(PC) Jackson v. Quick ( 2020 )

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 8 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 9 10 CORNEL JACKSON, No. 1:19-cv-01591-NONE-EPG (PC) 11 Plaintiff, FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS, RECOMMENDING THAT THIS ACTION 12 v. PROCEED ON PLAINTIFF’S CLAIMS AGAINST DEFENDANTS JASON QUICK, 13 JASON QUICK, et al., ELIZABETH ALVAREZ, A. ROSSETTE, LT. FOLLOWELL, LISETTE LOPEZ, DOMINIC 14 Defendants. RAMOS, KASANDRA SANCHEZ, HERMINA MARLEY, AND C. PURDENTE 15 FOR VIOLATING PLAINTIFF’S FIRST AND SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHTS WITH 16 RESPECT TO PLAINTIFF’S LEGAL CORRESPONDENCE AND FOR 17 CONSPIRACIES TO VIOLATE SUCH RIGHTS AND AGAINST DEFENDANT 18 ELIZABETH ALVAREZ, FOR VIOLATING PLAINTIFF’S RIGHT OF ACCESS TO THE 19 COURTS, AND THAT ALL OTHER CLAIMS AND DEFENDANTS BE DISMISSED 20 (ECF NO. 25) 21 TWENTY-ONE DAY DEADLINE 22 23 Plaintiff Cornel Jackson (“Plaintiff”) is a pretrial detainee proceeding pro se and in forma 24 pauperis in this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff filed the Complaint 25 commencing this action on November 7, 2019. (ECF No. 1). The Court screened Plaintiff’s First 26 amended Complaint on July 15, 2020. (ECF No. 24). Plaintiff filed his Second Amended 27 complaint on August 10, 2020. (ECF No. 25). The Complaint brings claims concerning his legal 28 mail and access to legal supplies. 1 The Court has reviewed the complaint and finds, for screening purposes, that Plaintiff’s 2 complaint states cognizable claims against (1) Defendants Jason Quick, Elizabeth Alvarez, A. 3 Rossette, Lt. Followell, Lisette Lopez, Dominic Ramos, Kasandra Sanchez, Hermina Marley, and 4 C. Purdente for violating Plaintiff’s First and Sixth Amendment rights with respect to Plaintiff’s 5 legal correspondence and for conspiracies to violate such rights and (2) Defendant Elizabeth 6 Alvarez, for violating Plaintiff’s right to defend himself under the Sixth and Fourteenth 7 Amendments and right of access to the courts under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The 8 Court recommends that these claims be allowed to proceed past the screening stage and that all 9 other claims and defendants be dismissed. 10 Plaintiff has twenty-one (21) days from the date of service of these findings and 11 recommendations to file his objections. 12 I. SCREENING REQUIREMENT 13 The Court is required to screen complaints brought by inmates seeking relief against a 14 governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The 15 Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the inmate has raised claims that are legally 16 “frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek 17 monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2). 18 As Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis, the Court may also screen the complaint under 28 19 U.S.C. § 1915. “Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been paid, 20 the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that the action or appeal fails to 21 state a claim upon which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). 22 A complaint is required to contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that 23 the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not 24 required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere 25 conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell 26 Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). Plaintiff must set forth “sufficient factual 27 matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Id. (quoting 28 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). The mere possibility of misconduct falls short of meeting this 1 plausibility standard. Id. at 679. While a plaintiff’s allegations are taken as true, courts “are not 2 required to indulge unwarranted inferences.” Doe I v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 572 F.3d 677, 681 3 (9th Cir. 2009) (citation and quotation marks omitted). Additionally, a plaintiff’s legal 4 conclusions are not accepted as true. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. 5 Pleadings of pro se plaintiffs “must be held to less stringent standards than formal 6 pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding that 7 pro se complaints should continue to be liberally construed after Iqbal). 