(PC) Cyprian v. Constable ( 2020 )

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 REALIOUS CYPRIAN, No. 2:19-cv-0689 AC P 12 Plaintiff, 13 v. ORDER 14 T. CONSTABLE, et al., 15 Defendants. 16 17 Plaintiff, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, seeks relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 18 has requested authority pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915 to proceed in forma pauperis. ECF Nos. 1, 19 2. This proceeding was referred to this court by Local Rule 302 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 20 636(b)(1)(B). Plaintiff has also requested the appointment of counsel. See ECF No. 1 at 6. 21 For the reasons stated below, plaintiff’s application to proceed in forma pauperis will be 22 granted, and plaintiff will be permitted to proceed with the cognizable claims of the complaint. 23 Plaintiff’s request for the appointment of counsel will be denied 24 I. IN FORMA PAUPERIS APPLICATION 25 Plaintiff has submitted a declaration that makes the showing required by 28 U.S.C. § 26 1915(a). See ECF Nos. 2, 6. Accordingly, the request to proceed in forma pauperis will be 27 granted. 28 //// 1 Plaintiff is required to pay the statutory filing fee of $350.00 for this action. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2 1914(a), 1915(b)(1). By this order, plaintiff will be assessed an initial partial filing fee in 3 accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). By separate order, the court will direct 4 the appropriate agency to collect the initial partial filing fee from plaintiff’s trust account and 5 forward it to the Clerk of Court. Thereafter, plaintiff will be obligated for monthly payments of 6 twenty percent of the preceding month’s income credited to plaintiff’s prison trust account. 7 These payments will be forwarded by the appropriate agency to the Clerk of Court each time the 8 amount in plaintiff’s account exceeds $10.00, until the filing fee is paid in full. 28 U.S.C. § 9 1915(b)(2). 10 II. SCREENING REQUIREMENT 11 The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a 12 governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The 13 court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally 14 “frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek 15 monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1)-(2). 16 A claim is legally frivolous when it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact. 17 Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989); Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1227-28 (9th 18 Cir. 1984). The court may, therefore, dismiss a claim as frivolous where it is based on an 19 indisputably meritless legal theory or where the factual contentions are clearly baseless. Neitzke, 20 490 U.S. at 327. The critical inquiry is whether a constitutional claim, however inartfully 21 pleaded, has an arguable legal and factual basis. See Jackson v. Arizona, 885 F.2d 639, 640 (9th 22 Cir. 1989); Franklin, 745 F.2d at 1227. 23 A complaint, or portion thereof, should only be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon 24 which relief may be granted if it appears beyond doubt that plaintiff can prove no set of facts in 25 support of the claim or claims that would entitle him to relief. Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 26 U.S. 69, 73 (1984) (citing Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957)); Palmer v. Roosevelt 27 Lake Log Owners Ass’n, 651 F.2d 1289, 1294 (9th Cir. 1981). In reviewing a complaint under 28 this standard, the court must accept as true the allegations of the complaint in question, Hosp. 1 Bldg. Co. v. Rex Hosp. Trustees, 425 U.S. 738, 740 (1976), construe the pleading in the light 2 most favorable to the plaintiff, and resolve all doubts in the plaintiff’s favor, Jenkins v. 3 McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421 (1969). 4 III. PLEADING STANDARD 5 Section 1983 “provides a cause of action for the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or 6 immunities secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States.” Wilder v. Virginia Hosp. 7 Ass’n, 496 U.S. 498, 508 (1990) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1983). Section 1983 is not itself a source 8 of substantive rights, but merely provides a method for vindicating federal rights conferred 9 elsewhere. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393-94 (1989). 10 To state a claim under Section 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: (1) 11 that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated and (2) that the 12 alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. See West v. 13 Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Ketchum v. Alameda County., 811 F.2d 1243, 1245 (9th Cir. 14 1987). 15 A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the 16 pleader is entitled to relief . . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not 17 required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere 18 conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell 19 Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). Plaintiff must set forth “sufficient factual 20 matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. Facial 21 plausibility demands more than the mere possibility that a defendant committed misconduct and, 22 while factual allegations are accepted as true, legal conclusions are not. Id. at 677-78. 23 Under Section 1983, a plaintiff bringing an individual capacity claim must demonstrate 24 that each defendant personally participated in the deprivation of his rights. See Jones v. 25 Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 2002). There must be an actual connection or link between 26 the actions of the defendants and the deprivation alleged to have been suffered by plaintiff. See 27 Ortez v. Washington County, State of Oregon, 88 F.3d 804, 809 (9th Cir. 1996); see also Taylor 28 v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989). 