(PC) Hardin v. Huggett ( 2021 )

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 DOUGLAS ANTHONY HARDIN, No. 2:20-cv-01872-CKD 12 Plaintiff, 13 v. ORDER 14 HUGGETT, et al., 15 Defendants. 16 17 Plaintiff is a state prisoner proceeding pro se in this civil rights action filed pursuant to 42 18 U.S.C. § 1983. This proceeding was referred to this court by Local Rule 302 pursuant to 28 19 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). 20 Plaintiff requests leave to proceed in forma pauperis. As plaintiff has submitted a 21 declaration that makes the showing required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a), his request will be granted. 22 Plaintiff is required to pay the statutory filing fee of $350.00 for this action. 28 U.S.C. §§ 23 1914(a), 1915(b)(1). By separate order, the court will direct the appropriate agency to collect the 24 initial partial filing fee from plaintiff’s trust account and forward it to the Clerk of the Court. 25 Thereafter, plaintiff will be obligated for monthly payments of twenty percent of the preceding 26 month’s income credited to plaintiff’s prison trust account. These payments will be forwarded by 27 the appropriate agency to the Clerk of the Court each time the amount in plaintiff’s account 28 exceeds $10.00, until the filing fee is paid in full. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). 1 I. Screening Requirement 2 The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a 3 governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The 4 court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally 5 “frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek 6 monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1),(2). 7 A claim is legally frivolous when it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact. 8 Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989); Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1227-28 (9th 9 Cir. 1984). The court may, therefore, dismiss a claim as frivolous where it is based on an 10 indisputably meritless legal theory or where the factual contentions are clearly baseless. Neitzke, 11 490 U.S. at 327. The critical inquiry is whether a constitutional claim, however inartfully 12 pleaded, has an arguable legal and factual basis. See Jackson v. Arizona, 885 F.2d 639, 640 (9th 13 Cir. 1989); Franklin, 745 F.2d at 1227. 14 In order to avoid dismissal for failure to state a claim a complaint must contain more than 15 “naked assertions,” “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause 16 of action.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-557 (2007). In other words, 17 “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory 18 statements do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Furthermore, a claim 19 upon which the court can grant relief has facial plausibility. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A 20 claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw 21 the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. 22 at 678. When considering whether a complaint states a claim upon which relief can be granted, 23 the court must accept the allegations as true, Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93-94 (2007), and 24 construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, see Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 25 U.S. 232, 236 (1974). 26 II. Allegations in the Complaint 27 At all times relevant to the allegations in the complaint, plaintiff was an inmate at Mule 28 Creek State Prison. In the complaint, plaintiff challenges the factual basis for a prison 1 classification decision made by defendant Huggett. Plaintiff contends that he was never charged 2 nor convicted of any sexual offense involving a child and that his classification based on such 3 false information places his life in danger. He alleges that his right to equal protection has been 4 violated based on this classification. By way of relief, plaintiff requests that his prison 5 classification be fixed to reflect the fact that he was never charged or convicted of any sex 6 offense. 7 III. Legal Standards 8 A. Linkage Requirement 9 The civil rights statute requires that there be an actual connection or link between the 10 actions of the defendants and the deprivation alleged to have been suffered by plaintiff. See 11 Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Serv., 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976). The 12 Ninth Circuit has held that “[a] person ‘subjects' another to the deprivation of a constitutional 13 right, within the meaning of section 1983, if he does an affirmative act, participates in another's 14 affirmative acts or omits to perform an act which he is legally required to do that causes the 15 deprivation of which complaint is made.” Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978) 16 (citation omitted). In order to state a claim for relief under section 1983, plaintiff must link each 17 named defendant with some affirmative act or omission that demonstrates a violation of plaintiff's 18 federal rights. 19 B. Equal Protection Clause 20 The Equal Protection Clause requires that persons who are similarly situated be treated 21 alike. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985). An equal 22 protection claim may be established by demonstrating that the defendant intentionally 23 discriminated against the plaintiff on the basis of the plaintiff's membership in a protected class, 24 such as race. See, e.g., Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 686 (9th Cir.2001); Thornton 25 v. City of St. Helens, 425 F.3d 1158, 1167 (9th Cir. 2005). Where no suspect class is implicated, 26 but fundamental interests are at issue, some courts have applied a “heightened” scrutiny standard. 27 See Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942). Otherwise, the challenged classification or 28 action generally only needs to satisfy a rational basis for the difference in treatment. Village of 1 Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000); Nelson v. City of Irvine, 143 F.3d 1196, 1205 2 (9th Cir. 1998) (emphasizing that “[u]nless a classification trammels fundamental personal rights 3 or implicates a suspect classification, to meet constitutional challenge the law in question needs 4 only some rational relation to a legitimate state interest.”). 