(PC) Armenta v. Burns ( 2020 )

1 2 3 4 5 6 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 8 9 RICHARD ARMENTA, Case No.: 1:20-cv-00968-BAM (PC) 10 Plaintiff, ORDER DIRECTING CLERK OF COURT TO RANDOMLY ASSIGN DISTRICT JUDGE 11 v. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 12 BURNS, et al., REGARDING DISMISSAL OF ACTION FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM 13 Defendants. (ECF No. 11) 14 FOURTEEN-DAY DEADLINE 15 Plaintiff Richard Armenta (“Plaintiff”) is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma 16 pauperis in this civil action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Court screened Plaintiff’s complaint 17 and granted leave to amend. (ECF No. 1, 10.) Plaintiff’s first amended complaint, filed on 18 September 14, 2020, is currently before the Court for screening. (ECF No. 11.) 19 I. Screening Requirement and Standard 20 The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a 21 governmental entity and/or against an officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. 22 23 § 1915A(a). Plaintiff’s complaint, or any portion thereof, is subject to dismissal if it is frivolous 24 or malicious, if it fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or if it seeks monetary 25 relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b). 26 A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the 27 pleader is entitled to relief . . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not 28 required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere 1 conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell 2 Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). While a plaintiff’s allegations are taken 3 as true, courts “are not required to indulge unwarranted inferences.” Doe I v. Wal-Mart Stores, 4 Inc., 572 F.3d 677, 681 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 5 To survive screening, Plaintiff’s claims must be facially plausible, which requires 6 sufficient factual detail to allow the Court to reasonably infer that each named defendant is liable 7 for the misconduct alleged. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quotation marks omitted); Moss v. U.S. 8 Secret Serv., 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). The sheer possibility that a defendant acted 9 unlawfully is not sufficient, and mere consistency with liability falls short of satisfying the 10 plausibility standard. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quotation marks omitted); Moss, 572 F.3d at 969. 11 II. Allegations in Complaint 12 Plaintiff is currently housed in California Men’s Colony in San Luis Obispo, California. 13 The events in the complaint are alleged to have occurred while Plaintiff was housed at California 14 State Prison in Corcoran, California. Plaintiff names as defendants (1) D. Burns, Correctional 15 Captain, and (2) L. Carroll, Appeals Coordinator. 16 In claim 1, Plaintiff alleges in June 2019, he filed a 602 appeal that Plaintiff’s life was in 17 substantial danger due to enemy concerns. The appeal was accepted at the first and second level 18 by Appeals Coordinator Carroll. Plaintiff alleges his life was in substantial danger at Corcoran 19 and “defendant prison officials failed to take adequate measures to safely house Plaintiff within 20 prison population when they housed plaintiff with fellow inmates who pose an unreasonable risk 21 to Plaintiff’s health and safety.” (ECF No. 11 p. 4 of 27.) Plaintiff feared for his life and 22 Defendant Carroll ignored Plaintiff’s request for help by losing and misplacing Plaintiff’s 602 23 appeal. In May 2020, Plaintiff received a memo that Plaintiff’s appeal was lost or it was 24 destroyed. This prevented Plaintiff from being able to present his claims. 25 Losing his appeals chilled Plaintiff’s exercise of his First Amendment rights and the 26 action did not reasonably advance legitimate correctional goals. Defendant Carroll had a duty to 27 process his 602 appeal and interview prisoners and failed to do so which put Plaintiff’s life in 28 1 danger. Defendant Carroll impeded Plaintiff’s ability to compile evidence through the appeals 2 process. Plaintiff is entitled to show that his life is being put in danger (ECF No. 11, p. 5 of 27.) 3 Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Carroll and Burns violated Plaintiff’s First Amendment rights to 4 redress his grievances, as they have lost or destroyed his grievances. They have interfered with 5 Plaintiff’s access to the courts. 6 Plaintiff filed a 602 about the lost 602. Defendant Burns was in charge of reviewing and 7 interviewing Plaintiff regarding the appeal. Defendant Burns failed to protect Plaintiff as 8 Defendant Burns lost Plaintiff’s appeal and Plaintiff’s pleas of help were ignored and impeded 9 Plaintiff’s access to the courts. Defendant Burns is believed to be directly responsible for 10 discarding Plaintiff’s inmate appeal, which is an abuse of power. (ECF No. 11, p. 6 of 27.) 11 Defendant Burns and Carroll “were aware that the inmate appeals process was the central 12 provider of a view into the internal operations of problems within the prison and Plaintiff’s 13 safety.” By losing his appeal, Plaintiff was without adequate system for the courts to be able to 14 evaluate his case. Burns and Carroll set up a written policy of setting artificial barriers and 15 obstacles to deny Plaintiff meaningful access to the courts. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants 16 Burns and Carroll acted deliberately indifferent by failing to act on the information contained in 17 his appeal which alerted them to his enemy concerns. Defendant Carrol and Burns denied and 18 obstructed Plaintiff’s grievance so that Plaintiff could not properly litigate his section 1983 19 complaint. (ECF No. 11, p.9 of 27.) They denied Plaintiff’s ability to present his claim to the 20 courts. Plaintiff says that Defendants have lost all of Plaintiff’s documents, exhibits, regarding 21 the failure to protect. 22 Plaintiff was housed in A-yard where Defendant Burns was captain. Plaintiff alleges that 23 at the time he filed his appeal, Defendant Burns was clearly aware Plaintiff’s life was in danger 24 and failed to act. 25 Plaintiff alleges a denial for access to the courts for discarding Plaintiff’s inmate grievance 26 and denying adequate access to the courts. Defendant Carroll used dishonest and unethical 27 methods to screen out the 602 appeal so that it would never be processed. Plaintiff alleges that 28 1 Defendants Carroll and Burns treated Plaintiff differently from others similarly situated by losing, 2 destroying Plaintiff appeal. 3 Plaintiff seeks compensatory and punitive damages. 4 III. Discussion 5 Plaintiff’s complaint fails to comply with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 and fails to 6 state a cognizable claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Despite being provided the relevant pleading 7 and legal standards, Plaintiff has been unable cure the pleading deficiencies. 8 A. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 9 Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8, a complaint must contain “a short and plain 10 statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). Detailed 11 factual allegations are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, 12 supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citation 13 omitted). Plaintiff must set forth “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to 14 relief that is plausible on its face.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570, 15 127 S.Ct. at 1974). While factual allegations are accepted as true, legal conclusions are not. Id.; 16 see also Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556–557. 17 Although Plaintiff's complaint is short, it is not a plain statement of his claims. As a basic 18 matter, the complaint does not clearly state what happened, when it happened or who was 19 involved. In fact, the first amended complaint includes fewer factual allegations than Plaintiff’s 20 original complaint. Plaintiff was forewarned that any subsequently pleading supersedes the 21 original complaint. It is unclear in the first amended complaint what happened, when it happened 22 and who was involved. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8. Plaintiff has been unable to cure this deficiency. 23 B. Appeal/Grievance Procedure 24 In his complaint, Plaintiff alleges his appeals were lost which resulted in his denial of 25 access to the courts. Insofar as any of his claims are based on the processing and resolution of his 26 appeals/grievances, Plaintiff’s complaint fails to state a cognizable claim. 27 As Plaintiff has been informed, Plaintiff does not have a constitutionally protected right to 28 1 have his appeals accepted or processed. Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 860 (9th Cir. 2003); 2 Mann v. Adams, 855 F.2d 639, 640 (9th Cir. 1988). The prison grievance procedure does not 3 confer any substantive rights upon inmates and actions in reviewing appeals cannot serve as a 4 basis for liability under section 1983. Buckley v. Barlow, 997 F.2d 494, 495 (8th Cir. 1993); see 5 also Givens v. Cal. Dep’t of Corr. & Rehab., No. 2:19-cv-0017 KJN P, 2019 WL 1438068, at *4 6 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 1, 2019) (“California’s regulations grant prisoners a purely procedural right: the 7 right to have a prison appeal.”) Therefore, prison officials are not required by federal law to 8 process inmate appeals or grievances in a particular way. Consequently, the failure or refusal to 9 process a grievance or the denial, rejection, or cancellation of a grievance does not violate any 10 constitutionally protected right. See Rushdan v. Gear, No. 1:16-cv-01017-BAM (PC), 2018 WL 11 2229259, at *6 (E.D. Cal. May 16, 2018); Givens, 2019 WL 1438068, at *4; Wright v. Shannon, 12 No. 1:05-cv-01485-LJO-YNP PC, 2010 WL 445203, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 2, 2010) (plaintiff’s 13 allegations that prison officials denied or ignored his inmate appeals failed to state a cognizable 14 claim under the First Amendment). As a result, Plaintiff may not impose liability on a defendant 15 simply because the defendant played a role in processing Plaintiff’s inmate appeals or grievances. 16 See Buckley, 997 F.2d at 495 (because an administrative appeal process is only a procedural 17 right, no substantive right is conferred, no constitutional protections arise, and the “failure to 18 process any of Buckley’s grievances … is not actionable under section 1983.”). 