(PC) Melton v. CDCR ( 2021 )

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 JAMES ANDREW MELTON, Case No. 2:21-cv-00833-JDP (PC) 12 Plaintiff, FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS THAT DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO 13 v. DISMISS BE GRANTED 14 CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF ECF No. 7 CORRECTION AND 15 REHABILITATION, et al., OBJECTIONS DUE WITHIN FOURTEEN DAYS 16 Defendants. 17 18 Plaintiff, a former state prisoner proceeding with counsel, brings this civil rights action 19 against California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitations; Giselle Matteson, the warden 20 of California State Prison Solano County; and correctional officers Petersen and O’Faire.1 He 21 alleges that in March 2020, while he was incarcerated at CSP-Solano County, Petersen and 22 O’Faire were supervising inmates working in one of the prison’s buildings. The inmates 23 allegedly ran an extension cord through the middle of the room without placing yellow warning 24 cones around the cord. Plaintiff, who is disabled and uses a cane to walk, caught his foot on the 25 cord, fell, and injured his rotator cuff. Despite submitting a request for medical treatment later 26 1 This action was originally commenced in Sacramento County Superior Court. The 27 complaint’s caption identifies one of the defendants as “Correctional Officer Petersen,” but in the body of the complaint that defendant’s name is spelled “Peterson.” ECF No. 1 at 4, 7. To avoid 28 confusion, this order will utilize the spelling contained in the complaint’s caption. 1 that day, plaintiff allegedly did not receive treatment until he was transferred to a county jail two 2 days later. 3 The complaint alleges federal claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the Americans with 4 Disabilities Act, and the Rehabilitation Act, as well as various state law claims. Defendants have 5 filed a motion to dismiss. I recommend that defendants’ motion be granted, plaintiff’s federal 6 claims be dismissed with leave to amend, and the court decline to exercise supplemental 7 jurisdiction over plaintiff’s state law claims. 8 Motion to Dismiss Standard 9 A motion to dismiss brought under Rule 12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of a claim, and 10 granting the motion is proper if there is no cognizable legal theory of liability or if insufficient 11 facts are alleged to support a cognizable theory. See Conservation Force v. Salazar, 646 F.3d 12 1240, 1241-42 (9th Cir. 2011). A court’s review is generally limited to the operative pleading. 13 See Daniels-Hall v. Nat’l Educ. Ass’n, 629 F.3d 992, 998 (9th Cir. 2010). A pleading is sufficient 14 under Rule 8(a)(2) if it contains “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader 15 is entitled to relief” that gives “the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds 16 upon which it rests.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. 17 Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). To survive a motion to dismiss, a plaintiff must allege “enough 18 facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. at 570. A claim has “facial 19 plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable 20 inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 21 662, 678 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). 22 Analysis 23 A. Section 1983 Claims 24 Defendants first argue that California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation 25 (“CDCR”) is entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity on plaintiff’s § 1983 claims. ECF No. 26 7-1 at 1. Plaintiff contends that CDCR waived its immunity by removing this case to this court. 27 ECF No. 8 at 4. 28 1 Although plaintiff is correct that CDCR waived Eleventh Amendment immunity by 2 removing this case, see Lapides v. Board of Regents of University System of Georgia, 535 U.S. 3 613, 617 (2002), he still cannot maintain his § 1983 claims against CDCR. A section 1983 claim 4 for monetary damages can only be brought against a person acting under color of state law, and a 5 state and its entities are not persons for purposes of section 1983. Id.; Will v. Michigan Dept. of 6 State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 64 (1989); Bank of Lake Tahoe v. Bank of America, 318 F.3d 914, 918 7 (9th Cir. 2003). Because plaintiff seeks only monetary damages, his section 1983 claims against 8 CDCR must be dismissed. 