(PC) Curley v. Clark ( 2020 )

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 KEVIN CURLEY, 1:20-cv-00453-JLT (PC) 12 Plaintiff, ORDER REQUIRING PLAINTIFF TO SUBMIT A RESPONSE 13 v. (Doc. 1) 14 CHIEF DEPUTY WARDEN CLARK, et al., THIRTY-DAY DEADLINE 15 Defendants. 16 17 Plaintiff has filed a complaint asserting constitutional claims against governmental employees 18 and/or entities. (Doc. 1.) Generally, the Court is required to screen complaints brought by inmates 19 seeking relief against a governmental entity or an officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 20 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised 21 claims that are legally “frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be 22 granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. 23 § 1915A(b)(1), (2). “Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been paid, 24 the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that . . . the action or appeal . . . 25 fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). 26 //// 27 //// 28 1 I. Pleading Standard 2 A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader 3 is entitled to relief. . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not required, but 4 “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, 5 do not suffice,” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 6 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)), and courts “are not required to indulge unwarranted inferences,” Doe I 7 v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 572 F.3d 677, 681 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citation 8 omitted). While factual allegations are accepted as true, legal conclusions are not. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 9 at 678. 10 Prisoners may bring § 1983 claims against individuals acting “under color of state law.” 11 See 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) (2)(B)(ii). Under § 1983, Plaintiff must demonstrate that 12 each defendant personally participated in the deprivation of his rights. Jones v. Williams, 297 F.3d 13 930, 934 (9th Cir. 2002). This requires the presentation of factual allegations sufficient to state a 14 plausible claim for relief. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79; Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 15 (9th Cir. 2009). Prisoners proceeding pro se in civil rights actions are entitled to have their pleadings 16 liberally construed and to have any doubt resolved in their favor, Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 17 (9th Cir. 2010) (citations omitted), but nevertheless, the mere possibility of misconduct falls short 18 of meeting the plausibility standard, Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Moss, 572 F.3d at 969. 19 II. Plaintiff’s Allegations 20 Plaintiff brings this damages action against several individuals employed at the California 21 State Prison in Corcoran, California (“CSP-Cor”): Chief Deputy Warden Clark, Chief Deputy 22 Warden Gamboa, Associate Warden D. Goss, Acting Chief Deputy Warden Cambell, Correctional 23 Counselor II G. Rangel, Lt. E. Garza, Captain D. Burns, and Counselor W. Costello. Each defendant 24 is named in his or her official and individual capacity. 25 As best as the Court can determine, plaintiff alleges as follows: 26 Plaintiff arrived at CSP-Cor from the California Health Care Facility on February 21, 2019, 27 as a “[Psychiatric Inpatient Programs] discharge inmate.” Upon his release from the California 28 Health Care Facility, plaintiff was endorsed to be transferred to California State Prison in Lancaster 1 (“CSP-Lan”) where he was to receive treatment in the Enhanced Outpatient Program (“EOP”). 2 Plaintiff’s transfer endorsement to CSP-Lan was set to expire on May 15, 2019. 3 Despite the endorsement to CSP-Lan, plaintiff was processed at CSP-Cor where Lt. Garza 4 and Captain Burns determined that plaintiff should be housed in the administrative segregation unit 5 (“ASU”) due to the “discrepancy concerning [plaintiff’s] case factors.” 6 On March 7 and March 9, 2019, plaintiff received RVRs for indecent exposure, which he 7 claims were falsified. As a result of the RVRs, the Institution Classification Committee (“ICC”) 8 endorsed plaintiff on March 13 to the COR Indecent Exposure (“IEX”) Pilot Program, a 180-day 9 program that must be completed by inmates charged with IEX. This program is a non-designated 10 yard where Sensitive Needs Yard (“SNY”) inmates and general population inmates are not separated 11 from one another. 12 Plaintiff was placed in ASU on March 21, 2019. That same day, he filed an inmate grievance 13 regarding his placement in the COR-IEX program and the failure to transfer him to CSP-Lac. 14 Plaintiff also sought release from ASU and placement in a Level 3 SNY pending his transfer. 15 On March 22, 2019, plaintiff was released from ASU and placed in a non-designated EOP 16 facility, meaning that SNY and general population inmates are not separated from one another. 17 Plaintiff was later assaulted by a SNY inmate. 