Reason v. City of Richmond ( 2021 )

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 ----oo0oo---- 11 12 ERIC REASON, an individual; No. 20-cv-01900-WBS-EFB STEPHANIE BASS, an individual; 13 RASHEED REASON, individually and as Co-Successor-in-Interest to 14 Decedent ERIC REASON II; TYRIQUE MEMORANDUM AND ORDER RE: REASON, individually and as Co- DEFENDANT CITY OF VALLEJO AND 15 Successor-in-Interest to VALLEJO CHIEF OF POLICE Decedent ERIC REASON II; K.R., SHAWNY WILLIAMS’ MOTION TO 16 individually and as Co- DISMISS, DEFENDANT CITY OF Successor-in-Interest to RICHMOND’S MOTION TO DISMISS, 17 Decedent ERIC REASON II, by and AND DEFENDANT RICHMOND CHIEF through his Guardian Ad litem OF POLICE BISA FRENCH’S 18 LATISHA PARKER; P.R., MOTION TO DISMISS individually and as Co- 19 Successor-in-Interest to Decedent ERIC REASON II, by and 20 through his Guardian Ad Litem LATISHA PARKER; N.M., 21 individually and as Co- Successor-in-Interest to 22 Decedent ERIC REASON II, by and through his Guardian Ad Litem 23 NIA MILLS; E.L.R., individually and as Co-Successor-in-Interest 24 to Decedent ERIC REASON II, by and through his Guardian Ad 25 Litem SHAWNTAY DAVIS; I.R.V., individually and as Co- 26 Successor-in-Interest to Decedent ERIC REASON II, by and 27 through his Guardian Ad Litem JULIA VELASQUEZ; 28 1 Plaintiffs, 2 v. 3 CITY OF RICHMOND, a municipal 4 corporation; CITY OF VALLEJO, a municipal corporation; the 5 ESTATE OF VIRGIL THOMAS, individually and in his capacity 6 as Police Sergeant for the CITY OF RICHMOND; SHAWNY WILLIAMS, in 7 his individual capacity as Chief of Police for the CITY OF 8 VALLEJO; BISA FRENCH, in her individual capacity as Chief of 9 Police for the CITY OF RICHMOND; DOES 1-25, inclusive, in their 10 individual capacities as police officers for the CITY OF 11 RICHMOND and/or CITY OF VALLEJO, and DOES 26-50, inclusive, 12 individually and in their supervisory capacity as 13 employees for the Richmond Police Department and/or Vallejo 14 Police Department 15 Defendants. 16 17 ----oo0oo---- 18 Plaintiffs Eric Reason, Stephanie Bass, Rasheed Reason, 19 Tyrique Reason, and the minor children of the decedent Eric 20 Reason II (“plaintiffs”) brought this action against the City of 21 Vallejo (“Vallejo”), the City of Vallejo’s Chief of Police Shawny 22 Williams, the City of Richmond (“Richmond”), the City of 23 Richmond’s Chief of Police Bisa French, the Estate of Richmond 24 Police Sergeant Virgil Thomas, and DOES 1-50 seeking damages 25 against defendants for violation of their civil rights under 42 26 U.S.C. § 1983, conspiracy to violate their civil rights under 42 27 U.S.C. § 1985, wrongful death, negligence, violation of 28 California Civil Code § 52.1, and battery. 1 Before the court are the City of Vallejo and the City 2 of Vallejo Chief of Police Shawny Williams’ Motion to Dismiss, 3 (Docket No. 6), the City of Richmond’s Motion to Dismiss (Docket 4 No. 8), and the City of Richmond Chief of Police Bisa French’s 5 Motion to Dismiss (Docket No. 9.) 6 I. Factual and Procedural Background 7 Plaintiffs allege that on November 10, 2019, defendant 8 Richmond Police Department Sergeant Virgil Thomas and decedent 9 Eric Reason II became embroiled in a heated verbal confrontation 10 over a parking spot in the city of Vallejo, California. (Compl. 11 at ¶ 1) (Docket No. 1.) Sergeant Thomas was on administrative 12 leave at the time of this incident. (Id. at ¶ 47.) Mr. Reason 13 walked back towards his van after exchanging words with Sergeant 14 Thomas. (See id. at ¶ 1) Sergeant Thomas then raised his gun 15 and fired at Mr. Reason and shot him in the back of the head. 16 (Id.) 17 Sergeant Thomas then contacted police dispatch and 18 identified himself as a Richmond Police Department Sergeant. 19 (See Compl. at ¶ 2.) Vallejo Police Officers responded to the 20 scene and initiated the Solano County Officer Involved Shooting 21 Protocol. (See id.) The Vallejo Police Department began 22 securing the crime scene and placed crime scene tape around the 23 vicinity of the shooting. (Id.) During this time, Vallejo 24 Police Officers allowed Sergeant Thomas to remain on scene 25 without being sequestered or cordoned off from critical items of 26 evidence. (Id.) Vallejo Police permitted Sergeant Thomas to 27 “disturb the crime scene and take photographs of Mr. Reason’s 28 dead body in full view of the Vallejo Police Department Officers 1 and members of the Reason family who were gathering outside of 2 the crime scene tape.” (Id.) Vallejo police officers uninvolved 3 in the investigation viewed Mr. Reason’s body under a tarp. (Id. 4 at ¶ 40.) 