B.T.H. v. County of Modoc ( 2021 )

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 B.T.H., a minor, T.J.H., a No. 2:20-cv-00566-JAM-AC minor, and V.C.H., a minor, by 12 Guardian Ad Litem PAMELA HINTON, 13 ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S Plaintiffs, MOTION TO DISMISS 14 v. 15 COUNTY OF MODOC, MODOC COUNTY 16 SHERIFF MIKE POINDEXTER, UNKNOWN MODOC COUNTY 17 CORRECTIONAL OFFICERS, SUPERVISORS, AND UNKNOWN MODOC 18 COUNTY MEDICAL CARE PROVIDERS, and DOES 1 through 50 19 inclusive, 20 Defendants. 21 22 I. BACKGROUND1 23 On March 13, 2020, Plaintiffs filed suit against Defendant 24 under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Compl., ECF No. 1. On August 18, 25 2020, the Court granted Defendant’s first motion to dismiss. See 26 27 1 This motion was determined to be suitable for decision without oral argument. E.D. Cal. L.R. 230(g). The hearing was 28 scheduled for November 24, 2020. 1 Order, ECF No, 21. Plaintiffs were given leave to amend. Id. 2 On September 2, 2020, Plaintiffs filed their first amended 3 complaint. See First Amended Complaint (“FAC”), ECF No. 22. 4 Shortly thereafter, upon stipulation by the parties, the Court 5 granted Plaintiffs leave to file a second amended complaint. See 6 Stip. and Order, ECF No. 25. On September 16, 2020, Plaintiffs 7 filed their second amended complaint. See Second Amended 8 Complaint (“SAC”), ECF No. 26. 9 Plaintiffs allege Defendants violated their Fourteenth 10 Amendment rights by denying their father medical care and due 11 process and maintaining an unconstitutional custom, policy, or 12 practice. Id. Plaintiffs’ father, Jeramy Hinton, suffered from 13 chronic bodily pain and suicidal depression stemming from 14 numerous surgical procedures he underwent in 2003. SAC ¶¶ 15. 15 In addition, Hinton was diagnosed with bilateral foraminal 16 stenosis, spondylolysis, and spondylolisthesis in 2018. SAC 17 ¶ 16. He was prescribed oxycodone and morphine sulfate to manage 18 those conditions. Id. 19 On March 24, 2018, Hinton was arrested and taken into 20 custody at the Modoc County Jail. SAC ¶ 17. Plaintiffs allege 21 Hinton received inadequate psychiatric and medical care while 22 incarcerated. SAC ¶ 19. Hinton’s previously-prescribed pain 23 medications were withheld, he was not monitored by either a 24 doctor or a nurse, and he was not prescribed or administered new 25 medication. SAC ¶¶ 25–26. On March 29, 2018, Hinton committed 26 suicide by hanging himself with a bedsheet in his cell. SAC 27 ¶ 20. Plaintiffs allege substandard care, resulting in Hinton’s 28 death, is attributable to the County’s inadequate hiring, 1 training, and supervision of jail personnel. SAC ¶ 22. 2 Defendants now move to dismiss Plaintiffs’ Second Cause of 3 Action, a Fourteenth Amendment Monell claim, for failing to 4 allege an unconstitutional custom, policy, or practice. See Mot. 5 at 6–10. For the reasons set forth below the Court grants 6 Defendants’ motion. 7 8 II. OPINION 9 A. Legal Standard 10 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires “a short 11 and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is 12 entitled to relief.” A Rule 12(b)(6) motion attacks the 13 complaint as not alleging sufficient facts to state a claim for 14 relief. “To survive a motion to dismiss [under 12(b)(6)], a 15 complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as 16 true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” 17 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009) (internal quotation 18 marks and citation omitted). While “detailed factual 19 allegations” are unnecessary, the complaint must allege more 20 than “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of 21 action, supported by mere conclusory statements.” Id. at 678. 22 “In sum, for a complaint to survive a motion to dismiss, the 23 non-conclusory ‘factual content,’ and reasonable inferences from 24 that content, must be plausibly suggestive of a claim entitling 25 the plaintiff to relief.” Moss v. U.S. Secret Serv., 572 F.3d 26 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). 27 B. Analysis 28 Municipalities may be held liable under § 1983 for 1 constitutional injuries inflicted through a municipal policy or 2 custom. Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436 3 U.S. 658, 694 (1978). To establish municipal liability under 4 § 1983, a plaintiff must show that (1) he was deprived of a 5 constitutional right; (2) the municipality had a policy; (3) the 6 policy amounted to a deliberate indifference to his 7 constitutional right; and (4) the policy was the moving force 8 behind the constitutional violation. Anderson v. Warner, 451 9 F.3d 1063, 1070 (9th Cir. 2006) (internal citations and 10 quotations omitted). 