Evans v. County of Trinity ( 2021 )

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 RONALD EVANS, No. 2:18-cv-00083-TLN-JDP 12 Plaintiff, 13 v. ORDER 14 COUNTY OF TRINITY, a municipal corporation; COLLEEN MURRAY; and 15 DOES 1-10, 16 Defendants. 17 18 This matter is before the Court on Defendants County of Trinity (“County”) and Colleen 19 Murray’s (“Murray”) (collectively, “Defendants”) Motion to Dismiss. (ECF No. 26.) Plaintiff 20 Ronald Evans (“Plaintiff”) opposed the motion. (ECF No. 27.) Defendants replied. (ECF No. 21 29.) For the reasons discussed herein, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss. 22 /// 23 /// 24 /// 25 /// 26 /// 27 /// 28 /// 1 I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND1 2 Plaintiff was arrested after ten pounds of medical marijuana was found in his vehicle and 3 confiscated. (ECF No. 22 at 2.) Plaintiff pleaded guilty to a vehicle code violation in Trinity 4 County Superior Court. (Id. at 2.) On January 24, 2017, the state court found that Plaintiff 5 lawfully possessed the marijuana under California law and ordered the return of Plaintiff’s 6 marijuana. (Id. at 2.) Plaintiff subsequently presented the court order to a County evidence 7 technician, who told Plaintiff that the marijuana would not be returned to him. (Id. at 6.) Murray, 8 the Deputy District Attorney assigned to the case, also told Plaintiff that his marijuana would not 9 be returned. (Id.) 10 On January 15, 2018, Plaintiff initiated this action against Defendants, asserting two 11 causes of action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“§ 1983”): (1) claims against the individual 12 Defendants for depriving Plaintiff of his property without due process of law in violation of the 13 Fourteenth Amendment, taking his property without compensation in violation of the Fifth 14 Amendment, and unreasonably seizing his property in violation of the Fourth Amendment;2 and 15 (2) a Monell claim against the County based on the underlying constitutional violations. (ECF 16 No. 1 at 6–7.) 17 On March 16, 2018, Defendants moved to dismiss the Complaint pursuant to Federal Rule 18 of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 12(b)(6). (ECF No. 6.) On August 6, 2019, the Court dismissed the 19 Complaint with leave to amend. (ECF No. 21.) 20 On September 4, 2019, Plaintiff filed the operative First Amended Complaint (“FAC”). 21 (ECF No. 22.) On October 16, 2019, Defendants filed the instant Motion to Dismiss the FAC in 22 its entirety pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). (ECF No. 26.) 23 /// 24 /// 25 1 The following recitation of facts is taken, sometimes verbatim, from Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint. (ECF No. 22.) 26 27 2 Plaintiff combined all the underlying constitutional violations into one cause of action in his Complaint. 28 1 II. STANDARD OF LAW 2 Rule 8(a) requires that a pleading contain “a short and plain statement of the claim 3 showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678–79 4 (2009). Under notice pleading in federal court, the complaint must “give the defendant fair notice 5 of what the claim . . . is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 6 544, 555 (2007) (internal quotations omitted). “This simplified notice pleading standard relies on 7 liberal discovery rules and summary judgment motions to define disputed facts and issues and to 8 dispose of unmeritorious claims.” Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 512 (2002). 9 On a motion to dismiss, the factual allegations of the complaint must be accepted as 10 true. Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 322 (1972). A court must give the plaintiff the benefit of every 11 reasonable inference to be drawn from the “well-pleaded” allegations of the complaint. Retail 12 Clerks Int’l Ass'n v. Schermerhorn, 373 U.S. 746, 753 n.6 (1963). A plaintiff need not allege 13 “‘specific facts’ beyond those necessary to state his claim and the grounds showing entitlement to 14 relief.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads 15 factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable 16 for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). 