5 In an “effort to conceal the criminal actions of 6 Sergeant Thomas and quell public outrage, the Vallejo Police 7 Department issued a press release which sought to justify the 8 shooting and overtly failed to accurately describe the true 9 circumstances of the shooting.” (Id. at ¶ 3.) In the aftermath 10 of the shooting, the Reason family initiated a complaint with 11 Chief of Police Shawny Williams related to the disturbance of the 12 crime scene and Sergeant Thomas photographing Mr. Reason’s 13 remains. (Id. at ¶ 4.) To date, the City has not formally 14 responded to the Reason family’s complaint. (See id.) 15 II. Discussion 16 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) allows for 17 dismissal when the plaintiff’s complaint fails to state a claim 18 upon which relief can be granted. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). 19 The inquiry before the court is whether, accepting the 20 allegations in the complaint as true and drawing all reasonable 21 inferences in the plaintiff’s favor, the complaint has stated “a 22 claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. 23 v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “The plausibility standard 24 is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more 25 than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” 26 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). “Threadbare 27 recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere 28 conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. Although legal 1 conclusions “can provide the framework of a complaint, they must 2 be supported by factual allegations.” Id. at 679. 3 Plaintiffs allege that the City of Vallejo, City of 4 Richmond, and their respective Chiefs of Police Shawny Williams 5 and Bisa French are liable under Monell v. Department of Social 6 Services of the City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978), for: 7 (1) having an unconstitutional custom or policy, (2) ratifying 8 the decisions of the officers who caused the constitutional 9 violation, and (3) failing to adequately train the police 10 officers. (Compl. at ¶¶ 80–94.) 11 Because 42 U.S.C. § 1983 does not provide for vicarious 12 liability, local governments “may not be sued under § 1983 for an 13 injury inflicted solely by its employees or agents.” Monell, 436 14 U.S. at 694. “Instead, it is when execution of a government’s 15 policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose 16 edicts or acts may be fairly said to represent official policy, 17 inflicts the injury that the government as an entity is 18 responsible under § 1983.” Id. A Monell claim lies where “the 19 municipal action was taken with the requisite degree of 20 culpability and must demonstrate a direct causal link between the 21 municipal action and the deprivation of federal rights.” Bd. of 22 Cty. Comm’rs of Bryan Cty. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 406 (1997). 23 To survive a motion to dismiss a Monell claim, a 24 plaintiff must do more than simply allege that a defendant 25 “maintained or permitted an official policy, custom, or practice 26 of knowingly permitting the occurrence of the type of wrongs” 27 alleged in the complaint. See AE ex. rel. Hernandez v. Cty. of 28 Tulare, 666 F.3d 631, 637 (9th Cir. 2012). Facts regarding the 1 specific nature of the alleged policy, custom, or practice are 2 required; merely stating the subject to which the policy relates 3 (i.e., excessive force) is insufficient. See id. 4 Following this rule, district courts have dismissed 5 complaints where a plaintiff alleged a single incident of 6 unconstitutional conduct as the basis for his Monell claim. See, 7 e.g., Wallace v. City of Santa Rosa, No. C 12-6451 MMC, 2013 WL 8 4675354, *2 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 30, 2013) (dismissing a Monell claim 9 rooted in allegations of an officer’s use of excessive force 10 during a plaintiff’s arrest and finding that a single incident is 11 insufficient to support a Monell claim based on inadequate 12 training or failure to discipline). 