18 Plaintiff’s appeal was partially granted at the first level of review on May 16, 2019, by 19 Correctional Counselor II Rangel and Associate Warden Goss. They noted that plaintiff was 20 required to complete the 180-day COR-IEX program in light of his RVRs, but they also noted that 21 the IEX program was being decommissioned, so he should expect to be released from the program 22 soon. 23 On June 24, 2019, Chief Deputy Warden Gamboa partially granted plaintiff’s appeal at the 24 second level of review after plaintiff was informed that he would be seen by the classification 25 committee for release from the COR-IEX program. 26 On June 27, 2019, the ICC, which was comprised of Costello and Rangel, released plaintiff 27 from the COR-IEX program and placed him in a Level 3 EOP program pending transfer to an 28 appropriate Level 4 facility that could serve his program needs. On August 28, 2019, the CSP-Cor 1 Unit Classification Committee, which included Correctional Counselor Costello, affirmed the June 2 27 ICC decision. On September 24, 2019, plaintiff was sent out to court before a case services 3 representative could review his file. 4 On November 14, 2019, plaintiff’s appeal was granted at the third level of review. Plaintiff 5 was released from the COR-IEX program, and a classification committee was scheduled to review 6 his case upon his return from court. 7 Plaintiff claims that these improper housing decisions violated his constitutional rights and 8 had a serious adverse effect on his mental health, cause serious physical injuries, and delayed 9 medical procedures. He also claims that his youth offenders board preparation has been hindered. 10 III. Discussion 11 A. Official v. Individual Capacity Claims 12 Plaintiff names the defendants in their official and individual capacities. Because plaintiff 13 is seeking only damages, he is informed that the Eleventh Amendment bars suits for money 14 damages in federal court against state officials in their official capacity. Aholelei v. Department 15 of Public Safety, 488 F.3d 1144, 1147 (9th Cir. 2007). However, it does not bar official capacity 16 suit for prospective relief, Wolfson v. Brammer, 616 F.3d 1045, 1065-66 (9th Cir. 2010); nor 17 does it bar suit for damages against state officials in their personal capacities. Hafer v. Melo, 502 18 U.S. 21, 30 (1991); Porter v. Jones, 319 F.3d 483, 491 (9th Cir. 2003). 19 “Personal-capacity suits . . . seek to impose individual liability upon a government officer 20 for actions taken under color of state law.” Hafer, 502 U.S. at 25; Suever v. Connell, 579 F.3d 21 1047, 1060-61 (9th Cir. 2009). Where a plaintiff is seeking damages against a state official and 22 the complaint is silent as to capacity, a personal capacity suit is presumed given the bar against an 23 official capacity suit. Shoshone-Bannock Tribes v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 42 F.3d 1278, 1284 24 (9th Cir. 1994); Price v. Akaka, 928 F.2d 824, 828 (9th Cir. 1991). 25 A claim for prospective injunctive relief against a state official in his official capacity is 26 not barred by the Eleventh Amendment provided the official has authority to implement the 27 requested relief. Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 92 (1989); accord Rouser v. 28 White, 707 F. Supp. 2d 1055, 1066 (E.D. Cal. 2010) (proper defendant for injunctive relief in suit 1 seeking implementation of CDCR policy is the CDCR Secretary in his official capacity). 2 Plaintiff’s official capacity claims must therefore be dismissed. 3 B. Linkage 4 Under § 1983, the plaintiff must demonstrate that each named defendant personally 5 participated in the deprivation of his rights. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676-77 Simmons v. Navajo 6 County, 609 F.3d 1011, 1020-21 (9th Cir. 2010); Ewing v. City of Stockton, 588 F.3d 1218, 1235 7 (9th Cir. 2009). Liability may not be imposed on supervisory personnel under the theory of 8 respondeat superior. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676-77. Supervisory personnel may only be held liable if 9 they “participated in or directed the violations, or knew of the violations and failed to act to 10 prevent them,” Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989) accord Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 11 1202, 1205-08 (9th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 2101 (2012). 12 Next, plaintiff names Chief Deputy Warden Clark and Acting Chief Deputy Warden 13 Cambell, but he asserts no charging allegations as to any of them. Accordingly, the Court finds 14 that he fails to state a claim against them. 15 C. Fourteenth Amendment Due Process 16 a. Falsified Reports 17 Plaintiff contends that the two RVRs issued for indecent exposure were falsified. To the 18 extent he seeks to impose liability for these RVRs, he is forewarned that the mere filing of a false 19 report by a prison official against a prisoner is not a per se violation of the prisoner’s 20 constitutional rights. See Muhammad v. Rubia, 2010 WL 1260425, at *3 (N.D. Cal., Mar. 29, 21 2010), aff'd, 453 F. App’x 751 (9th Cir. 2011) (“[A] prisoner has no constitutionally guaranteed 22 immunity from being falsely or wrongly accused of conduct which may result in the deprivation 23 of a protected liberty interest. As long as a prisoner is afforded procedural due process in the 24 disciplinary hearing, allegations of a fabricated charge fail to state a claim under § 1983.”) 