Williams Sports Rentals Inc. v. Willis ( 2019 )

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 10 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 11 12 WILLIAMS SPORTS RENTALS, INC., USCA NO. 19-72233 13 Plaintiff, No. 2:17-cv-00653-JAM-EFB 14 v. 15 MARIAN LATASHA WILLIS, U.S. DISTRICT COURT’S RESPONSE TO NINTH CIRCUIT’S INVITATION 16 Defendant. TO COMMENT ON CLAIMANT MARIAN WILLIS’S PETITION FOR A WRIT OF 17 MANDAMUS 18 19 In August 2016, Raeshon Williams drowned in South Lake Tahoe 20 after falling off the back of a jet ski. Seven months later, 21 Williams Sports Rentals (“WSR”)—the jet ski owner—filed a 22 complaint for exoneration from or limitation of liability in 23 federal court. Compl. for Exoneration (“Compl.”), ECF No. 1. 24 Pursuant to the Limitation of Liability Act, this court enjoined 25 all other proceedings “arising out of, consequent upon, or in 26 connection with” the August 13, 2016 incident. Order Approving 27 Stipulation of Value, ECF No. 11. 28 1 Williams’s mother, Marian Willis, filed (1) an answer to the 2 complaint, ECF No. 16; (2) a motion to lift the Court’s anti-suit 3 injunction, ECF No. 25; and (3) a counterclaim, ECF No. 17. The 4 Court denied Willis’s motion to lift the anti-suit injunction 5 from the bench. See Minutes (“Anti-suit Injunction Order”), ECF 6 No. 41. Willis appealed that ruling, ECF No. 43, and filed a 7 motion to stay the district court proceedings pending her appeal— 8 the Court also denied this motion. Order Denying Motion to Stay 9 (“Stay Order”), ECF No. 56. 10 Subsequently, the Court dismissed Willis’s counterclaims 11 with prejudice. Order Granting WSR’s MTD (“Dismissal Order”), 12 ECF No. 61. Willis appealed. ECF No. 62. Between her two 13 appeals, Willis sought appellate review of three of this Court’s 14 decisions: (1) the Anti-suit Injunction Order; (2) the Stay 15 Order; and (3) the Dismissal Order. 16 On April 25, 2018, the Ninth Circuit rendered its decision 17 with respect to Willis’s first appeal. USCA Order as to [ECF No. 18 43], ECF No. 67. The Court held: 19 A review of the record demonstrates that, on January 3, 2018, the district court entered final judgment 20 dismissing this action. The appeal of the judgment is pending in No. 18-15006. Consequently, this 21 preliminary injunction appeal is dismissed as moot. See Sec. and Exch. Comm’n v. Mount Vernon Mem’l Park, 22 664 F.2d 1358, 1361-62 (9th Cir. 1982). DISMISSED. 23 Id. at 2-3. The Ninth Circuit then issued the formal mandate on 24 that decision. ECF No. 78 (“The judgment of this Court, entered 25 April 25, 2018, takes effect this date.”). 26 One year later, the Ninth Circuit issued its order 27 purportedly addressing Willis’s appeal of the Dismissal Order. 28 USCA Memorandum as to [ECF No. 62], ECF No. 69. Willis had 1 argued this Court erred in (1) denying her motion to lift the 2 anti-suit injunction; (2) denying her motion for stay pending her 3 interlocutory appeal of that denial; and (3) dismissing her 4 wrongful death claim with prejudice. Id. at 2. The Court of 5 Appeals—despite previously dismissing Willis’s appeal of the 6 Anti-suit Injunction Order—found that this Court erred in failing 7 to conduct a prejudice inquiry when analyzing Willis’s motion to 8 dissolve the anti-suit injunction. Id. at 2-3. It also found 9 Willis’s appeal of the Stay Order was moot. Id. at 2. The Ninth 10 Circuit did not, however, address the propriety of this Court’s 11 dismissal of Willis’s claims. See generally id. 12 The parties returned to this Court in disagreement about the 13 exact scope of the Ninth Circuit’s ruling. WSR filed a motion 14 for exoneration from liability (“Mot.”). ECF No. 71. It argued 15 the Court of Appeals vacated and remanded the Anti-suit 16 injunction Order, not the Dismissal Order that had disposed of 17 Willis’s claims. Mot. at 2. WSR argued that, absent any pending 18 claims before the Court, (1) the Ninth Circuit’s remand on the 19 anti-suit injunction issue was moot, and (2) it was entitled to 20 exoneration of liability. Id. 21 Willis, however, interpreted the Ninth Circuit’s order as a 22 vacatur of both the Anti-suit Injunction Order and the Dismissal 23 Order. Opp’n to Mot. for Exoneration (“Opp’n”), ECF No. 74. She 24 argued that vacating the Dismissal Order placed her claims again 25 before the Court. And as such, Willis maintained the Court 26 needed to revisit her motion to dissolve the anti-suit injunction 27 and conduct the proper prejudice inquiry as the Ninth Circuit 28 required. Opp’n at 3-5, 10-12. 