McAdams v. El Dorado County ( 2021 )

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 | Brigitte McAdams, No. 2:20-cev-01290-KJM-KJN 12 Plaintiff, ORDER 13 v. El Dorado County, et al., 1S Defendants. 16 17 Plaintiff Brigitte McAdams brings this civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against 18 | El Dorado County and police officers M. French, B. Hellam and Sergeant Vissiere (collectively 19 | “defendants”), alleging excessive force and unlawful detention stemming from her arrest. See 20 | generally Compl., ECF No. 1. Defendants move to dismiss all claims as time-barred, among 21 | other reasons. See generally Mot. Dismiss, ECF No. 9. The matter is fully briefed. The court 22 | submitted the matter without a hearing. See Min. Order (July 7, 2021), ECF No. 13. The motion 23 | is granted without leave to amend. 24 | I. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS 25 On October 6, 2015, Officers French, Hellam and Vissiere arrested McAdams, handcuffed 26 | her behind her back, and pushed her into the back seat of a police patrol vehicle. Compl. {J 9-10, 27 | 12. McAdams asked the officers several times to loosen the handcuffs and told them she had 28 | preexisting medical conditions. /d. 10-11. The officers refused her request. /d. § 11. For two 1 hours, McAdams was held in the police vehicle, which was “overheated,” in 95-degree heat, 2 without air ventilation or water. Id. ¶ 12. After being detained in the car for that long, McAdams 3 suffered an episode of tachycardia and loss of consciousness. Id. ¶¶ 12–13. She experienced 4 dehydration, severe bruising and swelling in both wrists, as well as emotional distress. Id. ¶ 14. 5 The handcuffs had restricted McAdams’ blood flow, resulting in “permanent and non-reversible 6 nerve damage to both [her] hands and wrists.” Id. When one of three officers noticed McAdams 7 “slumped over” in the back seat of the police vehicle, the officer called an ambulance that then 8 took McAdams to a hospital. Id. ¶¶ 13–14. The next day, McAdams posted bail and was 9 released. Opp’n at 4,1 ECF No. 11. Several months later, on May 18, 2016, an El Dorado County 10 prosecutor filed criminal charges against McAdams based on incidents leading to her prior 11 arrest.2 Def. Req. J. Not. at 4, Ex. 1, ECF No. 14-1. After a jury trial in El Dorado County 12 Superior Court, the jury convicted McAdams on 5 counts of child abandonment on October 12, 13 2018. Id. at 7–10. 14 McAdams brings two § 1983 claims against defendants: excessive force and unreasonable 15 seizure, in violation of the Fourth Amendment, and unlawful detention, in violation of the 16 Fourteenth Amendment. Compl. ¶¶ 15–25. 17 II. LEGAL STANDARD 18 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) allows a defendant to attack a complaint for 19 failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. A motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. 20 P. 12(b)(6) is disfavored and rarely granted: “[a] complaint should not be dismissed unless it 21 appears beyond doubt that plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would 22 entitle him to relief.” Van Buskirk v. CNN, Inc., 284 F.3d 977, 980 (9th Cir. 2002) (citations 23 omitted). In deciding whether to grant a motion to dismiss, the court “accept[s] all factual 1 The court cites to pagination assigned by its CM/ECF system. 2 Defendants request the court take judicial notice of the criminal case record against McAdams in El Dorado County Superior Court. See Def. Req. J. Not., Ex. 1, ECF No. 14-1. Plaintiff did not file any opposition to this request. The court takes judicial notice of adjudicative facts in that record that are not subject to reasonable dispute, Fed. R. Evid. 201(b)(1), and grants 1 allegations of the complaint as true and draw[s] all reasonable inferences in favor of the 2 nonmoving party.” TwoRivers v. Lewis, 174 F.3d 987, 991 (9th Cir. 1999). “The court need not, 3 however, accept as true allegations that contradict matters properly subject to judicial notice or by 4 exhibit. Nor is the court required to accept as true allegations that are merely conclusory, 5 unwarranted deductions of fact, or unreasonable inferences.” Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors, 6 266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir. 2001) (citations omitted). For example, matters of public record may 7 be considered under Fed. R. Civ. P. 201, including pleadings, orders and other papers filed with 8 the court or records of administrative bodies. See Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 688 9 (9th Cir. 2001). Conclusions of law, conclusory allegations, unreasonable inferences, or 10 unwarranted deductions of fact need not be accepted. See Western Mining Council v. Watt, 11 643 F.2d 618, 624 (9th Cir. 1981). 12 “Where the facts and dates alleged in a complaint demonstrate that the complaint is 13 barred by the statute of limitations, a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) motion should be 14 granted.” Ritchie v. United States, 210 F. Supp. 2d 1120, 1123 (N.D. Cal. 2002). There is no 15 requirement, however, that affirmative defenses, including statutes of limitation, appear on the 16 face of the complaint. Hyatt Chalet Motels, Inc. v. Carpenters Local 1065, 430 F.2d 1119, 1120 17 (9th Cir. 1970). “When a motion to dismiss is based on the running of the statute of limitations, it 18 can be granted only if the assertions of the complaint, read with the required liberality, would not 19 permit the plaintiff to prove that the statute was tolled.” Jablon v. Dean Witter & Co., 20 614 F.2d 677, 682 (1980); see also TwoRivers, 174 F.3d at 991. 21 III. ANALYSIS 22 Defendants argue principally the court must dismiss McAdams’s civil rights claims 23 because they are time-barred. See Mem. P. & A. at 3–6, ECF No. 9. Because the court agrees as 24 explained below, it does not reach the merits of defendants’ alternative arguments. Because 25 § 1983 does not contain its own statute of limitations, “[f]ederal courts borrow from state law to 26 determine any applicable statute of limitations for § 1983 claims, including tolling provisions.” 27 Lockett v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 977 F.3d 737, 740 (9th Cir. 2020). For personal injury claims, 28 California’s statute of limitations period is two years. See Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 335.1 (“Two 1 years; actions for assault, battery or injury . . . caused by wrongful act or neglect.”). The two-year 2 statute of limitations begins to run “when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury 3 which is the basis of the action.” Olsen v. Idaho State Bd. of Med., 363 F.3d 916, 926 (9th Cir. 4 2004) (quoting TwoRivers v. Lewis, 174 F.3d 987, 991 (9th Cir.1999)). 5 Here, unless the statute of limitations was tolled after McAdams’s claims accrued, her 6 claims are barred by California’s two-year statute of limitations. “[F]ederal law determines when 7 a civil rights claim accrues.” Lukovsky v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 535 F.3d 1044, 1048 8 (9th Cir. 2008) (citations, emphasis omitted). Excessive force claims accrue on the date of the 9 arrest. Hill v. City of Los Angeles, No. 08-7689, 2009 WL 2601250, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 21, 10 2009). Here, McAdams’s claims accrued October 6, 2015, the date when she was arrested. See 11 Compl. ¶ 9. She filed this lawsuit on June 28, 2020, more than four and a half years after her 12 claims accrued. Id. at 1. 13 “State law governs the application of tolling doctrines.” Hill, 2009 WL 2601250, at *4. 14 California Government Code section 945.3 provides that the statute of limitations is tolled while 15 criminal charges are pending. Cal. Gov’t Code § 945.3 (“No person charged . . . [with] a criminal 16 offense may bring a civil action . . . against a peace officer or the public entity employing a peace 17 officer based upon conduct of the peace officer relating to the offense . . . while the charges 18 against the accused are pending before a superior court.”). The purpose behind the tolling 19 provision is to prohibit plaintiffs from using civil complaints as “bargaining chip[s] in plea 20 negotiations” or “discovery tools to probe the prosecution’s case.” Schmidlin v. City of Palo Alto, 21 157 Cal. App. 4th 728, 758 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007). 