17 Nevertheless, a court “need not assume the truth of legal conclusions cast in the form of 18 factual allegations.” United States ex rel. Chunie v. Ringrose, 788 F.2d 638, 643 n.2 (9th Cir. 19 1986). While Rule 8(a) does not require detailed factual allegations, “it demands more than an 20 unadorned, the defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. A 21 pleading is insufficient if it offers mere “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the 22 elements of a cause of action.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; see also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 23 678 (“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory 24 statements, do not suffice.”). Moreover, it is inappropriate to assume the plaintiff “can prove 25 facts that it has not alleged or that the defendants have violated the . . . laws in ways that have not 26 been alleged.” Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Cal. State Council of Carpenters, 459 27 U.S. 519, 526 (1983). 28 / / / 1 Ultimately, a court may not dismiss a complaint in which the plaintiff has alleged “enough 2 facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 697 (quoting 3 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). Only where a plaintiff fails to “nudge[ ] [his or her] claims . . . across 4 the line from conceivable to plausible[,]” is the complaint properly dismissed. Id. at 680. While 5 the plausibility requirement is not akin to a probability requirement, it demands more than “a 6 sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. at 678. This plausibility inquiry is “a 7 context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and 8 common sense.” Id. at 679. 9 In ruling upon a motion to dismiss, the court may consider only the complaint, any 10 exhibits thereto, and matters which may be judicially noticed pursuant to Federal Rule of 11 Evidence 201. See Mir v. Little Co. of Mary Hosp., 844 F.2d 646, 649 (9th Cir. 1988); Isuzu 12 Motors Ltd. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 12 F. Supp. 2d 1035, 1042 (C.D. Cal. 13 1998). 14 If a complaint fails to state a plausible claim, “[a] district court should grant leave to 15 amend even if no request to amend the pleading was made, unless it determines that the pleading 16 could not possibly be cured by the allegation of other facts.” Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130 17 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (quoting Doe v. United States, 58 F.3d 484, 497 (9th Cir. 1995)); see 18 also Gardner v. Marino, 563 F.3d 981, 990 (9th Cir. 2009) (finding no abuse of discretion in 19 denying leave to amend when amendment would be futile). Although a district court should 20 freely give leave to amend when justice so requires under Rule 15(a)(2), “the court’s discretion to 21 deny such leave is ‘particularly broad’ where the plaintiff has previously amended its 22 complaint[.]” Ecological Rights Found. v. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 713 F.3d 502, 520 (9th Cir. 23 2013) (quoting Miller v. Yokohama Tire Corp., 358 F.3d 616, 622 (9th Cir. 2004)). 24 III. ANALYSIS 25 A. Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment Claims 26 In his FAC, Plaintiff asserts § 1983 claims against the individual Defendants for violating 27 the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 28 1 Amendment.3 (ECF No. 22 at 9.) Defendants move to dismiss both claims on the basis that 2 Plaintiff has not identified a federally protected property interest.4 (See ECF. 26 at 5.) 3 Specifically, Defendants argue Plaintiff has “no cognizable federal property interest in marijuana 4 for any purpose.” (Id.) In opposition, Plaintiff contends that federal law does not preempt state 5 law in the field of marijuana regulation and that California state law protects Plaintiff’s 6 possession of marijuana. (See ECF No. 27 at 2–4.) The Court addresses the Fifth Amendment 7 claim first, then turns to the Fourteenth Amendment claim. 8 i. Fifth Amendment Claim 9 The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment prohibits the government from taking 10 “private property . . . for public use, without just compensation.” U.S. Const. amend. V. To 11 assert a claim under the Takings Clause, “a plaintiff must first demonstrate that he possesses a 12 ‘property interest’ that is constitutionally protected.” Schneider v. California Dep’t of Corr., 151 13 F.3d 1194, 1198 (9th Cir. 1998). State law, as well as federal law, can create a property interest. 