(PC) Rojas v. Lynch ( 2021 )

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 ROBERT EUGENE ROJAS, No. 2:20-cv-01275-TLN-CKD 12 Plaintiff, 13 v. ORDER 14 J. LYNCH, et al., 15 Defendants. 16 17 Plaintiff is a state prisoner proceeding pro se in this civil rights action filed pursuant to 42 18 U.S.C. § 1983. This proceeding was referred to this court by Local Rule 302 pursuant to 28 19 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). 20 Plaintiff requests leave to proceed in forma pauperis. As plaintiff has submitted a 21 declaration that makes the showing required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a), his request will be granted. 22 Plaintiff is required to pay the statutory filing fee of $350.00 for this action. 28 U.S.C. §§ 23 1914(a), 1915(b)(1). By separate order, the court will direct the appropriate agency to collect the 24 initial partial filing fee from plaintiff’s trust account and forward it to the Clerk of the Court. 25 Thereafter, plaintiff will be obligated for monthly payments of twenty percent of the preceding 26 month’s income credited to plaintiff’s prison trust account. These payments will be forwarded by 27 the appropriate agency to the Clerk of the Court each time the amount in plaintiff’s account 28 exceeds $10.00, until the filing fee is paid in full. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). 1 I. Screening Requirement 2 The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a 3 governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The 4 court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally 5 “frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek 6 monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1),(2). 7 A claim is legally frivolous when it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact. 8 Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989); Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1227-28 (9th 9 Cir. 1984). The court may, therefore, dismiss a claim as frivolous where it is based on an 10 indisputably meritless legal theory or where the factual contentions are clearly baseless. Neitzke, 11 490 U.S. at 327. The critical inquiry is whether a constitutional claim, however inartfully 12 pleaded, has an arguable legal and factual basis. See Jackson v. Arizona, 885 F.2d 639, 640 (9th 13 Cir. 1989); Franklin, 745 F.2d at 1227. 14 In order to avoid dismissal for failure to state a claim a complaint must contain more than 15 “naked assertions,” “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause 16 of action.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-557 (2007). In other words, 17 “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory 18 statements do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Furthermore, a claim 19 upon which the court can grant relief has facial plausibility. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A 20 claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw 21 the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. 22 at 678. When considering whether a complaint states a claim upon which relief can be granted, 23 the court must accept the allegations as true, Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93-94 (2007), and 24 construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, see Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 25 U.S. 232, 236 (1974). 26 II. Allegations in the Complaint 27 Plaintiff is a mentally ill inmate housed in the Psychiatric Services Unit (“PSU”) at 28 California State Prison-Sacramento. ECF No. 9 at 17. He is a participant in the Mental Health 1 Services Delivery System (“MHSDS”) at the enhanced outpatient level of care. ECF No. 9 at 17. 2 In his complaint, plaintiff challenges his conditions of confinement; the handling of his mail; his 3 access to law library materials and educational programs; and the denial of mental health and 4 medical services between November 1, 2019 and September 2020. ECF No. 9 at 5-24. He 5 names twenty-seven defendants, but generally fails to identify which defendant(s) were 6 responsible for each of his twenty separate claims for relief. In this single complaint, plaintiff 7 challenges everything that went wrong while he was housed in the PSU during the course of 8 almost an entire year. By way of relief, he seeks monetary damages and declaratory relief. ECF 9 No. 9 at 25. 10 III. Legal Standards 11 A. Linkage Requirement 12 The civil rights statute requires that there be an actual connection or link between the 13 actions of the defendants and the deprivation alleged to have been suffered by plaintiff. See 14 Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 15 (1976). The Ninth Circuit has held that “[a] person ‘subjects' another to the deprivation of a 16 constitutional right, within the meaning of section 1983, if he does an affirmative act, participates 17 in another's affirmative acts or omits to perform an act which he is legally required to do that 18 causes the deprivation of which complaint is made.” Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th 19 Cir. 1978) (citation omitted). In order to state a claim for relief under section 1983, plaintiff must 20 link each named defendant with some affirmative act or omission that demonstrates a violation of 21 plaintiff's federal rights. 22 B. Joinder of Claims and Defendants 23 A plaintiff may properly assert multiple claims against a single defendant in a civil action. 24 Fed. Rule Civ. P. 18. In addition, a plaintiff may join multiple defendants in one action where 25 “any right to relief is asserted against them jointly, severally, or in the alternative with respect to 26 or arising out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions and occurrences” and 27 “any question of law or fact common to all defendants will arise in the action.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 28 20(a)(2). However, unrelated claims against different defendants must be pursued in separate 1 lawsuits. See George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 607 (7th Cir. 2007). This rule is intended “not only 2 to prevent the sort of morass [a multiple claim, multiple defendant] suit produce[s], but also to 3 ensure that prisoners pay the required filing fees—for the Prison Litigation Reform Act limits to 3 4 the number of frivolous suits or appeals that any prisoner may file without prepayment of the 5 required fees. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).” Id. 6 C. Grievances Are Not Separately Actionable 7 The existence of a prison grievance procedure establishes a procedural right only and 8 “does not confer any substantive right upon the inmates.” Buckley v. Barlow, 997 F.2d 494, 495 9 (8th Cir. 1993) (citation omitted); see also Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 860 (9th Cir. 2003) 10 (no liberty interest in processing of appeals because no entitlement to a specific grievance 11 procedure). This means that a prison official’s action in reviewing an inmate grievance cannot 12 serve as a basis for liability under Section 1983. Buckley, 997 F.2d at 495. “Only persons who 13 cause or participate in the violations are responsible. Ruling against a prisoner on an 14 administrative complaint does not cause or contribute to the violation. A guard who stands and 15 watches while another guard beats a prisoner violates the Constitution; a guard who rejects an 16 administrative complaint about a completed act of misconduct does not.” George v. Smith, 507 17 F.3d 605, 609-10 (7th Cir. 2007) (citations omitted). 18 D. Conditions of Confinement 19 The Eighth Amendment applies to any claim involving the conditions of his confinement 20 of a prisoner who has already been convicted. In order for a prison official to be held liable for 21 alleged unconstitutional conditions of confinement, the prisoner must allege facts that satisfy a 22 two-prong test. Peralta v. Dillard, 744 F.3d 1076, 1082 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Farmer, 511 U.S. 23 at 837). The first prong is an objective prong, which requires that the deprivation be “sufficiently 24 serious.” Lemire v. Cal. Dep’t of Corr. & Rehab., 726 F.3d 1062, 1074 (9th Cir. 2013) (citing 25 Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834). In order to be sufficiently serious, the prison official’s “act or omission 26 must result in the denial of the ‘minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities.” Lemire, 726 27 F.3d at 1074. The objective prong is not satisfied in cases where prison officials provide 28 prisoners with “adequate shelter, food, clothing, sanitation, medical care, and personal safety.” 1 Johnson v. Lewis, 217 F.3d 726, 731 (9th Cir. 2000) (quoting Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d 1237, 2 1246 (9th Cir. 1982)). “[R]outine discomfort inherent in the prison setting” does not rise to the 3 level of a constitutional violation. Johnson v. Lewis, 217 F.3d at 732 (“[m]ore modest 4 deprivations can also form the objective basis of a violation, but only if such deprivations are 5 lengthy or ongoing”). Rather, extreme deprivations are required to make out a conditions of 6 confinement claim, and only those deprivations denying the minimal civilized measure of life’s 7 necessities are sufficiently grave to form the basis of an Eighth Amendment violation. Farmer, 8 511 U.S. at 834; Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 9 (1992). The circumstances, nature, and 9 duration of the deprivations are critical in determining whether the conditions complained of are 10 grave enough to form the basis of a viable Eighth Amendment claim. Johnson v. Lewis, 217 F.3d 11 at 731. 