1 The Court held a hearing on WSR’s motion. There, it posed 2 the same questions to Willis that it now asks the Ninth Circuit: 3 1. Did the Ninth Circuit’s decision vacate both the 4 Dismissal Order and the Anti-suit Injunction Order? 5 2. Assuming the Ninth Circuit vacated both the Dismissal 6 Order and the Anti-suit Injunction Order, could this 7 Court conduct the limitation action concurrently with 8 the state court proceedings after dissolving the anti- 9 suit injunction? 10 3. Assuming the Ninth Circuit only vacated the Anti-suit 11 Injunction Order, how does Willis’s failure to state a 12 claim in federal court not render the anti-suit 13 injunction issue moot? 14 See Transcript of Proceedings held on 7/30/19 (“Tr.”) at 12:10- 15 23, 13:20-14:18. Unpersuaded by Willis’s response, the Court 16 concluded the Ninth Circuit only vacated its Anti-suit Injunction 17 Order. Absent any pending claims in the suit, the Court found 18 the Ninth Circuit’s remand to conduct a prejudice analysis was 19 moot and granted WSR’s motion for exoneration. 20 21 I. DISCUSSION 22 The Court welcomes any guidance the Ninth Circuit can 23 provide on its previous vacatur and remand. As do the parties. 24 See Tr. at 5:12-14, ECF No. 83 (“I will confess that it took me a 25 while to reach an understanding of the Ninth Circuit’s decision 26 as well.”). Only this much is clear from the memorandum: the 27 Ninth Circuit viewed this case as falling within the single- 28 claimant exception. See USCA Memorandum at 2. As the Ninth 1 Circuit explained, when this exception applies, a district court 2 must dissolve a LOLA injunction on state court proceedings unless 3 the vessel owner can show that dissolving the injunction would 4 prejudice his limitation right. See Lewis v. Lewis & Clark 5 Marine, 531 U.S. 438, 449 (2001); Newton v. Shipman, 718 F.2d 6 959, 961 (9th Cir. 1983) (per curiam). This Court admittedly 7 erred when it denied Willis’s motion to dissolve the LOLA 8 injunction without conducting an on-the-record prejudice 9 analysis. See generally Transcript of Proceedings held on 10 8/29/17, ECF No. 44. 11 Notwithstanding that error, it is unclear how the Anti-suit 12 Injunction Order remains a live issue following a valid dismissal 13 of Willis’s claims. Even if this Court reads the Ninth Circuit’s 14 decision as vacating the both the Anti-suit Injunction Order and 15 the Dismissal Order, it remains concerned about adjudicating a 16 moot issue. In this Court’s opinion, re-litigating Willis’s 17 motion to dissolve the LOLA injunction would give rise to three 18 possible scenarios. First, the Court could conduct a prejudice 19 inquiry and find that dissolving the anti-suit injunction would 20 prejudice WSR’s limitation right. In which case, the injunction 21 would remain. See Ex parte Green, 286 U.S. 437, 439-440 (1932). 22 WSR would undoubtedly file the same motion to dismiss it filed in 23 November 2017. This Court would issue the same order it issued 24 in December 2017. And all parties would be in the same position 25 they were before the appeal, less thousands of dollars in legal 26 fees. 27 Second, the Court could find that dissolving the anti-suit 28 injunction would not prejudice WSR’s limitation right. 1 Admittedly, Willis would then be entitled to proceed with her 2 claims against WSR in state court. Newton v. Shipman, 718 F.2d 3 959, 961-62 (9th Cir. 1983). But this Court could still proceed 4 with the limitation action in federal court. See id. at 963. As 5 in the first scenario, WSR would file a motion to dismiss and, 6 for the reasons discussed in its prior Dismissal Order, this 7 Court would have to grant it. WSR would take this order down to 8 Alameda County Superior Court and remove itself from the state 9 proceedings. See Stoll v. Gottlieb, 305 U.S. 165, 171-73(1938). 10 Again, none of the parties are made better off by this process. 11 Finally, the Court could find WSR would not be prejudiced by 12 the state court proceedings, dissolve the anti-suit injunction, 13 and stay the federal proceedings until the state litigation is 14 complete. See Newton, 718 F.2d at 963. This is Willis’s 15 preferred course of action, though it makes little sense to the 16 Court. Using this approach, WSR’s two-year-old limitation action 17 would lie in wait for several more years while the parties 18 litigated in state court. Assuming Willis prevails, this Court 19 would then resume the federal proceedings. Given Willis 20 stipulated to “waiv[ing] any res judicata or collateral estoppel 21 effect that an intervening jury trial might [] have on [the 22 limitation issues],” the parties would have to argue the 23 limitation action from scratch. See Stipulation on Remand, ECF 24 No. 73. WSR would file a motion to dismiss, and the Court would 25 grant it. The Court does not see the utility in engaging in such 26 a purely academic exercise. 