepare for committee appearance; (3) written statement of fact-finding; (4) the right to present witnesses and evidence where it would not be unduly hazardous to institutional safety; (5) 26 an impartial decision-making body, and (6) assistance if inmate is illiterate or if issues are 27 complex. Wolff, 418 U.S. at 564-70; see generally Hanrahan v. Lane, 747 F.2 1137, 1140 (7th Cir. 1984). These requirements protect inmates from “arbitrary actions extinguishing their 28 privileges.” Hanrahan, 747 F.2d at 1140 (citation omitted). 1 face, has the potential to be cognizable. For this to become a viable claim, however, plaintiff 2 must identify the OCJ officials who placed him in disciplinary segregation and/or those who 3 punished him without due process. He must also state with specificity the actions each one took – 4 or failed to take – that support this alleged violation of due process. Plaintiff will be given the 5 opportunity to provide this information in an amended complaint. 6 B. Wasco State Prison and County Jail Officials: Defendants Zamora and Santo6 7 1. Facts 8 Plaintiff claims that defendant Zamora of WSP violated his rights when, in retaliation 9 against plaintiff for having filed grievances, he used thirteen unsupported disciplinary violations 10 to arrive at a Level IV classification for plaintiff. (See generally ECF No. 1 at 4-5). He also 11 claims that his rights were violated when, in violation of department policy, defendant Zamora 12 failed to provide written reports of the alleged findings of guilt in those disciplinary actions. (See 13 generally id. at 5). Plaintiff further alleges that his rights were violated when defendant Zamora 14 and defendant Santo conspired to create and then use false information to establish that plaintiff 15 had committed bad acts prior to his court conviction. (See id. at 5). He also appears to argue that 16 these defendants’ use of false information deprived him of his rights under the Equal Protection 17 Clause. (See generally id. at 5-7). 18 2. Relevant Law and Analysis 19 a. Retaliation 20 i. Defendant Zamora 21 Plaintiff alleges that defendant Zamora of WSP intentionally calculated a higher 22 classification level for plaintiff because plaintiff had filed grievances while in jail and because 23 within ninety days of his arrival at WSP, plaintiff had filed grievances there. (See ECF No. 1 at 24 4). According to plaintiff, defendant Zamora told him that he and defendant Santo of OCJ had 25 discussed the multiple grievances plaintiff had filed while housed at OCJ, and that plaintiff 26 27 6 Based upon the record, the court believes that defendant A. Santo is an employee of the Orange County Jail and will analyze plaintiff’s claims accordingly. If plaintiff is not an OCJ employee, 28 plaintiff must inform the court immediately. 1 having done the same thing within ninety days of his arrival at WSP was “putting [plaintiff’s] 2 career in jeopardy.” (See id. at 4) (brackets added). When plaintiff asked defendant Zamora if he 3 should take those words as a threat, defendant Zamora allegedly smiled at plaintiff and handed 4 him a copy of his legal summary paperwork which had calculated his classification points at a 5 level that was much higher than plaintiff had anticipated. 6 This claim against defendant Zamora is cognizable. It is well-settled that prisoners have a 7 First Amendment right to file grievances.7 Brodheim, 584 F.3d at 1269; Rhodes, 408 F.3d at 567. 8 Thus, retaliation against prisoners for having exercised their First Amendment rights is a 9 constitutional violation and prohibited as a matter of clearly established law. Brodheim, 584 F.3d 10 at 1269 (citing Rhodes, 408 F.3d at 566). Accordingly, plaintiff will be permitted to proceed with 11 this claim against defendant Zamora. 12 ii. Defendant Santo 13 Plaintiff alleges that defendant Santo of OCJ told defendant Zamora of WSP about the 14 grievances plaintiff had filed while he was in county jail. (See ECF No. 1 at 4). This, plaintiff 15 contends, led to a conspiracy between the two to retaliate against him by giving him a Level IV 16 classification at WSP in violation of his First Amendment rights. (See id. at 4). 