Tapia v. Sacramento Steps Forward ( 2021 )

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 ----oo0oo---- 11 12 MONICA TAPIA, No. 2:20-cv-02529-WBS-JDP 13 Plaintiff, 14 v. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER RE: DEFENDANT COUNTY OF 15 SACRAMENTO STEPS FORWARD; SACRAMENTO’S MOTION TO SACRAMENTO WELLNESS CENTER; DISMISS AND DEFENDANT 16 private organizations, CITY OF CONSUMERS SELF-HELP CENTER’S SACRAMENTO; COUNTY OF MOTION TO DISMISS AND MOTION 17 SACRAMENTO, public entities, and TO STRIKE DAVID ELLIOTT, as a private 18 individual and DOES 1 to 10, inclusive, 19 20 Defendants. 21 22 ----oo0oo---- 23 Plaintiff Monica Tapia (“plaintiff”) brought this 24 action against Sacramento Steps Forward, Consumers Self-Help 25 Center1, the City of Sacramento, the County of Sacramento, David 26 1 Defendant Consumers Self-Help Center was erroneously 27 sued as Sacramento Wellness Center. (See Consumers Self-Help Center Corporate Disclosure.) (Docket No. 7.) 28 1 Elliott, and Does 1 to 10 alleging sexual harassment and invasion 2 of privacy under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, First Amendment retaliation 3 under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and multiple claims under state law. 4 Before this court are the County of Sacramento’s Motion 5 to Dismiss (“County Mot. to Dismiss”)(Docket No. 8), Consumers 6 Self-Help Center’s Motion to Dismiss, (“Consumers Mot. to 7 Dismiss”) (Docket No. 9), and Consumers Self-Help Center’s Motion 8 to Strike. (“Consumers Mot. to Strike”) (Docket No 10.) The 9 County seeks to dismiss the fourth cause of action for sexual 10 harassment and invasion of privacy under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the 11 fifth cause of action for retaliation under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in 12 addition to several state court causes of action. (See generally 13 County Mot. to Dismiss.) Consumers Self-Help Center likewise 14 seeks to dismiss plaintiff’s fourth cause of action for sexual 15 harassment and invasion of privacy under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 along 16 with several state court causes of action. (See Consumers’ Mot. 17 to Dismiss.) 18 Plaintiff states that she does not oppose the dismissal 19 of her fourth and fifth claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which 20 constitute her only federal claims, as against all defendants and 21 that she intends to file a motion seeking to dismiss her federal 22 claims. (See Pl.’s Opp’n. to Mot. to Dismiss at 7) (Docket No. 23 13.) Accordingly, the court will grant the dismissal of 24 plaintiff’s fourth and fifth claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 25 against all defendants. 26 Because the court will dismiss plaintiff’s only federal 27 28 1 claims, the court no longer has federal question jurisdiction.2 2 Federal courts have “supplemental jurisdiction over all other 3 claims that are so related to claims in the action within such 4 original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or 5 controversy under Article III of the United States Constitution.” 6 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). But a district court “may decline to 7 exercise supplemental jurisdiction . . . [if] the district court 8 has dismissed all claims over which it has original 9 jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c); see also Acri v. Varian 10 Assocs., Inc., 114 F.3d 999, 1001 n.3 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc) 11 (explaining that a district court may decide sua sponte to 12 decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction). The Supreme 13 Court has stated that “in the usual case in which all federal-law 14 claims are eliminated before trial, the balance of factors to be 15 considered under the pendent jurisdiction doctrine--judicial 16 economy, convenience, fairness, and comity--will point toward 17 declining to exercise jurisdiction over the remaining state-law 18 claims.” Carnegie–Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 n.7 19 (1988). 20 Here, comity weighs in favor of declining to exercise 21 supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiff’s state law claims 22 because the state court is competent to hear those claims and may 23 have a better understanding of the relevant state law. As for 24 judicial economy, this action was removed to this court only a 25 little over a month ago and is still in its early stages,. 26 Judicial economy does not weigh in favor of exercising 27 2 There is no suggestion that there is diversity 28 jurisdiction in this case, and the court finds none. nee ene en nen en nnn on I OIE ESO 1 supplemental jurisdiction. 2 Lastly, convenience and fairness do not weigh in favor 3 of exercising supplemental jurisdiction. The federal and state 4 fora are equally convenient for the parties. There is no reason 5 to doubt that the state court will provide an equally fair 6 adjudication of the issues. Moreover, neither the County nor 7 Consumers Self-Help Center has argued that this court should 8 | maintain jurisdiction after the elimination of the federal claims 9 in this case. 10 Accordingly, the court declines to exercise 11 supplemental jurisdiction and will remand plaintiff’s remaining 12 state law claims. Because the court remands plaintiff's 13 remaining state law claims, the court will not consider the court 14 | will not consider Consumers’ Motion to Strike (Docket No. 10), 15 | which focuses solely on plaintiff’s prayers for relief under 16 state law. 17 IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that plaintiffs’ fourth and 18 fifth claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 are hereby DISMISSED as 19 | against all defendants. 20 AND IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this case be, and the 21 same hereby is, REMANDED to the Superior Court of California, in 22 and for the County of Sacramento. The Clerk of this Court shall 23 forward a copy of this Order to the Clerk of the Superior Court 24 of California, in and for the County of Sacramento. 25 | Dated: February 2, 2021 □□ tteom. Ad. bt—~ 26 WILLIAM B. SHUBB UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 27 28