8 II. ALLEGATIONS IN THE COMPLAINT 9 Plaintiff’s second amended complaint alleges as follows: 10 A. Legal Mail Allegations 11 Madera County Department of Corrections Classification Unit and Mailroom officers 12 intentionally and continuously violated Plaintiff’s constitutional rights when they opened all his 13 outgoing and incoming privileged attorney mail, read it, confiscated or withheld it, and turned it 14 over to the district attorney to prejudice Plaintiff in a pending criminal case. 15 Over the course of six months, Plaintiff mailed several sealed letters to his defense 16 counsel. The sealed envelopes were prominently labeled “Legal Mail.” The letters discussed 17 “defense strategies, as well as evidence found on official misconduct, inconsistencies, racially 18 edited words of the N-word used by law enforcement, and biasness.” 19 Plaintiff’s defense counsel performances were below standards. Plaintiff wrote mail to 20 courts, state bar members, and public officials for the purpose of presenting his claims of 21 violations suffered and to retain counsel. 22 Plaintiff filed a state bar complaint against his defense counsel. It was confiscated or 23 withheld by defendants in the classification unit. They turned photocopies of the complaint over 24 to the district attorney, who then forwarded a copy to defense counsel. This was a clear, conspired 25 practice to keep all participants in the federal crime against Plaintiff aware and prepared. 26 Madera County Jail policy defines “legal mail” as “all mail addressed to or from non- 27 Judicial government official[s], courts, and Attorneys[.]” Plaintiff’s outgoing mail sent to his 28 attorney and the courts called legal mail was confiscated or withheld by the classification unit. 1 The facility’s policies, and California law and the constitution were disregarded by 2 Defendant Jason Quick’s (“Quick”) request. Quick was the head of the classification unit. Upon 3 his request, and to benefit the prosecution team, he conspired with Defendants Elizabeth Alvarez 4 and CPL. A. Rossette (“Alvarez” and “Rossette”) to censor and accomplish the prosecutor’s 5 unconstitutional request. The conspired agreement between the prosecution team and Quick was 6 ongoing for five months to strip Plaintiff of his Due Process by gathering evidence to use against 7 him and aid the malicious prosecution against him. 8 Plaintiff’s defense counsel knowingly allowed the Defendants to prejudice Plaintiff’s 9 defense. Plaintiff’s defense counsel “has a constitutional duty of effective performance and 10 contract with the Plaintiff and refusing to litigate these violations adjuncted [sic] him to the 11 misconduct.” 12 Plaintiff filed a Marsden motion. At the hearing, Plaintiff’s defense counsel admitted on 13 the record to knowing that Defendants were opening and monitoring Plaintiff’s mail and he was 14 forwarded copies from the district attorney. Plaintiff began acting in pro-per. 15 Plaintiff appealed the Marsden hearing. “By appealing the hearing the Plaintiff would 16 receive the direct evidence needed from the courts or his appellate counsel that would prove the 17 conspired prejudice by the Defendant(s), District Attorney, and Defense Counsel.” Quick or his 18 training officer, Lt. Followell (“Followell”), immediately instructed the mailroom officers, 19 Defendants Lisette Lopez, Dominic Ramos, Kasandra Sanchez, Hermina Marley, and C. Purdente 20 (“Lopez,” “Ramos,” “Sanchez,” “Marley” and “Purdente”) “to adjunct with the Classification 21 Units conspired acts and ongoing practice of unjustified censorship by opening and reading all 22 [Plaintiff’s] incoming legal mail from the Courts or his Attorney, and to confiscate [and]/or 23 withhold all favorable documents (transcripts) that expose the Defendant(s) in CSU.” 24 Plaintiff filed a grievance to get answers from Defendants who refused to provide a notice 25 that they were going to open, read, or confiscate Plaintiff’s legal mail and provide it to the district 26 attorney’s office. Quick responded and denied Defense Counsel’s allegations. Plaintiff appealed 27 and all the supervisor agreed with Quick’s reply. 