Alejandre v. County of San Joaquin ( 2019 )

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 ----oo0oo---- 11 12 CINDY M. ALEJANDRE; and DAVID No. 2:19-cv-233 WBS KJN GONZALEZ II, as co-successors- 13 in-interest to decedent David Gonzalez III, 14 MEMORANDUM AND ORDER RE: Plaintiffs, DEFENDANT COUNTY OF SAN 15 JOAQUIN’S MOTION TO DISMISS v. PLAINTIFFS’ FIRST AMENDED 16 COMPLAINT COUNTY OF SAN JOAQUIN, a 17 municipal corporation; and DOES 1-50, inclusive, individually 18 and in their official capacity as Sheriff’s Deputies for the 19 San Joaquin County Sheriff’s Department, 20 Defendants. 21 22 ----oo0oo---- 23 24 Plaintiffs Cindy M. Alejandre and David Gonzalez II 25 brought this survival and wrongful death action against the 26 County of San Joaquin (“the County”) and unidentified individual 27 defendants for their conduct in connection with the death of 28 David Gonzalez III. Before the court is the County’s motion to 1 dismiss plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint (“FAC”). (Docket No. 2 18.) 3 The court described much of the factual and procedural 4 background to this lawsuit in its prior order granting the 5 County’s motion to dismiss the original complaint. (Mem. & Order 6 Re: Mot. to Dismiss (“MTD Order”) (Docket No. 12).) The court 7 found that plaintiffs failed to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 8 1983 for municipal liability -- plaintiffs’ only claim against 9 the County. The court gave plaintiffs thirty days to file an 10 amended complaint and the affidavits needed to comply with 11 California Code of Civil Procedure § 377.32. (See id.) On July 12 3, 2019, plaintiffs filed the necessary affidavits and their FAC, 13 which alleges one cause of action against the County under 42 14 U.S.C. § 1983. (Docket No. 17.) The County again moves to 15 dismiss this cause of action. 16 A municipality may not be held liable under 42 U.S.C. § 17 1983, unless a policy, practice, or custom of the municipality is 18 “the moving force of the constitutional violation.” Monell v. 19 Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 694 20 (1978). Liability attaches for the municipality when a violation 21 of a federally protected right can be attributed to (1) an 22 official municipal policy,1 id.; (2) “a widespread practice that, 23 although not authorized by written law or express municipal 24 policy, is so permanent and well settled as to constitute a 25 custom or usage with the force of law,” City of St. Louis v. 26 Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 127 (1988) (citation and quotations 27 1 Plaintiffs do not argue for municipal liability based 28 on an official municipal policy. 1 omitted); (3) a decision made or ratified by a person with “final 2 policymaking authority,” id. at 123 & 127; or (4) inadequate 3 training or supervision that is deliberately indifferent to an 4 individual’s constitutional rights, City of Canton v. Harris, 489 5 U.S. 378, 389 (1989). 6 In their FAC, plaintiffs have not changed their 7 allegations from those in the original complaint with respect to 8 their ratification (compare FAC ¶¶ 18, 21, 29-30 & 60-67, with 9 Compl. ¶¶ 18, 21, 29-30 & 60-67 (Docket No. 1)) or inadequate 10 training or supervision (compare FAC ¶¶ 15, 21 & 63-64, with 11 Compl. ¶¶ 15, 21 & 63-64) theories of liability. Plaintiffs 12 modified their allegations as to their policy or custom theory 13 only superficially. (Compare FAC ¶¶ 63-64, with Compl. ¶¶ 63- 14 64.) These modifications did not substantively change the 15 factual basis for this theory of liability. The court therefore 16 finds that the FAC does not state a claim for municipal liability 17 under these three theories for the same reasons identified in the 18 court’s previous order. (See MTD Order at 5-10.)2 19 Because plaintiffs have failed to allege sufficient 20 facts for any theory of municipal liability, the court will 21 dismiss plaintiffs’ only cause of action against the County. 22 Further, because plaintiffs failed to meaningfully amend their 23 complaint notwithstanding the court’s prior order, the court 24 finds that further amendment would be futile. See Gompper v. 25 VISX, Inc., 298 F.3d 893, 898 (9th Cir. 2002). 26 2 Plaintiffs again ask this court to apply a relaxed 27 pleading standard and accept allegations that lack elaborate factual detail. The court rejects this argument for the same 28 reasons it did previously. (See id. at 9 n.3.) 1 IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED THAT the County’s Motion to 2 Dismiss (Docket No. 18) be, and the same hereby is, GRANTED. 3 Plaintiffs’ fourth cause of action as against the County is 4 DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. 5 | Dated: August 28, 2019 belt au~ th d._kE 6 WILLIAM B. SHUBB UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28