(PC) Tolliver v. County of Sacramento ( 2021 )

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 RESHON TOLLIVER, No. 2:19-cv-02599-CKD P 12 Plaintiff, 13 v. ORDER 14 COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO, et al., 15 Defendants. 16 17 Plaintiff is a federal prisoner proceeding pro se in this civil rights action filed pursuant to 18 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This proceeding was referred to this court by Local Rule 302 pursuant to 28 19 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). On March 1, 2021, plaintiff filed a first amended complaint which is now 20 before the court for screening. ECF No. 18. 21 I. Screening Requirement 22 As plaintiff was previously advised, the court is required to screen complaints brought by 23 prisoners seeking relief against a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental 24 entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The court will independently dismiss a complaint or portion 25 thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally “frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state 26 a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is 27 immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1),(2). 28 ///// 1 II. Allegations in the Complaint 2 In his amended complaint, plaintiff challenges the actions of nine Sacramento County 3 Sheriff’s Officers involved in his arrest on November 7, 2017. ECF No. 18. Specifically, 4 plaintiff alleges that defendants searched zipped bags located inside of his car without a warrant 5 or probable cause and contraband was found. Plaintiff attaches various police reports to his 6 complaint that describe the circumstances surrounding plaintiff’s arrest as well as the search and 7 seizure of his vehicle. See ECF No. 18 at 7-21. The criminal charges for which plaintiff was 8 arrested were ultimately dismissed on December 27, 2017.1 9 III. Legal Standards 10 The following legal standards are being provided to plaintiff based on his pro se status as 11 well as the nature of the allegations in his amended complaint. 12 The civil rights statute requires that there be an actual connection or link between the 13 actions of the defendants and the deprivation alleged to have been suffered by plaintiff. See 14 Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 15 (1976). The Ninth Circuit has held that “[a] person ‘subjects' another to the deprivation of a 16 constitutional right, within the meaning of section 1983, if he does an affirmative act, participates 17 in another's affirmative acts or omits to perform an act which he is legally required to do that 18 causes the deprivation of which complaint is made.” Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th 19 Cir. 1978) (citation omitted). In order to state a claim for relief under section 1983, plaintiff must 20 link each named defendant with some affirmative act or omission that demonstrates a violation of 21 plaintiff's federal rights. 22 The Fourth Amendment protects individuals from unreasonable searches and seizures. 23 U.S. Const., amend. IV. This is not a prohibition “against all searches and seizures, but only 24 against unreasonable searches and seizures.” United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 682 (1985) 25 (emphasis in original). As plaintiff was previously advised, the Fourth Amendment requires law 26 27 1 Plaintiff indicates that “upon his arrest there was a federal hold.” ECF No. 18 at 2. Thus, it appears to the court that plaintiff’s current confinement in federal custody is not related to the 28 facts and circumstances of his arrest on November 7, 2017. 1 enforcement officers to have probable cause or a warrant to make an arrest. Beck v. Ohio, 379 2 U.S. 89, 91 (1964); see also Rosenbaum v. Washoe County, 663 F.3d 1071, 1076 (9th Cir. 2011) 3 (noting that “an arrest without probable cause violates the Fourth Amendment and gives rise to a 4 claim for damages under § 1983.”) (citation and quotation marks omitted); Cabrera v. City of 5 Huntington Park, 159 F.3d 374, 380 (9th Cir. 1998) (per curiam) (to prevail on Section 1983 6 claim for false arrest/false imprisonment, plaintiff must demonstrate there was no probable cause 7 to arrest him). “A police officer has probable cause to effect an arrest if ‘at the moment the arrest 8 was made ... the facts and circumstances within [his] knowledge and of which [he] had 9 reasonably trustworthy information were sufficient to warrant a prudent man in believing’ that the 10 suspect had violated a criminal law.” Orin v. Barclay, 272 F.3d 1207, 1218 (9th Cir. 2001) 11 (quoting Beck, 379 U.S. at 91 (2002)). 12 It now appears that plaintiff is challenging the search and seizure of his vehicle on 13 November 7, 2017 and not his actual arrest. “Temporary detention of individuals during the stop 14 of an automobile by the police, even if only for a brief period and for a limited purpose, 15 constitutes a ‘seizure’ of ‘persons' within the meaning” of the Fourth Amendment. Whren v. 16 United States, 517 U.S. 806, 809-10 (1996). “A police-initiated traffic stop is reasonable under 17 the Fourth Amendment if the police stop the vehicle because of a ‘reasonable suspicion’ that the 18 vehicle’s occupants have broken a law.” United States v. Hartz, 458 F.3d 1011, 1017 (9th Cir. 19 2006) (citation omitted). “Reasonable suspicion is formed by ‘specific, articulable facts which, 20 together with objective and reasonable inferences, form the basis for suspecting that the particular 21 person detained is engaged in criminal activity.’” United States v. Lopez-Soto, 205 F.3d 1101, 22 1105 (9th Cir. 2000) (quoting United States v. Michael R., 90 F.3d 340, 346 (9th Cir. 1996)). 