Mancilla v. County of Kern ( 2019 )

1 2 3 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 4 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 5 6 MARGARITA MANCILLA, et al., CASE NO. 1:19-CV-1309 AWI JLT 7 Plaintiffs ORDER ON DEFENDANTS’ MOTION 8 v. TO DISMISS 9 COUNTY OF KERN, et al., (Doc. No. 5) 10 Defendants 11 12 13 This is a civil rights dispute that arises from the removal of Plaintiff Margarita Mancilla’s 14 children from her home by agents of the Kern County Department of Human Services. Plaintiffs 15 brings three causes of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of the Fourth and Fourteenth 16 Amendments, as well as Monell liability. Defendants removed this case from the Kern County 17 Superior Court on September 19, 2019. Currently before the Court is Defendant’s Rule 12(b)(6) 18 motion to dismiss. Pursuant to the Local Rules, Plaintiffs have filed a notice of non-opposition. 19 For the reasons that follow, Defendants’ motion will be granted. 20 21 LEGAL FRAMEWORK 22 Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a claim may be dismissed because of the 23 plaintiff’s “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). A 24 dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) may be based on the lack of a cognizable legal theory or on the 25 absence of sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory. See Mollett v. Netflix, Inc., 26 795 F.3d 1062, 1065 (9th Cir. 2015). In reviewing a complaint under Rule 12(b)(6), all well- 27 pleaded allegations of material fact are taken as true and construed in the light most favorable to 28 the non-moving party. Kwan v. SanMedica, Int’l, 854 F.3d 1088, 1096 (9th Cir. 2017). However, 1 complaints that offer no more than “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the 2 elements of a cause of action will not do.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); Johnson 3 v. Federal Home Loan Mortg. Corp., 793 F.3d 1005, 1008 (9th Cir. 2015). To avoid a Rule 4 12(b)(6) dismissal, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a 5 claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Mollett, 795 F.3d at 1065. 6 7 DEFENDANTS’ MOTION 8 Parties’ Arguments 9 Defendants argue that the first cause of action for violation of the Fourth Amendment 10 identifies all Plaintiffs as pursuing the claim. However, while children who are removed from 11 their homes by social workers may pursue individual Fourth Amendment claims, parents may not. 12 Defendants also argue that Plaintiffs have sued Defendants Robin Ackling and Allyson 13 Seals in both their official and individual capacities. Because Kern County is a named Defendant, 14 suing these two individuals in their official capacities is redundant. 15 Finally, Defendants argue that the first and second causes of action are alleged against 16 Kern County. However, the County can only be held liable through Monell principles, not 17 vicariously. 18 Plaintiffs have filed a notice of non-opposition. See Doc. No. 6. 19 Discussion 20 1. Plaintiff Margarita Mancilla 21 Families have a “well-elaborated constitutional right to live together without governmental 22 interference.” Wallis v. Spencer, 202 F.3d 1126, 1136 (9th Cir. 2000). The Fourteenth 23 Amendment protects parents’ right to live with their children. Kirkpatrick v. County of Washoe, 24 843 F.3d 784, 789 (9th Cir. 2016). The claims of children who are taken into state custody are 25 evaluated under the Fourth Amendment’s right to be free from unreasonable seizures, rather than 26 the Fourteenth Amendment’s right to familial association. Keates v. Koile, 883 F.3d 1228, 1236 27 (9th Cir. 2018). Fourth Amendment rights are personal and cannot be asserted vicariously. 28 Plumhoff v. Rickard, 572 U.S. 765, 778 (2014); Longoria v. Pinal Cnty., 873 F.3d 699, 711 (9th 1 Cir. 2017). Whether under the Fourth Amendment, the Fourteenth Amendment, or the First 2 Amendment, the Constitution guarantees “that parents will not be separated from their children 3 without due process of law except in emergencies.” Keates, 883 F.3d at 1236 (quoting Mabe v. 4 San Bernardino Cnty., 237 F.3d 1101, 1107-08 (9th Cir. 2001)). 5 Plaintiffs’ non-opposition is a concession that parent Margarita Mancilla may not pursue a 6 Fourth Amendment claim that is based on Defendants removing her children from her home. 7 Therefore, the Court will dismiss the first cause of action brought by Margarita Mancilla without 8 leave to amend. See Keates, 883 F.3d at 1236; see also Kirkpatrick, 843 F.3d at 789. 9 2. Official Capacity Claims Against Allyson Seals and Robin Ackling 10 A suit against a governmental employee in her official capacity is really a suit against the 11 municipal entity employer. See Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166-67 (1985); Community 12 House, Inc. v. City of Boise, 623 F.3d 945, 966-67 (9th Cir. 2010). Here, the Complaint brings 13 claims against Defendants Seals and Ackling in their individual and official capacities. Because 14 Kern County is a defendant, naming Seals and Ackling as defendants in their official capacities is 15 unnecessary and redundant. Therefore, the claims against Seals and Ackling in their official 16 capacities will be dismissed without leave to amend.1 McFarland v. City of Clovis, 163 F.Supp.3d 17 798, 808 (E.D. Cal. 2016); Vance v. County of Santa Clara, 928 F.Supp. 993, 996 (N.D. Cal. 18 1996). 19 3. Entity Liability Under the First and Second Causes of Action 20 A municipality, “cannot be held liable solely because it employs a tortfeasor B or, in other 21 words, a municipality cannot be held liable under [42 U.S.C. ' 1983] under a respondeat superior 22 theory.” Monell, 436 U.S. at 691; Ulrich v. City & County of San Francisco, 308 F.3d 968, 984 23 (9th Cir. 2002). Liability only attaches where the municipality itself causes the constitutional 24 violation through “execution of a government=s policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers 25 or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy.” Monell, 436 U.S. 26 at 694; Ulrich, 308 F.3d at 984. 27 28 1 For clarity, the Court emphasizes that this dismissal does not affect the individual capacity claims against Seals and 1 Here, the first and second causes of action are alleged against Kern County, but a policy, 2 | custom, or practice is not alleged. However, express Monell theories are identified under the third 3 |cause of action. Given the allegations and the notice of non-opposition, the Court finds that no 4 | viable § 1983 claims are pled or intended to be pled under the first and second causes of action 5 against Kern County. Therefore, the first and second causes of action against Kern County will be 6 | dismissed without leave to amend. 7 8 ORDER 9 Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: 10 Plaintiff Margarita Mancilla’s first cause of action is DISMISSED without leave to amend; 11 The first and second causes of action against Defendant Kern County are DISMISSED 12 without leave to amend; 13 All claims against Defendant Ackling and Seals in their official capacities are 14 DISMISSED without leave to amend; and 15 Within fourteen (14) days of service of this order, Defendants shall file a response to 16 Plaintiffs’ Complaint. 17 18 IT IS SO ORDERED. 19 Dated: _ October 22, 2019 —= ZS Cb □□ — SENIOR DISTRICT JUDGE 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28