13 A. Claims Against the City of Vallejo 14 A municipality can be sued for “constitutional 15 deprivations visited pursuant to governmental custom.” Monell, 16 436 U.S. at 690. To establish liability, plaintiffs must show 17 that (1) they were deprived of a constitutional right, (2) the 18 municipality had a policy; (3) the policy amounted to a 19 deliberate indifference to their constitutional right; and (4) 20 the policy was the “moving force behind the constitutional 21 violation.” See Mabe v. San Bernardino Cty., 237 F.3d 1101, 22 1110–11 (9th Cir. 2001)(citing Van Ort v. Estate of Stanewich, 93 23 F.3d 831, 835 (9th Cir. 1996).) 24 Here, plaintiffs have alleged that their rights were 25 violated by the City of Vallejo because (1) Sergeant Virgil 26 Thomas was permitted to remain on the crime scene and 27 photographed Eric Reason’s body, (2) Vallejo police officers 28 uninvolved in the investigation viewed Eric Reason’s body under a 1 tarp, (3) the City of Vallejo issued a press release that made 2 inaccurate statements and was designed to defend Sergeant 3 Thomas’s actions, and (4) Chief Williams failed to respond to 4 their complaint. (Compl. at ¶¶ 80–94.) For the reasons 5 discussed below, even assuming that the alleged conduct 6 complained of by plaintiffs amounted to a violation of 7 constitutionally protected rights, plaintiffs have failed to 8 adequately plead a Monell claim against the City of Vallejo under 9 any theory. 10 1. Unconstitutional Custom or Policy 11 For an unwritten policy or custom to form the basis of 12 a Monell claim, it must be so “persistent and widespread” that it 13 constitutes a “permanent and well settled” practice. See Monell, 14 436 U.S. at 691. In pleading such a claim, the complaint must 15 “put forth additional facts regarding the specific nature of 16 [the] alleged policy, custom, or practice.” See AE ex. rel. 17 Hernandez, 666 F.3d at 637. Here, the thrust of the allegations 18 against the City of Vallejo is that (1) it allegedly allowed 19 Sergeant Thomas to corrupt the crime scene and photograph the 20 decedent, (2) it allowed uninvolved Vallejo police officers to 21 view the decedent, (3) it issued a supposedly misleading press 22 release, and (4) Vallejo Chief of Police Shawny Williams failed 23 to respond to a complaint by the Reason family. (See Compl. at 24 ¶¶ 81–85.) 25 However, plaintiffs have alleged no facts in their 26 complaint regarding an unconstitutional policy, custom or 27 practice, allegations of prior incidents, or facts which 28 demonstrate that the alleged practice was of “sufficient 1 duration, frequency, and consistency such that the alleged custom 2 or practice has become a traditional method of carrying out 3 policy.” See Harper v. Cty. Of Merced, 1:18-cv-005620-LJO-SKO, 4 2018 WL 5880786, *6 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 8, 2018). Plaintiffs’ 5 allegations are therefore insufficient to state a plausible, not 6 merely possible, claim for relief. See AE ex rel. Hernandez, 666 7 F.3d at 637. 8 2. Ratification 9 The Ninth Circuit has “found municipal liability on the 10 basis of ratification when the officials involved adopted and 11 expressly approved of the acts of others who caused the 12 constitutional violation.” Trevino v. Gates, 99 F.3d 911, 920 13 (9th Cir. 1996). Ratification “generally requires more than 14 acquiescence.” Sheehan v. City and Cty. of San Francisco, 743 15 F.3d 1211, 1231 (9th Cir. 2014) (overruled on other grounds by 16 City and Cty. of San Francisco v. Sheehan, 575 U.S. 600, 1767– 17 1778 (2015)). 18 Plaintiffs’ complaint states that Vallejo Police Chief 19 Shawny Williams ratified the Vallejo police officers’ conduct by 20 failing to discipline or re-train officers following the alleged 21 corruption of the crime scene and issuance of the press release. 22 (See Compl. at ¶¶ 81–86.) The complaint does not include any 23 factual allegations regarding any approval or ratification by the 24 City of the allegedly unconstitutional actions or the basis for 25 such approval. Moreover, it is well- established that the “mere 26 failure to discipline [the officers] does not amount to 27 ratification of their allegedly unconstitutional actions.” See 28 Sheehan, 743 F.3d at 1231. The plaintiffs here have therefore 1 failed to state a cognizable claim of ratification under Monell. 2 3. Failure to Train 3 In order to state a claim for failure to train under 4 Monell, a plaintiff must show that: (1) the existing training 5 program is inadequate in relation to the tasks the particular 6 officers must perform; (2) the officials have been deliberately 7 indifferent to the rights of the persons with whom the police 8 come into contact; and (3) the inadequacy of the training 9 “actually caused the deprivation of the alleged constitutional 10 right.” Merritt v. Cty. of Los Angeles, 875 F.2d 765, 770 (9th 11 Cir. 1989). “[W]hen city policymakers are on actual or 12 constructive notice that a particular omission in their training 13 program causes city employees to violate citizens’ constitutional 14 rights, the city may be deemed deliberately indifferent if the 15 policymakers choose to retain that program.” Connick v. 16 Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 61 (2011.) 