19 Plaintiff fails to state a cognizable claim for the manner in which his 602 grievance was 20 handled and subsequently lost. The procedural process for the 602 is not constitutionally 21 protected. Plaintiff also fails to state a cognizable claim for the alleged inability to view “the 22 inmate appeals process was the central provider of a view into the internal operations of problems 23 within the prison and Plaintiff’s safety.” Plaintiff does not have a constitutionally protected right 24 to access to information from the 602 grievance process to build a federal case for judicial review. 25 Plaintiff’s apparent argument that anyone who knows about a potential violation of the 26 Constitution from a 602 appeal, and fails to cure it, has violated the Constitution himself is not 27 correct. “Only persons who cause or participate in the violations are responsible. Ruling against a 28 1 prisoner on an administrative complaint does not cause or contribute to the violation.” Greeno v. 2 Daley, 414 F.3d 645, 656-57 (7th Cir. 2005); accord Mwasi v. Corcoran State Prison, No. 3 113CV00695DADJLTPC, 2016 WL 5210588, at *17 (E.D. Cal. May 20, 2016), report and 4 recommendation adopted sub nom. Mwasi v. Prison, No. 113CV00695DADJLT, 2016 WL 5 5109461 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 19, 2016) (Actions in reviewing prisoner’s administrative appeal cannot 6 serve as the basis for liability). 7 Although exhaustion is not required “when circumstances render administrative remedies 8 ‘effectively unavailable,’ ” Sapp v. Kimbrell, 623 F.3d 813, 822 (9th Cir. 2010) (citation 9 omitted), the Ninth Circuit requires “a good-faith effort on the part of inmates to exhaust a 10 prison’s administrative remedies as a prerequisite to finding remedies effectively unavailable,” 11 Albino v. Baca, 697 F.3d 1023, 1035 (9th Cir. 2012). 12 Even if the 602s could provide liability for a Defendant who reviews them, Plaintiff’s 602 13 do not provide any factual information. Plaintiff attached his 602s as exhibits to the first 14 amended complaint. These 602s do not give any factual support for the underlying claim of 15 failure to protect Plaintiff from injuries. Rather, the 602s complain of the 602s being lost and not 16 processing Plaintiff’s 602 appeal properly. There are no facts from which the Court can determine 17 that Plaintiff’s 602 appeals gave any defendant notice of Plaintiff’s concern about enemies. This 18 deficiency cannot be cured by amendment. 19 C. Linkage Requirement 20 The Civil Rights Act under which this action was filed provides: 21 Every person who, under color of [state law]...subjects, or causes to be subjected, any 22 citizen of the United States...to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution...shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other 23 proper proceeding for redress. 24 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 25 The statute plainly requires that there be an actual connection or link between the actions 26 of the defendants and the deprivation alleged to have been suffered by Plaintiff. See Monell v. 27 Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, (1978); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, (1976). The Ninth 28 1 Circuit has held that “[a] person ‘subjects another to the deprivation of a constitutional right, 2 within the meaning of section 1983, if he does an affirmative act, participates in another’s 3 affirmative acts or omits to perform an act which he is legally required to do that causes the 4 deprivation of which complaint is made.” Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir.1978). 5 While Plaintiff names Defendant Carroll and Defendant Burns, Plaintiff fails to allege 6 what each defendant did or did not do that resulted in a violation of his constitutional rights in 7 failing to protect him. Rather, Plaintiff’s allegations focus on Defendant Carroll’s and Burns’ 8 conduct in losing and not processing Plaintiff’s 602 appeals. This conduct does not give rise to a 9 constitutional violation. Plaintiff has been unable to cure this deficiency. 10 D. Failure to Protect 11 Although it is not clear from Plaintiff’s complaint, it appears that Plaintiff may be 12 attempting to allege a failure to protect Plaintiff from known enemies. 13 While the Eighth Amendment requires prison officials to provide prisoners with the basic 14 human needs, including reasonable safety, it does not require that the prisoners be comfortable 15 and provided with every amenity.” Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d 1237, 1246 (9th Cir.1982). A 16 housing assignment may be “restrictive and even harsh,” but will not violate the Eighth 17 Amendment unless it “either inflicts unnecessary or wanton pain or is grossly disproportionate to 18 the severity of crimes warranting imprisonment.” Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 348–349, 19 101 S.Ct. 2392, 69 L.Ed.2d 59 (1981) (finding inmates had no constitutional right to be housed in 20 single cells). Only where prison officials knew or should have known that a housing assignment 21 posed an excessive risk to an inmate's safety will placement with a particular inmate have 22 constitutional implications. Estate of Ford v. Ramirez–Palmer, 301 F.3d 1043, 1050 (9th 23 Cir.2002). To establish a failure to protect claim, the prisoner must establish that prison officials 24 were deliberately indifferent to a sufficiently serious threat to the prisoner’s safety. Farmer v. 25 Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994). “ ‘Deliberate indifference’ has both subjective and objective 26 components.” Labatad v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 714 F.3d 1155, 1160 (9th Cir. 2013). The prisoner 27 must show that “the official [knew] of and disregard[ed] an excessive risk to inmate ... safety; the 28 1 official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial 2 risk of serious harm exists, and [the official] must also draw the inference.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 3 837. “Liability may follow only if a prison official ‘knows that inmates face a substantial risk of 4 serious harm and disregards that risk by failing to take reasonable measures to abate it.’ ” 5 Labatad, 714 F.3d at 1160 (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 847). 6 Plaintiff was cautioned that in any amended complaint, Plaintiff must name the 7 individuals who he contends failed to protect him. He was told that Plaintiff must allege what 8 happened and who was involved and link each named individual to the alleged constitutional 9 violations. Plaintiff has failed to do so. He has not alleged what Defendant Burn or Defendant 10 Carroll did or did not do that subjected Plaintiff to injury from unknown enemies. Indeed, the 11 allegations do not assert that Plaintiff was injured at all or that he was attacked in any way. 12 Plaintiff has not been able to cure the allegations that Defendant Burns and Defendant Carroll 13 knew that Plaintiff faced a substantial risk of serious harm and disregards that risk by failing to 14 take reasonable measures to abate it. 15 E. Supervisor Liability 16 Insofar as Plaintiff is attempting to sue Defendant Burns, or any other defendant, based on 17 his or her supervisory role, he may not do so. Liability may not be imposed on supervisory 18 personnel for the actions or omissions of their subordinates under the theory of respondeat 19 superior. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676–77; Simmons v. Navajo Cty., Ariz., 609 F.3d 1011, 1020–21 (9th 20 Cir. 2010); Ewing v. City of Stockton, 588 F.3d 1218, 1235 (9th Cir. 2009); Jones v. Williams, 21 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 2002). 22 Supervisors may be held liable only if they “participated in or directed the violations, or 23 knew of the violations and failed to act to prevent them.” Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th 24 Cir. 1989); accord Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1205–06 (9th Cir. 2011); Corales v. Bennett, 567 25 F.3d 554, 570 (9th Cir. 2009). Supervisory liability may also exist without any personal 26 participation if the official implemented “a policy so deficient that the policy itself is a 27 repudiation of the constitutional rights and is the moving force of the constitutional violation.” 28 1 Redman v. Cty. of San Diego, 942 F.2d 1435, 1446 (9th Cir. 1991) (citations and quotations 2 marks omitted), abrogated on other grounds by Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1970). 3 Plaintiff has been unable to cure this deficiency. 4 IV. Conclusion and Recommendation 5 For the reasons stated, Plaintiff’s amended complaint fails to comply with Federal Rule of 6 Civil Procedure 8 and fails to state a cognizable claim for relief under section 1983. Despite 7 being provided with relevant pleading and legal standards, Plaintiff has been unable to cure the 8 deficiencies in his complaint by amendment, and thus further leave to amend is not warranted. 9 Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130 (9th Cir. 2000). 10 Accordingly, the Court HEREBY DIRECTS the Clerk of the Court to randomly assign a 11 district judge to this action. 12 Furthermore, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that this action be dismissed based on 13 Plaintiff’s failure state a cognizable claim upon which relief may be granted. 14 15 These Findings and Recommendation will be submitted to the United States District Judge 16 assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of Title 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within fourteen 17 (14) days after being served with these Findings and Recommendation, Plaintiff may file written 18 objections with the Court. The document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s 19 Findings and Recommendation.” Plaintiff is advised that failure to file objections within the 20 specified time may result in the waiver of the “right to challenge the magistrate’s factual 21 findings” on appeal. Wilkerson v. Wheeler, 772 F.3d 834, 839 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Baxter v. 22 Sullivan, 923 F.2d 1391, 1394 (9th Cir. 1991)). 23 24 IT IS SO ORDERED. 25 Dated: September 30, 2020 /s/ Barbara A. McAuliffe _ 26 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 27 28