(PC) Jackson v. Yniquez ( 2021 )

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 TONY JUNIOR JACKSON, Case No. 1:20-cv-00205-SKO (PC) 12 Plaintiff, FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO DISMISS ACTION FOR FAILURE TO 13 v. STATE A CLAIM 14 R. YNIQUEZ, et al., 21-DAY DEADLINE 15 Defendants. Clerk of the Court to Assign a District Judge 16 17 Plaintiff Tony Junior Jackson is a federal prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma 18 pauperis in this civil rights action brought pursuant to Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of 19 Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). Plaintiff alleges that prison officials at Federal 20 Correctional Institution, Mendota, deprived him of his constitutional right to access the courts. 21 (Doc. 9.) For the reasons set forth below, Plaintiff’s second amended complaint fails to state a 22 claim on which relief can be granted. Given that Plaintiff has received two opportunities to amend 23 his complaint (see Docs. 6, 8), the Court finds that further amendment would be futile. See Akhtar 24 v. Mesa, 698 F.3d 1202, 1212-13 (9th Cir. 2012). Therefore, the Court recommends that this 25 action be dismissed. 26 I. SCREENING REQUIREMENT 27 The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a governmental entity or an officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). 1 The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the complaint is frivolous or malicious, 2 fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant 3 who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). The Court should dismiss a complaint if 4 it lacks a cognizable legal theory or fails to allege sufficient facts to support a cognizable legal 5 theory. See Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). 6 II. PLEADING REQUIREMENTS 7 A. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) 8 “Rule 8(a)’s simplified pleading standard applies to all civil actions, with limited 9 exceptions.” Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N. A., 534 U.S. 506, 513 (2002). A complaint must contain 10 “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. 11 Civ. Pro. 8(a)(2). “Such a statement must simply give the defendant fair notice of what the 12 plaintiff's claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 512 (internal 13 quotation marks and citation omitted). 14 Detailed factual allegations are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a 15 cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 16 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). Plaintiff must 17 set forth “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim that is plausible on its face.’” 18 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). Factual allegations are accepted as 19 true, but legal conclusions are not. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). 20 The Court construes pleadings of pro se prisoners liberally and affords them the benefit of 21 any doubt. Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010) (citation omitted). However, “the 22 liberal pleading standard . . . applies only to a plaintiff’s factual allegations,” not his legal 23 theories. Neitze v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 330 n.9 (1989). Furthermore, “a liberal interpretation 24 of a civil rights complaint may not supply essential elements of the claim that were not initially 25 pled,” Bruns v. Nat’l Credit Union Admin., 122 F.3d 1251, 1257 (9th Cir. 1997) (internal 26 quotation marks and citation omitted), and courts “are not required to indulge unwarranted 27 inferences,” Doe I v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 572 F.3d 677, 681 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation 1 sufficient to state a cognizable claim, and “facts that are merely consistent with a defendant’s 2 liability” fall short. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 3 B. Linkage and Causation 4 To state a claim under Bivens, a plaintiff must show a causal connection between the 5 actions of the defendants and the constitutional deprivation alleged to have been suffered by the 6 plaintiff. See Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 373-75 (1976))1. “A person subjects another to the 7 deprivation of a constitutional right . . . if he does an affirmative act, participates in another’s 8 affirmative acts, or omits to perform an act which he is legally required to do that causes the 9 deprivation of which complaint is made.” Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978) 10 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 11 III. PLAINTIFF’S ALLEGATIONS 12 At the times relevant to this case, Plaintiff was incarcerated at Federal Correctional 13 Institution, Mendota. (See Doc. 1 at 8.) In his second amended complaint, Plaintiff alleges that he 14 was “pre-requested to be made available for [court proceedings at] the Superior Court of Arizona 15 on” June 14, 2019, and July 9, 2019. (Doc. 9 at 3.) Plaintiff does not specify the purpose of the 16 court proceedings in his second amended complaint. However, his original complaint makes clear 17 that the proceedings were child-dependency hearings. (See Doc. 1 at 8-10.) 18 According to Plaintiff, Defendant Yniquez “negligently disregarded Plaintiff[’s] . . . 19 request for an attorney call . . . by failing to [delegate] her responsibilities in her” absence. (Doc. 20 9 at 3.) Defendant Viramontes also “fail[ed] to [ ]delegate [his] responsibilities” and to properly 21 train his staff regarding “legal calls.” (Id. at 4.) As a result, Defendant Appleton failed to arrange 22 for Plaintiff’s participation via telephone at the June 14, 2019, and July 9, 2019, court hearings. 23 (See id.) Plaintiff was also “unable to present his argument to his attorney in advance of the 24 hearing.” (Id. at 3.) 