1 IV. PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT 2 Plaintiff names Correctional Officer T. Constable, Lieutenant S. Amador, and Second 3 Watch Officer J. Thomas1 – all employees at California Health Care Facility (“CHCF”) – as 4 defendants in this action. See ECF No. 1 at 1-2;2 see also ECF No. 5 at 1. He contends that his 5 Eighth Amendment rights were violated when, on July 28, 2018, defendant Constable and his 6 partner, defendant Thomas, failed to protect him from an attack on the yard by an angry EOP 7 mental health inmate. See id. at 3. As a result of the attack, plaintiff was seriously injured. See 8 id. 9 Plaintiff further alleges that he was denied his rights to due process and equal protection 10 under the Fourteenth Amendment and that his Eighth Amendment rights were violated when, at 11 his subsequent, related disciplinary hearing about the altercation, defendant Amador refused to 12 allow him to present video footage that would have shown the officers’ failure to act during the 13 incident as well as his attempt to avoid the attack. See generally ECF No. 1 at 4. He alleges that 14 because he was unable to present the video at his hearing, he was wrongly punished. See 15 generally id. 16 V. DISCUSSION 17 A. Failure to Protect 18 Plaintiff alleges that on July 28, 2018, he was being repeatedly threatened by an angry 19 EOP mental health inmate for two minutes. During the confrontation, defendant Constable and 20 defendant Thomas simply sat and watched the incident transpire, failing to intervene. See ECF 21 No. 1 at 3. Plaintiff further alleges that in response to the inmate’s aggression towards him, he 22 placed his hands in the air and backed away, to no avail. See id. Eventually, the inmate attacked 23 24 1 In the complaint, plaintiff initially stated that the name of the second watch officer was unknown and that he hoped to learn her name via discovery. See ECF No. 1 at 2. Thereafter, 25 however, plaintiff informed the court that her name is J. Thomas. See ECF No. 5 at 1. 26 Accordingly, the Clerk of Court will be directed to add J. Thomas as a defendant to the case caption of the docket. 27 2 Plaintiff also names Does 4 through 10, ECF No. 1 at 2, but makes no charging allegations against them. Because there are no claims against the putative Doe defendants, they will be 28 disregarded. 1 plaintiff, and plaintiff fought back. During the fight, plaintiff’s right eye was badly injured as 2 well as his nose. See id. 3 “The Eighth Amendment imposes a duty on prison officials to protect inmates from 4 violence at the hands of other inmates.” Cortez v. Skol, 776 F.3d 1046, 1050 (9th Cir. 2015). 5 The right to personal security is an “historic liberty interest” that is protected substantively by the 6 Due Process Clause. Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 315 (1982). This right is not 7 extinguished by lawful confinement, even for penal purposes. See generally Hutto v. Finney, 437 8 U.S. 678 (1978). Insufficient protection of a prisoner resulting in harm inflicted by other inmates 9 may also violate a prisoner’s due process rights. Hernandez v. Denton, 861 F.2d 1421, 1424 (9th 10 Cir. 1988) (citing Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 315-16). 11 Plaintiff has presented cognizable Eighth Amendment failure to protect claims against 12 defendants Constable and Thomas. Accordingly, plaintiff may proceed with these claims. 13 B. Denial of Due Process 14 Plaintiff alleges that after the fight, he was written up for “attempting to defend 15 [himself].” See ECF No. 1 at 4 (brackets added). He contends that there was video of the fight 16 and of the events that led up to it. See generally id. at 4. The video would have shown defendant 17 Constable’s and defendant Thomas’ failures to intervene, and it would have also shown that 18 plaintiff had attempted to avoid the attack. See id. at 4. When plaintiff sought the exculpatory 19 footage in order to present it at his disciplinary hearing, defendant Lieutenant S. Amador refused 20 to allow its production. See id. Thereafter, plaintiff was wrongfully punished for his actions. 21 See id. 22 In the prison disciplinary context, plaintiff has a right to procedural due process. The 23 minimum procedural requirements that satisfy due process are as follows: (1) advance, written 24 notice of violation; (2) provision of at least 24 hours to prepare for committee appearance; (3) 25 written statement of fact-finding; (4) the right to present witnesses and evidence where it would 26 not be unduly hazardous to institutional safety; (5) an impartial decision-making body, and (6) 27 assistance if inmate is illiterate or if issues are complex. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 564- 28 70 (1974); see generally Hanrahan v. Lane, 747 F.2d 1137, 1140 (1984). These requirements 1 protect prisoners from “arbitrary actions extinguishing their privileges.” Hanrahan, 747 F.2d at 2 1140 (citation omitted). 3 Plaintiff has stated a cognizable Fourteenth Amendment claim of deprivation of due 4 process against defendant Amador. Wolff requires that an inmate be provided the opportunity to 5 present witnesses and evidence, and while that right is not absolute (see Wolff, 418 U.S. at 566 6 (stating institutional safety, correctional goals exceptions)), the alleged refusal to consider 7 exculpatory evidence at his disciplinary hearing reasonably supports plaintiff’s claim that he was 8 deprived of due process. Therefore, plaintiff will be permitted to proceed with this claim. 9 C. Denial of Equal Protection 10 Plaintiff alleges that defendant Amador violated his right to equal protection under the law 11 when he refused to produce the video of the altercation so that plaintiff could defend himself 12 during his disciplinary hearing. See ECF No. 1 at 4. Specifically, plaintiff contends that in other 13 similar rules violation hearings, the camera footage is produced. He further alleges that prison 14 officials “have a custom to produce camera footage at hearings when it is ‘adverse’ to an inmate, 15 but when the camera footage is ‘exculpatory’ [prison officials] will not produce it.” See id. at 4 16 (brackets added) (quotation marks in original). 17 The Equal Protection Clause requires that persons who are similarly situated be treated 18 alike, see City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985), and 19 accordingly protects prisoners from arbitrary state action, see Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 20 487 n.11 (1995). An equal protection claim may be established by showing that defendants 21 intentionally discriminated against a plaintiff based upon his membership in a protected class, 22 Hartmann v. Calif. Dept. of Corrs. and Rehab., 707 F.3d 1114, 1123 (9th Cir. 2013), or that 23 similarly situated individuals were intentionally treated differently without a rational relationship 24 to a legitimate state purpose, Engquist v. Oregon Dept. of Agriculture, 553 U.S. 591, 601-602 25 (2008). 26 When an equal protection claim is premised on unique treatment rather than on a 27 classification, the Supreme Court has described it as a “class of one” claim. Village of 28 Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000) (per curiam). To state such a claim, a plaintiff 1 must allege that the defendant intentionally, and without rational basis, treated him differently 2 from those who were similarly situated. See Olech, 528 U.S. at 564. A class of one plaintiff 3 must show that the discriminatory treatment “was intentionally directed just at him, as opposed. . . 4 to being an accident or a random act.” Jackson v. Burke, 256 F.3d 93, 96 (2d Cir. 2001). 5 Plaintiff has presented a cognizable equal protection claim against defendant Amador. He 6 has alleged that defendant Amador treated him differently from other inmates when he refused to 7 produce the video at plaintiff’s disciplinary hearing, and that he did so because the video was 8 exculpatory. See generally ECF No. 1 at 4. Preventing the presentation of a video during a 9 disciplinary hearing because it is exculpatory is not rationally related to a legitimate state purpose. 10 Moreover, plaintiff’s allegation that exculpatory videos are routinely suppressed supports a 11 conclusion that this was not a random occurrence. Accordingly, plaintiff may proceed with his 12 equal protection claim against defendant Amador. 13 VI. APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL 14 The complaint includes a request for the appointment of counsel. See ECF No. 1 at 6. 15 The request is preceded by the statement that plaintiff is currently a patient in the California 16 Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation’s EOP Mental Health program and that he is being 17 treated with psychotropic medication. See id. The complaint also indicates that plaintiff was 18 assisted with its preparation. See id. 19 The United States Supreme Court has ruled that district courts lack authority to require 20 counsel to represent indigent prisoners in § 1983 cases. Mallard v. United States Dist. Court, 490 21 U.S. 296, 298 (1989). In certain exceptional circumstances, the court may request the voluntary 22 assistance of counsel pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1). Terrell v. Brewer, 935 F.2d 1015, 1017 23 (9th Cir. 1991); Wood v. Housewright, 900 F.2d 1332, 1335-36 (9th Cir. 1990). 24 To date, plaintiff has been able to present claims to the court that are both concise and 25 cognizable. See generally ECF No. 1. The fact that plaintiff had assistance in drafting the 26 complaint does not compel the conclusion that counsel is necessary; plaintiff plainly has 27 sufficient understanding of his case for the complaint to have been adequately drafted by another 28 individual. Accordingly, the court does not find the required exceptional circumstances at this MASS 2 LDU MMU I eT er AY UNM O 1 | time. Therefore, plaintiff's request for the appointment of counsel will be denied. 2 For the reasons stated above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: 3 1. The Clerk of Court shall replace the defendant identified as “Second Watch Officer” 4 || in the case caption of the docket with the name “J. Thomas”; 5 2. Plaintiff’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis (ECF No. 2) is GRANTED; 6 3. Plaintiff is obligated to pay the statutory filing fee of $350.00 for this action. Plaintiff 7 || 1s assessed an initial partial filing fee in accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 8 | 1915(b)(1). All fees shall be collected and paid in accordance with this court’s order to the 9 | appropriate agency filed concurrently herewith; 10 4. Plaintiff's request for the appointment of counsel (see ECF No. | at 6) is DENIED, 11 | and 12 5. Plaintiffs motions to screen the complaint (ECF Nos. 11, 14, 15) are DENIED as 13 || moot. 14 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that: 15 1. This action shall only proceed on the cognizable claims identified herein, and 16 2. Plaintiff has stated cognizable claims against the following defendants: 17 e Correctional Officer T. Constable; 18 e Correctional Officer J. Thomas, and 19 e Lieutenant S. Amador. 20 Under separate order, the court shall direct that service be initiated on these defendants 21 || under the court’s E-Service Pilot Program for civil rights cases for the Eastern District of 22 || California. 23 || DATED: September 14, 2020 ~ 24 CtAt0r2— Chane ALLISON CLAIRE 25 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 26 27 28