- 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 DANNY CARDENAS, JR., No. 2:19-CV-0691-TLN-DMC-P 12 Plaintiff, 13 v. ORDER 14 B.S. EDWARDS, et al., 15 Defendants. 16 17 Plaintiff, a prisoner proceeding pro se, brings this civil rights action under 42 18 U.S.C. § 1983. Before the Court are Plaintiff’s motions for the appointment of counsel. ECF Nos. 19 40, 43. Plaintiff also filed a motion for “investigators for discovery,” which the Court construes as 20 a motion for counsel. ECF No. 33. Defendants oppose the motions. ECF No. 39, 44. 21 The United States Supreme Court has ruled that district courts lack authority to 22 require counsel to represent indigent prisoners in § 1983 cases. See Mallard v. United States Dist. 23 Court, 490 U.S. 296, 298 (1989). In certain exceptional circumstances, the court may request the 24 voluntary assistance of counsel pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1). See Terrell v. Brewer, 935 25 F.2d 1015, 1017 (9th Cir. 1991); Wood v. Housewright, 900 F.2d 1332, 1335-36 (9th Cir. 1990). 26 A finding of “exceptional circumstances” requires an evaluation of both the likelihood of success 27 on the merits and the ability of the plaintiff to articulate his claims on his own in light of the 28 complexity of the legal issues involved. See Terrell, 935 F.2d at 1017. Neither factor is 1 dispositive, and both must be viewed together before reaching a decision. See id. In Terrell, the 2 United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit concluded the district court did not abuse its 3 discretion with respect to appointment of counsel because: 4 Terrell demonstrated sufficient writing ability and legal knowledge to articulate his claim. The facts he alleged and the issues he raised were not of 5 substantial complexity. The compelling evidence against Terrell made it extremely unlikely that he would succeed on the merits. 6 Id. at 1017. 7 8 Across his multiple motions, Plaintiff contends that he requires counsel because he 9 is indigent, untrained in the law, and because he is mentally and physically disabled and legally 10 blind. See, e.g., ECF Nos. 33 at 2; 40 at 2; 43 at 2. He contends that another prisoner has helped 11 him write down his submissions to the court. ECF No. 43 at 2. He also variously applies to his 12 arguments the standards for appointment of counsel in habeas corpus cases and implies that the 13 Sixth Amendment to the United States constitution requires appointment of counsel. See ECF 14 Nos. 33 at 2; 43 at 4. 15 The Court recognizes unique difficulties of litigating from prison. The Court is 16 mindful, too, that Plaintiff’s disabilities and the enduring COVID-19 pandemic serve to 17 exacerbate the plight of a pro se prisoner litigating a civil rights case. The Court, however, does 18 not find truly exceptional circumstances warranting a request by the Court for voluntary 19 assistance of counsel. The Court does not reach that conclusion because the Court disbelieves that 20 Plaintiff is disabled. Rather, review of the docket indicates that Plaintiff has been able to 21 articulate his claims on his own despite his medical conditions. See, e.g., Harrington v. Scribner, 22 785 F.3d 1299, 1309 (9th Cir. 2015). Plaintiff has filed multiple motions and substantive filing 23 that, although meandering, reasonably outline his requested relief. He has not demonstrated an 24 insufficient grasp of his case or an inadequate ability to articulate his claims. See, e.g., id. 25 Moreover, Plaintiff alleges fairly straightforward Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference and 26 cruel and unusual punishments. See ECF No. 18. The factual and legal issues involved in this 27 case are not unusually complex. 28 /// ee OS IEE OI IE ED OE 1 Furthermore, discovery is ongoing via pending motions to compel.' No dispositive 2 || motions have been filed as of the date of this order. The Court cannot say that Plaintiff has 3 || established a particular likelihood of success on the merits at the present stage of this case. 4 Plaintiff's motions for appointment of counsel (ECF Nos. 33, 40, 43) are 5 | DENIED. 6 IT IS SO ORDERED. 7 8 || Dated: January 26, 2021 = WS GC ? DENNIS M. COTA 10 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 | 1 The Court has granted Plaintiff an extension of time to reply to Defendants’ pending motions to compel via separate order. Discovery officially closed on November 9, 2020 (ECF No. 29). But because responses to discovery allegedly 28 || remain outstanding, discovery has not concluded, and no dispositive rulings are pending.
Document Info
Docket Number: 2:19-cv-00691
Filed Date: 1/26/2021
Precedential Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 6/19/2024