17 With respect to defendant Santo, plaintiff has not provided sufficient facts to support a 18 retaliation claim. To state a viable classification-related retaliation claim against defendant Santo, 19 plaintiff must provide facts which indicate that Santo, a jail employee, played an active and 20 improper role in the determination that plaintiff should receive a Level IV classification at WSP – 21 an institution where he, presumably, had no authority. Defendant Santo very well may have 22 spoken with defendant Zamora and told him that plaintiff had filed an inordinate number of 23 grievances while housed at the county jail. This, however, does not mean that defendant Santo 24 //// 25 7 Within the prison context, a viable claim of First Amendment retaliation entails five basic 26 elements: (1) An assertion that a state actor took some adverse action against an inmate (2) 27 because of (3) that prisoner's protected conduct, and that such action (4) chilled the inmate's exercise of his First Amendment rights, and (5) the action did not reasonably advance a legitimate 28 correctional goal. Rhodes, 408 F.3d at 567-68 (citations omitted) (footnote omitted). 1 had a direct hand in plaintiff’s classification status once he was released from jail and sent to 2 WSP. 3 Despite the weakness of this claim, because there is some question as to who employed 4 defendant Santo during the period in question and what his precise position was, any actual input 5 he may have had in determining plaintiff’s classification level at WSP remains uncertain. 6 Therefore, plaintiff will be given the opportunity to amend this claim.8 7 b. Failure to Follow Departmental Policy 8 To the extent plaintiff attempts to claim a violation of right when he contends that 9 defendant Zamora violated department policy when he failed to provide written reports of the 10 disciplinary actions that led to the alleged findings of guilt (see ECF No. 1 at 5), this claim is not 11 cognizable. This is because violations of prison policy and/or state law are not actionable in 12 federal court. See generally 28 U.S.C. § 1983; see Cousins v. Lockyer, 568 F.3d 1063, 1070 (9th 13 Cir. 2009); Galen v. Cty. of Los Angeles, 477 F.3d 652, 662 (9th Cir. 2007) (stating Section 1983 14 requires plaintiff to demonstrate violation of federal law, not state law). 15 There are no facts or information that plaintiff can add to this claim that would render it 16 cognizable. Consequently, plaintiff will not be given the opportunity to amend it. See Hartmann 17 v. CDCR, 707 F.3d 1114, 1130 (9th Cir. 2013) (“A district court may deny leave to amend when 18 amendment would be futile.”); accord Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1129 (9th Cir. 2000) 19 (“Courts are not required to grant leave to amend if a complaint lacks merit entirely.”). 20 c. Use of False Rules Violation and Disciplinary Reports 21 To the extent plaintiff asserts that defendants Zamora and Santo unlawfully used false 22 rules violation reports and/or disciplinary action history, which ultimately led to plaintiff being 23 assigned a higher prison classification (see ECF No. 1 at 8-13), this claim, as currently presented, 24 is not cognizable. This is because, the Due Process Clause itself does not contain any language 25 8 As an aside, the court notes that conspiracy alone is not a constitutional tort under Section 26 1983. There must always be an underlying constitutional violation. See Lacey v. Maricopa Cty., 27 693 F.3d 896, 935 (9th Cir. 2012) (mandating need for underlying constitutional violation to have conspiracy). Accordingly, the court only determines the existence and viability of the substantive 28 constitutional violations. 1 that grants a broad right to be free from false accusations. Freeman v. Rideout, 808 F.2d 949, 951 2 (2nd Cir. 1986). Thus, this argument fails to state a claim, and plaintiff will not be permitted to 3 amend it. See Hartmann, 707 F.3d at 1130. 4 d. No Procedural Due Process: False Rules Violation and Disciplinary 5 Reports 6 At the same time, however, prisoners are entitled to be free from arbitrary actions of 7 prison officials. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 558 (1974); Hanrahan v. Lane, 747 F.2 8 1137, 1140 (7th Cir. 1984) (citing Wolff). The protections against such arbitrary action are the 9 procedural due process requirements set forth in Wolff and identified earlier herein. Thus, filing 10 a false disciplinary charge against an inmate is actionable under Section 1983 if procedural due 11 process protections are not provided. See Freeman, 808 F.2d at 951-52; Hanrahan, 747 F.2d at 12 1141. 