(PC) Ramnanan v. Holmes ( 2021 )

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 ANDRE RAMNANAN, No. 2:21-cv-1113 KJN P 12 Plaintiff, 13 v. ORDER 14 B. HOLMES, et al., 15 Defendants. 16 17 Plaintiff is a state prisoner, proceeding pro se. Plaintiff seeks relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 18 § 1983. Plaintiff paid the filing fee. This proceeding was referred to this court by Local Rule 302 19 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). As discussed below, plaintiff’s complaint is dismissed with 20 leave to amend. 21 Screening Standards 22 The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a 23 governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The 24 court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner raised claims that are legally 25 “frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek 26 monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2). 27 A claim is legally frivolous when it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact. 28 Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989); Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1227-28 (9th 1 Cir. 1984). The court may, therefore, dismiss a claim as frivolous when it is based on an 2 indisputably meritless legal theory or where the factual contentions are clearly baseless. Neitzke, 3 490 U.S. at 327. The critical inquiry is whether a constitutional claim, however inartfully 4 pleaded, has an arguable legal and factual basis. See Jackson v. Arizona, 885 F.2d 639, 640 (9th 5 Cir. 1989), superseded by statute as stated in Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130-31 (9th Cir. 6 2000) (“[A] judge may dismiss [in forma pauperis] claims which are based on indisputably 7 meritless legal theories or whose factual contentions are clearly baseless.”); Franklin, 745 F.2d at 8 1227. 9 Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure “requires only ‘a short and plain 10 statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,’ in order to ‘give the 11 defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Bell Atlantic 12 Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). 13 In order to survive dismissal for failure to state a claim, a complaint must contain more than “a 14 formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action;” it must contain factual allegations 15 sufficient “to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atlantic, 550 U.S. at 555. 16 However, “[s]pecific facts are not necessary; the statement [of facts] need only ‘give the 17 defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Erickson v. 18 Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (quoting Bell Atlantic, 550 U.S. at 555, citations and internal 19 quotations marks omitted). In reviewing a complaint under this standard, the court must accept as 20 true the allegations of the complaint in question, Erickson, 551 U.S. at 93, and construe the 21 pleading in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 22 (1974), overruled on other grounds, Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183 (1984). 23 Plaintiff’s Complaint 24 Plaintiff sues eleven peace officers and one John Doe employed at Mule Creek State 25 Prison in 2019. Plaintiff claims that on July 2, 2019, defendant Calloway “instituted an 26 underground regulation upon plaintiff,” using the California Code of Regulations, Title 15. (ECF 27 No. 1 at 10.) When plaintiff inquired about the regulation, defendant Calloway “threatened” to 28 cite the regulation in the Rules Violation Report. Plaintiff responded that it did not matter 1 because he will file a 602 appeal in response because plaintiff was not breaking any rule. 2 Defendant issued plaintiff “an RVR 128-B Counseling Chrono” in retaliation for plaintiff 3 questioning the validity of Calloway’s actions. On July 9, 2019, plaintiff appealed Calloway’s 4 actions. Defendant Briniger upheld Calloway’s actions on July 29, 2019, in the first level 5 response. In subsequent reviews, defendants Costa, Cantu, Best and Holmes also upheld 6 Calloway’s actions. 7 On August 13, 2019, defendant Briniger heard an RVR authored by defendant Calloway 8 which plaintiff claims was in relation to the 602 appeal that defendant Briniger had denied at the 9 first level of review. Plaintiff objected that Briniger hearing the RVR was a conflict in light of his 10 role at the first level of review; Briniger disagreed and continued hearing the RVR. Plaintiff filed 11 a 602 appeal based on the alleged conflict, and defendants Campbell, Costa, Cantu, Holmes, and 12 Green, upheld Briniger’s actions or failed to take steps to rectify the situation. 