25 (citations omitted); Harper v. Costa, 2009 WL 1684599, at *2-3 (E.D. Cal., June 16, 2009), aff’d, 26 393 F. App’x 488 (9th Cir. 2010) (“Although the Ninth Circuit has not directly addressed this 27 issue in a published opinion, district courts throughout California ... have determined that a 28 prisoner’s allegation that prison officials issued a false disciplinary charge against him fails to 1 state a cognizable claim for relief under § 1983.”). Thus, any claim based on the allegedly 2 falsified reports necessarily fails. 3 b. Processing Inmate Grievance 4 Several of the defendants are named solely for their role in the processing of plaintiff’s 5 inmate grievance. The existence of a prison grievance procedure establishes a procedural right 6 only and “does not confer any substantive right upon the inmates.” Buckley v. Barlow, 997 F.2d 7 494, 495 (8th Cir. 1993) (citation omitted); see also Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 860 (9th 8 Cir. 2003) (no liberty interest in processing of appeals because no entitlement to a specific 9 grievance procedure). This means that a prison official’s action in reviewing an inmate grievance 10 cannot serve as a basis for liability under Section 1983. Buckley, 997 F.2d at 495. “Only persons 11 who cause or participate in the violations are responsible. Ruling against a prisoner on an 12 administrative complaint does not cause or contribute to the violation. A guard who stands and 13 watches while another guard beats a prisoner violates the Constitution; a guard who rejects an 14 administrative complaint about a completed act of misconduct does not.” George v. Smith, 507 15 F.3d 605, 609-10 (7th Cir. 2007) (citations omitted). Therefore, to the extent plaintiff seeks to 16 proceed against any of these defendants based solely on their role in responding to his grievances, 17 any such claim fails. 18 c. Prison Disciplinary Hearings 19 The Due Process Clause protects prisoners from being deprived of liberty without due 20 process of law. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556 (1974). In order to state a cause of action 21 for deprivation of due process, a plaintiff must first establish the existence of a liberty interest for 22 which the protection is sought. “States may under certain circumstances create liberty interests 23 which are protected by the Due Process Clause.” Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 483-84 (1995). 24 “When protected interests are implicated, the right to some kind of prior hearing is paramount....” 25 Neal v. Shimoda, 131 F.3d 818, 830 (9th Cir. 1997) (quoting Board of Regents of State Colleges 26 v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569-70 (1972)). However, “[p]rison disciplinary proceedings are not part 27 of a criminal prosecution, and the full panoply of rights due a defendant in such proceedings does 28 not apply.” Wolff, 418 U.S. at 556. 1 With respect to prison disciplinary proceedings, the minimum procedural requirements 2 that must be met are: (1) written notice of the charges; (2) at least 24 hours between the time the 3 prisoner receives written notice and the time of the hearing, so that the prisoner may prepare his 4 defense; (3) a written statement by the fact finders of the evidence they rely on and reasons for 5 taking disciplinary action; (4) the right of the prisoner to call witnesses in his defense, when 6 permitting him to do so would not be unduly hazardous to institutional safety or correctional 7 goals; and (5) assistance to the prisoner where the prisoner is illiterate or the issues presented are 8 legally complex. Wolff, 418 U.S. at 563-71. As long as the five minimum Wolff requirements are 9 met, due process has been satisfied. Walker v. Sumner, 14 F.3d 1415, 1420 (9th Cir. 1994), 10 abrogated on other grounds by Sandin, 515 U.S. 472. In addition, “some evidence” must support 11 the decision of the hearing officer, Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 455 (1985), and the 12 evidence must have some indicia of reliability, Cato v. Rushen, 824 F.2d 703, 705 (9th Cir. 13 1987). The “some evidence” standard is not particularly stringent, and the relevant inquiry is 14 whether “there is any evidence in the record that could support the conclusion reached....” Hill, 15 472 U.S. at 455-56. 16 Under state law, the existence of a liberty interest created by prison regulations is 17 determined by focusing on the nature of the deprivation. Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 481-84 18 (1995). Liberty interests created by state law are “generally limited to freedom from restraint 19 which ... imposes atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary 20 incidents of prison life.” Id. at 484; Myron v. Terhune, 476 F.3d 716, 718 (9th Cir. 2007). 