Lull v. County of Sacramento ( 2021 )

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 Christopher Lull and Autotek, Inc., No. 2:20-cv-01646-KJM-CKD 12 Plaintiffs, ORDER 13 v. County of Sacramento, et al., 15 Defendants. 16 17 This action is the fourth of four related cases brought by plaintiffs Christopher Lull and 18 | Autotek, the first of which is now closed: (1) Lull v. County of Sacramento, No. 16-cv-01093 19 | (E.D. Cal. filed May 20, 2016 closed July 20, 2020) (“Lull P’); (2) Lull v. County of Sacramento, 20 | No. 20-cv-00165 (E.D. Cal. filed Jan. 22, 2020) (“Lull IT’); (3) Lull v. County of Sacramento, No. 21 | 20-cv-1645 (E.D. Cal. filed Aug. 17, 2020) (“Lull IIT’); and (4) Lull v. County of Sacramento, 22 | No. 20-cv-1646 (E.D. Cal. filed Aug. 17, 2020) (“Lull IV’). Defendants County of Sacramento 23 | and several of its individual officers! move to dismiss. Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 6. The matter 24 | is fully briefed and the court submitted it without a hearing. The court grants the motion to 25 | dismiss without leave to amend because, as explained below, this action is duplicative. ' The defendant officers are Ben Lamera, Robin Rasmussen, Laura Jacobson, Jessica Brandt, Leighann Moffitt, Greg Stowe and Diana Ruiz. 1 I. BACKGROUND 2 The court has described the parties’ dispute in several previous orders. To summarize 3 briefly, Autotek provides automotive smog check services. Compl. ¶ 5, ECF No. 1. Lull is its 4 majority shareholder. Id. Autotek is located on a commercial property in Antelope, California, 5 which Lull also owns. Id. ¶¶ 5, 10; see Lull I, Order (July 27, 2017) at 2, ECF No. 31. Autotek 6 has been a tenant of the same Antelope property since 2011. See Compl. ¶ 10. In 2010, Autotek 7 obtained a license from the County of Sacramento to conduct business at the Antelope property. 8 Id. ¶ 14. The parties’ dispute first reached this court in 2016, in the case identified here as Lull I. 9 See Lull I, Second Am. Compl., ECF No. 35. 10 While Lull I was pending, plaintiff filed Lull II. Lull II, First Am. Compl. (“FAC”) ¶¶ 15– 11 16, ECF No. 6; see also Related Case Order (Feb. 12, 2020), ECF No. 86. Mr. Lull is the only 12 plaintiff in Lull II, whereas both he and Autotek are the plaintiffs in the other three actions. In 13 Lull II, Lull alleges the County retaliated against him after he “directly criticized” the County’s 14 polices “for over 10 years in public forums.” Id. ¶ 11. 15 Plaintiffs then filed Lull III. It is not relevant for present purposes. 16 In this lawsuit, Lull IV, plaintiffs allege the County improperly revoked plaintiffs’ 17 business license, which plaintiffs “relied upon” to conduct business. Compl. ¶¶ 14–15. Shortly 18 after plaintiffs filed their complaint in this action, the County moved to dismiss the case as 19 duplicative of Lull II. See Mot. Dismiss at 2, ECF No. 6. Later, in an August 2021 joint status 20 report, the parties proposed a stipulation to stay this proceeding until the resolution of Lull II. Jt. 21 Status Report at 3, ECF No. 24. Rather than stay the case, the court considers whether this action 22 duplicates Lull II, in fulfilling its obligation to “secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive 23 determination of” this action. Fed. R. Civ. P. 1. 24 II. DISCUSSION 25 “Plaintiffs generally have ‘no right to maintain two separate actions involving the same 26 subject matter at the same time in the same court and against the same defendant.” Adams v. Cal. 27 Dep’t of Health Servs., 487 F.3d 684, 688 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Walton v. Eaton Corp., 28 563 F.2d 66, 70 (3d Cir. 1977)), overruled on other grounds by Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880 1 (2008). District courts may therefore dismiss duplicative actions. Id. Dismissal of duplicative 2 lawsuits, rather than consolidation or a stay, “is favored because it ‘promotes judicial economy 3 and the comprehensive disposition of litigation.’” Jensen v. Secorp Indus., No. 19-07980, 2019 4 WL 8064603, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 9, 2019) (quoting Adams, 487 F.3d at 692). To determine 5 whether a suit is duplicative, courts examine whether the “causes of action and relief sought, as 6 well as the parties or privies to the action, are the same.” Adams, 487 F.3d at 689. 7 Courts use the transaction test to determine whether the claims and relief sought are the 8 same. See In re JPMorgan Chase Deriv. Litig., 263 F. Supp. 3d 920, 939 (E.D. Cal. 2017). 