Ramirez v. City of Bakersfield ( 2020 )

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 ANTHONY MARKIS RAMIREZ, et al., No. 1:19-cv-01413-DAD-JLT 12 Plaintiffs, 13 v. ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO STAY PROCEEDINGS 14 CITY OF BAKERSFIELD, et al., (Doc. No. 8) 15 Defendants. 16 17 On November 19, 2019, defendants City of Bakersfield, Isaac Aleman, and Ryan 18 McWilliams (collectively “defendants”) moved for a stay in this action. (Doc. No. 8.) Plaintiffs 19 Anthony Markis Ramirez and Marinah Renae Segura (collectively, “plaintiffs”), who are 20 represented by counsel in this action, have not opposed the pending motion, filed a statement of 21 non-opposition, or otherwise communicated with the court regarding the pending motion. The 22 court deems the motion suitable for decision without oral argument pursuant to Local Rule 23 230(g).1 Having considered the defendants’ motion, and for the reasons stated below, the court 24 will grant the motion to stay. 25 1 The undersigned apologizes for the delay in the issuance of this order. This court’s 26 overwhelming caseload has been well publicized and the long-standing lack of judicial resources 27 in this district has reached crisis proportion. (See Doc. No. 16.) Unfortunately, that situation sometimes results in a submitted matter being overlooked for a period of time and that occurred 28 with respect to this motion. 1 BACKGROUND 2 In their complaint, plaintiffs allege as follows. On February 11, 2019 at approximately 3 4:30 p.m., plaintiffs were placed under surveillance by the Bakersfield Police Department for 4 suspected involvement in a carjacking incident that had occurred earlier that day. (Doc. No. 1 5 (“Compl.”) at ¶ 16.) Defendants McWilliams and Aleman, along with other Bakersfield Police 6 Department detectives staged in the area, observed plaintiffs getting into a gray Mustang and 7 ultimately rushed plaintiffs with firearms. (Id. at ¶ 17.) Plaintiff Ramirez sustained multiple 8 gunshot wounds, rendering him paralyzed from his armpits down, resulting in him being confined 9 to a wheelchair for the remainder of his life. (Id. at ¶ 19.) Both plaintiffs claim to have suffered 10 extreme psychological distress and injury, including fear, trauma, anxiety, stress, depression, 11 humiliation, and emotional distress as a result of this incident. (Id. at ¶ 20.) 12 On October 7, 2019, plaintiffs filed this action seeking damages stemming from the 13 alleged excessive use of force in violation of their Fourth Amendment rights, municipal liability 14 based upon alleged unconstitutional customs or policies, and causes of action brought under state 15 law. (Id.) On November 19, 2019, defendants filed this motion to stay proceedings, arguing that 16 in a criminal proceeding currently pending in the Kern County Superior Court plaintiffs are 17 charged with assault with a deadly weapon other than a firearm and reckless evading of a peace 18 officer based on the same events alleged in this complaint filed in this action. (Doc. No. 8; see 19 also Doc. No. 8-2.) On January 10, 2020, defendants filed a statement noting plaintiffs’ failure to 20 respond to the pending motion and requesting this court grant the motion in its entirety without 21 oral argument. (Doc. No. 13.) 22 LEGAL STANDARD 23 “[T]he power to stay proceedings is incidental to the power inherent in every court to 24 control the disposition of the causes on its docket with economy of time and effort for itself, for 25 counsel, and for litigants.” Landis v. N. Am. Co., 299 U.S. 248, 254 (1936); accord Stone v. INS, 26 514 U.S. 386, 411 (1995) (“[W]e have long recognized that courts have inherent power to stay 27 proceedings and ‘to control the disposition of the causes on its docket with economy of time and 28 effort for itself, for counsel, and for litigants.’” (Breyer, J., dissenting) (quoting Landis, 299 U.S. 1 at 254)). Deciding whether to grant a stay pending the outcome of other proceedings “calls for 2 the exercise of judgment, which must weigh competing interests and maintain an even balance.” 3 Landis, 299 U.S. at 254–55. 4 The party seeking such a stay must “make out a clear case of hardship or inequity in being 5 required to go forward, if there is even a fair possibility that the stay for which he prays will work 6 damage to some one [sic] else.” Id. at 255. In considering whether to grant a stay, this court 7 must weigh several factors, including “[1] the possible damage which may result from the 8 granting of a stay, [2] the hardship or inequity which a party may suffer in being required to go 9 forward, and [3] the orderly course of justice measured in terms of the simplifying or 10 complicating of issues, proof, and questions of law which could be expected to result from a 11 stay.” CMAX, Inc. v. Hall, 300 F.2d 265, 268 (9th Cir. 1962) (citing Landis, 299 U.S. at 254–55). 