14 See id. at 1200–01. However, although “state law creates a property interest, not all state-created 15 rights rise to the level of a constitutionally protected interest.” Brady v. Gebbie, 859 F.2d 1543, 16 1548 n.3 (9th Cir. 1988). 17 Plaintiff asserts Defendants violated the Fifth Amendment by taking Plaintiff’s marijuana 18 without compensation. (ECF No. 22 at 9.) Plaintiff argues that California state law protects his 19 possession of marijuana. (ECF No. 27 at 3–4.) However, even construing all reasonable 20 inferences in Plaintiff’s favor, Plaintiff fails to articulate how his state-defined right to possess 21 marijuana “rise[s] to the level of a constitutionally protected interest.” Indeed, despite Plaintiff’s 22 3 In the Complaint, Plaintiff explicitly brought a Fourth Amendment claim under § 1983. 23 (ECF No. 1 at 6.) This claim was dismissed with leave to amend. (ECF No. 21.) In the FAC, Plaintiff does not explicitly reassert his Fourth Amendment claim. (See ECF No. 22.) Plaintiff 24 only vaguely asserts that his right “[t]o be free from unreasonable seizures” was violated and provides no factual allegations to support this conclusion. (Id. at 8–9.) It also bears mentioning 25 that neither party addresses a Fourth Amendment claim in their briefing on the instant motion. 26 Therefore, it appears Plaintiff has withdrawn his Fourth Amendment claim. 27 4 Defendants raise several other grounds for dismissal. However, because the Court finds that Plaintiff fails to state a claim for any of the alleged constitutional violations, the Court need 28 not and does not address Defendants’ alternative arguments. 1 argument that marijuana no longer deserves Schedule I drug categorization (ECF No. 27 at 4–5), 2 marijuana remains illegal under federal law. See 21 C.F.R. § 1308.11(d)(23); see also Gonzales 3 v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 14–15 (2005). Additionally, courts within this district have clarified that 4 marijuana is contraband per se under federal law and thus no person can have a cognizable 5 federal legal interest in it. See, e.g., Barrios v. Cty. of Tulare, No. 1:13-CV-1665 AWI GSA, 6 2014 WL 2174746, at *5 (E.D. Cal. May 23, 2014); Schmidt v. Cty. of Nevada, No. 2:10-CV- 7 3022 FCD/EFB, 2011 WL 2967786, at *5 (E.D. Cal. July 19, 2011) (“Thus, under federal law, 8 marijuana is contraband per se, which means no person can have a cognizable legal interest in 9 it.”); see also Cook v. City of California, No. 1:16-CV-00429-DAD-JLT, 2016 WL 8730712, at 10 *5–6 (E.D. Cal. December 9, 2016) (“Plaintiff has failed to allege a cognizable property interest 11 in any medical marijuana plants and therefore has not stated a cognizable Takings Clause 12 claim.”). 13 Accordingly, Plaintiff cannot bring a Fifth Amendment claim regarding the alleged taking 14 of his marijuana without compensation. Because there is no cognizable federal property interest 15 in marijuana, it is not possible for Plaintiff to cure this deficiency through amendment. 16 Therefore, the Court DISMISSES Plaintiff’s Fifth Amendment claim without leave to amend. 17 ii. Fourteenth Amendment Claim 18 Under the Fourteenth Amendment, “[n]o state shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, 19 or property, without due process of laws.” U.S. Const. amend. XIV. To establish a procedural or 20 substantive due process claim,5 a plaintiff must first show “a liberty or property interest protected 21 by the Constitution.” Wedges/Ledges of California, Inc. v. City of Phoenix., 24 F.3d 56, 62 (9th 22 Cir. 1994) (quoting Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569 (1972)); Kraft v. Jacka, 872 F.2d 23 862, 866 (9th Cir. 1989)). Although state law creates property interests, see Little v. Gore, 148 F. 24 Supp. 3d 936, 955 (S.D. Cal. 2015) (quoting Samson v. City of Bainbridge Island, 683 F.3d 1051, 25 1057 (9th Cir. 2012), “federal constitutional law determines whether that interest rises to the level 26 27 5 Plaintiff does not specify whether his claim is for procedural or substantive due process. (See ECF No. 22.) However, for the reasons stated above, such a distinction is not necessary to 28 resolve this issue. 