9 As for the section 1983 claims against Matteson, Petersen, and O’Faire, defendants argue 10 that these claims must be dismissed because the complaint does not allege that these defendants 11 participated in the alleged violation of plaintiff’s civil rights. ECF No. 7-1 at 10-11. To state a 12 claim under section 1983, a plaintiff must allege that a defendant acting under color of state law 13 caused an deprivation of a right secured by federal law. Soo Park v. Thompson, 851 F.3d 910, 14 921 (9th Cir. 2017). Accordingly, a supervisory defendant is liable under section 1983 only if the 15 supervisor (1) personally participated in the deprivation of constitutional rights or directed the 16 violations or (2) knew of the violations and failed to act to prevent them. Hansen v. Black, 885 17 F.2d 642, 646 (9th Cir. 1989); Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989). 18 The only allegation concerning defendant Matteson is that she was the acting warden at 19 the time of the injury. ECF No. 1 at 5. And plaintiff’s sole allegation regarding O’Faire and 20 Petersen is that they supervised the inmates working in the room where plaintiff was injured. Id. 21 at 7. These allegations do not show that the individual defendants participated in, or knew of but 22 failed to prevent, a violation of plaintiff’s constitutional rights. I therefore recommend that 23 plaintiff’s section 1983 claims be dismissed with leave to amend. 24 B. ADA and Rehabilitation Act Claims 25 Defendants also argue that the complaint lacks sufficient factual allegations to state claims 26 under the ADA and Rehabilitation Act. ECF No. 7-1 at 13-15. Both Title II of the ADA and 27 § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act require plaintiff to show that he was excluded from participation 28 in, or denied benefits of, a public entity’s programs or activities by reason of his disability. Duval 1 v. Cnty. of Kitsap, 260 F.3d 1124, 1135 (9th Cir. 2001). 2 Plaintiff’s ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims are based solely on his conclusory 3 allegations that defendants denied him “the benefits of the services, programs, and activities, of 4 the CDCR medical care facility [and] the mental health facilities” because of his disability. ECF 5 No. 1 at 16. Such vague allegations fail to show that plaintiff was subjected to discrimination 6 based on a disability. Accordingly, his ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims should also be 7 dismissed with leave to amend. 8 C. State Law Claims. 9 Plaintiff’s remaining claims are for violations of various state laws. The complaint does 10 not establish diversity of the parties and, as discussed above, plaintiff has yet to allege a 11 cognizable federal claim. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1332; see also Bautista v. Pan Am. World 12 Airlines, Inc., 828 F.2d 546, 552 (9th Cir. 1987) (holding that the complaint must specifically 13 allege diverse citizenship of all parties to invoke diversity jurisdiction). Consequently, there is no 14 basis for exercising supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiff’s state law claims, and those claims 15 must be dismissed. See Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 n.7. (1988) (“[I]n the 16 usual case in which all federal-law claims are eliminated before trial, the balance of factors to be 17 considered under the pendent jurisdiction doctrine-judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and 18 comity-will point toward declining to exercise jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims.”); 19 United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966) (“Needless decisions of state law 20 should be avoided both as a matter of comity and to promote justice between the parties, by 21 procuring for them a surer-footed reading of the applicable law.”). Accordingly, plaintiff’s state 22 law claims must also be dismissed. 23 Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED that the Clerk of Court shall randomly assign a 24 United States District Judge to this case. 25 Further, it is RECOMMENDED that: 26 1. Defendant’s motion to dismiss, ECF No. 7, be granted. 27 2. Plaintiff’s complaint, ECF No. 1 at 4-16, be dismissed with leave to amend. 28 3. Plaintiff be granted thirty days from any order adopting these findings and 1 || recommendations to file an amended complaint. 2 These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge 3 | assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Within fourteen days of 4 | being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written objections with 5 | the court. Such a document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and 6 | Recommendations.” Any response to the objections shall be served and filed within fourteen 7 | days of service of the objections. The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the 8 | specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. See Turner vy. Duncan, 9 | 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998); Martinez v. Yist, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991). 10 Wl IT IS SO ORDERED. 12 ( 4 ie — Dated: _ November 2, 2021 Q_—_—. 13 JEREMY D. PETERSON 4 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28