13 On August 13, 2019, defendant Jenkins falsified an RVR against plaintiff in retaliation for 14 seeking redress against defendant Calloway based on the initial underground regulation issue on 15 July 7, 2019. On September 10, 2019, defendant Elston was the hearing officer conducting the 16 hearing on the August 13, 2019 RVR, and told plaintiff that “If you make trouble for my staff, I 17 will bury you,” and “I will never go against my staff, ever!” (ECF No. 1 at 15.) On September 18 19, 2019, plaintiff filed a 602 appeal about the September 10, 2019 disciplinary hearing. 19 Subsequently, defendants Green and Holmes reviewed and upheld Elston’s actions by denying 20 plaintiff’s appeals. 21 On August 9, 2019, plaintiff filed a staff complaint against defendant Calloway based on 22 Calloway’s conduct on July 2, 2019. Defendant White, AGPA, rejected plaintiff’s claim citing 23 time constraints. Plaintiff resubmitted the staff complaint, which defendant White cancelled. 24 On August 13, 2019, plaintiff submitted a staff complaint related to the falsifying of 25 documents on July 26, 2019, and on September 9, 2019, defendant White screened out and 26 rejected the complaint. (ECF No. 1 at 16.) Plaintiff resubmitted the complaint, but defendant 27 White rejected it again. On September 11, 2019, plaintiff filed a 602 appeal to CCII M. Johnston, 28 alleging “Greenwall tactics and code of silence” used to discourage plaintiff from obtaining relief. 1 On September 18, 2019, defendant White erroneously screened out plaintiff’s complaint. 2 On September 12, 2019, plaintiff submitted another staff complaint to appeals coordinator 3 Johnston, which was screened out and rejected by defendant White, who appended a copy of the 4 August 9, 2019 staff complaint which was rejected by defendant Lt. John Doe on September 9, 5 2019, and again on September 27, 2019. (ECF No. 1 at 17.) 6 In his cause of action, plaintiff claims that defendants initiated and perpetuated a 7 conspiracy through the use of underground regulations and the enforcement of a code of silence 8 to dissuade plaintiff from seeking relief. (ECF No. 1 at 18.) Plaintiff claims that defendant peace 9 officers acted in concert to violate plaintiff’s First, Fifth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment 10 rights, as well as various sections of the California Constitution. (ECF No. 1 at 19.) In addition, 11 defendant Elston verbally threatened plaintiff and “engaged in the code of silence and campaign 12 of calculated harassment.” (ECF No. 1 at 19.) Plaintiff claims that defendants’ actions chilled 13 plaintiff’s First Amendment rights and caused him to think twice before pursuing a complaint 14 against defendants. 15 Plaintiff also alleges that defendants Holmes, Cantu and Costa are responsible for the 16 training and actions of their subordinates and have a duty to act upon being made aware of their 17 subordinates’ misconduct. (ECF No. 1 at 20.) Further, he claims that defendants deprived 18 plaintiff of his substantive due process rights by targeting plaintiff and falsifying rules violation 19 reports to punish plaintiff for seeking redress. 20 Plaintiff seeks, inter alia, money damages, and an order expunging any rules violation 21 reports authored or addressed by defendants. (ECF No. 1 at 21.) 22 Discussion 23 Defendants Involved in Appeals Review 24 Most of the defendants named in plaintiff’s complaint were solely involved in reviewing 25 plaintiff’s 602 appeals. Prisoners do not have a “separate constitutional entitlement to a specific 26 prison grievance procedure.” Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 860 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing Mann 27 v. Adams, 855 F.2d 639, 640 (9th Cir.1988)). Even the lack of, or the failure of prison officials to 28 properly implement, an administrative appeals process within the prison does not raise 1 constitutional concerns. Mann, 855 F.2d at 640. Thus, prison officials’ actions in responding to 2 plaintiff’s grievances cannot give rise to any claims for relief under § 1983 for violation of due 3 process. “[A prison] grievance procedure is a procedural right only, it does not confer any 4 substantive right upon the inmates.” Buckley v. Barlow, 997 F.2d 494, 495 (8th Cir. 1993) 5 (citing Azeez v. DeRobertis, 568 F. Supp. 8, 10 (N.D. Ill. 1982)); see also Ramirez, 334 F.3d at 6 860 (no liberty interest in processing of appeals because no entitlement to a specific grievance 7 procedure); Massey v. Helman, 259 F.3d 641, 647 (7th Cir. 2001) (existence of grievance 8 procedure confers no liberty interest on prisoner); Mann, 855 F.2d at 640. “Hence, it does not 9 give rise to a protected liberty interest requiring the procedural protections envisioned by the 10 Fourteenth Amendment.” Azeez, 568 F. Supp. at 10; Spencer v. Moore, 638 F. Supp. 315, 316 11 (E.D. Mo. 1986). 