13 It is unclear in the record whether it was defendant Zamora or defendant Santo – or both – 14 who created and/or proffered the allegedly false rules violation reports. (See generally ECF No. 1 15 at 3-7). It is also incredibly unclear whether plaintiff received procedural due process after 16 allegedly being falsely accused of rule violations. The court has neither the time, nor the 17 inclination to weed through plaintiff’s convoluted complaint in order to make presumptive 18 determinations regarding these key questions. Therefore, plaintiff will be given the opportunity 19 to amend this claim. If he chooses to do so, he must clearly state which defendant did what and 20 when. He must also indicate whether he was provided the Wolff protections after the allegedly 21 false rules violations and/or disciplinary reports were drawn up. 22 e. Equal Protection: Improper Classification and Loss of Privileges 23 Plaintiff also argues that the false information provided by defendants Zamora and Santo 24 deprived him of “equal protection, equal privileges” and “drastically impair[ed] [his] conditions 25 of confinement by increasing his restrictions.” (See ECF No. 1 at 5-7) (brackets added). 26 Specifically, he asserts that based upon his background factors, he had anticipated receiving a 27 Level III classification. He contends, however, that because of defendants’ false reports, he 28 improperly received a Level IV classification. (See id. at 5-7). As a result, he has more 1 restrictions and “very limited and/or restricted availability of vocational training, educational 2 training or related rehabilitation opportunities” than other inmates. (See id. at 6). For the 3 following reasons, this argument is not cognizable. 4 First, plaintiff’s status as a prisoner does not make him a member of a suspect class, and 5 classification at a particular security level is not a fundamental right. Aros v. Robinson, No. CV 6 04-0306 PHX SRB (LOA), 2012 WL 13105638, at *10 (D. Ariz. Feb. 3, 2012) (citing Webber v. 7 Crabtree, 158 F.3d 460, 461 (9th Cir. 1998) (using suspect class and fundamental right when 8 analyzing equal protection claim)); see generally Rodriguez v. Cook, 169 F.3d 1176, 1179 (9th 9 Cir. 1999) (citations omitted) (noting indigent prisoners are not suspect class). Thus, a showing 10 that plaintiff’s Level IV classification was rationally related to a legitimate governmental 11 objective is all that is needed for defendants’ classification decision to withstand scrutiny. See 12 generally Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1, 10 (1992); Webber, 158 F.3d at 461; see Nelson v. City 13 of Irvine, 143 F.3d 1196, 1205 (9th Cir. 1998). 14 There could be a myriad of reasons why prison officials gave plaintiff a Level IV 15 classification instead of a Level III classification, rational reasons to which most courts could 16 reasonably defer. Federal courts are to “afford appropriate deference and flexibility to state 17 officials trying to manage a volatile environment.” Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 482 (1995); 18 see Myron v. Terhune, 476 F.3d 716, 719 (9th Cir. 2007) (acknowledging Supreme Court 19 directive not to “fine-tune the ordinary incidents of prison life”). Thus, this equal protection 20 claim is not cognizable. 21 Finally, to the extent that this claim also alleges a wrongful deprivation of access to 22 educational training and rehabilitation programs, there is no constitutional right to rehabilitation, 23 and a lack of programming does not violate the Constitution, either. Coakley v. Murphy, 884 24 F.2d 1218, 1221 (9th Cir. 1989) (citations omitted); Hoptowit, 682 F.2d at 1255). 25 For these reasons, plaintiff’s equal protection claim is without merit. Consequently, 26 plaintiff will not be permitted to amend them. See Hartmann, 707 F.3d at 1130. 