22 The parties dispute when and for how long the statute of limitations tolled. See Opp’n at 23 3–5; Reply at 2–3, ECF No. 14. McAdams argues the court must apply California’s 24 interpretation of section 945.3, as elucidated in Schmidlin, rather than the approach outlined by 25 the Ninth Circuit in Cabrera v. City of Huntington Park, 159 F.3d 374, 379–81 (9th Cir. 1998) 26 and Torres v. City of Santa Ana, 108 F.3d 224, 227 (9th Cir. 1997). See Opp’n at 3–5. The court 1 need not decide whether Cabrera and Torres remain good law in light of Schmidlin because 2 McAdams’s claims are untimely under both frameworks.3 3 In Cabrera and Torres, tolling begins the date an accusatory pleading is filed in a court 4 and ends the date the court enters its final disposition of the criminal charges. Cabrera, 159 F.3d 5 at 379–81; Torres, 108 F.3d at 227. Applying this approach here, tolling began on May 18, 2016, 6 when the state prosecutor filed a criminal complaint against McAdams, Def. Req. J. Not. at 4, and 7 ended on October 12, 2018, when the Superior Court adjudicated McAdams’s case, id. at 7–10. 8 The total time tolled is approximately 28 months4 plus 24 days. Because McAdams filed her 9 complaint 56 months plus 22 days after her claim accrued, even with tolling McAdams’ clock ran 10 slightly more than four months past the two-year statute of limitations and is untimely. 11 In Schmidlin, a period of tolling begins the date “the notice to appear [is] inferentially 12 served on defendant at the time of [her] release” and ends the date of “final disposition of the 13 charges,” 157 Cal. App. 4th at 758–61; see Brown v. Collins, No. 28-1418, 2020 WL 1957559, at 14 *6 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 27, 2020) (notice to appear is accusatory pleading). When the statute of 15 limitations is tolled by issuance of a notice to appear, the statute resumes running 25 days after 16 the initial arrest, assuming immediate release, if no criminal complaint is filed by then. 17 Schmidlin, 157 Cal. App. 4th at 758–61 (citing Cal. Penal Code § 853.6(e), providing a 18 prosecutor must file a complaint within 25 days from time of arrest). Under Schmidlin, tolling 19 began the day after McAdams’s arrest on October 7, 2015, when she was released with a notice to 20 appear. See Def. Req. J. Not. at 4. There are no allegations or judicially noticed facts showing a 21 prosecutor filed criminal charges against McAdams within the 25 days following her release. See 22 generally Compl.; Def. Req. J. Not. Therefore, the limitations clock resumed ticking on 23 October 31, 2015, twenty-five days after the October 7 arrest and continued to run through 24 May 18, 2016 when the prosecutor filed the criminal complaint against McAdams, for a total of 3 The Ninth Circuit has not revisited Cabrera and Torres, although it distinguished those cases in Jackson v. McMillen, 249 F. App’x 530, 531 (9th Cir. 2007). 4 Because McAdams did not miss the statute of limitations under any calculation by a mere day or days, the court provides the relevant time periods using total months as a basic measure of time plus any additional days. 1 | six months, 18 days, which were not tolled. Twenty-eight months plus 24 days were then tolled 2 | again, from May 18, 2016 to October 12, 2018 when the Superior Court adjudicated McAdams’s 3 | case. The clock started ticking again with the October 12 date until June 28, 2020 when 4 | McAdams filed this lawsuit, for 20 months, 16 days. Under this framework the statute of 5 | limitations ran for slightly more than 27 months. McAdams’s claims are untimely by 6 | approximately two months, nine days. 7 Accordingly, all of McAdams’s claims are time-barred by the applicable statute of 8 | limitations. The court dismisses the claims without leave to amend because amendment would be 9 | futile. See, e.g., Rutman Wine Co. v. E. & J. Gallo Winery, 829 F.2d 729, 738 (9th Cir. 1987). 10 | IV. CONCLUSION 11 The court grants defendants’ motion to dismiss without leave to amend. 12 This order resolves ECF No. 9. 13 IT IS SO ORDERED. 14 | DATED: December 21, 2021. CHIEF ED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE