R.H. v. City of Redding ( 2022 )

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 ----oo0oo---- 11 12 R.H., a minor, by and through No. 2:20-cv-01435 WBS DMC her guardian ad litem, Sheila 13 Brown; ESTATE OF ERIC JAY HAMES, by and through its personal 14 representative, Crystal Dunlap MEMORANDUM AND ORDER RE: Bennett, DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR 15 SUMMARY JUDGMENT Plaintiffs, 16 v. 17 CITY OF REDDING, a public 18 entity; JOE ROSSI, an individual; KIP KINNEAVY, an 19 individual; JAY GUTERDING, an individual; BRETT LEONARD, an 20 individual; and DOES 5 through 20 inclusive, 21 Defendants. 22 23 ----oo0oo---- 24 Plaintiffs R.H., a minor, by and through her guardian 25 ad litem, and the Estate of Eric Jay Hames, by and through its 26 personal representative, brought this action, alleging violations 27 of federal and state law, against the City of Redding (“the 28 1 City”), and City of Redding police officers Joe Rossi (“Rossi”), 2 Kip Kinneavy (“Kinneavy”), Jay Guterding (“Guterding”), and Brett 3 Leonard (“Leonard”). This suit arises from the fatal shooting of 4 Eric Hames by Rossi, Kinneavy, Guterding, and Leonard. The 5 complaint contains claims for: (1) excessive force in violation 6 of the Fourth Amendment, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, (2) unwarranted 7 interference with the right to familial association in violation 8 of the Fourteenth Amendment, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, (3) municipal 9 liability under Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 10 658 (1978),1 (4) battery, (5) violation of the Tom Bane Civil 11 Rights Act, Cal. Civ. Code § 52.1, and (6) negligence. Before 12 the court is the defendants’ motion for summary judgment. 13 (Docket No. 29.) 14 I. Factual Background 15 On August 27, 2018, Rossi was on patrol and heard a 16 call over the police radio about a man, later identified as 17 Hames, who was in the middle of the roadway obstructing traffic 18 at an intersection in Redding, California. (Pls.’ Resp. to 19 Defs.’ Statement of Undisputed Facts (“DSUF”) at No. 1 (Docket 20 No. 31); Defs.’ Resp. to Pls.’ Statement of Undisputed Facts 21 (“PSUF”) at No. 1 (Docket No. 35).) Dispatch services for the 22 police department had received multiple calls about Hames stating 23 he was “jumping in front of cars,” and “yelling and spitting on 24 passing vehicles.” (Decl. of Maria Nozzolino (“Nozzolino 25 Decl.”), Ex. A of Ex. D (Decl. of Chris Smyrnos) at 4. (Docket 26 1 In opposition to defendants’ motion, plaintiffs have 27 withdrawn their Monell liability claim against the City of Redding. (Pls.’ Opp’n at 16 (Docket No. 30).) Therefore, the 28 court will not address it in this order. 1 No. 29-3).) 2 Rossi arrived at the intersection and observed Hames 3 throw a glass bottle in the air, yell incomprehensibly, and take 4 a six-inch knife out from a sheath on his belt. (DSUF at No. 3; 5 PSUF at Nos. 2-3; Decl. of Neil Gehlawat (Gehlawat Decl.), Ex. C, 6 Video Summary of Subject Shooting (Docket No. 32).) Hames, 7 initially positioned closer to the passenger side of Rossi’s 8 patrol vehicle, moved no closer than 10 feet away from Rossi’s 9 driver side door. (PSUF at Nos. 4-5.) Over the PA system, Rossi 10 told Hames to put the knife down and Hames did not comply. (DSUF 11 at No. 5.) Rossi’s initial encounter with Hames lasted 12 approximately 30 seconds to one minute before Hames ran in the 13 direction of a nearby shopping center. (PSUF at No. 7.) 14 Rossi followed Hames in his patrol vehicle and 15 communicated over the dispatch radio, alerting other units that 16 Hames was armed with a knife and had fled into the shopping 17 center. (DSUF at No. 8; PSUF at No. 9.) Rossi encountered Hames 18 at the back of a Domino’s Pizza building alongside Larkspur Lane 19 and exited his patrol vehicle with his handgun drawn. (PSUF at 20 No. 10.) Guterding, Leonard, and Kinneavy arrived within seconds 21 and joined Rossi in a semi-circle around Hames, with their 22 handguns drawn, as Hames stood near two AC units at the back of 23 the building with his arms crossed and the knife in his hand. 24 (DSUF at No. 12; Gehlawat Decl., Ex. C.) Kinneavy turned back 25 and retrieved a shotgun from his nearby parked patrol vehicle. 26 (DSUF at No. 14; Gehlawat Decl., Ex. C.) 27 Rossi and Kinneavy gave Hames verbal commands to drop 28 the knife. (DSUF at No. 15.) Hames walked three steps from the 1 AC unit in the direction of Guterding, with the knife still in 2 his hand and his arms crossed. (See id. at No. 17; PSUF at No. 3 28; Gehlawat Decl., Exs. A and B, videos of shooting.) Rossi, 4 Guterding, Kinneavy, and Leonard shot Hames. (DSUF at Nos. 18- 5 21; Gehlawat Decl., Exs. A and B.) Rossi fired two or three 6 shots, Guterding fired three shots, Kinneavy fired four rounds 7 from his shotgun, and Leonard fired one shot. (PSUF at Nos. 14, 8 15, 34, 40.) 