E. & J. Gallo Winery v. Pestmaster Services, Inc. ( 2020 )

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 ----oo0oo---- 11 12 E. & J. GALLO WINERY, a No. 2:19-cv-02120-WBS-KJN California corporation, 13 Plaintiff, 14 ORDER DISMISSING SUPPLEMENTAL v. CLAIMS 15 PESTMASTER SERVICES, INC., a 16 California corporation, JEFFERY M. VAN DIEPEN, and UNITED STATES 17 OF AMERICA, 18 Defendants. 19 20 ----oo0oo---- 21 Plaintiff E. & J. Gallo Winery (“plaintiff” or “Gallo”) 22 brought this action against Pestmaster Services, Inc. 23 (“Pestmaster”), its president and owner, Jeffery Van Diepen (“Van 24 Diepen”), and the United States of America (“United States”) 25 alleging violations of state tort law after Pestmaster’s 26 application of an herbicide destroyed Gallo’s grape vines. 27 (First Am. Compl. (“FAC”) (Docket No. 8).) In an order on March 28 25, 2020, this Court granted the United States’ motion to dismiss 1 on the grounds of immunity. (See Order Granting Mot. to Dismiss 2 (Docket No. 26).) 3 At the status conference on August 21, 2020, the court 4 raised sua sponte the issue of whether the court still has 5 federal jurisdiction following the dismissal of the claims 6 against the United States. The court ordered supplemental 7 briefing and takes the question under submission without the need 8 for further arguments. 9 I. Discussion1 10 28 U.S.C. § 1367 grants jurisdiction over state-law 11 claims that are “so related to claims in the action within such 12 original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or 13 controversy under Article III of the United States Constitution.” 14 See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). However, under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c), the 15 court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction in 16 specified circumstances, including when the “the district court 17 has dismissed all claims over which it has original 18 jurisdiction.” See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). Supplemental 19 jurisdiction is a doctrine of discretion, not of plaintiff’s 20 right. See United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 21 726 (1966). The Supreme Court has stated that “in the usual case 22 in which all federal-law claims are eliminated before trial, the 23 balance of factors to be considered under the pendent 24 jurisdiction doctrine--judicial economy, convenience, fairness, 25 and comity--will point toward declining to exercise jurisdiction 26 1 The court already recited the factual background in its 27 order dismissing the claims against the United States. (See Docket No. 26.) Accordingly, the court will refrain from doing 28 so again. 1 over the remaining state-law claims.” Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. 2 Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 n. 7 (1988). 3 Both plaintiff and defendants concede that there is no 4 basis for federal jurisdiction apart from the court’s 5 discretionary supplemental jurisdiction.2 However, both parties 6 urge this court to maintain supplemental jurisdiction over the 7 case. (See generally Pl.’s Jurisdiction Br. (Docket No. 32); 8 Def.’s Resp. Br. (Docket No. 33).) Plaintiff claims that the 9 court maintaining federal jurisdiction will facilitate discovery 10 from the federal actors already dismissed. (See Pl.’s 11 Jurisdiction Br. at 4.) Defendants argue that this court is 12 familiar with the facts of the case and that the significant 13 delay in expert discovery that will be occasioned by plaintiff 14 re-filing the state law claims in state court will be unfair to 15 defendants and a needless expenditure of the parties’ and 16 judicial resources. (See Def.’s Resp. Br. at 4.) 17 Despite these arguments, the court will decline to 18 exercise its supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiff’s state law 19 claims here. Comity weighs in favor of declining to exercise 20 supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiff’s state law claims 21 because the state court is competent to hear those claims and is 22 likely to have a better understanding of the relevant state law. 23 Plaintiff speculates that because the parties may need 24 2 Plaintiff requested the opportunity to provide briefing 25 as to federal enclave jurisdiction, but now concedes that federal enclave jurisdiction does not apply to the facts presented here 26 as the damage to plaintiff’s vineyard did not occur on federal 27 property. (Pl.’s Br. on Continuing Federal Jurisdiction over Claims at 2 (“Pl.’s Jurisdiction Br.”) (Docket No. 32).) 28 1 access to federal property to conduct their discovery, it would 2 be easier for them to use the processes of the federal court in 3 order to do so. First, no showing has been made that the state 4 court processes would be inadequate for these purposes. Second, 5 the parties have not cited, and the court is unaware of, any 6 authority for retaining supplemental jurisdiction because they 7 prefer to conduct their discovery using the processes of the 8 federal court. 9 As for defendant’s arguments, this case was filed in 10 this court less than a year ago, has not advanced further than 11 the motion to dismiss stage, and plaintiff’s state law claims 12 have not been the subject of any significant litigation in this 13 court. This court’s familiarity with this case was limited to 14 the federal claims against the United States. The court has not 15 yet had any involvement in the merits of the claims against the 16 remaining defendants. Although counsel state they are ready to 17 take expert depositions, it does not appear that any depositions 18 have been taken yet. There is nothing to prevent plaintiff from 19 refiling his claims against the remaining defendants in the state 20 court and proceeding with discovery there,3 and any additional 21 cost or delay resulting therefrom should be minimal. 22 Convenience and fairness likewise do not weigh in favor 23 of exercising supplemental jurisdiction. The federal and state 24 3 “[T]he period of limitations for any claim asserted 25 under [28 U.S.C. 1367(a)], and for any other claim in the same action that is voluntarily dismissed at the same time as or after 26 the dismissal of the claim under subsection (a), shall be tolled 27 while the claim is pending and for a period of 30 days after it is dismissed unless State law provides for a longer tolling 28 period.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(d). WAS VELOC VV RDOUING RAVUUPETOTI Ot Vere Orey TF OAyte vy Vil 1 fora are equally convenient for the parties. There is no reason 2 to doubt that the state court will provide an equally fair 3 adjudication of the issues. Plaintiff’s federal claims which 4 formed the basis of this court’s original jurisdiction, were 5 | tenuous from the outset. (See Order Granting Mot. to Dismiss at 6 4-6.) Had plaintiff filed this action in the state court in the 7 first place, any costs or delay resulting from this order could 8 | have been avoided. Judicial economy thus does not weigh in favor 9 of exercising supplemental jurisdiction. 10 Accordingly, the court declines to exercise 11 supplemental jurisdiction and will dismiss plaintiff’s remaining 12 state law claims. 13 Plaintiff’s claims under California law against 14 defendants are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE to refiling in state 15 court. 16 The Clerk of Court is instructed to enter judgment 17 accordingly. 18 | Dated: September 25, 2020 dete ak. 4 J 19 WILLIAM B. SHUBB 30 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28