28 /// 1 Plaintiff also filed a grievance with the mailroom officers named as Defendants in this 2 action after his mail from courts was received and opened outside his presence. Lopez rejected 3 the grievance. For sixteen months, Plaintiff’s First and Sixth Amendment rights were violated by 4 Defendants in the mailroom regularly opening all his incoming legal mail from federal courts and 5 attorneys outside his presence without his consent. 6 Plaintiff’s legal runners asked the mailroom Defendants about the legal mail, but the 7 mailroom Defendants denied any censorship. 8 On a couple of occasions, Sanchez personally provided Plaintiff with opened legal mail 9 from the courts. Plaintiff filed a grievance, but it was rejected. 10 Plaintiff contacted a number of attorneys and established a relationship through requests 11 for assistance. Envelopes marked “Confidential Legal Mail” from attorneys were received and 12 opened outside of his presence or without his consent. 13 The Northern Innocence Project responded and requested a consent letter to correspond 14 with Plaintiff’s legal runners. Plaintiff complied and sent a consent letter to receive assistance 15 with his pending case. Plaintiff’s legal runners contacted the Innocence Project lawyer, who had 16 been informed of the legal mail tampering in the first letter. The legal runners told Plaintiff that 17 the lawyer sent additional letters, which Plaintiff never received. Plaintiff also received no notice 18 about them. Plaintiff alleges that withholding these incoming documents violates Plaintiff’s right 19 to send and receive legal mail. 20 The first such letter was delivered, but it was opened outside of Plaintiff’s presence. 21 Plaintiff filed a grievance concerning this letter. Prudente reported there was no record of the 22 letter being logged. 23 Another such letter was properly marked confidential correspondence from an attorney 24 with the Equal Justice Initiative. It was opened outside Plaintiff’s presence and without his 25 consent. Plaintiff filed a grievance with Marley because the letter was received with an RTS slip 26 logged by her. Marley stated that she went an RTS slip but no legal mail was sent. 27 After filing appeals, Plaintiff received transcript order receipts from the courts to the court 28 reporters. These were also withheld or routed to another institution and never received. Plaintiff 1 needs these court records to seek habeas corpus relief. Plaintiff contacted his appellate counsel 2 and requested the hearing transcripts. His counsel sent properly marked legal mail in response. 3 The letter was opened outside Plaintiff’s presence and without his consent. These actions violate 4 Plaintiff’s First and Sixth Amendment rights. 5 B. Legal Supplies Allegations 6 Plaintiff, acting in pro per, after being certified by the Court, immediately requested legal 7 supplies so he could prepare motions in his pending case, which have to be filed with the district 8 attorney and the court in a timely fashion. Defendants in the classification unit who regulate the 9 distribution of legal supplies denied Plaintiff’s request for legal supplies without comment. 10 Plaintiff filed another request for legal supplies. Alvarez stated that Plaintiff is required to 11 purchase his own stamps, envelopes, pens, or papers from the commissary or have someone drop 12 them off. Plaintiff did not have enough money for both hygiene supplies and legal supplies. 13 Plaintiff bought hygiene supplies instead. Plaintiff was officially indigent and the law states he is 14 entitled to these supplies for communicating with the courts. Plaintiff filed a grievance. 15 Failure to receive the legal supplies hindered Plaintiff’s ability to represent himself in his 16 criminal case and in his habeas petitions. Defendants knew Plaintiff was indigent but still charged 17 him for photocopies of exhibits. Classification Unit’s legal assistance program provided Plaintiff 18 only with the case law they wanted him to have, not adequate assistance from persons trained in 19 the law. 20 “Plaintiff filed numerous petitions that were either denied for failure to receive assistance 21 of the correct steps and procedures or due to writs being withheld [and]/or confiscated from 22 Defendant(s)[.]” “Defendant(s) legal assistance policies and practices of strip[p]ing 23 confidentiality from pro-per prisoners by making legal runners sign contract to allow them to 24 monitor any and all legal documents between them and the Plaintiff after showing that they will 25 provide the content to the District Attorney.” Defendants’ actions also violate California Law, 26 title 15, and the U.S. Constitution. 