27 //// 28 //// 1 C. High Desert State Prison Officials: Defendants Hale, Foss and Foston 2 Plaintiff argues that defendants Hale, Foss and Foston at HDSP violated his rights under 3 the “Eighth through Fourteenth” Amendments and were deliberately indifferent to his health and 4 safety as well as to his physical, emotional and psychological well-being when they failed to 5 corroborate the behavioral reports that led to him being assigned to a Level IV prison. (See ECF 6 No. 1 at 8, 10-11). He also contends that these defendants failed to act, in violation of prison 7 policies and procedures, knowing that as a result of their inaction, plaintiff’s conditions of 8 confinement would be severely impaired, and his access to prison programming and educational 9 opportunities would be restricted. (See id. at 8-10). 10 1. Deliberate Indifference: Health, Safety and Classification 11 Construed as an Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim, to wit, that defendants’ 12 assigning plaintiff a Level IV classification constituted deliberate indifference to his mental and 13 physical health and safety, it is without merit. First, plaintiff’s points to no tangible harm – 14 physical or otherwise – that he has actually experienced as a result of the Level IV classification. 15 (See generally ECF No. 1). Deliberate indifference to health or safety in such an analysis is 16 satisfied by showing: “(a) a purposeful act or failure to respond to a prisoner’s pain or possible 17 medical need and (b) harm caused by the indifference.” Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 1091, 1096 (9th 18 Cir. 2006) (internal citations, punctuation and quotation marks omitted); accord, Wilhelm v. 19 Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1122 (9th Cir. 2012); Lemire v. CDCR, 726 F.3d 1062, 1081 (9th Cir. 20 2013). “[T]he mere act of classification does not amount to an infliction of pain.” Therefore, it is 21 not condemned by the Eighth Amendment. See Myron, 476 F.3d at 719 (citation omitted) 22 (internal quotation marks omitted). Moreover, as stated earlier, a prisoner has no constitutional 23 right to a particular classification status. See Moody v. Daggett, 429 U.S. 78, 88 n.9 (1976); 24 Hernandez v. Johnston, 833 F.2d 1316, 1318 (9th Cir. 1987) (citing Moody). 25 For these reasons, plaintiff’s deliberate indifference argument fails to state a claim upon 26 which relief may be granted. Therefore, plaintiff will not be given the opportunity to amend it. 27 See Hartmann, 707 F.3d at 1130. 28 //// 1 2. Failure to Act Resulting in Deprivation of Prison Programming 2 Plaintiff’s claim that defendants Hale, Foss and Foston’s failures to corroborate the 3 behavioral reports that contributed to his Level IV classification is without merit for a couple of 4 reasons. First, its supporting assertion that the three “completely disregarded their own policies 5 and procedures[] and . . . refused to enforce them (see ECF No. 1 at 9) (brackets added),” 6 ultimately challenges defendants’ application of prison rules and regulations. As stated earlier, a 7 misapplication of prison policies and procedures fails to state a claim in a Section 1983 action. 8 See Cousins, 568 F.3d at 1070; Galen, 477 F.3d at 662. Next, as previously stated, an inmate has 9 no constitutional right to prison programming or rehabilitation. See Coakley, 884 F.2d at 1221; 10 Hoptowit, 682 F.2d at 1255. For these reasons, this claim is without merit, and plaintiff may not 11 amend it. See Hartmann, 707 F.3d at 1130. 12 VI. CONCLUSION 13 In sum, the following claim is cognizable, and plaintiff may proceed in this action with it 14 as it has been presented to the court: 15 • The retaliation claim against defendant Zamora of WSP. 16 In addition, the following claims are not cognizable, but plaintiff may amend them: 17 • Plaintiff’s cruel and unusual punishment claims against OCJ officials; 18 • Plaintiff’s retaliation claim against OCJ officials; 19 • Plaintiff’s procedural due process claim against OCJ officials; 20 • The retaliation claim against defendant Santo of OCJ, and 21 • Any procedural due process claims against defendants Zamora and Santo that relate to 22 any false rules violation and/or disciplinary reports filed against plaintiff. 23 Plaintiff is not required to amend his complaint. If he chooses, he may proceed solely on 24 the claim that have been identified as cognizable herein. Whichever choice plaintiff makes, he 25 must inform the court of it via the Notice on How to Proceed form that is attached to the end of 26 this order. 