12 “Liability under § 1983 must be based on active unconstitutional behavior and cannot be 13 based upon a ‘mere failure to act.’” Stocker v. Warden, 2009 WL 981323 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 13, 14 2009) (quoting Shehee v. Luttrell, 199 F.3d 295, 300 (6th Cir. 1999). Where a defendant’s only 15 involvement in the allegedly unconstitutional conduct is the denial of administrative grievances, 16 the failure to intervene on a prisoner’s behalf to remedy alleged unconstitutional behavior does 17 not amount to active unconstitutional behavior for purposes of § 1983. Perkins v. Cal. Dep’t of 18 Corr. & Rehab., 2010 WL 3853276 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 30, 2010) (citing Shehee, 199 F.3d at 300); 19 see also Stocker, 2009 WL 981323, at *10.1 20 //// 21 1 In the context of medical claims, some district courts have disagreed, at least regarding Eighth 22 Amendment complaints against medically-trained officers who deny appeals requesting specific care. See, e.g., Coleman v. Adams, 2010 WL 2572534 (E.D. Cal. June 22, 2010); Arreola v. 23 Dudley, 2010 WL 3033806 (E.D. Cal. July 30, 2010); Herrera v. Hall, 2010 WL 2791586 *4 (E.D. Cal. July 14, 2010). Such courts have generally reasoned that, although Ramirez and 24 Mann prohibit due process claims regarding the handling of appeals, they “do not touch upon whether an appeal reviewer’s actions can be considered ‘cruel and unusual’ within the 25 meaning of the Eighth Amendment.” Coleman, 2010 WL 2572534, at *7. In Coleman, the district court reasoned that the plaintiff’s reference to his administrative appeal (in that case, 26 for a request for a lower bunk and pain medication needed to treat previous injuries) “merely bolsters his allegation that supervisory personnel had actual awareness of the risk to plaintiff’s 27 safety.” Id. Although plaintiff refers to the Eighth Amendment, he alleges no facts claiming that any defendant was deliberately indifferent to plaintiff’s serious medical needs, or a risk to 28 plaintiff’s safety. 1 False Charges 2 Plaintiff alleges that defendant Jenkins falsified the charges brought against plaintiff in the 3 RVR. Plaintiff does not attempt to state an independent cause of action on this basis, and he 4 could not. Allegedly false statements by a correctional officer do not violate an inmate’s 5 constitutional rights and cannot, based on alleged falsity alone, support a claim under 42 U.S.C. 6 § 1983. See Buckley v. Gomez, 36 F. Supp. 2d 1216, 1222 (S.D. Cal. 1997) (prisoners have no 7 constitutional right to be free from wrongfully issued disciplinary reports), aff’d without opinion, 8 168 F.3d 498 (9th Cir. 1999); accord, Sprouse v. Babcock, 870 F.2d 450, 452 (8th Cir. 1989); 9 Freeman v. Rideout, 808 F.2d 949, 951 (2nd Cir. 1986); Hanrahan v. Lane, 747 F.2d 1137, 1141 10 (7th Cir. 1984). As long as prison disciplinary charges are supported by “some evidence,” due 11 process is satisfied. Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 454 (1985). 12 Verbal Harassment 13 Similarly, allegations of harassment and embarrassment are not cognizable under section 14 1983. Rutledge v. Arizona Bd. of Regents, 660 F.2d 1345, 1353 (9th Cir. 1981), aff’d sub nom. 15 Kush v. Rutledge, 460 U.S. 719 (1983); see also Franklin v. Oregon, 662 F.2d 1337, 1344 (9th 16 Cir.1982) (allegations of harassment with regards to medical problems not cognizable); 17 Ellingburg v. Lucas, 518 F.2d 1196, 1197 (8th Cir. 1975) (Arkansas state prisoner does not have 18 cause of action under § 1983 for being called obscene name by prison employee); Batton v. North 19 Carolina, 501 F.Supp. 1173, 1180 (E.D. N.C. 1980) (mere verbal abuse by prison officials does 20 not state claim under § 1983). Thus, to the extent plaintiff alleges defendant Elston’s comment 21 “If you make trouble for my staff, I will bury you,” subjected plaintiff to verbal harassment, such 22 allegation fails to state a cognizable civil rights claim. 