12 The second prong focuses on the subjective intent of the prison official. Peralta, 774 F.3d 13 at 1082 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837). The deliberate indifference standard 14 requires a showing that the prison official acted or failed to act despite the prison official’s 15 knowledge of a substantial risk of serious harm to the prisoner. Id. (citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 16 842); see also Redman v. Cnty. of San Diego, 942 F.2d 1435, 1439 (9th Cir. 1991). Mere 17 negligence on the part of the prison official is not sufficient to establish liability. Farmer, 511 18 U.S. at 835. 19 E. Deliberate Indifference to a Serious Medical Need 20 Denial or delay of medical care for a prisoner’s serious medical needs may constitute a 21 violation of the prisoner’s Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 22 97, 104-05 (1976). An individual is liable for such a violation only when the individual is 23 deliberately indifferent to a prisoner’s serious medical needs. Id.; see Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 24 1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 2006); Hallett v. Morgan, 296 F.3d 732, 744 (9th Cir. 2002); Lopez v. 25 Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1131-32 (9th Cir. 2000). 26 In the Ninth Circuit, the test for deliberate indifference consists of two parts. Jett, 439 27 F.3d at 1096, citing McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050 (9th Cir. 1991), overruled on other 28 grounds by WMX Techs., Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc). First, the 1 plaintiff must show a “serious medical need” by demonstrating that “failure to treat a prisoner’s 2 condition could result in further significant injury or the ‘unnecessary and wanton infliction of 3 pain.’” Id., citing Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104. “Examples of serious medical needs include ‘[t]he 4 existence of an injury that a reasonable doctor or patient would find important and worthy of 5 comment or treatment; the presence of a medical condition that significantly affects an 6 individual’s daily activities; or the existence of chronic and substantial pain.’” Lopez, 203 F. 3d 7 at 1131-1132, citing McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1059-60. 8 Second, the plaintiff must show the defendant’s response to the need was deliberately 9 indifferent. Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096. This second prong is satisfied by showing (a) a purposeful act 10 or failure to respond to a prisoner’s pain or possible medical need and (b) harm caused by the 11 indifference. Id. Under this standard, the prison official must not only “be aware of facts from 12 which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists,” but that person 13 “must also draw the inference.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994). This “subjective 14 approach” focuses only “on what a defendant’s mental attitude actually was.” Id. at 839. A 15 showing of merely negligent medical care is not enough to establish a constitutional violation. 16 Frost v. Agnos, 152 F.3d 1124, 1130 (9th Cir. 1998), citing Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105-106. A 17 difference of opinion about the proper course of treatment is not deliberate indifference, nor does 18 a dispute between a prisoner and prison officials over the necessity for or extent of medical 19 treatment amount to a constitutional violation. See, e.g., Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1058 20 (9th Cir. 2004); Sanchez v. Vild, 891 F.2d 240, 242 (9th Cir. 1989). Furthermore, mere delay of 21 medical treatment, “without more, is insufficient to state a claim of deliberate medical 22 indifference.” Shapley v. Nev. Bd. of State Prison Comm’rs, 766 F.2d 404, 407 (9th Cir. 1985). 23 Where a prisoner alleges that delay of medical treatment evinces deliberate indifference, the 24 prisoner must show that the delay caused “significant harm and that Defendants should have 25 known this to be the case.” Hallett, 296 F.3d at 745-46; see McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1060. 26 F. First Amendment Claims 27 Under the First Amendment, prisoners have a right to send and receive mail. Witherow v. 28 Paff, 52 F.3d 264, 265 (9th Cir. 1995) (per curiam). However, a prison may adopt regulations or 1 practices for inmate mail which limit a prisoner’s First Amendment rights as long as the 2 regulations are “reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.” Turner v. Safley, 482 3 U.S. 78, 89, (1987). “When a prison regulation affects outgoing mail as opposed to incoming 4 mail, there must be a ‘closer fit between the regulation and the purpose it serves.’” Witherow, 52 5 F.3d at 265 (quoting Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 412 (1989)). Courts have also 6 afforded greater protection to legal mail than non-legal mail. See Thornburgh, 490 U.S. at 413. 