5 C. Due Process Clause 6 To state a claim for violation of the right to procedural due process, plaintiff must allege 7 facts showing: “(1) a deprivation of a constitutionally protected liberty or property interest, and 8 (2) a denial of adequate procedural protections.” Kildare v. Saenz, 325 F.3d 1078, 1085 (9th Cir. 9 2003). However, the due process clause does not apply to prison classification decisions. See 10 Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 224-25 (1976); Moody v. Daggett, 429 U.S. 78, 88 n. 9 (1976) 11 (emphasizing that state action that adversely affects a prisoner’s classification or qualification for 12 prison programming does not automatically implicate a due process violation); Hernandez v. 13 Johnston, 833 F.2d 1316, 1318 (9th Cir. 1987) (stating that a prisoner does not have a 14 constitutional right to a particular classification). In order to state a cognizable claim for violation 15 of due process during a custody classification hearing, plaintiff must allege facts which suggest 16 that he was deprived of a protected liberty interest. Such liberty interests are “generally limited to 17 freedom from restraint which, while not exceeding the sentence in such an unexpected manner as 18 to give rise to protection by the Due Process Clause of its own force, nonetheless imposes 19 atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” 20 Sandin v. Connor, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995) (internal citations omitted). 21 IV. Analysis 22 The court has reviewed plaintiff’s complaint and finds that it fails to state a claim upon 23 which relief can be granted under federal law. Because inmates have no inherent liberty interest 24 in their classification by prison officials, plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief may 25 be granted. See Frost v. Agnos, 152 F.3d 1124, 1130 (9th Cir.1998). Although plaintiff attempts 26 to couch his claim as an equal protection violation, the facts do not reference any intentional 27 different treatment or purposeful discrimination on the part of defendants. As a result, plaintiff 28 has failed to state a cognizable equal protection claim. Additionally, even though he is named as 1 a defendant, Correctional Counselor Costas is not linked to the alleged constitutional violation. 2 Therefore, plaintiff has failed to state a claim against defendant Costas. For all these reasons, 3 plaintiff’s complaint must be dismissed. The court will, however, grant leave to file an amended 4 complaint. 5 If plaintiff chooses to amend the complaint, plaintiff must demonstrate how the conditions 6 complained of have resulted in a deprivation of plaintiff’s constitutional rights. See Ellis v. 7 Cassidy, 625 F.2d 227 (9th Cir. 1980). Also, in his amended complaint, plaintiff must allege in 8 specific terms how each named defendant is involved. There can be no liability under 42 U.S.C. 9 § 1983 unless there is some affirmative link or connection between a defendant’s actions and the 10 claimed deprivation. Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976). Furthermore, vague and conclusory 11 allegations of official participation in civil rights violations are not sufficient. Ivey v. Board of 12 Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). 13 Finally, plaintiff is informed that the court cannot refer to a prior pleading in order to 14 make plaintiff’s amended complaint complete. Local Rule 220 requires that an amended 15 complaint be complete in itself without reference to any prior pleading. This is because, as a 16 general rule, an amended complaint supersedes the original complaint. See Loux v. Rhay, 375 17 F.2d 55, 57 (9th Cir. 1967). Once plaintiff files an amended complaint, the original pleading no 18 longer serves any function in the case. Therefore, in an amended complaint, as in an original 19 complaint, each claim and the involvement of each defendant must be sufficiently alleged. 20 V. Plain Language Summary for Pro Se Party 21 The following information is meant to explain this order in plain English and is not 22 intended as legal advice. 23 The court has reviewed the allegations in your complaint and determined that they do not 24 state any claim against the defendants. Your complaint is being dismissed, but you are being 25 given the chance to fix the problems identified in this screening order. 26 Although you are not required to do so, you may file an amended complaint within 30 27 days from the date of this order. If you choose to file an amended complaint, pay particular 28 attention to the legal standards identified in this order which may apply to your claims. 1 In accordance with the above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: 2 1. Plaintiffs request for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (ECF No. 2) is granted. 3 2. Plaintiff is obligated to pay the statutory filing fee of $350.00 for this action. All fees 4 || shall be collected and paid in accordance with this court’s order to the Director of the California 5 || Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation filed concurrently herewith. 6 3. Plaintiff's complaint is dismissed. 7 4. Plaintiff is granted thirty days from the date of service of this order to file an amended 8 | complaint that complies with the requirements of the Civil Rights Act, the Federal Rules of Civil 9 || Procedure, and the Local Rules of Practice. The amended complaint must bear the docket 10 || number assigned this case and must be labeled “Amended Complaint.” Failure to file an 11 || amended complaint in accordance with this order will result in a recommendation that this action 12 || be dismissed. 13 | Dated: March 26, 2021 / ae □□ / a Ly a 4 CAROLYN K DELANEY 15 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 16 17 18 19 20 21 12/hard1872.14.docx 22 23 24 25 26 27 28