23 Retaliation 24 It is unclear whether plaintiff can state a cognizable retaliation claim against a particular 25 defendant. 26 Prisoners have a First Amendment right to file prison grievances and retaliation against 27 prisoners for exercising this right is a constitutional violation. Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 28 566 (9th Cir. 2005); Bruce v. Ylst, 351 F.3d 1283, 1288 (9th Cir. 2003). A claim for First 1 Amendment retaliation in the prison context requires: (1) that a state actor took some adverse 2 action against the plaintiff (2) because of (3) the plaintiff’s protected conduct, and that such 3 action (4) chilled the plaintiff’s exercise of his First Amendment rights, and (5) “the action did 4 not reasonably advance a legitimate correctional goal.” Rhodes, 408 F.3d at 567-68; Brodheim v. 5 Cry, 584 F.3d 1262, 1269 (9th Cir. 2009). 6 To prove the second element, retaliatory motive, plaintiff must show that his protected 7 activities were a “substantial” or “motivating” factor behind the defendant’s challenged conduct. 8 Brodheim v. Cry, 584 F.3d 1262, 1269, 1271 (9th Cir. 2009). Plaintiff must provide direct or 9 circumstantial evidence of defendant’s alleged retaliatory motive; mere speculation is not 10 sufficient. See McCollum v. CDCR, 647 F.3d 870, 882-83 (9th Cir. 2011); accord, Wood v. 11 Yordy, 753 F.3d 899, 905 (9th Cir. 2014). In addition to demonstrating defendant’s knowledge 12 of plaintiff’s protected conduct, circumstantial evidence of motive may include: (1) proximity in 13 time between the protected conduct and the alleged retaliation; (2) defendant’s expressed 14 opposition to the protected conduct; and (3) other evidence showing that defendant’s reasons for 15 the challenged action were false or pretextual. McCollum, 647 F.3d at 882. 16 Plaintiff alleges that defendant Calloway issued plaintiff an “RVR 128-B Counseling 17 Chrono” in retaliation for plaintiff questioning the validity of Calloway’s purported regulation 18 and engaging in a protected activity. But plaintiff’s allegations do not make the timing clear. 19 Plaintiff claims that on July 2, 2019, defendant Calloway “instituted an underground regulation 20 upon plaintiff.” (ECF No. 1 at 11.) Plaintiff then states he questioned defendant Calloway about 21 the regulation. If the document was filed before plaintiff questioned Calloway or informed 22 Calloway that plaintiff would be filing a grievance, the document could not have been filed 23 because of plaintiff’s claim he would file an appeal. Moreover, it is unclear whether the 24 document was a rules violation report or simply a counseling chrono. “[N]umerous courts within 25 the Ninth Circuit have concluded that informational and counseling chronos do not constitute 26 adverse actions.” Heilman v. Furster, 2018 WL 2588900, at *11 (C.D. Cal. May 1, 2018).2 27 2 The court explained its reasoning in finding that false custodial counseling chronos are not 28 adverse actions: “Defendants contend that the Villa and Furster Chronos cannot be considered 1 Because plaintiff did not describe the nature of the “RVR 128-B Counseling Chrono,” or provide 2 a copy of the document, the court is unable to discern whether plaintiff sustained a rules violation 3 report, or a counseling chrono. Plaintiff is granted leave to file an amended complaint in which 4 he should address each element of a retaliation claim as to defendant Calloway. 5 Challenges to Rules Violation Reports 6 It is unclear whether plaintiff contends that his procedural due process rights were violated 7 in a particular disciplinary proceeding. Plaintiff is advised that “[p]rison disciplinary proceedings 8 are not part of a criminal prosecution, and the full panoply of rights due a defendant in such 9 proceedings does not apply.” Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556 (1974). Rather, for 10 disciplinary proceedings that include the loss of good time credits, Wolff established that an 11 inmate must receive (1) twenty-four-hour advanced written notice of the charges against him, id. 12 at 563-64; (2) “a written statement by the factfinders as to the evidence relied on and reasons for 13 the disciplinary action,” id. at 564 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); (3) an 14 opportunity to call witnesses and present documentary evidence where doing so “will not be 15 unduly hazardous to institutional safety or correctional goals,” id. at 566; (4) assistance at the 16 hearing if he is illiterate or if the matter is complex, id. at 570; and (5) a sufficiently impartial fact 17 finder, id. at 570-71. As long as the five minimum Wolff requirements are met in a prison 18 disciplinary proceeding, due process has been satisfied. Walker v. Sumner, 14 F.3d 1415, 1420 19 (9th Cir. 1994), overruled on other grounds by Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 483-84 (1995). 