7 Isolated incidents of mail interference or tampering will not support a claim under section 1983 8 for violation of plaintiff's constitutional rights. See Davis v. Goord, 320 F.3d 346, 351 (2d. Cir. 9 2003); Gardner v. Howard, 109 F.3d 427, 431 (8th Cir. 1997); Smith v. Maschner, 899 F.2d 940, 10 944 (10th Cir. 1990); see also Crofton v. Roe, 170 F.3d 957, 961 (9th Cir. 1999) (emphasizing 11 that a temporary delay or isolated incident of delay of mail does not violate a prisoner's First 12 Amendment rights). Generally, such isolated incidents must be accompanied by evidence of an 13 improper motive on the part of prison officials or result in interference with an inmate’s right of 14 access to the courts or counsel in order to rise to the level of a constitutional violation. See Smith, 15 899 F.2d at 944. 16 A prison’s interference with legal mail may also violate an inmate’s right of access to the 17 courts which is protected by the First Amendment’s right to petition the government and the due 18 process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Snyder v. Nolen, 380 F.3d 279, 290-291 (7th 19 Cir. 2004) (discussing the development of cases concerning a prisoner’s right of access to the 20 courts). Prison officials may not actively interfere with an inmate’s right to litigate. Silva v. 21 Vittorio, 658 F.3d 1090, 1103 (9th Cir. 2011), overruled on other grounds by Richey v. Dahne, 22 807 F.3d 1202, 1209 n. 6 (9th Cir. 2015). In order to state a claim for the denial of access to the 23 courts, a plaintiff must allege he suffered an actual injury, which is prejudice with respect to 24 contemplated or existing litigation, such as the inability to meet a filing deadline or present a non- 25 frivolous claim. Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 349 (1996). 26 G. Retaliation 27 “Within the prison context, a viable claim of First Amendment retaliation entails five 28 basic elements: (1) An assertion that a state actor took some adverse action against an inmate (2) 1 because of (3) that prisoner's protected conduct, and that such action (4) chilled the inmate's 2 exercise of his First Amendment rights, and (5) the action did not reasonably advance a legitimate 3 correctional goal. Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559 567-68 (9th Cir. 2005) (citations omitted). 4 Filing an inmate grievance is a protected action under the First Amendment. Bruce v. Ylst, 351 5 F.3d 1283, 1288 (9th Cir. 2003). A prison transfer may also constitute an adverse action. See 6 Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 568 (9th Cir. 2005) (recognizing an arbitrary confiscation and 7 destruction of property, initiation of a prison transfer, and assault as retaliation for filing inmate 8 grievances); Pratt v. Rowland, 65 F.3d 802, 806 (9th Cir. 1995) (finding that a retaliatory prison 9 transfer and double-cell status can constitute a cause of action for retaliation under the First 10 Amendment). 11 IV. Analysis 12 The court has reviewed plaintiff’s complaint and finds that it fails to state a claim upon 13 which relief can be granted under federal law. Plaintiff has improperly joined multiple claims 14 against multiple defendants in this single action. Multiple claims can only be joined if they are all 15 against a single defendant. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 18(a). Joinder of defendants is only permitted if 16 “any right to relief is asserted against them ... with respect to or arising out of the same 17 transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences; and any question of law or fact 18 common to all defendants will arise in the action.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 20(a)(2). In this case, multiple 19 claims are presented against multiple defendants. The only thing that they share in common is the 20 location where they occurred. The undersigned finds that plaintiff has improperly joined multiple 21 defendants in a single action. Rather than determine which claim(s) against which defendant(s) 22 plaintiff may proceed against, the court will allow plaintiff to be the captain of his own ship and 23 make that election in the course of amending his complaint. 24 The court also finds that plaintiff’s complaint must be dismissed for failing to comply 25 with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Although the Federal Rules of Civil 26 Procedure adopt a flexible pleading policy, a complaint must give fair notice and state the 27 elements of the claim plainly and succinctly. Jones v. Community Redev. Agency, 733 F.2d 646, 28 649 (9th Cir. 1984). Many of the allegations in the complaint are unrelated to one another, and it 1 is unduly burdensome to determine which, if any, state a cognizable claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 2 § 1915A(b). In McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d 1172, 1177 (9th Cir. 1996), the Court of Appeal 3 upheld the dismissal of a complaint it found to be “argumentative, prolix, replete with 4 redundancy, and largely irrelevant. It consists largely of immaterial background information.” 