17 Here, plaintiffs have not provided any factual 18 allegations (1) as to how the City’s officer training is 19 inadequate, (2) that the officials have been deliberately 20 indifferent to the rights of Vallejo citizens, or (3) that the 21 inadequacy of the training was what actually caused the alleged 22 deprivation of plaintiffs’ constitutional rights. See Merritt, 23 875 F.2d at 770. Accordingly, plaintiffs have failed to state a 24 cognizable claim of failure to train under Monell. Because the 25 complaint fails to state a Monell claim under any theory, the 26 court will dismiss the complaint’s fourth claim against the City 27 of Vallejo. 28 1 B. Claims Against the City of Richmond1 2 Plaintiffs’ sole allegation against the City of Richmond is 3 that the City of Richmond failed to discipline or retrain 4 Sergeant Thomas following the death of Eric Reason and permitted 5 him to return to his post. (See Compl. at ¶ 71.) Plaintiffs and 6 the City of Richmond go to great lengths to dispute whether 7 Sergeant Thomas was acting within the scope of his employment at 8 the time of the incident. (See generally Reply to City of 9 Richmond’s Mot. to Dismiss); (See generally City of Richmond Mot. 10 to Dismiss.) However, the court need not decide whether Sergeant 11 Thomas acted within the scope of his employment because, even 12 assuming that Sergeant Thomas did act in his official capacity, 13 plaintiffs have failed to adequately plead a claim against the 14 City of Richmond under Monell, as discussed below. 15 1. Unconstitutional Custom or Policy 16 The thrust of the allegations against the City of 17 Richmond is that Sergeant Thomas was allowed to return to work 18 following the death of Eric Reason and was allegedly not 19 disciplined or re-trained. (See Compl. at ¶¶ 68–71.) However, 20 plaintiffs have alleged no facts in their complaint regarding an 21 22 1 The City of Richmond also seeks to dismiss plaintiffs’ sixth cause of action for wrongful death--negligence under 23 California Code of Civil Procedure §§ 377.60–377.61 because it is duplicative of the seventh cause of action for negligence. (See 24 City of Richmond Mot. to Dismiss at 14.) Plaintiffs concede this and seek to amend to cure this deficiency or file a notice 25 withdrawing and/or dismissing the duplicative cause of action. (See Pls.’ Reply to City of Richmond’s Mot. to Dismiss at 21 26 (Docket No. 12).) Accordingly, the court will permit plaintiffs 27 to cure this defect either by amending the complaint or filing a notice withdrawing or dismissing the duplicative cause of action. 28 1 unconstitutional policy, custom or practice, allegations of prior 2 incidents, or facts which demonstrate that the alleged practice 3 was of “sufficient duration, frequency, and consistency such that 4 the alleged custom or practice has become a traditional method of 5 carrying out policy.” See Harper, 2018 WL 5880786, at *6. 6 Instead, plaintiffs rely solely on boilerplate conclusions of 7 customs, practices and policies related to excessive force and 8 police misconduct. (See Compl. at ¶ 72.) Plaintiffs’ 9 allegations are therefore insufficient to state a plausible, not 10 merely possible, claim for relief against the City of Richmond 11 upon this theory. See AE ex rel. Hernandez, 666 F.3d at 637. 12 2. Ratification 13 Plaintiffs’ complaint states that the Richmond Chief of 14 Police Bisa French ratified the Sergeant Thomas’s conduct by 15 failing to discipline or re-train him following the death of Eric 16 Reason. (See Compl. at ¶¶ 81–87.) However, the complaint does 17 not include any factual allegations regarding any approval or 18 ratification by the City of the allegedly unconstitutional 19 actions or the basis for such approval. Moreover, it is well- 20 established that the “mere failure to discipline [the officers] 21 does not amount to ratification of their allegedly 22 unconstitutional actions.” See Sheehan, 743 F.3d at 1231. 23 Plaintiffs have therefore failed to state a cognizable claim of 24 ratification against the City of Richmond under Monell. 