(PS) Coleman v. Coleman ( 2020 )

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 TIMONTHY ALLEN COLEMAN, No. 2:20-cv-00548-TLN-CKD PS 12 Plaintiff, 13 v. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 14 MELISSA LEA COLEMAN, et al., 15 Defendants. 16 17 Plaintiff is proceeding in this action pro se. On July 21, 2020, the court dismissed 18 plaintiff’s complaint, with leave to amend. Plaintiff has now filed an amended complaint. 19 The federal in forma pauperis statute authorizes federal courts to dismiss a case if the 20 action is legally “frivolous or malicious,” fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted 21 or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 22 1915(e)(2). A claim is legally frivolous when it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact. 23 Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989); Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1227-28 (9th 24 Cir. 1984). The court may, therefore, dismiss a claim as frivolous where it is based on an 25 indisputably meritless legal theory or where the factual contentions are clearly baseless. Neitzke, 26 490 U.S. at 327. 27 As plaintiff was advised in the court’s order of dismissal with leave to amend, a federal 28 district court does not have jurisdiction to review errors in state court decisions in civil cases. 1 Dist. of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 476 (1983); Rooker v. Fidelity 2 Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 415 (1923). “The district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction either to 3 conduct a direct review of a state court judgment or to scrutinize the state court’s application of 4 various rules and procedures pertaining to the state case.” Samuel v. Michaud, 980 F. Supp. 5 1381, 1411-12 (D. Idaho 1996), aff’d, 129 F.3d 127 (9th Cir. 1997). See also Branson v. Nott, 62 6 F.3d 287, 291-92 (9th Cir.1995) (finding no subject matter jurisdiction over section 1983 claim 7 seeking, inter alia, implicit reversal of state trial court action); MacKay v. Pfeil, 827 F.2d 540, 8 544-45 (9th Cir. 1987) (attacking state court judgment because substantive defense improper 9 under Rooker-Feldman). That the federal district court action alleges the state court’s action was 10 unconstitutional does not change the rule. Feldman, 460 U.S. at 486. If federal claims are 11 “inextricably intertwined” with a state court judgment, the federal court may not hear them. Id. 12 “[T]he federal claim is ‘inextricably intertwined’ with the state court judgment if the federal 13 claim succeeds only to the extent that the state court wrongly decided the issues before it.” 14 Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 25 (1987) (Marshall, J., concurring). In sum, the 15 Rooker-Feldman doctrine applies “[i]f a federal plaintiff asserts as a legal wrong an allegedly 16 erroneous decision by a state court, and seeks relief from a state court judgment based on that 17 decision.” Noel v. Hall, 341 F.3d 1148, 1163–64 (9th Cir. 2003). 18 Here, plaintiff’s amended complaint names the Stanislaus County Superior Court and 19 Xavier Bacerra (sic), the California Attorney General1. (ECF No. 4 at 1.) Plaintiff alleges the 20 Stanislaus County Superior Court “accepted and returned [a] motion for service” relating to an 21 action filed by Melissa Coleman alleging that plaintiff was a risk of abducting their daughter. 22 (ECF No. 4 at 7.) After an unsuccessful mediation, the court issued an order restricting the 23 plaintiff’s travel with his daughter. (Id at 8.) Plaintiff subsequently appealed the trial court’s 24 decision to the California Court of Appeal Fifth District and to the California Supreme Court, 25 losing both times.2 26 1 There are no factual allegations against the Attorney General that the court can discern. 27 2 See, California Appellate Courts Case Information, http://appellatecases.courtinfo.ca.gov/search.cfm?dist=0 (search last name “Coleman” and first 28 name “Timothy”). 1 As he did in his original complaint, plaintiff again alleges that the procedural deficiencies 2 of the state court proceedings violated his due process rights. (See ECF No. 4 at 9.) For example, 3 plaintiff alleges that the trial court incorrectly placed the burden of proof on plaintiff, plaintiff 4 was not allowed to testify in a “meaningful way,” and the court “predetermined the outcome of 5 the proceeding.” (Id.) 6 Plaintiff is, in essence, seeking a direct appeal to this court from the decision of the 7 California Supreme Court, something prohibited by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. See Noel, 341 8 F.3d at 1154 (“Under Rooker-Feldman, a federal district court does not have subject matter 9 jurisdiction to hear a direct appeal from the final judgment of a state court.”). Plaintiff asserts in 10 his amended complaint that, “this complaint does not violate the Rooker-Feldman Doctrine as my 11 injury comes from the Stanislaus Superior Court unconstitutionally applying the law of the State 12 of California against me thereby depriving me of my Constitutionally Guaranteed Civil Rights.” 13 (ECF 4 at 10.) The court disagrees with plaintiff’s analysis, and finds that this court does not 14 have subject matter jurisdiction over plaintiff’s complaint. The amended complaint must therefore 15 be dismissed. 16 If a complaint fails to state a plausible claim, “[a] district court should grant leave to 17 amend even if no request to amend the pleading was made, unless it determines that the pleading 18 could not possibly be cured by the allegation of other facts.” Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 19 1130 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc); see also Gardner v. Marino, 563 F.3d 981, 990 (9th Cir. 2009) 20 (finding no abuse of discretion in denying leave to amend when amendment would be futile). 21 Here, the court provided plaintiff with an opportunity to cure his defective pleadings 22 regarding the elements addressed herein. At this juncture, the court is of the opinion that further 23 leave to amend would be futile. The TAC should therefore be dismissed without leave to amend. See Fid. Fin. Corp. v. Fed. Home Loan Bank of San Francisco, 792 F.2d 1432, 1438 24 (9th Cir. 1986) (“The district court’s discretion to deny leave to amend is particularly broad 25 where the court has already given the plaintiff an opportunity to amend his complaint.”). 26 In accordance with the above, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that: 27 1. Plaintiff’s amended complaint be dismissed without leave to amend. 28 2. The Clerk of Court be directed to close this case. 1 These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge 2 | assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Within fourteen (14) 3 | days after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written 4 objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any reply to the objections ° shall be served on all parties and filed with the court within fourteen (14) days after service of the 6 objections. Failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the 7 | District Court’s order. Turmer v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998); Martinez v. YIst, 951 8 | F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991). g || Dated: November 8, 2020 Pt I / > has 0 CANO fe KOU 7 CAROLYN K. DELANEY 11 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28