9 Hames was 23 feet, 10 inches from Guterding and more 10 than 15-20 feet from Leonard when he was shot, though the 11 officers’ recollections place Hames at a closer distance. 12 (Gehlawat Decl., Ex. C.; DSUF at Nos. 18-21.) Approximately 60 13 seconds passed from the time Rossi encountered Hames at the 14 Domino’s Pizza to the time he was shot. (Gehlawat Decl., Ex. C.) 15 II. Legal Standard 16 Summary judgment is proper “if the movant shows that 17 there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the 18 movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. 19 P. 56(a). The party moving for summary judgment bears the 20 initial burden of establishing the absence of a genuine issue of 21 material fact and can satisfy this burden by presenting evidence 22 that negates an essential element of the non-moving party’s case. 23 See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322–23 (1986). 24 Alternatively, the movant can demonstrate that the non-moving 25 party cannot provide evidence to support an essential element 26 upon which it will bear the burden of proof at trial. Id. If 27 the moving party has properly supported its motion, the burden 28 shifts to the non-moving party to set forth specific facts to 1 show that there is a genuine issue for trial. See id. at 324. 2 Any inferences drawn from the underlying facts must, however, be 3 viewed in the light most favorable to the party opposing the 4 motion. See Matsuhita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 5 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). 6 III. Qualified Immunity on Plaintiffs’ Federal Claims 7 In actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the doctrine 8 of qualified immunity “protects government officials ‘from 9 liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not 10 violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of 11 which a reasonable person would have known.’” Pearson v. 12 Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 13 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). Qualified “immunity protects all but 14 the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.” 15 White v. Pauly, 137 S. Ct. 548, 551 (2017) (quotations omitted). 16 The court has carefully reviewed the evidence submitted 17 by both parties, which includes video exhibits showing the 18 entirety of the encounter at multiple angles, depositions, and 19 expert reports. (See Gehlawat Decl., Exs. A-C.) Based on the 20 evidence and the existing case law, the court cannot conclude 21 that the officers’ acted in a manner that was “plainly 22 incompetent” or “knowingly violat[ing] the law.” See White, 137 23 S. Ct. at 551. 24 To determine whether an officer is entitled 25 to qualified immunity, the court considers: (1) whether there has 26 been a violation of a constitutional right; and (2) whether the 27 officers’ conduct violated “clearly established” federal 28 law. See Sharp v. Cnty. of Orange, 871 F.3d 901, 909 (9th Cir. 1 2017) (citing Kirkpatrick v. Cnty. of Washoe, 843 F.3d 784, 788 2 (9th Cir. 2016)). The court has the discretion to decide which 3 prong of qualified immunity to address first and, if analysis of 4 one prong proves dispositive, the court need not analyze the 5 other. See Pearson, 555 U.S. at 236. Here, the court will 6 exercise its discretion to analyze the second prong first: 7 whether the officers’ conduct violated a clearly established 8 right. 9 The clearly established inquiry “serves the aim of 10 refining the legal standard and is solely a question of law for 11 the judge.” Tortu v. Las Vegas Metro. Police Dep’t, 556 F.3d 12 1075, 1085 (9th Cir. 2009). The Supreme Court has noted that the 13 law “does not require a case directly on point for a right to be 14 clearly established, [but] existing precedent must have placed 15 the statutory or constitutional question beyond debate.” White, 16 137 S. Ct. at 551 (quotations and citations omitted). 