12 A stay may be granted regardless of whether the separate proceedings are “judicial, 13 administrative, or arbitral in character, and does not require that the issues in such proceedings are 14 necessarily controlling of the action before the court.” Leyva v. Certified Grocers of Cal., Ltd., 15 593 F.2d 857, 864 (9th Cir. 1979). 16 DISCUSSION 17 Defendants have moved to stay this action on the grounds that (1) the abstention doctrine 18 set forth in Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971) applies to this case; and (2) a stay would 19 preserve defendants’ right to bring a motion to bar plaintiffs’ claims under the doctrine set forth 20 in Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). (Doc. No. 8-1 at 3, 5.) The court addresses each 21 argument in turn. 22 A. Younger Abstention 23 “Younger abstention is a jurisprudential doctrine rooted in overlapping principles of 24 equity, comity, and federalism.” San Jose Silicon Valley Chamber of Commerce Political Action 25 Comm. v. City of San Jose, 546 F.3d 1087, 1091 (9th Cir. 2008). While “comity is the main 26 reason for federal court restraint in the face of ongoing state judicial proceedings, . . . another is to 27 avoid unwarranted determinations of federal constitutional law.” Gilbertson v. Albright, 381 F.3d 28 965, 975 (9th Cir. 2004). Application of Younger abstention has four requirements: 1 (1) a state-initiated proceeding is ongoing; (2) the proceeding implicates important state interests; (3) the federal plaintiff is not 2 barred from litigating federal constitutional issues in the state proceeding; and (4) the federal court action would enjoin the 3 proceeding or have the practical effect of doing so, i.e., would interfere with the state proceeding in a way that Younger 4 disapproves. 5 San Jose Silicon Valley, 546 F.3d at 1092. “For Younger to apply, all four requirements must be 6 ‘strictly satisfied.’” Barra v. City of Kerman, No. 1:08-cv-01909-OWW-GSA, 2009 WL 7 1706451, at *5 (E.D. Cal. June 9, 2009) (citing AmerisourceBergen Corp. v. Roden, 495 F.3d 8 1143, 1149 (9th Cir. 2007)). 9 Here, the first and second Younger elements are met. At the time plaintiffs filed this 10 action in federal court, plaintiffs were being prosecuted in the Kern County Superior Court.2 11 Moreover, the second requirement is satisfied because courts have held that “[s]tate criminal 12 proceedings implicate California’s interest in prosecuting state criminal laws, free from federal 13 interference.” Quesada v. City of Antioch, No. C 08-1567 JL, 2008 WL 4104339, at *1 (N.D. 14 Cal. Aug. 29, 2008) (citing Peyton v. Burdick, No. 1:07-cv-00453-LJO TAG, 2008 WL 1776450 15 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 18, 2008)). 16 The third Younger element is also met here because plaintiffs will have an opportunity to 17 raise their federal constitutional issues in the state criminal proceeding. This prong “requires only 18 the absence of ‘procedural bars’ to raising a federal claim in the state proceedings,” Commc’ns 19 Telesystems Int’l v. California Pub. Util. Comm’n, 196 F.3d 1011, 1020 (9th Cir. 1999), and “[a] 20 party opposing abstention ‘has the burden of showing that state procedural law barred 21 presentation of its claims.’” Franklin v. City of Kingsburg, No. 1:18-cv-0824 AWI SKO, 2020 22 WL 2793061, at *4 (E.D. Cal. May 29, 2020) (citing Commc’ns Telesystems Int’l, 196 F.3d at 23 1020). 24 2 Pursuant to Federal Rule 201, courts “may take judicial notice of undisputed matters of public 25 record, Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 689 (9th Cir.2001), including documents on file in federal or state courts.” Harris v. County of Orange, 682 F.3d 1126, 1132 (9th Cir. 2012). 