(PC) Turner v. Guibord ( 2021 )

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 ANTHONY DEWAYNE LEE TURNER, No. 2:19-cv-0416 DB P 12 Plaintiff, 13 v. ORDER AND 14 SACRAMENTO CITY FIRE DEPT., et FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATIONS al., 15 Defendants. 16 17 Plaintiff is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with this civil rights action pursuant to 42 18 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff’s three prior pleadings were screened and found to be devoid of a 19 cognizable claim. Plaintiff was granted one final opportunity to state a claim. The Court is now in 20 receipt of plaintiff’s Fourth Amended Complaint. 21 I. Screening Requirements 22 “[T]he court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that ... the action or 23 appeal (i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or 24 (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 25 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)–(iii). This provision applies to all actions filed in forma pauperis, whether or not 26 the plaintiff is incarcerated. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1129 (9th Cir. 2000); see also 27 Calhoun v. Stahl, 254 F.3d 845 (9th Cir. 2001) (per curiam). 28 1 II. Pleading Standard 2 Section 1983 “provides a cause of action for the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or 3 immunities secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States.” Wilder v. Virginia Hosp. 4 Ass'n, 496 U.S. 498, 508 (1990) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1983). Section 1983 is not itself a source of 5 substantive rights, but merely provides a method for vindicating federal rights conferred 6 elsewhere. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393-94 (1989). 7 To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: (1) that a 8 right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated and (2) that the alleged 9 violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. See West v. Atkins, 487 10 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Ketchum v. Alameda Cnty., 811 F.2d 1243, 1245 (9th Cir. 1987). 11 A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the 12 pleader is entitled to relief . . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not 13 required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere 14 conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell 15 Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). Plaintiff must set forth “sufficient factual 16 matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. Facial 17 plausibility demands more than the mere possibility that a defendant committed misconduct and, 18 while factual allegations are accepted as true, legal conclusions are not. Id. at 677-78. 19 III. Plaintiff’s Allegations 20 Plaintiff brings this action against Sacramento City Police Officer Guibord, Officer White 21 Bear, Officer Waggoner, and T. Hopkins, a paramedic. Plaintiff seeks damages. 22 Plaintiff’s allegations may be fairly summarized as follows: 23 On August 14, 20161, plaintiff entered the Arco AM/PM market in Sacramento, 24 California, whereupon he handed the store clerk, Steve Wiggins, a $100 bill. Wiggins, in turn, 25 contacted the police, complaining that plaintiff was unintelligible and waving his arms above his 26 head. 27 1 Attachments to the pleading suggest that this incident occurred in 2017, not 2016. (See ECF No. 28 22 at 11.) 1 In response to Wiggins’s call, Officers Guibord and White bear arrived at the market. 2 Officer Guibord directed plaintiff to go outside of the store, where Officer White Bear detained 3 him without explanation. Officer Guibord came out a few minutes later, learned that plaintiff had 4 car keys on him for a vehicle parked in front of the market, and then placed plaintiff in handcuffs. 5 The officers took plaintiff’s keys and searched plaintiff’s car without plaintiff’s consent. 6 Officer Waggoner arrived on the scene by this point and took plaintiff’s blood pressure 7 without plaintiff’s consent. Plaintiff was in fact refusing any medical treatment and blood draws, 8 including to Hopkins, the paramedic, who also arrived on the scene. 9 The defendants ignored plaintiff’s vocal refusal to give consent for the blood draw, calling 10 him a drug addict and telling him that his opinion does not count. Officer Waggoner grabbed 11 plaintiff’s left wrist and threw his arm around plaintiff’s neck while Officer White Bear grabbed 12 plaintiff’s right wrist. Officer Guibord grabbed plaintiff’s right shoulder and slammed him down 13 to the ground where plaintiff was rendered unconscious. 14 When plaintiff awoke, he was on a stretcher being taken towards the ambulance. Plaintiff 15 attempted to get off the stretcher, but the three officers physically restrained him while trying to 16 strap him to the gurney. It is then that paramedic Hopkins drew plaintiff’s blood over his 17 objections. One vial of blood was eventually taken, which the defendant officers took to the 18 “Highway Patrol Office of the Sacramento Police City Dept.” for testing. 19 After his blood was taken, plaintiff was “kidnapped and forcefully taken” to the Mercy 20 San Juan Hospital, where he was not given a blood test or offered a urine analysis test or a field 21 sobriety test. He was also not informed that he violated any laws or given a citation to appear in 22 court. 23 Three months later, plaintiff appeared in court on other charges and first learned that he 24 had been charged with Driving Under the Influence following the August 14, 2016, incident. On 25 that charge, he was sentenced to 240 days with a three-year probation, which ran concurrent with 26 plaintiff’s other case. 27 //// 28 //// 1 IV. Discussion 2 The Fourth Amendment protects persons against unreasonable searches. U.S. Const. 3 amend. IV. Blood tests “plainly constitute searches of ‘persons,’ and depend antecedently upon 4 seizures of ‘persons,’ within the meaning of that Amendment.” Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 5 757, 767 (1966). “[W]arrantless compulsory blood tests are unreasonable unless supported by 6 both probable cause and exigent circumstances.” Ellis v. City of San Diego, Cal., 176 F.3d 1183, 7 1191-92 (1999); see also Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S. 141, 148 (2013) (“Such an invasion of 8 bodily integrity implicates an individual’s most personal and deep-rooted expectations of 9 privacy.”). 10 Plaintiff accuses the defendants of violating his Fourth Amendment rights when they held 11 him down and drew his blood over his vociferous objections. Plaintiff also submits that he was 12 charged with Driving Under the Influence for the August 14, 2016, events and sentenced thereon. 13 Under the favorable termination rule laid out in Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 14 (1994), to recover damages in a § 1983 action for an alleged constitutional violation that would 15 necessarily imply that a criminal conviction or sentence is invalid, a plaintiff must prove that the 16 conviction or sentence was reversed, expunged, or otherwise invalidated. If the criminal 17 conviction or sentence has not been reversed, expunged, or otherwise invalidated, claims that 18 would necessarily imply the invalidity of the criminal conviction or sentence must be brought in a 19 petition for writ of habeas corpus rather than through a § 1983 case. See id; Muhammad v. Close, 20 540 U.S. 749, 750-751 (2004). 21 Here, the court finds that success on plaintiff’s claim of a Fourth Amendment violation 22 stemming from the blood draw would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction for 23 Driving Under the Influence. Because plaintiff has not alleged that his conviction or sentence on 24 that charge has been reversed or expunged, the court is forced to conclude that plaintiff is barred 25 under Heck from seeking damages on his claim based on the unauthorized blood draw. 26 Plaintiff also appears to bring a claim for a violation of his Fourth Amendment rights 27 stemming from the force used against him prior to the blood draw. As alleged, Officer Waggoner 28 grabbed plaintiff’s left wrist and threw his arm around plaintiff’s neck, Officer White Bear 1 grabbed plaintiff’s right wrist, and Officer Guibord grabbed plaintiff’s right shoulder and 2 slammed plaintiff face down on the ground hard enough to render him unconscious. Of these 3 three defendants, only Officer Guibord’s actions can reasonably be construed as excessive force. 4 Police officers violate an individual’s Fourth Amendment rights when they use excessive 5 force during an arrest. See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989). Such claims are 6 assessed using an “objective reasonableness standard.” Blanford v. Sacramento County, 406 F.3d 7 1110, 1115 (9th Cir. 2005). “[R]easonableness is generally assessed by carefully weighing the 8 nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual's Fourth Amendment interests against the 9 importance of the governmental interests alleged to justify the intrusion.” County of Los Angeles 10 v. Mendez, 137 S. Ct. 1539, 1546 (2017) (internal quotation omitted). The government interest in 11 use-of-force cases is evaluated from “the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene.” 12 Graham, 490 U.S. at 396. Here, the court “must consider the risk of bodily harm that [Officer 13 Guiford’s] actions posed to [plaintiff] in light of the threat to the public that [Officer Guiford] was 14 trying to eliminate.” Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 382 (2007). 15 Liberally construing the complaint, the risk of harm created by Officer Guibord’s force 16 was high, as demonstrated by the fact that plaintiff was thrown to the ground so hard that he was 17 rendered unconscious long enough to be transferred onto a gurney and taken towards an 18 ambulance. On the other side of the scale, the asserted governmental interest was to prevent the 19 crime that Officer Guibord believed plaintiff was committing. As to that, however, plaintiff was 20 charged with Driving Under the Influence for having had driven his car to the market—that is, 21 there was no pending crime taking place. Alternatively, Officer Guibord was attempting to 22 prevent plaintiff from evading a blood draw. Under either scenario, the need for force appears 23 inconsistent then with the amount of force used by this defendant. Since an excessive force claim 24 would not necessarily be barred by Heck, Simpson v. Thomas, 528 F.3d 685, 691 (9th Cir. 2008), 25 the court finds that plaintiff has stated a cognizable Fourth Amendment excessive force claim 26 against this defendant. 27 //// 28 //// 1] V. Conclusion 2 Based on the foregoing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that a district judge be assigned to this 3 | case; and 4 IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that this action proceed only on a Fourth Amendment 5 | excessive force claim against Officer Guiford and that all other claims and defendants be dismissed. 6 These Findings and Recommendations will be submitted to the United States District Judge 7 | assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of Title 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Within fourteen days 8 | after being served with these Findings and Recommendations, the parties may file written 9 | objections with the Court. The document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s 10 | Findings and Recommendations.” The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the 11 | specified time may result in the waiver of rights on appeal. Wilkerson v. Wheeler, 772 F.3d 834, 12 | 839 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Baxter v. Sullivan, 923 F.2d 1391, 1394 (9th Cir. 1991)). 13 | Dated: March 15, 2021 14 15 16 ORAH BARNES /DLBT: UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 17 || DBAnbox/Substantive/tum0416.scrn 44C 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28