(HC) Williams v. Pallares ( 2021 )

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 TANISHIA SAVANNAH WILLIAMS, No. 2:20-cv-01519 JAM GGH P 12 Petitioner, 13 v. FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATIONS 14 MICHAEL PALLARES, Acting Warden, 15 Respondent. 16 17 Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding in pro se with a petition for writ of habeas corpus 18 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Pending before the court is petitioner’s motion to stay this action 19 pending exhaustion of her state court remedies. ECF No. 25. 20 Motion to Stay 21 A district court may properly stay a habeas petition and hold it in abeyance pursuant to 22 Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269 (2005). See King v. Ryan, 564 F.3d 1133, 1135 (9th Cir. 2009). 23 Under Rhines, a district court may stay a mixed petition to allow a petitioner to present an 24 unexhausted claim to the state courts. Rhines, 544 U.S. at 277. Assuming the petition itself has 25 been timely filed, such a stay “eliminates entirely any limitations issue with regard to the 26 originally unexhausted claims, as the claims remain pending in federal court[.]” King, 564 F.3d at 27 1140. A petitioner qualifies for a stay under Rhines so long as (1) good cause is shown for a 28 failure to have first exhausted the claims in state court; (2) the claim or claims at issue potentially 1 have merit; and (3) there has been no indication that petitioner has been intentionally dilatory in 2 pursuing the litigation. Rhines, 544 U.S. at 277-78. What constitutes good cause has not been 3 precisely defined except to indicate at the outer end that petitioner must not have engaged in 4 purposeful dilatory tactics, Rhines, 544 U.S. at 277- 78, and that “extraordinary circumstances” 5 need not be found. Jackson v. Roe, 425 F.3d 654, 661-662 (9th Cir. 2005); see also Rhines, 544 6 U.S. at 279 (Stevens, J., concurring) (the “good cause” requirement should not be read “to impose 7 the sort of strict and inflexible requirement that would trap the unwary pro se prisoner”) (internal 8 citation omitted); id. (Souter, J., concurring) (pro se habeas petitioners do not come well trained 9 to address tricky exhaustion determinations). “But as the Jackson court recognized, we must 10 interpret whether a petitioner has “good cause” for a failure to exhaust in light of the Supreme 11 Court’s instruction in Rhines that the district court should only stay mixed petitions in ‘limited 12 circumstances.’ We also must be mindful that AEDPA aims to encourage the finality of sentences 13 and to encourage petitioners to exhaust their claims in state court before filing in federal court.” 14 Wooten v. Kirkland, 540 F.3d 1019, 1023-24 (9th Cir. 2008), quoting Jackson, 425 F.3d at 661) 15 (internal citations omitted). 16 In her motion, petitioner states the COVID-19 pandemic greatly impacted her ability to 17 receive “any court paperwork” from prison and that there was no “attempt to locate [petitioner] at 18 the Shasta County Jail” where she was located the past 13 months. ECF No. 25-1 at 1. Petitioner 19 attests during this time, petitioner did not have counsel and as a result was not told about “due 20 dates or to sign any court documents that [she] had to submit.” Id. at 2. Petitioner further states 21 she “had no knowledge about any court activities or proceedings going on” and that her “learning 22 disability” makes it “really hard for [her] to express things.” Id. For these reasons, petitioner 23 requests this court to grant her stay. Id. 24 Petitioner has not established grounds for a stay under Rhines. Petitioner has not shown 25 good cause for her failure to fully exhaust her claims in state court. Petitioner provides bare 26 assertions in her motion and does not provide this court with sufficient reasoning as to why she 27 did not present her claims to the California Supreme Court prior to filing in federal court. “Good 28 cause turns on whether the petitioner can set forth a reasonable excuse, supported by sufficient 1 evidence, to justify that failure.” Blake v. Baker, 745 F.3d 977, 982 (9th Cir. 2014). Here, the 2 court does not find a stay is proper. See Wooten, 540 F.3d at 1024 (Pursuant to the United States 3 Supreme Court instruction in Rhines, a district court should only stay petitions in “limited 4 circumstances.”) Based on the present motion, the undersigned recommends this motion be 5 denied and the habeas petition be dismissed for failure to exhaust state court remedies. 6 Motion for Appointment of Counsel 7 Petitioner has requested the appointment of counsel. ECF Nos. 27, 30). There currently 8 exists no absolute right to appointment of counsel in habeas proceedings. See Nevius v. Sumner, 9 105 F.3d 453, 460 (9th Cir. 1996). However, 18 U.S.C. § 3006A authorizes the appointment of 10 counsel at any stage of the case “if the interests of justice so require.” See Rule 8(c), Fed. R. 11 Governing § 2254 Cases. In the present case, the court does not find that the interests of justice 12 would be served by the appointment of counsel at the present time. 13 IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that petitioner’s requests for appointment of counsel (ECF 14 Nos. 27, 30) is denied. 15 Furthermore, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that: 16 1. Petitioner’s motion to stay and hold the petition in abeyance (ECF No. 25) be denied; and 17 2. The habeas petition (ECF No. 1) be dismissed without prejudice for failure to fully 18 exhaust claims in state court. 19 These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge 20 assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Within fourteen days 21 after being served with these findings and recommendations, petitioner may file written 22 objections with the court. The document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge's 23 Findings and Recommendations.” Failure to file objections within the specified time may waive 24 the right to appeal the District Court's order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir.1991). 25 Dated: November 4, 2021 /s/ Gregory G. Hollows 26 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 27 28