(PC) Hill v. Danforth ( 2021 )

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 WILLIAM C. HILL, No. 2:20-CV-2278-DMC-P 12 Plaintiff, 13 v. ORDER 14 PAUL DANFORTH, 15 Defendant. 16 17 Plaintiff, a prisoner proceeding pro se, brings this civil rights action under 42 18 U.S.C. § 1983. Pending before the Court is Plaintiff’s complaint, ECF No. 1. 19 The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief 20 against a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C. 21 § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if it: (1) is frivolous or 22 malicious; (2) fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted; or (3) seeks monetary relief 23 from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2). Moreover, 24 the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require that complaints contain a “. . . short and plain 25 statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). This 26 means that claims must be stated simply, concisely, and directly. See McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d 27 1172, 1177 (9th Cir. 1996) (referring to Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(e)(1)). These rules are satisfied if the 28 complaint gives the defendant fair notice of the plaintiff’s claim and the grounds upon which it 1 rests. See Kimes v. Stone, 84 F.3d 1121, 1129 (9th Cir. 1996). Because Plaintiff must allege 2 with at least some degree of particularity overt acts by specific defendants which support the 3 claims, vague and conclusory allegations fail to satisfy this standard. Additionally, it is 4 impossible for the Court to conduct the screening required by law when the allegations are vague 5 and conclusory. 6 7 I. PLAINTIFF’S ALLEGATIONS 8 Plaintiff names as the only defendant Paul Danforth, an officer with the 9 Sacramento County Police Department. Plaintiff contends Defendant perjured himself at his 10 preliminary hearing in a criminal matter, as well as in various police reports, resulting in criminal 11 charges being brought and Plaintiff being detained. See ECF No. 1, pgs. 4-13. 12 13 II. DISCUSSION 14 Plaintiff’s complaint is defective for one of two reasons. To the extent Plaintiff 15 has been convicted, his current claim is barred because success on the merits would necessarily 16 imply the invalidity of that conviction and Plaintiff has not alleged that the conviction has been 17 set aside or overturned. To the extent Plaintiff’s criminal case is still pending, the Court should 18 abstain from exercising jurisdiction until criminal proceedings have concluded. Each situation is 19 discussed in more detail below. 20 A. Heck Bar 21 When a state prisoner challenges the legality of his custody and the relief he seeks 22 is a determination that he is entitled to an earlier or immediate release, such a challenge is not 23 cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the prisoner’s sole federal remedy is a petition for a writ 24 of habeas corpus. See Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 500 (1973); see also Neal v. Shimoda, 25 131 F.3d 818, 824 (9th Cir. 1997); Trimble v. City of Santa Rosa, 49 F.3d 583, 586 (9th Cir. 26 1995) (per curiam). Thus, where a § 1983 action seeking monetary damages or declaratory relief 27 alleges constitutional violations which would necessarily imply the invalidity of the prisoner’s 28 underlying conviction or sentence, or the result of a prison disciplinary hearing at issue was 1 imposition of a sanction affecting the overall length of confinement, such a claim is not 2 cognizable under § 1983 unless the conviction or sentence has first been invalidated on appeal, by 3 habeas petition, or through some similar proceeding. See Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 483- 4 84 (1994) (concluding that § 1983 claim not cognizable because allegations were akin to 5 malicious prosecution action which includes as an element a finding that the criminal proceeding 6 was concluded in plaintiff’s favor); Butterfield v. Bail, 120 F.3d 1023, 1024-25 (9th Cir. 1997) 7 (concluding that § 1983 claim not cognizable because allegations of procedural defects were an 8 attempt to challenge substantive result in parole hearing); cf. Neal, 131 F.3d at 824 (concluding 9 that § 1983 claim was cognizable because challenge was to conditions for parole eligibility and 10 not to any particular parole determination); cf. Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74 (2005) 11 (concluding that § 1983 action seeking changes in procedures for determining when an inmate is 12 eligible for parole consideration not barred because changed procedures would hasten future 13 parole consideration and not affect any earlier parole determination under the prior procedures). 14 Here, success on the merits of Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant Danforth would 15 necessarily imply the invalidity of any criminal conviction, if in fact Plaintiff has been convicted. 16 Because Plaintiff has not alleged sufficient facts for the Court to definitely conclude that the Heck 17 bar applies to this case, Plaintiff will be provided an opportunity to amend. 18 B. Abstention 19 If Plaintiff has not yet been convicted and is a pre-trial detainee, Younger 20 abstention bars the federal court from hearing a civil rights claim arising from an ongoing 21 criminal prosecution. See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971). In some instances, the Court 22 may stay a federal action pending the outcome of ongoing criminal proceedings related to alleged 23 civil rights violations. See Wallace v. Kato, 127 S.Ct. 1091 (2007). Because it is unclear whether 24 Plaintiff is a pre-trial detainee such that these doctrines would apply, the Court will permit 25 Plaintiff an opportunity to amend. 26 / / / 27 / / / 28 / / / 1 III. CONCLUSION 2 Because it is possible that the deficiencies identified in this order may be cured by 3 amending the complaint, Plaintiff is entitled to leave to amend prior to dismissal of the entire 4 action. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126, 1131 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). Plaintiff is 5 informed that, as a general rule, an amended complaint supersedes the original complaint. See 6 Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1262 (9th Cir. 1992). Thus, following dismissal with leave to 7 amend, all claims alleged in the original complaint which are not alleged in the amended 8 complaint are waived. See King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565, 567 (9th Cir. 1987). Therefore, if 9 Plaintiff amends the complaint, the Court cannot refer to the prior pleading in order to make 10 Plaintiff's amended complaint complete. See Local Rule 220. An amended complaint must be 11 complete in itself without reference to any prior pleading. See id. 12 If Plaintiff chooses to amend the complaint, Plaintiff must demonstrate how the 13 conditions complained of have resulted in a deprivation of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights. See 14 Ellis v. Cassidy, 625 F.2d 227 (9th Cir. 1980). The complaint must allege in specific terms how 15 each named defendant is involved, and must set forth some affirmative link or connection 16 between each defendant’s actions and the claimed deprivation. See May v. Enomoto, 633 F.2d 17 164, 167 (9th Cir. 1980); Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). 18 Finally, Plaintiff is warned that failure to file an amended complaint within the 19 time provided in this order may be grounds for dismissal of this action. See Ferdik, 963 F.2d at 20 1260-61; see also Local Rule 110. Plaintiff is also warned that a complaint which fails to comply 21 with Rule 8 may, in the Court’s discretion, be dismissed with prejudice pursuant to Rule 41(b). 22 See Nevijel v. North Coast Life Ins. Co., 651 F.2d 671, 673 (9th Cir. 1981). 23 / / / 24 / / / 25 / / / 26 / / / 27 / / / 28 / / / 1 Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: 2 1. Plaintiff's complaint is dismissed with leave to amend; and 3 2. Plaintiff shall file a first amended complaint within 30 days of the date of 4 | service of this order. 5 6 || Dated: August 6, 2021 Ssvcqo_ 7 DENNIS M. COTA 8 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28