5 The Ninth Circuit observed that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require a complaint to 6 contain “simple, concise, and direct” allegations. McHenry, 84 F.3d at 1177. Plaintiff’s 7 complaint illustrates the same “unfair burdens” imposed by complaints “prolix in evidentiary 8 detail, yet without simplicity, conciseness and clarity” which “fail to perform the essential 9 functions of a complaint.” McHenry, 84 F.3d at 1179-80. 10 With respect to the claims challenging the conditions of his confinement, plaintiff does 11 not identify any defendant responsible for these asserted constitutional violations. Absent such 12 linkage, he fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Moreover, many of the 13 allegations presented in plaintiff’s complaint are “routine discomfort[s] inherent in the prison 14 setting” that do not rise to the level of a constitutional violation. Johnson v. Lewis, 217 F.3d at 15 732. In any amended complaint raising challenges to his conditions of confinement, plaintiff 16 must identify the duration of the specific deprivation that he suffered. See Johnson, 217 f.3d at 17 731. 18 Moreover, to the extent that plaintiff alleges numerous deficiencies in the prison grievance 19 process, these claims are not separately actionable. See Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 860 20 (9th Cir. 2003). 21 For all these reasons, plaintiff’s complaint must be dismissed. The court will, however, 22 grant plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint. 23 If plaintiff chooses to amend the complaint, plaintiff must demonstrate how the conditions 24 complained of have resulted in a deprivation of plaintiff’s constitutional rights. See Ellis v. 25 Cassidy, 625 F.2d 227 (9th Cir. 1980). Also, in his amended complaint, plaintiff must allege in 26 specific terms how each named defendant is involved. There can be no liability under 42 U.S.C. 27 § 1983 unless there is some affirmative link or connection between a defendant’s actions and the 28 claimed deprivation. Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976). Furthermore, vague and conclusory 1 allegations of official participation in civil rights violations are not sufficient. Ivey v. Board of 2 Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). 3 Finally, plaintiff is informed that the court cannot refer to a prior pleading in order to 4 make plaintiff’s amended complaint complete. Local Rule 220 requires that an amended 5 complaint be complete in itself without reference to any prior pleading. This is because, as a 6 general rule, an amended complaint supersedes the original complaint. See Loux v. Rhay, 375 7 F.2d 55, 57 (9th Cir. 1967). Once plaintiff files an amended complaint, the original pleading no 8 longer serves any function in the case. Therefore, in an amended complaint, as in an original 9 complaint, each claim and the involvement of each defendant must be sufficiently alleged. 10 V. Plain Language Summary for Pro Se Party 11 The following information is meant to explain this order in plain English and is not 12 intended as legal advice. 13 The court has reviewed the allegations in your complaint and determined that they do not 14 state any claim against the defendants. Your complaint is being dismissed, but you are being 15 given the chance to fix the problems identified in this screening order. 16 Although you are not required to do so, you may file an amended complaint within 30 17 days from the date of this order. If you choose to file an amended complaint, pay particular 18 attention to the legal standards identified in this order which may apply to your claims. 19 In accordance with the above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: 20 1. Plaintiff’s request for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (ECF No. 10) is granted. 21 2. Plaintiff is obligated to pay the statutory filing fee of $350.00 for this action. All fees 22 shall be collected and paid in accordance with this court’s order to the Director of the California 23 Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation filed concurrently herewith. 24 3. Plaintiff’s complaint is dismissed. 25 4. Plaintiff is granted thirty days from the date of service of this order to file an amended 26 complaint that complies with the requirements of the Civil Rights Act, the Federal Rules of Civil 27 Procedure, and the Local Rules of Practice. The amended complaint must bear the docket 28 number assigned this case and must be labeled “Amended Complaint.” Failure to file an 1 | amended complaint in accordance with this order will result in a recommendation that this action 2 || be dismissed. 3 || Dated: March 26, 2021 Card Kt | / ye □□□ 4 CAROLYNK.DELANEY 5 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 6 7 8 9 10 1] 12/rojal275.14.docx 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 1]