(PC)Estrada v. Fruchtenicht ( 2020 )

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 FRANK RUDOLPH ESTRADA, No. 2:20-CV-1523-KJM-DMC-P 12 Plaintiff, 13 v. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 14 DAN FRUCHTENICHT, et al., 15 Defendants. 16 17 Plaintiff, a prisoner proceeding pro se, brings this civil rights action pursuant to 18 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Pending before the Court is Plaintiff’s complaint (ECF No. 1). 19 The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief 20 against a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C. 21 § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if it: (1) is frivolous or 22 malicious; (2) fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted; or (3) seeks monetary relief 23 from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2). Moreover, 24 the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require that complaints contain a “. . . short and plain 25 statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). This 26 means that claims must be stated simply, concisely, and directly. See McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d 27 1172, 1177 (9th Cir. 1996) (referring to Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(e)(1)). These rules are satisfied if the 28 complaint gives the defendant fair notice of the plaintiff’s claim and the grounds upon which it 1 rests. See Kimes v. Stone, 84 F.3d 1121, 1129 (9th Cir. 1996). Because Plaintiff must allege 2 with at least some degree of particularity overt acts by specific defendants which support the 3 claims, vague and conclusory allegations fail to satisfy this standard. Additionally, it is 4 impossible for the Court to conduct the screening required by law when the allegations are vague 5 and conclusory. 6 7 I. PLAINTIFF’S ALLEGATIONS 8 Plaintiff is currently incarcerated at the California Correctional Center in 9 Susanville and is filing suit against Yolo County’s Chief Probation Officer Dan Fruchtenicht, 10 Supervising Probation Officer Terry M. Chadwick, and Probation Officers Gonzalez and Lara. 11 ECF No. 1 at 3-5. Plaintiff alleges damages arising from false statements made in a probation 12 report resulting in his detention. Id. Plaintiff does not, however, specify which, if any, of the 13 defendant’s authored the probation report at issue. Id. Plaintiff alleges that a probation report 14 was written on or before June 10, 2019. Id. He contends that the contents of that report were 15 factually inaccurate. Id. Plaintiff alleges that the report stated that he had failed to comply with 16 the orders of his probation to enroll in counseling when he had in fact enrolled in and completed 17 the mandated counseling. Id. at 3-4. The report also stated that plaintiff had violated his 18 probation prior to June 10, 2019, and that there were no mitigating circumstances to his alleged 19 violation of probation. Id. at 4-5. Plaintiff contends that both of those statements were untrue. 20 Id. 4-5. Plaintiff alleges that there were multiple probation reports submitted, one of which, dated 21 July 6, 2019, stated that Plaintiff’s probation should be reinstated, while the other, dated June 10, 22 2019, stated he should be sentenced to state prison for 5 years and 8 months. Id. at 5. Plaintiff 23 does not identify who authored either of these reports. Id. Plaintiff contends that, as a result of 24 the false claims made in the probation report, he has been wrongly incarcerated. Id. at 3-5. 25 / / / 26 / / / 27 / / / 28 / / / 1 II. DISCUSSION 2 Plaintiff fails to allege sufficient facts to establish a causal link between the alleged 3 actions and any of the defendants. Plaintiff also fails to allege sufficient facts to find supervisory 4 liability for defendants Fruchtenicht and Chadwick. Further, Plaintiff’s allegations do not give 5 rise to a cognizable claim under § 1983. 6 A. Causal Link 7 To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the plaintiff must allege an actual 8 connection or link between the actions of the named defendants and the alleged deprivations. See 9 Monell v. Dep’t of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976). “A 10 person ‘subjects’ another to the deprivation of a constitutional right, within the meaning of 11 § 1983, if he does an affirmative act, participates in another's affirmative acts, or omits to perform 12 an act which he is legally required to do that causes the deprivation of which complaint is made.” 13 Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). Vague and conclusory allegations 14 concerning the involvement of official personnel in civil rights violations are not sufficient. See 15 Ivey v. Board of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). Rather, the plaintiff must set forth 16 specific facts as to each individual defendant’s causal role in the alleged constitutional 17 deprivation. See Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 634 (9th Cir. 1988). 18 Plaintiff names four defendants in this case, Dan Fruchtenicht, Terry M. 19 Chadwick, Gonzalez, and Lara. At no point in Plaintiff’s complaint does he identify what actions 20 any of these defendants undertook directly. While plaintiff does allege that a false probation 21 report was written, he does not identify which, if any, of the defendant’s authored it. Plaintiff has 22 failed to establish that there was any specific act done by any specific defendant named in this 23 case. As such, the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to state a cognizable claim against the 24 defendants. 25 / / / 26 / / / 27 / / / 28 / / / 1 B. Supervisor Liability 2 Supervisory personnel are generally not liable under § 1983 for the actions of their 3 employees. See Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding that there is no 4 respondeat superior liability under § 1983). A supervisor is only liable for the constitutional 5 violations of subordinates if the supervisor participated in or directed the violations. See id. The 6 Supreme Court has rejected the notion that a supervisory defendant can be liable based on 7 knowledge and acquiescence in a subordinate’s unconstitutional conduct because government 8 officials, regardless of their title, can only be held liable under § 1983 for his or her own conduct 9 and not the conduct of others. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676 (2009). Supervisory 10 personnel who implement a policy so deficient that the policy itself is a repudiation of 11 constitutional rights and the moving force behind a constitutional violation may, however, be 12 liable even where such personnel do not overtly participate in the offensive act. See Redman v. 13 Cnty of San Diego, 942 F.2d 1435, 1446 (9th Cir. 1991) (en banc). 14 When a defendant holds a supervisory position, the causal link between such 15 defendant and the claimed constitutional violation must be specifically alleged. See Fayle v. 16 Stapley, 607 F.2d 858, 862 (9th Cir. 1979); Mosher v. Saalfeld, 589 F.2d 438, 441 (9th Cir. 17 1978). Vague and conclusory allegations concerning the involvement of supervisory personnel in 18 civil rights violations are not sufficient. See Ivey v. Board of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th 19 Cir. 1982). “[A] plaintiff must plead that each Government-official defendant, through the 20 official’s own individual actions, has violated the constitution.” Iqbal, 662 U.S. at 676. 21 Plaintiff names the Chief Probation Officer and a Supervising Officer in his 22 complaint. In addition to the above failure to establish any specific acts of these defendants, 23 supervisors in § 1983 cases generally are not liable for the acts of their subordinates. See Taylor, 24 880 F.2d at 1045. Plaintiff has failed to establish that either supervisory defendant – Fruchtenicht 25 or Chadwick – participated in or directed any actions that resulted in any alleged deprivations. 26 Because Plaintiff has not alleged sufficient facts to establish supervisor liability against 27 Fruchtenicht or Chadwick, the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to state a cognizable claim 28 against Fruchtenicht or Chadwick. 1 C. Relation to Habeas 2 When a state prisoner challenges the legality of his custody and the relief he seeks 3 is a determination that he is entitled to an earlier or immediate release, such a challenge is not 4 cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the prisoner’s sole federal remedy is a petition for a writ 5 of habeas corpus. See Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 500 (1973); see also Neal v. Shimoda, 6 131 F.3d 818, 824 (9th Cir. 1997); Trimble v. City of Santa Rosa, 49 F.3d 583, 586 (9th Cir. 7 1995) (per curiam). Thus, where a § 1983 action seeking monetary damages or declaratory relief 8 alleges constitutional violations which would necessarily imply the invalidity of the prisoner’s 9 underlying conviction or sentence, or the result of a prison disciplinary hearing resulting in 10 imposition of a sanction affecting the overall length of confinement, such a claim is not 11 cognizable under § 1983 unless the conviction or sentence has first been invalidated on appeal, by 12 habeas petition, or through some similar proceeding. See Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 483- 13 84 (1994) (concluding that § 1983 claim not cognizable because allegations were akin to 14 malicious prosecution action which includes as an element a finding that the criminal proceeding 15 was concluded in plaintiff’s favor); Butterfield v. Bail, 120 F.3d 1023, 1024-25 (9th Cir. 1997) 16 (concluding that § 1983 claim not cognizable because allegations of procedural defects were an 17 attempt to challenge substantive result in parole hearing); cf. Neal, 131 F.3d at 824 (concluding 18 that § 1983 claim was cognizable because challenge was to conditions for parole eligibility and 19 not to any particular parole determination); cf. Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74 (2005) 20 (concluding that § 1983 action seeking changes in procedures for determining when an inmate is 21 eligible for parole consideration not barred because changed procedures would hasten future 22 parole consideration and not affect any earlier parole determination under the prior procedures). 23 Success on the merits of plaintiff’s claims in this case necessarily implies that his 24 current imprisonment is invalid. Plaintiff states that he is imprisoned as a direct consequence of 25 the alleged falsehoods found in probation reports. For the foregoing reasons, the Court finds that 26 Plaintiff has failed to state a cognizable claim against any of the defendants under § 1983. 27 / / / 28 / / / MAIS 2 □□□ □□ UUING INI RAINING UC IO ee OY VV 1 I. CONCLUSION 2 Because it does not appear possible that the deficiencies identified herein can be 3 | cured by amending the complaint, Plaintiff is not entitled to leave to amend prior to dismissal of 4 | the entire action. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126, 1131 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). 5 | Specifically, while it may be possible to cure the defects regarding failure to allege a causal link 6 | and failure to allege sufficient facts to establish supervisory liability, the Heck-bar discussed 7 | above is fatal to plaintiff's action. 8 Based on the foregoing, the undersigned recommends that Plaintiff's complaint be g | dismissed without leave to amend and with prejudice. 10 These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District 11 | Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(). Within 14 days 12 | after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written 13 | objections with the court. Responses to objections shall be filed within 14 days after service of 14 | objections. Failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal. See 15 | Martinez v. Yist, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991). 16 17 | Dated: September 16, 2020 Ssvcqo_ 18 DENNIS M. COTA 19 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28