27 At the July hearing and in its petition to the Ninth 28 Circuit, Willis argued this Court’s critical misstep was in 1 thinking that it would retain jurisdiction to adjudicate the 2 negligence prong of the limitation action if it dissolved the 3 anti-suit injunction. Tr. at 16:11-17, 17:7-18:3; Appellant’s 4 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (“Petition”) at 2-3, No. 19- 5 72233. Indeed, Willis’s counsel stated, in no uncertain terms, 6 the question of WSR’s liability “is not before this Court, should 7 have never been before this Court, and will not be before this 8 Court if I come back here.” Tr. 17:13-15. Willis largely relies 9 on Lewis v. Lewis & Clark Marine, Inc., 531 U.S. 438 (2001), Lake 10 Tankers v. Henn, 354 U.S. 147 (1957), and In re Tidewater, 249 11 F.3d 342 (5th Cir. 2001) for this position. Tr. at 15:10-20; 12 Petition at 2-3. But as this Court has already explained, it 13 does not read these cases the way Willis does. While these cases 14 include mandatory language about dissolving a LOLA injunction 15 absent a showing of prejudice when the single-claimant exception 16 applies, they do not indicate that a district court divests 17 itself of jurisdiction over the negligence phase of a limitation 18 action upon dissolving the injunction. See Lewis, 531 U.S. at 19 445 (“Thus, the saving to suitors clause preserves remedies and 20 the concurrent jurisdiction of state courts over some admiralty 21 and maritime claims.” (emphasis added)); Lake Tankers, 354 U.S. 22 at 153 (explaining that the single claimant exception would at 23 times subject a vessel owner to a “multiplicity of suits”). Nor 24 do these cases appear to “narrowly circumscribe” a district 25 court’s ability to proceed with a LOLA action concurrently with 26 state court proceedings. To the contrary, Newton, 718 F.3d at 27 963–another case upon which Willis relies—squarely counsels 28 against tying a district court’s hands this way. There, the 1 Ninth Circuit explained: 2 In remanding this case for further action by the district court, we offer some general guidance on how 3 the case might proceed. First it may be noted that admiralty practice incorporates the Federal Rules of 4 Civil Procedure which were drafted ‘to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every 5 actin.’ Fed. R. Civ. P. 1; Fed. R. Civ. P. Supp.R.A. advisory committee note. Useless formalities should 6 not inhibit the efficient administration of the court . . . . The district court should select the 7 most efficient manner of proceeding. 8 Id. 9 Each of the three scenarios discussed above ultimately lead 10 to the dismissal of Willis’s claim. That is because eventually— 11 be it now or in a few years—this Court must adjudicate WSR’s 12 limitation action. As the Ninth Circuit knows, limitation 13 actions proceed in two phases. First, the injured party must 14 show “what acts of negligence or conditions of unseaworthiness 15 caused the accident.” In re Hechinger, 802 F.2d 202, 207 (9th 16 Cir. 1989). If the claimant fails to make a showing of 17 negligence or unseaworthiness, the vessel owner is wholly 18 exonerated—“if no liability exists there is nothing to limit.” 19 Id. (quoting Northern Fishing Trading Co., Inc. v. Grabowski, 20 1973 A.M.C. 1283, 1290 (9th Cir. 1973)). Accordingly, although 21 the single-claimant exception allows Willis to try her wrongful 22 death and survival action claims before a jury in state court, 23 she must eventually still prove WSR’s negligence by a 24 preponderance of the evidence in federal court. Given that this 25 Court has previously found on two occasions that Willis failed to 26 set forth a negligence claim because she did not allege WSR owed 27 her son a duty of care, Willis cannot successfully defend against 28 WSR’s limitation action. See ECF Nos. 41, 61. Accordingly, this 1 Court’s finding that the anti-suit injunction issue is moot 2 should be affirmed by the Ninth Circuit. 3 4 Il. CONCLUSION 5 This Court granted WSR’s motion for exoneration based on its 6 finding that the anti-suit injunction issue was moot. The Court 7 stands by its ruling, but invites clarification from the Ninth 8 Circuit on its May 21, 2019 Memorandum, June 10, 2010 Mandate, or 9 any of its prior case law. 10 11 Dated: October 1, 2019 12 kA 13 Geren aaa pebrsacr 00k 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28