11 A plaintiff may also establish municipal liability by 12 demonstrating that: (1) the constitutional tort was the result of 13 a longstanding practice or custom that constitutes the standard 14 operating procedure of the local government entity; (2) the 15 tortfeasor was an official whose acts fairly represent official 16 policy such that the challenged action constituted official 17 policy; (3) an official with final policy-making authority 18 delegated that authority to, or ratified the decision of, a 19 subordinate; or (4) the municipality failed to adequately train 20 the tortfeasors. See Price v. Sery, 513 F.3d 962, 966 (9th Cir. 21 2008) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 22 The Monell claim in Plaintiffs’ SAC is almost entirely 23 identical to the Monell claim in Plaintiffs’ original complaint. 24 As before, Plaintiffs allege that the Modoc County Jail personnel 25 were hired by the county “without adequate training and were 26 therefore inadequately trained and supervised to render 27 psychiatric treatment to patients.” SAC ¶ 22. Plaintiffs add 28 that Modoc County was aware of prior instances of self-inflicted 1 injury by pretrial detainees at the jail but did nothing to 2 prevent their recurrence. SAC ¶ 37. Plaintiffs further allege 3 that Modoc County has a “policy, custom, or habit” of providing 4 substandard psychiatric and medical care to inmates at the 5 facility and that Hinton died as a “direct and proximate result 6 of this policy, custom, or habit.” SAC ¶¶ 38–39. 7 The only notable difference between the original complaint 8 and the SAC is that, this time around, Plaintiffs allege 9 violations of a specific standard regarding inmate medications. 10 See SAC ¶¶ 24–26. The standard states that Modoc County Jail 11 inmates will be permitted to continue taking any previously- 12 prescribed medication while in jail, and that they will be 13 referred to the jail nurse or doctor who will be responsible for 14 monitoring their health and prescribing their medication. SAC 15 ¶ 24. Plaintiffs allege that jail staff deprived Hinton of pain 16 medication and failed to refer him to a nurse or doctor. SAC 17 ¶¶ 25–26. Plaintiffs also add that Hinton’s sister informed the 18 Modoc County District Attorney of his medical and psychiatric 19 needs and was told the county did not have the funds necessary to 20 address them. Opp’n at 9. Plaintiffs infer from this that the 21 county has a policy of denying inmates psychiatric care. Id. 22 The Court finds that these additional facts are still 23 insufficient to maintain Plaintiffs’ Monell claim. To the extent 24 the above-referenced standard is suggestive of a written policy, 25 Plaintiffs do not allege that policy is unconstitutional. And 26 Plaintiffs fail to explain how it—or any other custom, policy, or 27 practice—was the “moving force” behind the alleged inadequate 28 psychiatric or medical care. See Monell, 436 U.S. 658, 694 1 (1978). As for the conversation between Hinton’s sister and the 2 district attorney, the district attorney allegedly told her the 3 county did not have the funds necessary to provide Hinton with 4 the psychiatric and medical care she requested. This statement 5 was made regarding only Hinton. Opp’n at 9 (“[She] was advised 6 that the County had no funds to provide such care for him.”) 7 (emphasis added). It cannot be reasonably inferred from this 8 that the county has a policy of denying inmates psychiatric and 9 medical care. As with the original complaint, Plaintiffs do not 10 identify other instances in which inmates received substandard 11 care to demonstrate that the alleged custom, policy, or practice 12 was “standard operating procedure.” Gillette v. Delmore, 979 13 F.2d 1342, 1347 (9th Cir. 1992). 14 Plaintiffs have, therefore, failed to add any new factual 15 content—and reasonable inferences from that content—that is 16 plausibly suggestive of a Monell claim entitling them to relief. 17 Thus, the Court’s prior analysis still stands. See Order 18 Granting Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss with Leave to Am. at 8–10, ECF 19 No. 21. Plaintiffs’ claim that Defendants violated their 20 Fourteenth Amendment rights by maintaining an unconstitutional 21 custom, policy, or practice is dismissed. 22 C. Leave to Amend 23 Plaintiffs request leave to amend any portion of the SAC 24 deemed deficient. See Opp’n at 9–10. The Court need not grant 25 leave to amend where amendment would be futile. Deveraturda v. 26 Globe Aviation Sec. Servs., 454 F.3d 1043, 1049 (9th Cir. 2006). 27 Plaintiffs have amended their complaint twice. They have, 28 nonetheless, failed to present a cognizable legal theory in nnn en enn en ne nn nnn nn nnn nnn ne oo ne NO 1 support of their Monell claim. Amendment, at this point, would 2 be futile. Accordingly, dismissal of the Second Cause of Action 3 with prejudice is appropriate. Plaintiffs’ request for leave to 4 amend is DENIED. 5 6 Til. ORDER 7 For the reasons set forth above, the Court GRANTS 8 Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss. Plaintiffs’ Second Cause of 9 Action is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. 10 IT IS SO ORDERED. 11 Dated: January 21, 2021 12 kA 13 Geren aaa pebrsacr 00k 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28