25 Plaintiff alleges that the failure to speak with his attorney in advance of the hearings, and 26 the failure to telephonically appear at the hearings, “resulted in the loss of a claim for emergency 27 1 The cases cited in this subsection address the standards for actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which also apply to 1 injunctive relief to have his child placed back in the custody of Hiedi Anderson.” (Id.) Hiedi 2 Anderson was present at the June 14, 2019, hearing. (Id. at 4.) Plaintiff states that the court had 3 the authority to grant his requested relief because his child had been “seized in violation of the 4th 4 Amendment without a warrant or investigation.” (Id. at 3-4.) 5 IV. DISCUSSION 6 Inmates have a fundamental, constitutional right of access to the courts. Lewis v. Casey, 7 518 U.S. 343, 346, 350 (1996). To establish a constitutional access-to-courts claim, a prisoner 8 must allege an “actual injury,” i.e., he must show that an official frustrated or hindered efforts to 9 pursue a legal claim. Id. at 351. 10 Access-to-courts claims generally fall into two categories: (1) claims arising from an 11 official frustrating a plaintiff from preparing and filing a lawsuit in the present, i.e., a forward- 12 looking claim, and (2) claims arising from an official causing the loss of a meritorious claim that 13 can no longer be pursued, i.e., a backward-looking claim. Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 14 412-15 (2002). When a prisoner asserts a backward-looking claim, “he must show: 1) the loss of 15 a ‘non-frivolous’ or ‘arguable’ underlying claim; 2) the official acts frustrating the litigation; and 16 3) a remedy that may be awarded as recompense but that is not otherwise available in a future 17 suit.” Phillips v. Hust, 477 F.3d 1070, 1076 (9th Cir.2007) (citing Christopher, 536 U.S. at 413- 18 414), overruled on other grounds by Hust v. Phillips, 555 U.S. 1150 (2009). 19 According to Plaintiff, Defendants failed to make him available to appear telephonically 20 for child-dependency hearings before the Arizona Superior Court on June 14, 2019, and July 9, 21 2019. (See Doc. 9 at 3-4, Doc. 1 at 8-10.) Plaintiff alleges that, as a result, the Arizona court 22 found his child to be “dependent” as to Plaintiff and he “los[t] . . . a claim for emergency 23 injunctive relief.” (Id.) Plaintiff thus asserts a backward-looking claim. See Christopher, 536 U.S. 24 at 413-14 (backward-looking “cases do not look forward to a class of future litigation, but 25 backward to a time when specific litigation ended poorly . . . or could have produced a remedy 26 subsequently unobtainable”). Plaintiff seeks damages as recompense. (Doc. 9 at 4.) 27 Plaintiff’s allegations, however, fails to establish an access-to-courts claim that is 1 non-frivolous or arguable, or that Defendants caused him to lose the underlying claim. The 2 documents attached to Plaintiff’s original complaint show that Plaintiff’s attorney was present at 3 the hearings on June 14, 2019, and July 9, 2019. (Doc. 1 at 25, 33.) Additionally, the Arizona 4 court continued the matter to July 26, 2019 (id. at 34), when Plaintiff was able to telephonically 5 appear and to testify (id. at 38). The court did not decide the matter with respect to Plaintiff until 6 after he testified. (Id. at 38-39.) 7 Plaintiff, therefore, fails to provide any facts that arguably suggest that the Arizona court 8 would have reached a different decision had he appeared at the June 14 and July 9 hearings, given 9 that (1) the court considered his testimony at the July 26 hearing before reaching its decision, and 10 (2) he was incarcerated throughout this period, see Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 8-201(15)(a)(i) 11 (“‘Dependent child’ . . . [m]eans a child who is adjudicated to be . . . [i]n need of proper and 12 effective parental care and control and . . . who has no parent or guardian willing to exercise or 13 capable of exercising such care and control.”) Although a plaintiff asserting an access-to-courts 14 claim need not show that he would have ultimately succeeded on his underlying claim, Phillips 15 477 F.3d at 1076, he must at least “show . . . the ‘arguable’ nature of the . . . claim is more than 16 hope,” Christopher, 536 U.S. at 416. Plaintiff’s allegations fail to show that his underlying child- 17 dependency claim is arguable or non-frivolous. Thus, Plaintiff fails to state a cognizable access- 18 to-courts claim.2 19 V. CONCLUSION, ORDER, AND RECOMMENDATION 20 For the reasons set forth above, Plaintiff’s second amended complaint (Doc. 9) fails to 21 state a claim on which relief can be granted. Given that Plaintiff has received two opportunities to 22 amend his pleading (Docs. 6, 8), the Court finds that further amendment would be futile. See 23 Akhtar v. Mesa, 698 F.3d 1202, 1212-13 (9th Cir. 2012). Accordingly, the Court 24 RECOMMENDS that this action be dismissed for failure to state a claim. The Court DIRECTS 25 the Clerk of the Court to assign a district judge to this action. 26 /// 27 2 1 These Findings and Recommendations will be submitted to the United States District 2 Judge assigned to this case, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within 21 days of the date of 3 service of these Findings and Recommendations, Plaintiff may file written objections with the 4 Court. The document should be captioned, “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and 5 Recommendations.” Plaintiff’s failure to file objections within the specified time may result in 6 waiver of his rights on appeal. Wilkerson v. Wheeler, 772 F.3d 834, 839 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing 7 Baxter v. Sullivan, 923 F.2d 1391, 1394 (9th Cir. 1991)). 8 IT IS SO ORDERED. 9 Sheila K. Oberto 10 Dated: June 11, 2021 /s/ . UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27