20 //// 21 “adverse actions”; nor would they chill a person of ordinary firmness. (Mot. at 21-23.) This argument is also well-taken. As defendants assert, a CDCR 128-A counseling chrono is issued 22 when “minor misconduct recurs after verbal counseling or if documentation of minor misconduct 23 is needed.” Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3312(a)(2); In re Perez, 7 Cal. App. 5th 65, 75 (2016), as modified on denial of reh’g (Jan. 4, 2017). A CDCR 128-B general chrono is used to document 24 information about inmate behavior. Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3000; In re Cabrera, 216 Cal. App. 4th 1522, 1526 n.4 (2013). The regulations do not require that any action be taken as a result of a 25 counseling or informational chrono. See Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, §§ 3000, 3312. Nor do the Villa and Furster Chronos, in particular, require that any actions be taken against plaintiff, although 26 they do express concern about plaintiff’s future conduct. By contrast, an RVR results in 27 disciplinary proceedings being instituted against the inmate. See id., § 3312(a)(3) (setting forth procedure for instituting disciplinary proceedings via RVR).” Heilman, 2018 WL 2588900 at 28 *10. 1 Conspiracy 2 Plaintiff alleges that all of the defendants were engaged in a conspiracy to enforce a code 3 of silence and engage in a campaign of harassment. 4 To state a claim for conspiracy under section 1983, plaintiff must show the existence of an 5 agreement or a meeting of the minds to violate his constitutional rights, and an actual deprivation 6 of those constitutional rights. Avalos v. Baca, 596 F.3d 583, 592 (9th Cir. 2010); Franklin v. Fox, 7 312 F.3d 423, 441 (9th Cir. 2001). “[T]o state a claim for conspiracy under § 1985, a plaintiff 8 must first have a cognizable claim under § 1983.” Olsen v. Idaho State Bd. of Med., 363 F.3d 9 916, 930 (9th Cir. 2004) (citation omitted). 10 Plaintiff’s conspiracy claim fails for several reasons. First, a “campaign of harassment’ is 11 not a cognizable basis for a constitutional claim. Second, plaintiff’s complaint fails to state a 12 cognizable civil rights violation. Third, plaintiff’s complaint is devoid of facts demonstrating the 13 existence of a conspiracy, and conclusory allegations are insufficient. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556- 14 57; See also Gilbrook v. City of Westminster, 177 F.3d 839, 856-57 (9th Cir. 1999); Margolis v. 15 Ryan, 140 F.3d 850, 853 (9th Cir. 1998) (to state claim for conspiracy under § 1983, plaintiff 16 must allege facts showing an agreement among the alleged conspirators to deprive him of his 17 rights); Karim-Panahi v. Los Angeles Police Dep’t., 839 F.2d 621, 626 (9th Cir. 1988) (“A mere 18 allegation of conspiracy without factual specificity is insufficient.” (citations omitted)). Plaintiff 19 makes general, conclusory allegations that the defendants, in taking all of the alleged actions, 20 were doing so in the furtherance of some conspiracy. Plaintiff must plead the basic elements of a 21 civil conspiracy: an agreement and concerted action amongst the defendants in the furtherance of 22 that agreement, and that each defendant conspired to violate plaintiff's constitutional rights. See 23 also Kendall v. Visa U.S.A., Inc., 518 F.3d 1042, 1047 (9th Cir. 2008) (noting that a bare 24 allegation of a conspiracy is almost impossible to defend against where numerous individuals are 25 concerned). 26 Leave to Amend 27 The court finds the allegations in plaintiff’s complaint so vague and conclusory that it is 28 unable to determine whether the current action is frivolous or fails to state a claim for relief. The 1 court determines that the complaint does not contain a short and plain statement as required by 2 Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Although the Federal Rules adopt a flexible pleading policy, a complaint 3 must give fair notice and state the elements of the claim plainly and succinctly. Jones v. Cmty. 4 Redev. Agency, 733 F.2d 646, 649 (9th Cir. 1984). Plaintiff must allege with at least some 5 degree of particularity overt acts which defendants engaged in that support plaintiff’s claim. Id. 6 Because plaintiff failed to comply with the requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), the complaint 7 must be dismissed. The court will, however, grant leave to file an amended complaint. 