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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 JOSHUA DAVIS BLAND, No. 2:19-CV-2100-JAM-DMC-P 12 Plaintiff, 13 v. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 14 STATE OF CALIFORNIA, et al., 15 Defendants. 16 17 Plaintiff, a prisoner proceeding pro se, brings this civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. 18 § 1983. Before the Court is Plaintiff’s motion for injunctive relief. ECF No. 22 The undersigned 19 United States Magistrate Judge recommends denying the motion. 20 I. PLAINTIFF’S ALLEGATIONS 21 Plaintiff contends that he has been denied the right to correspond with co-plaintiffs. 22 Id. at 1. He states that he has a First Amendment right to correspond with whom he wishes and to 23 be free from arbitrary government interference in his personal pursuits. Id. Plaintiff concludes by 24 stating that the First Amendment applies to the State of California by way of the Fourteenth 25 Amendment to the United States Constitution. Id. He then cites Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 74 26 (1906) to argue that his rights may only be taken from him through due process of law. Id. Plaintiff 27 attaches a mail cover sheet on which someone has written that the attached mail was inmate to 28 inmate correspondence, not legal mail. Id. at 2. 1 II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 2 The primary purpose of a preliminary injunction is preservation of the status quo. 3 See, e.g., Ramos v. Wolf, 975 F.3d 872, 887 (9th Cir. 2020). More specifically, the purpose of a 4 preliminary injunction is preservation the Court's power to render a meaningful decision after a trial 5 on the merits. See, e.g., Univ. of Texas v. Camenisch, 451 U.S. 390, 395 (1981); Barth v. Montejo, 6 No. 2:19-cv-1874-DB-P, 2021 WL 1291962, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 7, 2021). It is meant to maintain 7 the relative positions of the parties and prevent irreparable loss of rights before a trial and final 8 judgment. See, e.g., Camenisch, 451 U.S. at 395; Ramos, 975 F.3d at 887; Doe #1 v. Trump, 957 9 F.3d 1050, 1068 (9th Cir. 2020). A preliminary injunction may assume two forms. Marlyn 10 Nutraceuticals, Inc. v. Mucos Pharma GmbH & Co., 571 F.3d 873, 878 (9th Cir. 2009). Prohibitory 11 injunctions prevent a party from acting, thus maintaining the status quo. Id. A mandatory injunction 12 directs some responsible party to act. Id. at 879. 13 The legal principles applicable to requests for injunctive relief, such as a temporary 14 restraining order or preliminary injunction, are well established. To prevail, the moving party must 15 show that irreparable injury is likely in the absence of an injunction. See Stormans, Inc. v. Selecky, 16 586 F.3d 1109, 1127 (9th Cir. 2009) (citing Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20– 17 22 (2008)); see also All. for the Wild Rockies v. Cottrell, 632 F.3d 1127, 1131 (9th Cir. 2011). To 18 the extent that prior Ninth Circuit cases suggest a lesser standard by focusing solely on the 19 possibility of irreparable harm, such cases are “no longer controlling, or even viable.” Am. Trucking 20 Ass’ns, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 559 F.3d 1046, 1052 (9th Cir. 2009); see Cottrell, 632 F.3d at 21 1132; Stormans, 586 F.3d at 1127. Instead, the proper test requires a party to demonstrate: (1) he 22 is likely to succeed on the merits; (2) he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of an 23 injunction; (3) the balance of hardships tips in his favor; and (4) an injunction is in the public 24 interest. E.g., Winter, 555 U.S. at 20; Cottrell, 632 F.3d at 1131; Stormans, 586 F.3d at 1127. 25 The Ninth Circuit evaluates the above factors under a sliding scale. Cottrell, 632 26 F.3d at 1131–35. A stronger showing on one factor may offset a weaker showing on another. Id. at 27 1132. But a plaintiff must make some showing on all four factors. Id. at 1135. Under the scale, if 28 the balance of the hardships tips sharply towards the plaintiff, the plaintiff need only show “serious 1 questions going to the merits” provided that the plaintiff also satisfies the other two factors. Id. at 2 1131–35. Thus, when there are serious questions going to the merits and a balance of hardships tips 3 sharply towards the plaintiff, a preliminary injunction may issue if the plaintiff also shows that 4 there is a likelihood of irreparable injury and that the injunction is in the public interest. Id. 5 A preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy that is not awarded as of right. 