25 3. Failure to Train 26 Plaintiffs have not provided any factual allegations as 27 to (1) how the City’s officer training is inadequate, (2) that 28 the officials have been deliberately indifferent to the rights of 1 Richmond citizens, or (3) that the inadequacy of the training was 2 what actually caused the alleged deprivation of plaintiffs’ 3 constitutional rights. See Merritt, 875 F.2d at 770. 4 Accordingly, plaintiffs have failed to state a cognizable claim 5 of failure to train under Monell. Because the complaint fails to 6 state a Monell claim under any theory, the court will dismiss the 7 complaint’s third claim against the City of Richmond. 8 C. Claims Against Vallejo Chief of Police Shawny Williams 9 and Richmond Chief of Police Bisa French 10 Plaintiffs attempt to sue Chief Williams and Chief 11 French in their individual capacities under Monell, but a Monell 12 claim may be brought only against a municipality, not an 13 individual. See Guillory v. Orange Cty., 731 F.2d 1379, 1382 14 (9th Cir. 1984) (“Monell does not concern liability of 15 individuals acting under color of state law.”) Monell liability 16 applies only to municipal or other local government units when a 17 plaintiff alleges unconstitutional action on the part of a 18 government entity, and “the action that is alleged to be 19 unconstitutional implements or executes a policy statement, 20 ordinance, regulation, or decision officially adopted and 21 promulgated by that body’s officers.” Monell, 436 U.S. at 690. 22 Therefore, Monell liability only applies to government 23 entities when employees of such entities are found to have 24 committed other constitutional violations and “a policy, practice 25 or custom of the entity can be shown to be a moving force behind 26 the violation of constitutional rights.” Dougherty v. City of 27 Covina, 654 F.3d 892, 900 (9th Cir. 2011.) 28 “Although there is a general rule that parties are 1 allowed to amend their pleadings, it does not extend to cases in 2 which any amendment would be an exercise in futility, or where 3 the amended complaint would also be subject to dismissal.” See 4 Steckman v. Hart Brewing, Inc., 143 F.3d 1293, 1298 (9th Cir. 5 1998)(internal citations omitted). The third and fourth claims 6 will therefore be dismissed with prejudice as against Chief 7 Williams and Chief French with prejudice because amendment of 8 these Monell claim would be futile.2 9 IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the City of Vallejo and 10 Vallejo Chief of Police Shawny Williams’ motion to dismiss 11 plaintiffs’ fourth claim under Monell, (Docket No. 6), the City 12 of Richmond’s motion to dismiss plaintiffs’ third claim under 13 Monell (Docket No. 8), and Richmond Chief of Police Bisa French’s 14 motion to dismiss plaintiffs’ third claim under Monell (Docket 15 No. 9) be, and the same hereby are, GRANTED. Plaintiffs’ third 16 and fourth Monell claims against Chief French and Chief Williams 17 are dismissed with prejudice.3 18 19 2 Defendant City of Vallejo and Chief of Police Shawny Williams requests that the court take judicial notice of the 20 security camera footage of the shooting and the fact that Chief Shawny Williams joined the Vallejo Police Department on November 21 10, 2019. (Request for Judicial Notice (“City of Vallejo’s 22 RJN”)) (Docket No. 6-1).) The City of Richmond and Richmond Chief of Police Bisa French also request that the court take 23 judicial notice of five exhibits in support of their respective motions to dismiss. (See City of Richmond and Bisa French’s RJN) 24 (Docket No. 16-1).) Because the facts alleged in plaintiffs’ complaint are insufficient to establish a Monell claim against 25 any defendant under any theory, with or without these exhibits, the court need not consider whether to take judicial notice of 26 them at this stage of the proceedings. 27 3 The court expresses no opinion as to whether Chief 28 Williams and Chief French could be sued under any other theory. eee enn enn nnn nn nn I OE OE OS IIES ENO 1 Plaintiffs have twenty days from the date this Order is 2 signed to file an amended complaint if they can do so consistent 3 | with this Order. Plaintiffs also have twenty days to file a 4 notice withdrawing and/or dismissing the duplicative sixth or 5 seventh cause of action if they opt not to cure the defect by 6 amending the complaint. . - 7 Dated: January 12, 2021 hi klew A hh bee WILLIAM B. SHUBB 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 14