23 “A search incident to a lawful arrest is an exception to the general rule that warrantless 24 searches violate the Fourth Amendment.” United States v. Camou, 773 F.3d 932, 937 (9th Cir. 25 2014). Police officers are further permitted to impound and then conduct inventory searches of 26 seized vehicles pursuant to the community caretaker exception to the Fourth Amendment. South 27 Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 368 (1976). Whether a vehicle may be impounded “under 28 the community caretaking doctrine depends on the location of the vehicle and the police officer's 1 duty to prevent it from creating a hazard to other drivers or from being a target for vandalism or 2 theft.” See United States v. Caseres, 533 F.3d 1064, 1075 (9th Cir. 2008). Once a vehicle is 3 legally impounded, police officers are permitted to conduct an inventory search of its contents in 4 accordance with the local police department’s policies. Opperman, 428 U.S. at 375-76; see also 5 Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. at 372 (finding an inventory search lawful where “there was no 6 showing that the police, who were following standardized procedures, acted in bad faith or for the 7 sole purpose of investigation.”); Hallstrom v. Garden City, 991 F.2d 1473, 1477 n.4 (9th Cir. 8 1993) (upholding the towing of a car from a public parking lot following the driver's arrest 9 pursuant to the community caretaking exception of the warrant requirement). 10 IV. Analysis 11 The court has reviewed plaintiff’s first amended complaint and finds that it fails to state a 12 claim upon which relief can be granted under federal law. The most glaring deficiency with 13 respect to plaintiff’s amended complaint is his failure to identify which defendant committed 14 which alleged constitutional violation. See Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). 15 Plaintiff’s amended complaint is a mere two pages in length, absent the attachments. ECF No. 16 18. In these two pages, plaintiff identifies the defendants who were involved in the alleged illegal 17 search by their last names and badge numbers, but he does not specify how each of the nine 18 different officers was specifically involved. ECF No. 18 at 1. Apparently, plaintiff leaves that 19 task to the court to figure that out based on the attachment of all of the police reports from his 20 arrest on November 7, 2017. ECF No. 18 at 4-21. However, “[j]udges are not like pigs, hunting 21 for truffles buried in briefs.” United States v. Dunkel, 927 F.2d 955, 956 (7th Cir. 1991) (per 22 curiam). The court is required to liberally construe pro se pleadings, but it is not required to draft 23 those pleadings. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972) (stating that pro se pleadings 24 are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by lawyers). Therefore, plaintiff’s 25 amended complaint will be dismissed. The court will, however, grant plaintiff leave to file a 26 second amended complaint to attempt to cure the deficiencies identified in this screening order. 27 If plaintiff chooses to amend the complaint, plaintiff must demonstrate how the conditions 28 complained of have resulted in a deprivation of plaintiff’s constitutional rights. See Ellis v. 1 Cassidy, 625 F.2d 227 (9th Cir. 1980). Also, in his amended complaint, plaintiff must allege in 2 specific terms how each named defendant is involved. There can be no liability under 42 U.S.C. 3 § 1983 unless there is some affirmative link or connection between a defendant’s actions and the 4 claimed deprivation. Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976). Furthermore, vague and conclusory 5 allegations of official participation in civil rights violations are not sufficient. Ivey v. Board of 6 Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). 7 Finally, plaintiff is informed that the court cannot refer to a prior pleading in order to 8 make plaintiff’s amended complaint complete. Local Rule 220 requires that an amended 9 complaint be complete in itself without reference to any prior pleading. This is because, as a 10 general rule, an amended complaint supersedes the original complaint. See Loux v. Rhay, 375 11 F.2d 55, 57 (9th Cir. 1967). Once plaintiff files an amended complaint, the original pleading no 12 longer serves any function in the case. Therefore, in an amended complaint, as in an original 13 complaint, each claim and the involvement of each defendant must be sufficiently alleged. 14 V. Plain Language Summary 15 The following information is meant to explain this order in plain English and is not 16 intended as legal advice. 17 The first amended complaint is being dismissed because it fails to link any of the named 18 defendants to the asserted constitutional violations. You are being given the chance to fix the 19 problems identified in this screening order by filing a second amended complaint. 20 Although you are not required to do so, you may file a second amended complaint within 21 30 days from the date of this order. If you choose to file an amended complaint, pay particular 22 attention to the legal standards identified in this order which may apply to your claims. 23 Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: 24 1. Plaintiff’s first amended complaint (ECF No. 18) is dismissed. 25 2. Plaintiff is granted thirty days from the date of service of this order to file a second 26 amended complaint that complies with the requirements of the Civil Rights Act, the Federal Rules 27 of Civil Procedure, and the Local Rules of Practice. The amended complaint must bear the 28 docket number assigned this case and must be labeled “Amended Complaint.” Failure to file a 1 || second amended complaint in accordance with this order will result in a recommendation that this 2 || action be dismissed. 3 | Dated: July 13, 2021 Card ft | bs L , — 4 CAROLYNK.DELANEY 5 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 6 7 8 9 10 1] 12 12/tolI2599.14a.docx 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28