26 Accordingly, the court grants defendants’ request for judicial notice of the Kern County Superior 27 Court criminal dockets pertaining to plaintiffs’ criminal proceedings. (Doc. No. 8-2 at 1; see also id. Ex. A; id. Ex. B.) Those dockets indicate that proceedings have been ongoing in that criminal 28 case since March 7, 2019 and July 16, 2019. (See Doc. Nos. 8-2, Ex. A; id., Ex. B.) 1 In the present case, plaintiffs have not met their burden of showing that their claims will 2 be procedurally barred from raising their claims in the state criminal prosecution. Plaintiffs’ two 3 federal causes of action are rooted in an excessive force claim in violation of the Fourth 4 Amendment. (Doc. No. 1 at 7–10.) Defendants contend that because plaintiffs are charged with 5 assault with a deadly weapon other than a firearm and reckless evading of a peace officer, “[t]he 6 issue of whether the force used by the Defendants in this case was reasonable will certainly be an 7 issue in the criminal proceedings.” (Doc. No. 8-1 at 5.) The court agrees. Plaintiffs will have an 8 opportunity to raise their constitutional issues, particularly when defending themselves against the 9 reckless evading of a peace officer charge.3 See Quesada, 2008 WL 4104339, at *1 (“If the 10 prosecutor of the Contra Costa County Superior Court provides evidence that these Plaintiffs 11 resisted arrest, Plaintiffs can defend those criminal allegations by setting forth evidence that the 12 officers unlawfully arrested them and/or used unreasonable or excessive force to effect those 13 arrests.”). 14 Finally, the fourth Younger element is also satisfied.4 “[A]bstention to avoid concurrent, 15 duplicative litigation is available in some very limited circumstances—in particular, when the 16 requested relief in federal court is a declaratory judgment.” Roden, 495 F.3d at 1151. While 17 3 Defendants have provided minimal evidentiary support from which the court could reach this 18 conclusion. The Kern County Superior Court criminal dockets simply reflect the charges that 19 have been brought in that case and do not contain any identifying information that would allow the court to definitively deduce that the events alleged in this action also gave rise to the ongoing 20 state proceedings. Some courts have found similar showings to be insufficient. See Speer v. Cty. of San Bernardino, No. EDCV 20-44 JGB (SPX), 2020 WL 3882940, at *3 (C.D. Cal. May 4, 21 2020) (finding that the provided state court proceeding’s felony complaint and criminal docket— which included “a general recitation of the elements of the crime, and only note[d] the crime 22 [was] alleged to have occurred on the same day as the officer-involved shooting”—insufficient 23 for supporting a finding that the Heck bar applied). Here, the court infers by plaintiffs’ lack of opposition to the pending motion that plaintiffs concede that the events alleged in this action also 24 gave rise to the Kern County Superior Court proceedings. Should plaintiffs determine that this inference is misplaced, plaintiffs are encouraged to file a motion to reconsider this order. 25 4 In their motion, defendants do not address the fourth Younger factor at all. The Ninth Circuit 26 has stated: “As Gilbertson makes clear, while there are only three ‘threshold elements’ to 27 application of Younger, there is a vital and indispensable fourth element: the policies behind the Younger doctrine must be implicated by the actions requested of the federal court.” Roden, 495 28 F.3d at 1149. 1 Younger abstention most often applies to cases involving declaratory or injunctive relief, the 2 Ninth Circuit has clarified that in some situations “a determination that the federal plaintiff’s 3 constitutional rights were violated [in an action for damages] would be just as intrusive as a 4 declaratory judgment.” See Gilbertson, 381 F.3d at 980–84 (applying Younger to a § 1983 action 5 for damages in which plaintiff was challenging the constitutionality of a state proceeding). 6 In the present action, plaintiffs are seeking compensatory and punitive damages. (See 7 Compl.) Both the Fourth Amendment claim for the alleged excessive use of force before this 8 court and the reckless evading of a peace officer claim brought against plaintiffs in the state 9 criminal prosecution require a determination of whether plaintiffs were attempting to flee. 10 Compare Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989) (explaining that an excessive force 11 determination requires assessing the circumstances, including “whether [the suspect] is actively 12 resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight”) with Cal. Veh. Code § 2800.2 (requiring 13 that the person “flee[] or attempt[] to elude a pursuing peace officer”).”). If this court were to 14 find in favor of plaintiffs in this civil action, that finding would have the practical effect of 15 enjoining the state court criminal proceeding by providing plaintiffs’ a defense to the reckless 16 evading of a peace officer charge. See Rivas v. California Highway Patrol, No. CV 15-03001 17 MMM (MRWX), 2015 WL 4040596, at *6 (C.D. Cal. July 1, 2015) (“A court ruling that 18 defendants violated the Fourth Amendment by detaining [plaintiff] unlawfully or using excessive 19 force would affect the state court proceeding, in a practical manner, as if it had issue a declaration 20 or injunction; this is because an unlawful detention or use of excessive force would operate as a 21 defense to the misdemeanor charges under § 69.”). 