27 Plaintiff was called the N-word by an officer. Plaintiff filed a grievance, but Defendants 28 rejected it. 1 III. SECTION 1983 2 The Civil Rights Act under which this action was filed provides: 3 Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to 4 be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities 5 secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress . . . . 6 7 42 U.S.C. § 1983. “[Section] 1983 ‘is not itself a source of substantive rights,’ but merely 8 provides ‘a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.’” Graham v. Connor, 490 9 U.S. 386, 393-94 (1989) (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n.3 (1979)); see also 10 Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Org., 441 U.S. 600, 618 (1979); Hall v. City of Los Angeles, 11 697 F.3d 1059, 1068 (9th Cir. 2012); Crowley v. Nevada, 678 F.3d 730, 734 (9th Cir. 2012); 12 Anderson v. Warner, 451 F.3d 1063, 1067 (9th Cir. 2006). 13 To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that (1) the defendant acted under 14 color of state law, and (2) the defendant deprived him of rights secured by the Constitution or 15 federal law. Long v. County of Los Angeles, 442 F.3d 1178, 1185 (9th Cir. 2006); see also Marsh 16 v. Cnty. of San Diego, 680 F.3d 1148, 1158 (9th Cir. 2012) (discussing “under color of state 17 law”). A person deprives another of a constitutional right, “within the meaning of § 1983, ‘if he 18 does an affirmative act, participates in another’s affirmative act, or omits to perform an act which 19 he is legally required to do that causes the deprivation of which complaint is made.’” Preschooler 20 II v. Clark Cnty. Sch. Bd. of Trs., 479 F.3d 1175, 1183 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Johnson v. Duffy, 21 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978)). “The requisite causal connection may be established when an 22 official sets in motion a ‘series of acts by others which the actor knows or reasonably should 23 know would cause others to inflict’ constitutional harms.” Preschooler II, 479 F.3d at 1183 24 (quoting Johnson, 588 F.2d at 743). This standard of causation “closely resembles the standard 25 ‘foreseeability’ formulation of proximate cause.” Arnold v. Int’l Bus. Mach. Corp., 637 F.2d 26 1350, 1355 (9th Cir. 1981); see also Harper v. City of Los Angeles, 533 F.3d 1010, 1026 (9th Cir. 27 2008). 28 Additionally, a plaintiff must demonstrate that each named defendant personally 1 participated in the deprivation of his rights. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676-77. In other words, there must 2 be an actual connection or link between the actions of the defendants and the deprivation alleged 3 to have been suffered by Plaintiff. See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of City of N.Y., 436 U.S. 4 658, 691, 695 (1978). 5 IV. ANALYSIS OF PLAINTIFF’S CLAIMS 6 A. Legal Mail Allegations 7 Generally, prisoners have “a First Amendment right to send and receive mail.” Witherow 8 v. Paff, 52 F.3d 264, 265 (9th Cir.1995) (per curiam). Moreover, a prison may adopt regulations 9 or practices that impinge on a prisoner’s First Amendment rights as long as the regulations are 10 “reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.” See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89, 107 11 S.Ct. 2254, 96 L.Ed.2d 64 (1987). 12 Confidential correspondence between a prisoner and his criminal attorney is protected by 13 the Sixth Amendment. See Nordstrom v. Ryan, 762 F.3d 903, 909 (9th Cir. 2014) (“What prison 14 officials don’t have the right to do is read a confidential letter from an inmate to his lawyer.”). 15 Additionally, the Ninth Circuit “recognize[s] that prisoners have a protected First Amendment 16 interest in having properly marked legal mail opened only in their presence.” Hayes v. Idaho 17 Corr. Ctr., 849 F.3d 1204, 1211 (9th Cir. 2017). 18 However, this protection does not extend to correspondence with government agencies. 19 O’Keefe v. Van Boening, 82 F.3d 322, 326 (9th Cir. 1996) (upholding prison policy including 20 reviewing inmate correspondence with government officials, stating “Regulating correspondence 21 between prisoners and government agencies can serve to prevent criminal activity and maintain 22 prison security”); Hamilton v. Department of Corrections, 43 F. App’x 107 (9th Cir. 2002) 23 (unreported) (“Although Hamilton may have a right to correspond confidentially with an FBI 24 agent under California law, see Cal.Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3141(a) & (c)(2) (inmates may 25 correspond confidentially with federal officials appointed by the President of the United States, 26 and their staff members), no such federal constitutional right exists”); Grigsby v. Horel, No. C 07- 27 2833 CRB (PR), 2008 WL 11422633, at *2 (N.D. Cal., Apr. 28, 2008); aff’d 341 F. App’x 314 28 (9th Cir. 2009) (“The cited incoming mail from the Commission on Judicial Performance, Del 1 Norte County Superior Court and the State Bar of California is not material because it was not 2 ‘legal mail.’”); Williams v. Simon, 2018 WL 1585785, at *4 (D. Or. Mar. 30, 2018) (“A prison 3 need not treat all mail sent to government officials as legal mail.”). 4 Here, many of Plaintiff’s allegations concerning mail to or from government agencies or 5 courts. Plaintiff’s rights are not violated by Defendants reading such letters. See O’Keefe, 82 F.3d 6 at 326. But Plaintiff has stated several claims with respect to mail to or from his attorneys. For 7 instance, he alleges that his prosecutors conspired with Quick, who in turn conspired with 8 Alvarez and Rossette, to censor Plaintiff’s legal mail by “regularly open[ing] all his incoming 9 legal mail from federal courts and attorneys outside his presence without his consent.” (emphasis 10 added). Although it is not perfectly clear which attorneys sent the mail, reading Plaintiff’s 11 complaint liberally, the Court finds that Plaintiff has adequately stated a claim that Quick, 12 Alvarez and Rossette opened letters from his attorneys outside of his presence. Given the nature 13 of the allegation—that they shared the information with the prosecutors in Plaintiff’s criminal 14 case—and reading the complaint liberally, the Court also finds that Plaintiff has alleged those 15 Defendants read such letters. 16 In addition, Plaintiff alleges that others were involved in censoring Plaintiff’s mail. For 17 instance: 18 Defendant Jason Quick or his training officer LT. Followell immediately 19 instructed the mailroom officer Defendant(s) Lisette Lopez, Dominic Ramos, Kasandra Sanchez, Hermina Marley, and C. Purdente to adjunct with the 20 Classification units Conspired acts and ongoing practice of unjustified censorship by opening and reading all his incoming Legal mail from the courts or his 21 Attorney, and to confiscate [and]/or withhold all favorable documents (transcripts) . . . . 22 23 Thus, Plaintiff states a First Amendment claim to the extent he alleges his legal mail was 24 opened outside of his presence. See Hayes, 849 F.3d at 1211. He also states a Sixth Amendment 25 claim to the extent he alleges the defendants read his confidential communications with his 26 attorney. See Nordstrom, 762 F.3d at 909 (9th Cir. 2014) (“What prison officials don’t have the 27 right to do is read a confidential letter from an inmate to his lawyer.”). Accordingly, for screening 28 purposes, Plaintiff has stated claims against Quck, Alvarez, Rossette, Followell, Lopez, Ramos, 1 Sanchez, Marley and Purdente for violating his First and Sixth Amendment rights. 2 B. Conspiracy 3 To state a claim for conspiracy under § 1983, Plaintiff must show the existence of an 4 agreement or meeting of the minds to violate constitutional rights, Avalos v. Baca, 596 F.3d 583, 5 592 (9th Cir. 2010); Franklin v. Fox, 312 F.3d 423, 441 (9th Cir. 2001), and that an “actual 6 deprivation of his constitutional rights resulted from the alleged conspiracy,” Hart v. Parks, 450 7 F.3d 1059, 1071 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Woodrum v. Woodward County, Oklahoma, 866 F.2d 8 1121, 1126 (9th Cir. 1989)). “‘To be liable, each participant in the conspiracy need not know the 9 exact details of the plan, but each participant must at least share the common objective of the 10 conspiracy.’” Franklin, 312 F.3d at 441 (quoting United Steelworkers of Am. v. Phelps Dodge 11 Corp., 865 F.2d 1539, 1541 (9th Cir.1989)). Additionally, Plaintiff must show that Defendants 12 “conspired or acted jointly in concert and that some overt act [was] done in furtherance of the 13 conspiracy.” Sykes v. State of California, 497 F.2d 197, 200 (9th Cir. 1974). 