21 The Due Process Clause itself does not confer on inmates a liberty interest in being 22 confined in the general prison population instead of administrative segregation. See Hewitt v. 23 Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 466-68 (1983); see also May v. Baldwin, 109 F.3d 557, 565 (9th Cir. 1997) 24 (convicted inmate’s due process claim fails because he has no liberty interest in freedom from 25 state action taken within sentence imposed and administrative segregation falls within the terms 26 of confinement ordinarily contemplated by a sentence) (quotations omitted); Resnick v. Hayes, 27 213 F.3d 443, 447 (9th Cir. 2000) (plaintiff’s placement and retention in the SHU was within 28 range of confinement normally expected by inmates in relation to ordinary incidents of prison life 1 and, therefore, plaintiff had no protected liberty interest in being free from confinement in the 2 SHU) (quotations omitted). 3 Liberally construed, plaintiff alleges a due process claim premised on his placement in the 4 COR-IEX program. On review, this claim fails because it is not clear against whom it is asserted. 5 In addition, the claim is vague and conclusory. That is, while plaintiff contends that he was placed 6 in this program after having been issued falsified RVRs, there are simply no facts to inform the 7 Court or any of the defendants who was responsible for this placement, what procedures were 8 followed in making the placement determination (i.e., a committee decision, a hearing, etc.), or 9 what were the conditions of the program in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life. In the 10 absence of these necessary details, this claim cannot be analyzed and must therefore be dismissed. 11 d. Transfer to Preferred Institution 12 Finally, any claim premised on the defendants’ alleged failure to house plaintiff at CSP- 13 Lan fails because plaintiff is not entitled to be transferred to any particular prison. See Olim v. 14 Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 245 (1983); Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 225 (1976); Montayne 15 v. Haymes, 427 U.S. 236, 242 (1976) (It is well settled that prisoners have no constitutional right 16 to placement in any particular prison, to any particular security classification, or to any particular 17 housing assignment.). 18 IV. Conclusion 19 Plaintiff’s complaint fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted. The Court will 20 grant plaintiff an opportunity to file an amended complaint. Noll v. Carlson, 809 F.2d 1446, 1448- 21 49 (9th Cir. 1987). If plaintiff does not wish to amend, he may instead file a notice of voluntary 22 dismissal, and the action then will be terminated by operation of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(1)(A)(i). 23 Alternatively, plaintiff may forego amendment and notify the Court that he wishes to stand on his 24 complaint. See Edwards v. Marin Park, Inc., 356 F.3d 1058, 1064-65 (9th Cir. 2004) (plaintiff may 25 elect to forego amendment). If the last option is chosen, the undersigned will issue findings and 26 recommendations to dismiss the complaint without leave to amend, plaintiff will have an 27 opportunity to object, and the matter will be decided by a District Judge. 28 If plaintiff opts to amend, he must demonstrate that the alleged acts resulted in a deprivation 1 of his constitutional rights. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677-78. Plaintiff must set forth “sufficient factual 2 matter . . . to ‘state a claim that is plausible on its face.’” Id. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 3 555 (2007)). Plaintiff should note that although he has been granted the opportunity to amend his 4 complaint, it is not for the purposes of adding new and unrelated claims. George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 5 605, 607 (7th Cir. 2007). Plaintiff should carefully review this screening order and focus his efforts 6 on curing the deficiencies set forth above. 7 Finally, plaintiff is advised that Local Rule 220 requires that an amended complaint be 8 complete in itself without reference to any prior pleading. As a general rule, an amended complaint 9 supersedes the original complaint. See Loux v. Rhay, 375 F.2d 55, 57 (9th Cir. 1967). Once an 10 amended complaint is filed, the original complaint no longer serves a function in the case. Id. 11 Therefore, in an amended complaint, as in an original complaint, each claim and the involvement 12 of each defendant must be sufficiently alleged. The amended complaint should be clearly titled, in 13 bold font, “First Amended Complaint,” reference the appropriate case number, and be an original 14 signed under penalty of perjury. Plaintiff’s amended complaint should be brief. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). 15 Although accepted as true, the “[f]actual allegations must be [sufficient] to raise a right to relief 16 above the speculative level . . . .” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citations omitted). Accordingly, the 17 Court ORDERS as follows: 18 1. Within thirty days from the date of service of this order, plaintiff must file either a 19 first amended complaint curing the deficiencies identified by the Court in this order, 20 a notice of voluntary dismissal, or a notice of election to stand on the complaint; and 21 2. If plaintiff fails to file a first amended complaint or notice of voluntary dismissal, 22 the Court will recommend the action be dismissed, with prejudice, for failure to 23 obey a court order and failure to state a claim. 24 IT IS SO ORDERED. 25 26 Dated: November 2, 2020 /s/ Jennifer L. Thurston UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 27 28