1 of a legitimate claim of entitlement protected by the Due Process Clause.” Id. (quoting Memphis 2 Light Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1, 9 (1978); Samson, 683 F.3d at 1057; Lawson v. 3 Umatilla County, 139 F.3d 690, 692 (9th Cir. 1998)). 4 Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment claim fails for the same reason as his Fifth Amendment 5 claim because Plaintiff fails to establish that “federal constitutional law” elevates his property 6 interest in marijuana “to the level of a legitimate claim of entitlement protected by the Due 7 Process Clause.” Id. In Barrios v. County of Tulare, for example, a court in this district found 8 that “[a]lthough California may provide [plaintiff] with the right to possess medical marijuana, 9 federal law does not. Because marijuana is contraband under federal law, [plaintiff] had no 10 property interest in the marijuana that was protected by the Fourteenth Amendment due process 11 clause.” 2014 WL 2174746 at *5 (citations omitted). Furthermore, in Little v. Gore, a court 12 within the Southern District of California determined that “[w]ith respect to medical marijuana, 13 although California state law may create a property interest in the marijuana, California district 14 courts have found there is no property interest for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment.” 148 15 F. Supp. 3d at 955 (citing Barrios, 2014 WL 2174746 at *4; Staffin v. Cty. of Shasta, No. 13:CV- 16 03315 JAM-CMK, 2013 WL 1896812, at *4–5 (E.D. Cal. May 6, 2013); Schmidt, 2011 WL 17 2967786, at *5–6). 18 Accordingly, Plaintiff cannot bring a Fourteenth Amendment Due Process claim. Because 19 there is no cognizable federal property interest in marijuana, it is not possible for Plaintiff to cure 20 this deficiency through amendment. In the concluding remarks of his opposition, Plaintiff asks 21 for leave to amend to add an Equal Protection claim. (See ECF No. 27 at 8.) Despite having 22 ample opportunity to raise an Equal Protection claim in the Complaint and FAC, Plaintiff waited 23 until the very end of his opposition to mention such a claim. Plaintiff fails to explain his delay. If 24 such a delay were not reason enough to deny leave to amend, the Court also notes that Plaintiff 25 has no cognizable property interest in marijuana and thus has no standing to bring an Equal 26 Protection claim. See Schmidt, 2011 WL 2967786 at *5–6 (dismissing a plaintiff’s Equal 27 Protection claim “because plaintiff had no property interest in the contraband, he suffered no 28 injury as a result of any alleged destruction of the marijuana”); see also Barnum Timber Co. v. 1 | U.S. EPA, 633 F.3d 894, 897-98 (9th Cir. 2011) (stating that without harm to a legally protected 2 | interest there is no injury-in-fact); Qwest Corp. v. City of Surprise, 434 F.3d 1176, 1180 (9th Cir. 3 | 2006) (finding that a plaintiff cannot sue in federal court when there is no injury-in-fact). In other 4 | words, granting Plaintiff leave to amend his Fourteenth Amendment claim — whether as a Due 5 | Process claim or Equal Protection claim — would be futile. 6 Therefore, the Court DISMISSES Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment claim without 7 | leave to amend. 8 B. Monell Liability 9 Plaintiff also asserts a Monell claim against the County. (ECF No. 22 at 8-9.) To bring a 10 | Monell claim against a municipality, a plaintiff must establish “the local government had a 11 | deliberate policy, custom, or practice that was the ‘moving force’ behind the constitutional 12 | violation [he] suffered.” Whitaker v. Garcetti, 486 F.3d 572, 581 (9th Cir. 2007). 13 Here, Plaintiff has failed to establish any underlying constitutional violations. “[A] 14 | municipality . . . [cannot] be held liable under § 1983 where no injury or constitutional violation 15 | has occurred.” Jackson vy. City of Bremerton, 268 F.3d 646, 653 (9th Cir. 2001). Plaintiff's 16 | opposition fails to address this fundamental deficiency. Accordingly, Plaintiff's Monell claim is 17 | DISMISSED without leave to amend. 18 IV. CONCLUSION 19 Based on the foregoing, the Court hereby GRANTS Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss 20 | Plaintiffs First Amended Complaint (ECF No. 26.) without leave to amend. The Clerk of Court 21 || is directed to close the case. 22 IT IS SO ORDERED. 23 | Dated: February 9, 2021 24 () jf 25 MY } Locka 26 Troy L. Nunley □ 37 United States District Judge 28