17 When determining whether the right at issue has been 18 clearly established, the court may not “define clearly 19 established law at a high level of generality.” See Kisela v. 20 Hughes, 138 S. Ct. 1148, 1152 (2018) (quoting Ashcroft v. Al- 21 Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 742 (2011)). Rather, “the clearly 22 established law at issue must be particularized to the facts of 23 the case.” White, 137 S. Ct. at 552. This is particularly 24 important in excessive force cases because “[i]t is sometimes 25 difficult for an officer to determine how the relevant legal 26 doctrine, here excessive force, will apply to the factual 27 situation the officer confronts.” Mullenix v. Luna, 136 S. Ct. 28 305, 308 (2015). 1 With the framework above in mind, the court analyzes 2 whether the law was clearly established such that reasonable 3 officers on August 27, 2018 would have known that the use of 4 deadly force is unreasonable against an armed suspect who was 5 acting erratically, had ignored commands, fled from an initial 6 encounter with an officer, moved toward an officer with a knife 7 in hand, and caused the officers to fear for their safety. 8 The case in which the court finds the circumstances to 9 be most analogous to those here is Kisela v. Hughes, 138 S. Ct. 10 1148 (2018). In Kisela, officers responded to reports of a woman 11 with a knife acting erratically in a neighborhood. Id. at 1151. 12 Upon arrival, the officers saw the suspect come out of the home 13 with a large kitchen knife, and stand within six feet, and 14 “striking distance,” of another woman. See id. at 1151, 1154. 15 There, as here, the suspect did not hold up the knife or run 16 toward anyone but ignored the officers’ orders to drop the 17 weapon. Id. at 1151. There, as here, the officers shot the 18 suspect within a minute of arriving on the scene. Id. The 19 Supreme Court reversed the district court’s denial of qualified 20 immunity because the law was not clearly established that the use 21 of deadly force in such a situation violated the decedent’s 22 constitutional rights. Id. at 1154-55. 23 Given the similarity to the facts in Kisela, decided 24 just four months prior to the incident here, the court concludes 25 that reasonable officers would not have been put on notice that 26 use of deadly force in the instant case was unreasonable. Though 27 the distance between Hames and the officers was greater than the 28 six feet in Kisela, there is no clearly established law from the 1 Ninth Circuit or the Supreme Court that establishes a minimum 2 distance between the suspect and the officers before they are 3 justified in using deadly force. 4 Courts do take the distance between the suspect and the 5 officers into account when evaluating the totality of the 6 circumstances. For example, although it was decided after the 7 incident in this case, in Ventura v. Rutledge, 978 F.3d 1088 (9th 8 Cir. 2020), the court concluded the officer was entitled to 9 qualified immunity where the officer shot a suspect who was 10-15 10 feet away. Id. at 1090. The officer had received domestic 11 violence related reports about the suspect and the suspect was 12 armed with a knife, ignoring commands, and advancing toward the 13 officer. Id. The court determined there was no clearly 14 established law demonstrating the officer’s use of deadly force 15 was unconstitutional. Id. at 1092. The 23 feet and 10 inches 16 between the officers and Hames is relatively close in range to 17 the distance in Ventura. Accord Buchanan v. City of San Jose, 18 782 F. App’x 589 (9th Cir. 2019) (holding officers did not use 19 excessive force when they shot a man armed with a knife who was 20 55 feet away and advancing toward the officers). 21 The court’s finding of qualified immunity is further 22 supported by Blanford v. Sacramento County, 406 F.3d 1110 (9th 23 Cir. 2005). Blanford involved a man whom officers, after 24 receiving several reports about, observed walking through a 25 neighborhood with a sword and behaving erratically. Blanford, 26 406 F.3d at 1112. As in the instant case, the man failed to heed 27 warnings or commands. See id. at 1112-13; (DSUF at No. 16.) The 28 man eventually tried to enter a home through the front door and 1 then through the backyard. Id. at 1113. Officers believed the 2 man posed an imminent threat to anyone that could be in the home 3 or the backyard, though he had never advanced toward the 4 officers. Id. The officers shot the man multiple times as he 5 tried to enter the home. Id. at 1113-14. Only later did the 6 officers learn that he was trying to enter his own home and did 7 not hear the officers because he had headphones in. Id. at 1112- 8 14. The Ninth Circuit concluded the use of deadly force did not 9 violate the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 1119. 