8 If plaintiff chooses to amend the complaint, plaintiff must demonstrate how the conditions 9 about which he complains resulted in a deprivation of plaintiff’s constitutional rights. See, e.g., 10 West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). Also, the complaint must allege in specific terms how 11 each named defendant is involved. Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 371 (1976). There can be no 12 liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 unless there is some affirmative link or connection between a 13 defendant’s actions and the claimed deprivation. Rizzo, 423 U.S. at 371; May v. Enomoto, 633 14 F.2d 164, 167 (9th Cir. 1980). Furthermore, vague and conclusory allegations of official 15 participation in civil rights violations are not sufficient. Ivey v. Bd. of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 16 268 (9th Cir. 1982). 17 A plaintiff may properly assert multiple claims against a single defendant. Fed. Rule Civ. 18 P. 18. In addition, a plaintiff may join multiple defendants in one action where “any right to relief 19 is asserted against them jointly, severally, or in the alternative with respect to or arising out of the 20 same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions and occurrences” and “any question of law 21 or fact common to all defendants will arise in the action.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 20(a)(2). Unrelated 22 claims against different defendants must be pursued in separate lawsuits. See George v. Smith, 23 507 F.3d 605, 607 (7th Cir. 2007). This rule is intended “not only to prevent the sort of morass [a 24 multiple claim, multiple defendant] suit produce[s], but also to ensure that prisoners pay the 25 required filing fees -- for the Prison Litigation Reform Act limits to 3 the number of frivolous 26 suits or appeals that any prisoner may file without prepayment of the required fees. 28 U.S.C. 27 § 1915(g).” George, 507 F.3d at 607. 28 //// ] In addition, plaintiff is informed that the court cannot refer to a prior pleading in order to 2 | make plaintiff's amended complaint complete. Local Rule 220 requires that an amended 3 || complaint be complete in itself without reference to any prior pleading. This requirement exists 4 || because, as a general rule, an amended complaint supersedes the original complaint. See Ramirez 5 || v. County of San Bernardino, 806 F.3d 1002, 1008 (9th Cir. 2015) (“an ‘amended complaint 6 || supersedes the original, the latter being treated thereafter as non-existent.’” (internal citation 7 || omitted)). Once plaintiff files an amended complaint, the original pleading no longer serves any 8 | function in the case. Therefore, in an amended complaint, as in an original complaint, each claim 9 || and the involvement of each defendant must be sufficiently alleged. 10 In accordance with the above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: 11 1. Plaintiff's complaint is dismissed. 12 2. Within thirty days from the date of this order, plaintiff shall complete the attached 13 || Notice of Amendment and submit the following documents to the court: 14 a. The completed Notice of Amendment; and 15 b. An original of the Amended Complaint. 16 || Plaintiff's amended complaint shall comply with the requirements of the Civil Rights Act, the 17 || Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and the Local Rules of Practice. The amended complaint must 18 || also bear the docket number assigned to this case and must be labeled “Amended Complaint.” 19 Failure to file an amended complaint in accordance with this order may result in the 20 || dismissal of this action. 21 | Dated: October 7, 2021 2 Aectl Aharon omni. UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 24 25 26 27 28 1] 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 ANDRE RAMNANAN, No. 2:21-cv-1113 KJN P 11 Plaintiff, 12 v. NOTICE OF AMENDMENT 13 B. HOLMES, et al., 14 Defendants. 15 16 Plaintiff hereby submits the following document in compliance with the court’s order 17 filed______________. 18 _____________ Amended Complaint DATED: 19 20 ________________________________ Plaintiff 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28