9 “Claims in the second suit are barred if they are based on ‘any part of the transaction, or series of 10 connected transactions, out of which the [prior] action arose.’” Id. at 940 (quoting Whole 11 Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2340 (2016)). This test does not require the 12 claims and legal theories be identical; rather, the question is whether the two suits arise out of the 13 “same transaction nucleus of facts.” Costantini v. Trans World Airlines, 681 F.2d 1199, 1202 14 (9th Cir. 1982). 15 Here, plaintiffs’ claims satisfy the transaction test. They derive from the same 16 transactional nucleus of facts: the County’s denial of plaintiffs’ business license. Compare 17 generally Lull II, FAC with Lull IV, Compl. Each claim in Lull IV is in fact identical to a claim in 18 Lull II: 19  In Lull II, plaintiff Lull alleges nine claims arising from the denial of the business 20 license: First Amendment retaliation for “illegitimate revocations” of the business 21 license, Lull II, FAC ¶¶ 28–32; violation of substantive due process because he 22 was deprived of “his right to devote his property to legitimate uses and chosen 23 profession as a commercial landlord,” id. ¶¶ 33–41; violation of equal protection 24 because he was “singled out” and “stripped of his substantive [p]roperty 25 entitlements,” id. ¶¶ 42–46; violation of procedural due process because he was 26 deprived of “his right to devote his [p]roperty to legitimate use[],” id. ¶¶ 47–49; 27 excessive fines for the “seizure” of his property, which “extinguished all essential 28 tenancy and income derived from that tenancy,” id. ¶¶ 50–52; unreasonable 1 seizure because “[d]efendants executed an expedient process that seized dominion 2 and control” of plaintiff’s property, id. ¶¶ 53–55; conspiracy to obstruct justice 3 because defendants “enacted a unsanctioned [sic] and clandestine task force” to 4 seize Lull’s property, id. ¶¶ 56–64; violation of the California Bane Act because 5 defendants “used threats, intimidation and coercion . . . in doing the acts described 6 herein,” id. ¶¶ 66–69; and intentional infliction of emotional distress because 7 defendants’ actions were “outrageous, extreme and intentionally designed to vex 8 and harass [p]laintiff,” id. ¶¶ 70–71. 9  In Lull IV, plaintiffs repeat seven of these claims: First Amendment retaliation for 10 “shutting down their [b]usiness,” Lull IV, Compl. ¶¶ 29–33; violation of 11 substantive due process because defendants “intentionally cause[d] the destruction 12 of the [b]usiness and hinder[ed] the use of the [p]roperty,” id. ¶¶ 34–41; violation 13 of equal protection because plaintiffs “have been singled out” by defendants’ 14 revocation of their business license, id. ¶¶ 42–46; unreasonable seizure of property 15 because defendants “seized dominion and control of [p]laintiffs [sic] business 16 without permission,” id. ¶¶ 47–50; conspiracy to obstruct justice because 17 defendants “enacted a unsanctioned [sic] and clandestine task force” to seize Lull’s 18 property, id. ¶¶ 51–60; violation of the California Bane Act because defendants 19 “used intimidation and coercion” against Lull, id. ¶¶ 61–63; and intentional 20 infliction of emotional distress because defendants’ actions were “outrageous, 21 extreme and intentionally designed to vex and harass [p]laintiff,” id. ¶¶ 64–65. 22 The party in Lull II is also in privity with the parties in Lull IV. “Privity is a legal 23 conclusion designating a person so identified in interest with a party to former litigation that he 24 represents precisely the same right in respect to the subject matter involved.” Headwaters Inc. v. 25 U.S. Forest Service, 399 F.3d 1047, 1052–53 (9th Cir. 2005) (citations and quotation marks 26 omitted). Parties in certain legal relationships are in privity, including corporations and their 27 officers or shareholders. Id. at 1053. Here, although Autotek was not a party to Lull II, it is in 28 ///// 1 privity with plaintiff Lull, who is its majority shareholder, Lull IV, Compl. ¶ 5. Accordingly, the 2 parties in the two actions are effectively the same. 3 In sum, Lull IV arises from the same facts as Lull II, includes the same claims as Lull II, 4 and is brought by parties who are in privity with the plaintiff in Lull II. The actions are 5 duplicative. Lull IV is dismissed. Leave to amend is denied to prevent unfair prejudice to the 6 defendants and further wasteful litigation. Plaintiffs are cautioned that the filing of additional 7 duplicative actions may result in sanctions, including summary dismissal and monetary sanctions. 8 III. CONCLUSION 9 This action is dismissed without leave to amend. 10 This order resolves ECF No. 6 and closes the case. 11 IT IS SO ORDERED. 12 DATED: November 1, 2021.