10 Hames posed at least as much of a threat as the man in 11 Blanford. Hames had ignored multiple commands to drop his knife 12 and had fled from his initial encounter with Rossi. Unlike the 13 officers in Blanford who were uncertain if anyone was even in the 14 home when the man began to enter, here, the officers observed 15 Hames moving toward one of them with his knife. The 16 circumstances here could be viewed by a reasonable officer as 17 more threatening. 18 Plaintiffs bear the burden of “proving that the right 19 allegedly violated was clearly established at the time of the 20 official’s allegedly impermissible conduct.” Camarillo 21 v. McCarthy, 998 F.2d 638, 639 (9th Cir. 1993). Plaintiffs 22 primarily rely on three cases — Tennessee v. Garner, 105 S. Ct. 23 1694 (1985), Glenn v. Washington County, 673 F.3d 864 (9th Cir. 24 2011), and Espinosa v. City of San Francisco, 598 F.3d 528 (9th 25 Cir. 2010) — to further their argument against qualified 26 immunity. However, these cases are insufficient to put 27 reasonable officers in these circumstances on notice that their 28 conduct was violating clearly established law. 1 The leading case of Tennessee v. Garner simply sets out 2 the general proposition that when a law enforcement officer is 3 pursuing a fleeing suspect the officer may not use deadly force 4 unless the officer has probable cause to believe the suspect 5 poses a significant threat of death or serious physical injury to 6 the officer or others. Garner, 105 S. Ct. at 1697. It does not 7 speak to any set of circumstances similar to those presented in 8 this case. To the contrary, the facts here differ significantly 9 from the conduct the Supreme Court found to be unconstitutional 10 in Garner, which involved the shooting of a clearly unarmed 11 suspect in the back of the head while he was running away from 12 the officers. Id. 13 In Glenn, officers responded to a call from family 14 members and friends about an intoxicated, suicidal teenager 15 standing outside his home. Glenn, 673 F.3d at 867. The teen was 16 holding a pocketknife to his own neck and would not drop it, but 17 was not threatening anyone else. Id. at 873. While the teenager 18 stood still, one of the officers fired beanbag rounds at him. 19 Id. at 869. As he was being hit with the beanbag rounds, the 20 teenager took one or two steps toward the home, in which his 21 parents remained, and the officers fired 11 shots at him. Id. at 22 879. The Ninth Circuit reversed the grant of summary judgment 23 for the Glenn defendants and determined that there were material 24 questions of fact that precluded a conclusion that the force used 25 by the officers, the beanbag rounds and the deadly force, was 26 reasonable as a matter of law. Id. at 879-80. This case is 27 distinguishable from Glenn in that Hames was not a threat just to 28 himself, as the teen was in Glenn, but posed an immediate threat 1 to the officers. Hames was advancing toward Guterding with a 2 knife and not standing still like the teenager in Glenn. 3 Plaintiffs’ reliance on Espinosa is also insufficient. 4 In Espinosa, officers used deadly force in an attempt to make an 5 arrest of an unarmed suspect who was hiding in an attic and 6 resisting arrest when officers searched a home. Espinosa, 598 7 F.3d at 533. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s 8 denial of qualified immunity because there was evidence that the 9 officers’ initial entry into the premises violated the occupant’s 10 Fourth Amendment right and that such illegal entry provoked the 11 confrontation which resulted in the shooting. Id. at 539. Here, 12 unlike in Espinosa, there is no suggestion that the officers 13 improperly on the scene or that they did anything to provoke 14 Hames’ conduct, and they were not approaching an unarmed suspect, 15 rather one who was indisputably armed with a knife. 16 Even if the officers were mistaken about whether Hames 17 was going to harm them, the reasonableness inquiry recognizes 18 “that it is inevitable that law enforcement officials will in 19 some cases reasonably but mistakenly conclude” that their conduct 20 comports with the Constitution and thus shields officials from 21 liability when their mistake is reasonable. See Anderson v. 22 Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 641 (1987). Given the precedent 23 outlined above, the court concludes that at the time of the 24 shooting, a reasonable officer in these circumstances would not 25 have known that he was violating Hames’ constitutional rights. 26 To the contrary, clearly established law would signal to a 27 reasonable officer that it was permissible to use deadly force in 28 these circumstances. 