(PS) Liang v. Stockton Police Dept. ( 2021 )

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 KUANGHUEI LIANG, et al., No. 2:21-cv-0661-TLN-CKD PS 12 Plaintiffs, 13 v. ORDER AND FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 14 STOCKTON POLICE DEPARTMENT, 15 Defendant. 16 17 All three plaintiffs—each proceeding without counsel in this action—have requested leave 18 to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915.1 (ECF Nos. 2-4.) Plaintiffs’ 19 applications in support of their IFP requests make the required financial showing. Accordingly, 20 the court grants each plaintiff’s request to proceed IFP. 21 The determination that a plaintiff may proceed IFP does not complete the required 22 inquiry, however. Pursuant to the IFP statute, federal courts must screen IFP complaints and 23 dismiss the case if the action is “frivolous or malicious,” “fails to state a claim on which relief 24 may be granted,” or seeks monetary relief against an immune defendant. 28 U.S.C. 25 § 1915(e)(2)(B); Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126-27 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) 26 (“[S]ection 1915(e) not only permits but requires a district court to dismiss an [IFP] complaint 27 1 This action proceeds before the undersigned pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Local 28 Rule 302(c)(21). 1 that fails to state a claim.”). 2 The Complaint & Plaintiff’s Earlier Ongoing Lawsuit 3 Plaintiffs are a family of three who live in Stockton, California. This case is the last of 4 seven separate lawsuits plaintiffs filed in this court between October 2020 and April 2021, all 5 related in various ways to longstanding alleged harassment by their neighbor, Mickey Anderson.2 6 Plaintiffs filed this case on April 13, 2021 against the Stockton Police Department (“SPD”), the 7 San Joaquin County District Attorney’s Office, the “Stockton Courthouse,” five members of the 8 SPD, the County Deputy District Attorney, and six judges of the California Superior Court for 9 San Joaquin County. (ECF No. 1 at 1, 8-10.) Plaintiffs recount a long history of abuse by Mr. 10 Anderson, ranging from verbal harassment to destruction of property and personal assault. (Id. 11 at 13-24.) Plaintiffs claim that, despite responding to various isolated incidents, the SPD never 12 helped them solve their issues with Mr. Anderson, thereby purportedly violating the Fourteenth 13 Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. (Id. at 14-16.) Plaintiffs and Mr. Anderson obtained 14 several TROs against each other over the years, and the County brought criminal charges against 15 Mr. Anderson. Plaintiffs assert that the San Joaquin County District Attorney’s Office and 16 Superior Court—and the judges involved—violated their Fourteenth Amendment rights by 17 mishandling the various associated civil and criminal proceedings. (Id. at 18-22.) 18 In one of their first cases in this court, “Liang I,” plaintiffs also brought a complaint 19 against the SPD and several of its officers for allegedly violating their constitutional rights in 20 handling the same TROs and incidents between plaintiffs and Mr. Anderson. Liang et al. v. 21 Stockton Police Dept., et al., No. 2:20-cv-02520-TLN-DB (PS) (filed 12/21/20). On April 5, 22 2021, that complaint was dismissed with leave to amend. (No. 2:20-cv-02520, ECF No. 3.) The 23 magistrate judge assigned to “Liang I” found that plaintiffs failed to identify what cause of action 24 2 Liang et al. v. Anderson et al., No. 2:20-cv-01990-JAM-DB (PS) (filed 10/05/20); Liang et al. v. 25 Stockton Police Dept., et al., No. 2:20-cv-02520-TLN-DB (PS) (filed 12/21/20); Liang et al. v. 26 Anderson et al., No. 2:21-cv-00557-JAM-AC (PS) (filed 03/25/21); Liang et al. v. Anderson, No. 2:21-cv-00594-JAM-KJN (PS) (filed 03/30/21); Liang et al v. Kallis, No. 2:21-cv-00595- 27 JAM-CKD (PS) (filed 03/30/21); Liang et al v. Anderson, No. 2:21-cv-00596-TLN-JDP (PS) (filed 03/30/21). In all seven cases, plaintiffs represent themselves and sought leave to proceed 28 without paying the filing fee. 1 they were asserting, or to allege facts supporting a cognizable cause of action. (Id. at 4-7.) 2 On April 13, 2021, plaintiffs filed the instant complaint, “Liang II,” including a more 3 coherent narrative of events and assertion of Fourteenth Amendment claims under 28 U.S.C. 4 § 1983. (ECF No. 1.) About two weeks later, on April 28, 2021, plaintiffs then filed their First 5 Amended Complaint (“FAC”) in Liang I. (No. 2:20-cv-02520, ECF No. 4.) The Liang I FAC 6 repeats, word-for-word, every sentence of the instant complaint—but weaves in additional 7 allegations (often in parentheses) between those sentences, and in a few places makes minor 8 wording changes.3 Compare ECF No. 1 at 8 (“With omission of [SPD] and forgery of official 9 restraining order, which led the Judges to make a wrong judgment.”), with No. 2:20-cv-02520, 10 ECF No. 4 at 14 (“With omission of [SPD] and forgery of official restraining order (That was a 11 made-up restraining court order), which led the Judges to make a wrong judgment.”). The 12 Liang I FAC names all 15 of the same defendants in this complaint (Liang II) but also adds many 13 others not named in Liang II. Both complaints request the same relief: some $2 billion in 14 damages for lost income, medical expenses, and security equipment. (ECF No. 1 at 24; No. 2:20- 15 cv-02520, ECF No. 4 at 32-33.) 