(PC) Coleman v. Lopez ( 2020 )

1 2 3 4 5 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 6 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 7 8 MICHAEL JOHN COLEMAN, 1:20-cv-00113-GSA (PC) 9 Plaintiff, ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE WHY THIS ACTION SHOULD NOT BE DISMISSED AS 10 vs. BARRED BY HECK V. HUMPHREY, 512 U.S. 477 (1994) AND EDWARDS v. BALISOK, 11 T. LOPEZ, et al., 520 U.S. 641 (1997); AND FOR PLAINTIFF’S FAILURE TO EXHAUST REMEDIES 12 Defendants. BEFORE FILING SUIT 13 (ECF No. 22.) 14 30 DAY DEADLINE TO RESPOND 15 16 I. BACKGROUND 17 Michael John Coleman (“Plaintiff”) is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma 18 pauperis in this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. On January 2, 2020, Plaintiff 19 filed the Complaint commencing this action in the Sacramento Division of the United States 20 District Court for the Eastern District of California. (ECF No. 1.) On January 22, 2020, the case 21 was transferred to this court. (ECF No. 7.) 22 On January 31, 2020, the court screened the Complaint and dismissed it for failure to 23 state a claim, with leave to amend. (ECF No. 10.). On August 24, 2020, Plaintiff filed the First 24 Amended Complaint, which is now before the court for screening. 28 U.S.C. § 1915. (ECF No. 25 22.) 26 II. SCREENING REQUIREMENT 27 The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a 28 governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The 1 Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally 2 “frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek 3 monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1),(2). 4 “Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been paid, the court shall 5 dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that the action or appeal fails to state a claim 6 upon which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). 7 A complaint is required to contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that 8 the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not 9 required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere 10 conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell 11 Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). While a plaintiff’s allegations are taken 12 as true, courts “are not required to indulge unwarranted inferences.” Doe I v. Wal-Mart Stores, 13 Inc., 572 F.3d 677, 681 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). To state 14 a viable claim, Plaintiff must set forth “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim 15 to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79; Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 16 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). While factual allegations are accepted as true, legal 17 conclusions are not. Id. The mere possibility of misconduct falls short of meeting this 18 plausibility standard. Id. 19 III. SUMMARY OF FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT 20 Plaintiff is presently incarcerated at Salinas Valley State Prison in Soledad, California. 21 The events at issue in the First Amended Complaint took place at the California Substance Abuse 22 Treatment Facility (SATF) in Corcoran, California, when Plaintiff was incarcerated there in the 23 custody of the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation. Plaintiff names as 24 defendants T. Lopez, Sergeant K. Sudano, Lieutenant M. Jones, and Correctional Officer 25 Cavagnaro. 26 Following is a brief summary of Plaintiff’s allegations: 27 Plaintiff alleges that he was issued a 115 Rules Violation Report (RVR) at SATF on 28 October 29, 2019, for possession of a deadly weapon after two razor blades were found in his 1 cell. Plaintiff claims that he was wrongly charged and sent to the Security Housing Unit (SHU) 2 while he awaited his RVR hearing, violating his rights to due process. 3 He further alleges that on January 21, 2020, at his RVR hearing, he was found guilty of 4 possession of a deadly weapon. He requested 6 witnesses and only one was interviewed. He 5 suffered a credit loss of 365 days and lost contact visiting privileges. He also had 24 points 6 applied to his classification score. He served a term in the SHU. Plaintiff alleges that the guilty 7 finding will affect his ability to be released as a non-violent offender on parole pursuant to 8 Proposition 47. He was advised that a credit forfeiture for a Division A, B, or C offense will not 9 be restored. 10 As relief, Plaintiff seeks an order reversing the punitive effects of the guilty finding from 11 his record. 12 IV. HECK V. HUMPHREY, 512 U.S. 477 (1994) AND EDWARDS v. BALISOK, 520 13 U.S. 641 (1997) 14 When a prisoner challenges the legality or duration of his custody, or raises a 15 constitutional challenge which could entitle him to an earlier release, his sole federal remedy is 16 a writ of habeas corpus. Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475 (1973); Young v. Kenny, 907 F.2d 17 874 (9th Cir. 1990), cert. denied 11 S.Ct. 1090 (1991). Moreover, when seeking damages for an 18 allegedly unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, “a § 1983 plaintiff must prove that the 19 conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared 20 invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into question by a 21 federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2254.” Heck v. Humphrey, 512 22 U.S. 477, 487-88 (1994). “A claim for damages bearing that relationship to a conviction or 23 sentence that has not been so invalidated is not cognizable under § 1983.” Id. at 488. This 24 “favorable termination” requirement has been extended to actions under § 1983 that, if 25 successful, would imply the invalidity of prison administrative decisions which result in a 26 forfeiture of good-time credits. Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641, 643–647 (1997). 27 Here, Plaintiff alleges that he suffered a credit loss of 365 days when he was found guilty 28 of possession of a deadly weapon. If successful, a decision in this case would imply the invalidity 1 of the prison administrative decision which resulted in Plaintiff’s forfeiture of good-time credits. 2 The First Amended Complaint does not contain any allegations to show that Plaintiff’s finding 3 of guilt under the RVR has been reversed, expunged, declared invalid, or called into question by 4 a writ of habeas corpus. Therefore, Plaintiff shall be required to show cause in writing why this 5 action should not be dismissed as barred by Heck or Edwards. 6 V. EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES 7 It appears on the face of Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint that neither has he 8 exhausted his administrative remedies before filing suit. 9 Pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995, “[n]o action shall be brought with 10 respect to prison conditions under [42 U.S.C. § 1983], or any other Federal law, by a prisoner 11 confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as 12 are available are exhausted.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). Prisoners are required to exhaust the 13 available administrative remedies prior to filing suit. Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 211, 127 S.Ct. 14 910 (2007); McKinney v. Carey, 311 F.3d 1198, 1199-1201 (9th Cir. 2002). Exhaustion is 15 required regardless of the relief sought by the prisoner and regardless of the relief offered by the 16 process, Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 741, 121 S.Ct. 1819 (2001), and the exhaustion 17 requirement applies to all suits relating to prison life, Porter v. Nussle, 435 U.S. 516, 532, 122 18 S.Ct. 983 (2002). 19 Prisoners are required to exhaust before bringing suit. Booth, 532 U.S. at 741. From the 20 face of Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint, it appears clear that Plaintiff filed suit prematurely 21 and in such instances, the case may be dismissed. Albino v. Baca, 747 F.3d 1162, 1169 (9th Cir. 22 2014) (en banc) (where failure to exhaust is clear from face of complaint, case is subject to 23 dismissal for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b(6)); Wyatt v. Terhune, 315 F.3d 1108, 1120 24 (9th Cir. 2003) (“A prisoner’s concession to nonexhaustion is a valid ground for dismissal. . . .”) 25 (overruled on other grounds by Albino, 747 F.3d at 1168-69); see also Nordstrom v. Ryan, 762 26 F.3d 903, 908 (9th Cir. 2014) (“Dismissal for failure to state a claim under § 1915A ‘incorporates 27 the familiar standard applied in the context of failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil 28 Procedure 12(b)(6).’”) (quoting Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1121 (9th Cir. 2012)). 1 Discussion 2 Plaintiff brings allegations in the First Amended Complaint of events occurring after the 3 original Complaint was filed. For example, Plaintiff alleges that he was found guilty of 4 possession of a deadly weapon at his RVR hearing on January 21, 2020, and as a result of the 5 guilty finding he suffered a credit loss of 365 days, lost contact visiting privileges, had 24 points 6 applied to his classification score, and was given a term in the SHU. As relief in the First 7 Amended Complaint, Plaintiff seeks an order reversing the punitive effects of the guilty finding 8 from his record. 9 Because Plaintiff filed his original Complaint on January 2, 2020, which was before his 10 RVR hearing took place on January 20, 2020, Plaintiff could not have exhausted his remedies 11 for his due process claim concerning the guilty finding before he brought this lawsuit. Therefore, 12 Plaintiff shall be required to show cause why this case should not be dismissed based on 13 Plaintiff’s failure to exhaust his administrative remedies before filing suit. 14 VI. ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE 15 In light of the foregoing analysis, Plaintiff is HEREBY ORDERED to respond in writing 16 to this order, within thirty (30) days of the date of service of this order, showing cause why this 17 case should not be dismissed as barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994) and Edwards 18 v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641 (1997), and dismissed for Plaintiff’s failure to exhaust his administrative 19 remedies before filing suit. 20 Failure to respond to this order may result in the dismissal of this case. 21 IT IS SO ORDERED. 22 23 Dated: September 1, 2020 /s/ Gary S. Austin UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 24 25 26 27 28