1 Accordingly, the court will grant summary judgment to 2 defendants Rossi, Kinneavy, Guterding, and Leonard on the Fourth 3 and Fourteenth Amendment claims on the ground of qualified 4 immunity.2 5 IV. State Law Claims 6 Because the court will grant summary judgment for 7 defendants on plaintiffs’ federal claims, the court no longer has 8 federal question jurisdiction, and there is no suggestion that 9 there is diversity jurisdiction in this case. Federal courts 10 have “supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that are so 11 related to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction 12 that they form part of the same case or controversy under Article 13 III of the United States Constitution.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). A 14 district court “may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction 15 . . . [if] the district court has dismissed all claims over which 16 it has original jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. § 17 1367(c); see also Acri v. Varian Assocs., Inc., 114 F.3d 999, 18 1001 n.3 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc) (explaining that a district 19 court may decide sua sponte to decline to exercise supplemental 20 jurisdiction). 21 The Supreme Court has stated that “in the usual case in 22 which all federal-law claims are eliminated before trial, the 23 balance of factors to be considered under the pendent 24 jurisdiction doctrine – judicial economy, convenience, fairness 25 and comity – will point toward declining to exercise jurisdiction 26 2 Because the court determines the defendants are 27 entitled to qualified immunity based on the second prong of the analysis, it does not address whether plaintiffs’ constitutional 28 rights have been violated. 1 over the remaining state-law claims.” Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. 2 Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 n.7 (1988). 3 Here, comity strongly weighs in favor of declining to 4 exercise supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiffs’ state law 5 claims. The state courts are fully competent to adjudicate such 6 claims. Some of plaintiffs’ claims raise particularly complex 7 questions of state law, such as the Tom Bane Civil Rights Act, 8 which are better left for California courts to resolve. 9 As for judicial economy, plaintiffs’ state law claims 10 have not been the subject of any significant litigation in this 11 case, as this is the first instance in which the merits of 12 plaintiffs’ claims are being considered. Judicial economy does 13 not weigh in favor of exercising supplemental jurisdiction. And 14 finally, convenience and fairness do not weigh in favor of 15 exercising supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiffs’ remaining 16 state law claims. The federal and state fora are equally 17 convenient for the parties. There is no reason to doubt that the 18 state court will provide an equally fair adjudication of the 19 issues. There is nothing to prevent plaintiffs from refiling 20 their state law claims against defendants in state court, and any 21 additional cost or delay resulting therefrom should be minimal.3 22 Accordingly, the court declines to exercise supplemental 23 jurisdiction and will dismiss plaintiffs’ remaining state law 24 3 “[T]he period of limitations for any claim asserted 25 under [28 U.S.C. § 1367(a)], and for any other claim in the same action that is voluntarily dismissed at the same time or after 26 the dismissal of the claim under subsection (a), shall be tolled 27 while the claim is pending and for a period of 30 days after it is dismissed unless State law provides for a longer tolling 28 period.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(d). eee enn nee ene non nnn on on nnn nn nnn OO IS IE I 1 claims without prejudice to refiling in state court. 2 IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that defendants’ motion for 3 summary judgment (Docket No. 29) be, and the same hereby is, 4 GRANTED on the ground of qualified immunity on plaintiffs’ 5 federal claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against defendants Rossi, 6 Kinneavy, Guterding, and Leonard. 7 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiffs’ remaining state 8 law claims against defendants be, and the same hereby are, 9 DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE to refiling in state court. 10 The Clerk shall enter Judgment in favor of all 11 defendants in accordance with this Order. 12 | Dated: February 10, 2022 bette 2d. □□ 13 WILLIAM B. SHUBB UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 14