16 Analysis 17 The instant complaint (in Liang II) must be dismissed because it is duplicative of the 18 ongoing Liang I case. “Plaintiffs generally have no right to maintain two separate actions 19 involving the same subject matter at the same time in the same court and against the same 20 defendant.” Adams v. California Dep’t of Health Servs., 487 F.3d 684, 688 (9th Cir. 2007) 21 (cleaned up), overruled on other grounds by Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880 (2008). District 22 courts have the power to control their dockets, including the power to dismiss claims that are 23 duplicative of claims presented in other cases. M.M. v. Lafayette Sch. Dist., 681 F.3d 1082, 1091 24 (9th Cir. 2012). 25 26 3 The Liang I FAC omits only two sentences that appear in the conclusion of plaintiffs’ Statement of Claims in the instant complaint. (See ECF No. 1 at 23 (beginning with “I respectfully move 27 the Court . . .” and ending with “. . . treated by this justice system”).) These two sentences summarize incidents and allegations described in detail elsewhere in both the instant complaint 28 and the Liang I FAC, however. 1 To determine whether a suit is duplicative, courts apply the same test that governs claim 2 preclusion, that is, “we examine whether the causes of action and relief sought, as well as the 3 parties or privies to the action, are the same.” Id. at 688-89. To decide whether the causes of 4 action in two suits are the same, courts apply the “transaction test,” which requires consideration 5 of four criteria: “(1) whether rights or interests established in the prior judgment would be 6 destroyed or impaired by prosecution of the second action; (2) whether substantially the same 7 evidence is presented in the two actions; (3) whether the two suits involve infringement of the 8 same right; and (4) whether the two suits arise out of the same transactional nucleus of facts.” Id. 9 at 689 (quoting Costantini v. Trans World Airlines, 681 F.2d 1199, 1201-02 (9th Cir. 1982)). 10 “The last of these criteria is the most important.” Costantini, 681 F.2d at 1202. 11 All elements of this test are met here. No detailed analysis of each criterion is needed 12 because, as discussed above, the Liang I FAC contains, word-for-word, every allegation asserted 13 in the instant complaint (with very few minor exceptions). Based on a side-by-side comparison 14 of the two documents, it appears that plaintiffs merely added on to the instant Liang II complaint 15 to produce the Liang I FAC. This makes it obvious that the Liang I and Liang II suits are the 16 same. Accordingly, to conserve judicial resources, this later-filed suit (Liang II) should be 17 dismissed. See Adams, 487 F.3d at 692-93 (upholding dismissal of duplicative later suit “where 18 one district court had duplicative suits contemporaneously pending on its docket”); see also Cato 19 v. United States, 70 F.3d 1103, 1105 n.5 (9th Cir. 1995) (no abuse of discretion where district 20 court dismisses an IFP complaint that “merely repeats pending or previously litigated claims”). 21 All of plaintiffs’ present claims can be fully and fairly litigated in the earlier-filed suit. 22 ORDER 23 Accordingly, it is HEREBY ORDERED that plaintiffs’ requests to proceed in forma 24 pauperis (ECF Nos. 2-4) are GRANTED. 25 //// 26 //// 27 //// 28 //// 1 RECOMMENDATIONS 2 In addition, it is RECOMMENDED that 3 1. The action be DISMISSED without prejudice and without leave to amend, as duplicative 4 of plaintiffs’ earlier-filed action in No. 2:20-cv-02520; and 5 2. The Clerk of Court be directed to CLOSE this case. 6 7 These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge 8 || assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Within fourteen (14) 9 | days after being served with these findings and recommendations, plaintiffs may file written 10 | objections with the court. Such a document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate 11 | Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Plaintiffs are advised that failure to file objections 12 | within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. Martinez v. 13 | Yist, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991). 14 | Dated: May 25, 2021 ety dh Ld (a CAROLYNK.DELANEY/ 16 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 17 18 19 || 19.%ang.0661 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28