22 The court therefore concludes that Younger abstention is appropriate and supports the 23 issuance of a stay in this action. 24 B. The Heck Bar 25 In Heck, the Supreme Court held that 26 when a [plaintiff] seeks damages in a § 1983 suit, the district court must consider whether a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would 27 necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence; if it would, the complaint must be dismissed . . .. But if the district court 28 determines that the plaintiff’s action, even if successful, will not 1 demonstrate the invalidity of any outstanding criminal judgment against the plaintiff, the action should be allowed to proceed, in the 2 absence of some other bar to the suit. 3 512 U.S. at 486–87. “Heck says that if a criminal conviction arising out of the same facts stands 4 and is fundamentally inconsistent with the unlawful behavior for which section 1983 damages are 5 sought, the 1983 action must be dismissed.” Smith v. City of Hemet, 394 F.3d 689, 695 (9th Cir. 6 2005) (internal citation and quotation mark omitted), cert. denied, 545 U.S. 1128 (2005). 7 Here, plaintiffs § 1983 claim is based on the same facts giving rise to their state criminal 8 charges. As stated above, a judgment in favor of the plaintiffs on the basis of Fourth Amendment 9 excessive force would necessarily imply the invalidity of a conviction for reckless evading of a 10 peace officer. Ultimately, should plaintiffs be convicted of reckless evading of a peace officer in 11 state court, their § 1983 claim before this court will be subject to the Heck bar. See Quesada, 12 2008 WL 4104339, at *3. Moreover, plaintiffs have not demonstrated that those criminal charges 13 brought against them have been dismissed. Robinson v. Oakland Police Dep’t, No. C 09-05526 14 CW (PR), 2010 WL 1572250, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 20, 2010) (“Because Plaintiff was involved in 15 ongoing state criminal proceedings when he filed these actions and has not informed the Court 16 since that charges against him have been dismissed or that any resulting conviction has been 17 overturned or invalidated by a state tribunal, these actions must be dismissed.”). 18 Accordingly, this action should also be stayed in order to preserve defendants’ right to 19 bring a motion to bar plaintiffs’ claims in this civil rights action under Heck. 20 CONCLUSION 21 In sum, the court finds that granting the stay will likely cause little harm to plaintiffs 22 because they seek compensatory and punitive damages, as opposed to injunctive or declaratory 23 relief. This is balanced against the inequity defendants may suffer if their opportunity to raise the 24 Heck bar is precluded by the continuance of these proceedings, or if a finding in favor of 25 plaintiffs in this civil action has the practical effect of enjoining the state court proceeding in a 26 way that Younger abstention disapproves. Accord CMAX, Inc., 300 F.2d at 268–69 (“The relief 27 which it seeks in the district court action is money damages. A delay in the trial will delay any 28 such recovery. . . . But this, in any event, would be the extent of its damage. . . . No impressive wOoOw 4:40 ETL MARS VR MVOC ot POC eOrer 1 | showing of irreparable damage or injustice having been made we are not inclined to judge the 2 | stay order with a critical eye.”) Moreover, because the federal and state actions arise from the 3 || same facts and there is overlap in factual issues to be decided, this action will likely be simplified 4 | □□□ stay. 5 For these reasons, 6 1. Defendants’ motion to stay filed on November 19, 2019 (Doc. No. 8) is granted; 7 2. This action is stayed pending resolution of the underlying state court action; and 8 3. The parties are directed to inform the court when either a final judgment is entered 9 in the underlying state court criminal action or in the event that case is dismissed. 10 | IT IS SO ORDERED. si am Dated: _ September 25, 2020 Dla Ve £ 12 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28