14 Plaintiff alleges that the prosecutors conspired with Quick, who in turn conspired with 15 Alvarez and Rossette, to censor Plaintiff’s legal mail. Plaintiff also alleges that Quick or 16 Followell instructed Lopez, Ramos, Sanchez, Marley and Purdente to open Plaintiff’s legal mail 17 in violation of his First and Sixth Amendment rights. Thus, he has stated a claim against Quick, 18 Alvarez, Rossette, Followell, Lopez, Ramos, Sanchez, Marley, and Purdente for conspiracies to 19 violate his First and Sixth Amendment rights. 20 C. Legal Supplies Allegations 21 Plaintiff alleges he was provided with insufficient supplies to use to defend himself in his 22 criminal case. 23 “[P]risoners have a constitutional right of access to the courts.” Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 24 817, 821 (1977).1 Indeed, the Supreme Court has recognized its “decisions have consistently 25 required States to shoulder affirmative obligations to assure all prisoners meaningful access to the 26 courts.” Id. at 824. “[W]hat Bounds required was that the resources meet minimum constitutional 27 1 Additional elements for a cause of action based on lack of access to the courts were explained in Lewis v. Casey, 28 518 U.S. 343 (1996). 1 standards sufficient to provide meaningful, though perhaps not ideal, access to courts.” Phillips v. 2 Hust, 588 F.3d 652, 656 (9th Cir. 2009) (cleaned up). This standard requires that “the tools of 3 litigation must be made available when necessary to ensure ‘meaningful access’ to the courts.” Id. 4 at 655-56 (quoting Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 351 (1996)). 5 A lack of supplies may support a claim for lack of access to the courts, in certain 6 circumstances. For instance, relying on Bounds, the District of Colorado ordered the government 7 to provide an incarcerated pro se defendant with certain necessary trial preparation supplies: 8 To ensure an inmate’s constitutional right of meaningful access to the courts, the 9 state must provide him with a “reasonably adequate opportunity” to present his legal claims. Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 825, 97 S.Ct. 1491, 1496, 52 10 L.Ed.2d 72 (1977); Petrick v. Maynard, 11 F.3d 991, 994 (10th Cir. 1993). Practically, this standard requires prisoners be afforded paper, writing 11 implements, stamps, and access to notary services, as well access to an adequate law library or legal advisor. Bounds, 97 S.Ct. at 1496–97; Petrick, 11 F.3d at 994. 12 Beyond these basic requirements, the state is required to provide only such items 13 as shown to be necessary to “assist inmates in the preparation and filing of meaningful legal papers.” Bounds, 97 S.Ct. at 1498. See also Wolff v. McDonnell, 14 418 U.S. 539, 576, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 2984, 41 L.Ed.2d 935 (1974) (chief aim of court’s access precedents is to “protect[ ] the ability of an inmate to prepare a 15 petition or complaint”). 16 Moreover, even as to the established basic necessities (paper, pen, etc.), a prisoner 17 does not have an unlimited right to plumb the public fisc for supplies. “Reasonable regulations are necessary to balance the rights of prisoners with 18 budgetary considerations.” Twyman v. Crisp, 584 F.2d 352, 359 (10th Cir. 1978). See also Penrod v. Zavaras, 94 F.3d 1399, 1403 (10th Cir. 1996) (“[T]he 19 constitutional obligation to provide inmates access to courts does not require states to give inmates unlimited access to a law library, and inmates do not have 20 the right to select the method by which access will be provided.”) (internal 21 citation omitted). Prison administrators thus may place reasonable limits on the quantity and type of items inmates may be given or to which they may be 22 permitted access. 23 United States v. Santiago, 199 F. Supp. 3d 1287, 1289-90 (D. Colo. 2016). See also Brown v. 24 Morales, No. CV 15-0483-FMO (JEM), 2018 WL 6016158, at *7 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 6, 25 2018), report and recommendation adopted, 2018 WL 6164256 (C.D. Cal. May 17, 2018) (“The 26 Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments protect a criminal defendant’s right to conduct his own 27 defense. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 834-36 (1975). The right to self-representation may 28 be violated if an inmate is denied access to law books, witnesses, and other tools necessary to 1 prepare a defense. Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1047 (9th Cir. 1989); see also Milton v. Morris, 2 767 F.2d 1443, 1145-46 (9th Cir. 1985).”). 3 In the past, the Ninth Circuit had addressed this issue in habeas cases. Before being 4 reversed by the Supreme Court, the Ninth Circuit had held “an incarcerated criminal defendant 5 who chooses to represent himself has a constitutional right to access law books or other tools to 6 assist him in preparing a defense.” Espitia v. Ortiz, 113 F. App’x 802, 804 (9th Cir. 2004) 7 (cleaned up) (quoting Bribiesca v. Galaza, 215 F.3d 1015, 1020 (9th Cir.2000)), cert. granted, 8 judgment rev’d sub nom. Kane v. Garcia Espitia, 546 U.S. 9 (2005). But in its reversal, the 9 Supreme Court noted that Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975), upon which the Ninth 10 Circuit relied, did not clearly establish such a right for habeas corpus purposes: 11 The federal appellate courts have split on whether Faretta, which establishes a 12 Sixth Amendment right to self-representation, implies a right of the pro se defendant to have access to a law library. Compare Milton, supra, with United 13 States v. Smith, 907 F.2d 42, 45 (C.A.6 1990) (“[B]y knowingly and intelligently waiving his right to counsel, the appellant also relinquished his access to a law 14 library”); United States ex rel. George v. Lane, 718 F.2d 226, 231 (C.A.7 1983) (similar). That question cannot be resolved here, however, as it is clear 15 that Faretta does not, as § 2254(d)(1) requires, “clearly establis[h]” the law 16 library access right. In fact, Faretta says nothing about any specific legal aid that the State owes a pro se criminal defendant. The Bribiesca court and the court 17 below therefore erred in holding, based on Faretta, that a violation of a law library access right is a basis for federal habeas relief. 18 546 U.S. at 10 (alterations in original). 19 Given these precedents, the Court finds that Plaintiff sufficiently states a claim for 20 violation of access to the courts to proceed past screening. 2 21 V. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 22 The Court has screened Plaintiff’s amended complaint and finds that it states cognizable 23 claims against (1) Defendants Quick, Alvarez, Rossette, Followell, Lopez, Ramos, Sanchez, 24 Marley, and Purdente for violating Plaintiff’s First and Sixth Amendment rights with respect to 25 Plaintiff’s legal correspondence and for conspiracies to violate such rights and (2) Alvarez for 26 violating Plaintiff’s right of access to the courts. 27 2 It is possible that Plaintiff has active criminal proceedings. If so, certain of the claims might be subject to stays or 28 dismissals pending the outcome of those proceedings. QO 4.40 LOIN INE ENS OVOP OI OTe AY tv VI A 1 Based on the foregoing, it is HEREBY RECOMMENDED that: 2 1. This case proceed on Plaintiff’s claims against: 3 a. Defendants Jason Quick, Elizabeth Alvarez, A. Rossette, Lt. Followell, Lisette 4 Lopez, Dominic Ramos, Kasandra Sanchez, Hermina Marley, and C. Purdente 5 for violating Plaintiff’s First and Sixth Amendment rights with respect to 6 Plaintiff’s legal correspondence and for conspiracies to violate such rights; and 7 b. Defendant Elizabeth Alvarez for violating Plaintiff’s right of access to the 8 courts; and 9 2. All other claims in Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint be dismissed, with 10 prejudice. 11 These findings and recommendations will be submitted to the United States district judge 12 | assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of Title 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Within twenty-one 13 | (21) days after being served with these findings and recommendations, Plaintiff may file written 14 | objections with the Court. The document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s 15 || Findings and Recommendations.” 16 Plaintiff is advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may result in the 17 | waiver of rights on appeal. Wilkerson v. Wheeler, 772 F.3d 834, 838-39 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing 18 | Baxter v. Sullivan, 923 F.2d 1391, 1394 (9th Cir. 1991)). 19 20 IT IS SO ORDERED. 21 | Dated: _ September 29, 2020 [sf ey — 09 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 23 24 25 26 27 28 12