27 //// 28 //// 1 VII. OPTION TO AMEND THE COMPLAINT 2 Plaintiff is being given the opportunity to amend the complaint. If plaintiff chooses to file 3 an amended complaint, it will take the place of the original complaint. See Lacey v. Maricopa 4 Cty., 693 F.3d 896, 925 (9th Cir. 2012) (amended complaint supersedes original). Any amended 5 complaint should observe the following: 6 An amended complaint must identify as a defendant only persons who personally 7 participated in a substantial way in depriving plaintiff of a federal constitutional right. Johnson 8 v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978) (a person subjects another to the deprivation of a 9 constitutional right if he does an act, participates in another's act or omits to perform an act he is 10 legally required to do that causes the alleged deprivation). 11 An amended complaint must also contain a caption including the names of all 12 defendants. Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(a). Plaintiff may not change the nature of this suit by alleging 13 new, unrelated claims. See George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 607 (7th Cir. 2007). 14 Any amended complaint must be written or typed so that it is complete in itself without 15 reference to any earlier filed complaint. See L.R. 220 (E.D. Cal. 2009). This is because an 16 amended complaint supersedes any earlier filed complaint, and once an amended complaint is 17 filed, the earlier filed complaint no longer serves any function in the case. See Loux v. Rhay, 18 375 F.2d 55, 57 (9th Cir. 1967) (“The amended complaint supersedes the original, the latter 19 being treated thereafter as non-existent.”), overruled on other grounds by Lacey v. Maricopa 20 Cty., 693 F.3d 896 (2012). 21 Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: 22 1. The Clerk of Court shall add A. Santo, a prison official at the Orange County Jail, as a 23 defendant in the case caption of the docket; 24 2. Plaintiff’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis (ECF No. 2) is GRANTED; 25 3. Plaintiff is obligated to pay the statutory filing fee of $350.00 for this action. Plaintiff 26 is assessed an initial partial filing fee in accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 27 1915(b)(1). All fees shall be collected and paid in accordance with this court’s order to the 28 appropriate agency filed concurrently herewith, and 2 OP □□□ OP eve PAY AV VE 1 4. Plaintiff's complaint (ECF No. 1) is DISMISSED with leave to amend. 2 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that within sixty days of the date of this order, plaintiff shall 3 | either: 4 1. File an amended complaint, or 5 2. Inform the court in writing that: 6 a. He wishes to proceed only on the cognizable claims identified herein, and 7 b. He voluntarily dismisses any and all other defendants and claims in this action 8 | pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(1)(A)Q). 9 Failure to take one of these courses of action within the time allotted may result in the 10 | dismissal of this action for failure to prosecute and/or failure to obey a court order. See Fed. R. 11 | Civ. P. 41(b); see also L.R. 110. 12 | Dated: August 25, 2020 Vlad” 14 15 ORAH BARNES UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 16 17 | pLB:13 DB/ORDERS/ORDERS.PRISONER.CIVIL RIGHTS /hayd0432.sern 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 16 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 ERIC RYAN HAYDE, No. 2:19-cv-0432 DB P 12 Plaintiff, 13 v. PLAINTIFF’S NOTICE ON HOW TO PROCEED 14 E. ZAMORA, et al., 15 Defendants. 16 CHECK ONE: 17 Plaintiff would like to proceed immediately on his First Amendment retaliation claim 18 against defendant E. Zamora of Wasco State Prison. By choosing to go forward without 19 amending the complaint, plaintiff: (1) consents to the dismissal without prejudice of the claims 20 against defendants A. Santo of Orange County Jail; G. Hale, T. Foss, D. Foston of High Desert 21 State Prison, and any and all employees of the Orange County Jail, and (2) chooses to forego any 22 related and/or potentially viable claims against them and any other potential, yet to be named 23 defendants pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(1)(A)(i). 24 Plaintiff would like to amend the complaint. 25 26 DATED: _______________________________ 27 ERIC RYAN HAYDE Plaintiff Pro Se 28