(PC) Jenkins v. MacDonald ( 2021 )

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 MARKEITH JENKINS, No. 2:21-CV-1555-DMC-P 12 Plaintiff, 13 v. ORDER 14 MacDONALD, et al., 15 Defendants. 16 17 Plaintiff, a prisoner proceeding pro se, brings this civil rights action pursuant to 18 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Pending before the Court is Plaintiff’s original complaint, ECF No. 1. 19 The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief 20 against a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C. 21 § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if it: (1) is frivolous or 22 malicious; (2) fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted; or (3) seeks monetary relief 23 from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2). Moreover, 24 the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require that complaints contain a “. . . short and plain 25 statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). This 26 means that claims must be stated simply, concisely, and directly. See McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d 27 1172, 1177 (9th Cir. 1996) (referring to Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(e)(1)). These rules are satisfied if the 28 complaint gives the defendant fair notice of the plaintiff’s claim and the grounds upon which it 1 rests. See Kimes v. Stone, 84 F.3d 1121, 1129 (9th Cir. 1996). Because Plaintiff must allege 2 with at least some degree of particularity overt acts by specific defendants which support the 3 claims, vague and conclusory allegations fail to satisfy this standard. Additionally, it is 4 impossible for the Court to conduct the screening required by law when the allegations are vague 5 and conclusory. 6 7 I. PLAINTIFF’S ALLEGATIONS 8 Plaintiff names the following as defendants: (1) Macdonald, a correctional officer 9 at California State Prison, Sacramento (CSP-Sac); (2) Vang, a correctional officer at CSP-Sac; 10 and (3) Buckley, a correctional officer at CSP-Sac. ECF No. 1, pg. 2. To help further identify 11 Defendants, Plaintiff provides that Macdonald has the third watch in building three (3); Buckley 12 has the second watch in building five (5), floor number two (2), facility A, post 221052; and 13 Vang has second watch in control building three (3). See id. at 5. Plaintiff alleges facts giving 14 rise to one claim against each of the three Defendants for violating the Eighth Amendment’s 15 Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause—though Plaintiff does not mention the Eighth 16 Amendment. See id. at 3-5. 17 Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants abused Plaintiff “by bio molecular 18 passage ‘AI’ capabilities, awaking me at night with simulation of violent nightmares, 19 pornography, actual touching, enabled by activation by ceiling lights and electronic devices, 20 Bluetooth capabilities, and diodes (placed in food) used to incite, influence and coerce IEX 21 behavior (indecent exposure).” Id. at 3. Defendants performed “actual touching” of Plaintiff’s 22 groin. See id. at 5. Defendants’ “abuse of computer science literacy” led to Plaintiff being placed 23 in segregation on July 23, 2021, and subjected Plaintiff to “psychological terrorism.” See id. at 3. 24 Plaintiff “would like to be compensated for ‘unwilling’ ingestion” of drugs used by Defendants 25 and for the ongoing abuse. See id. Plaintiff seems to accuse each of the Defendants for all the 26 abuses listed above. See id. at 1-5. Plaintiff does not accuse any one particular Defendant of any 27 one particular act. See id. at 1-5. 28 / / / 1 II. DISCUSSION 2 The Court finds Plaintiff’s complaint suffers from one primary defect. Plaintiff’s 3 claim fails to sufficiently link the conduct of any particular named defendant to a specific 4 constitutional or statutory violation. 5 To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the plaintiff must allege an actual 6 connection or link between the actions of the named defendants and the alleged deprivations. See 7 Monell v. Dep’t of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976). “A 8 person ‘subjects’ another to the deprivation of a constitutional right, within the meaning of 9 § 1983, if he does an affirmative act, participates in another's affirmative acts, or omits to perform 10 an act which he is legally required to do that causes the deprivation of which complaint is made.” 11 Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). Vague and conclusory allegations 12 concerning the involvement of official personnel in civil rights violations are not sufficient. See 13 Ivey v. Board of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). Rather, the plaintiff must set forth 14 specific facts as to each individual defendant’s causal role in the alleged constitutional 15 deprivation. See Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 634 (9th Cir. 1988). 16 Here, Plaintiff’s claim consistently references Defendants as a group. Where 17 Plaintiff does reference specific named defendants, he does not reference specific conduct of each 18 named defendants that would define an Eighth Amendment violation. Plaintiff will be provided 19 an opportunity to amend his claim to state which defendants took which specific action that 20 caused the violation. As to each named defendant, Plaintiff must allege which Defendant took 21 what action that caused which specific constitutional violation. 22 23 III. CONCLUSION 24 Because it is possible that the deficiencies identified in this order may be cured by 25 amending the complaint, Plaintiff is entitled to leave to amend prior to dismissal of the entire 26 action. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126, 1131 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). Plaintiff is 27 informed that, as a general rule, an amended complaint supersedes the original complaint. See 28 Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1262 (9th Cir. 1992). Thus, following dismissal with leave to 1 | amend, all claims alleged in the original complaint which are not alleged in the amended 2 | complaint are waived. See King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565, 567 (9th Cir. 1987). Therefore, if 3 | Plaintiff amends the complaint, the Court cannot refer to the prior pleading in order to make 4 | Plaintiff's amended complaint complete. See Local Rule 220. An amended complaint must be 5 | complete in itself without reference to any prior pleading. See id. 6 If Plaintiff chooses to amend the complaint, Plaintiff must demonstrate how the 7 | conditions complained of have resulted in a deprivation of Plaintiff's constitutional rights. See 8 | Ellis v. Cassidy, 625 F.2d 227 (9th Cir. 1980). The complaint must allege in specific terms how 9 || each named defendant is involved, and must set forth some affirmative link or connection 10 || between each defendant’s actions and the claimed deprivation. See May v. Enomoto, 633 F.2d 11 | 164, 167 (9th Cir. 1980); Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). 12 Finally, Plaintiff is warned that failure to file an amended complaint within the 13 | time provided in this order may be grounds for dismissal of this action. See Ferdik, 963 F.2d at 14 | 1260-61; see also Local Rule 110. Plaintiff is also warned that a complaint which fails to comply 15 | with Rule 8 may, in the Court’s discretion, be dismissed with prejudice pursuant to Rule 41(b). 16 | See Nevijel v. North Coast Life Ins. Co., 651 F.2d 671, 673 (9th Cir. 1981). 17 Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: 18 1. Plaintiffs original complaint is dismissed with leave to amend; and 19 2. Plaintiff shall file a first amended complaint within 30 days of the date of 20 || service of this order. 21 22 | Dated: October 5, 2021 Sx