6 Winter, 555 U.S. at 24; Cottrell, 632 F.3d at 1131. The burden to achieve injunctive relief is 7 particularly high when a party seeks a mandatory injunction. See Garcia v. Google, Inc., 786 F.3d 8 733, 740 (9th Cir. 2015). Mandatory injunctions go beyond an injunction preventing a party from 9 acting, and thus beyond mere maintenance of the status quo. See id. They require a party to act. Id. 10 District courts must deny requests for mandatory injunctions unless the law and facts clearly favor 11 a moving party. Id. The Court will not grant such requests in doubtful cases. Id. 12 III. DISCUSSION 13 The Court need not undertake any lengthy analysis. Plaintiff has not established 14 grounds for any relief, let alone a preliminary injunction. Plaintiff’s motion does not establish that 15 he is likely to succeed on the merits of his claims, that he faces irreparable harm if this Court does 16 not issue an injunction, that the hardships tip in his favor, or that an injunction is in the public 17 interest. See, e.g., Cottrell, 632 F.3d at 1131–35. Although the United States Court of Appeals for 18 Ninth Circuit has employed a sliding scale under which a stronger showing as to one of the 19 foregoing elements can make up for a weaker showing on another element, Plaintiff has not made 20 any requisite showing on any element. See id.; Ramos, 975 F.3d at 878–88; ECF No. 22. There are 21 simply no grounds on which to grant injunctive relief. 22 Even construing Petitioner’s submissions liberally, Petitioner makes no real 23 argument on any of the elements justifying the extraordinary remedy of an injunction. Petitioner’s 24 submissions make no showing satisfying what the Ninth Circuit has determined is the most 25 important factor—likelihood of success on the merits. See Garcia, 786 F.3d at 740. He offers 26 nothing but his allegations of government interference in his ability to correspond with co-plaintiffs. 27 That conclusory allegation is insufficient. Nor, assuming that Plaintiff refers to this case, is it 28 accurate. Plaintiff is the only plaintiff in this case. Moreover, the Court has not yet screened 1 | Plaintiff's first amended complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A and thus cannot say that Plaintiff has 2 | established any particular likelihood of success on the merits of his claims. 3 Furthermore, although the Court need not consider the remaining elements, it is 4 | worth noting that Plaintiffs has not remotely established irreparable harm. If true, □□□□□□□□□□□ 5 | allegations that the government (presumably prison officials) have wholly prevented him from 6 | corresponding with others, such as by sending mail, could constitute a violation of his constitutional 7 | rights. See Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 407-08 (1989); Hayes v. Idaho Corr. Ctr., 849 8 | F.3d 1204, 1209 (9th Cir. 2017); Witherow v. Paff, 52 F.3d 264, 265 (9th Cir. 1995); King v. 9 | Lemos, No. 1:20-cv-01837-NONE-BAM (PC), 2021 WL 2038187, at *6 (E.D. Cal. May. 21, 10 | 2021). Deprivation of constitutional rights can qualify as irreparable harm. E.g., Melendres v. 11 | Arpaio, 695 F.3d 990, 1002 (9th Cir. 2012). But Plaintiff's indefinite allegation that he “is being denied 12 || the ability to correspond” with co-plaintiffs and others does not establish that harm. Plaintiff must show 13 | that irreparable harm is likely, not just possible. Cottrell, 632 F.3d at 1131. He has not done so. 14 IV. RECOMMENDATION 15 The undersigned United States Magistrate Judge recommends that □□□□□□□□□□□ 16 | motions for injunctive relief (ECF No. 22) be DENIED. 17 These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District 18 | Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(). Within 14 days after 19 | being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written objections with 20 | the Court. Responses to objections shall be filed within 14 days after service of objections. Failure 21 | to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal. See Martinez v. YIst, 951 22 | F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991). 23 24 | Dated: June 29, 2021 Sx
Document Info
Docket Number: 2:19-cv-02100
Filed Date: 6/30/2021
Precedential Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 6/19/2024