(PC) Beaton v. State of California ( 2019 )

1 2 3 4 5 6 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 8 9 PAUL NIVARD BEATON, Case No. 1:19-cv-00952-AWI-EPG (PC) 10 Plaintiff, FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS RECOMMENDING DISMISSAL OF 11 v. ACTION FOR FAILURE TO STATE A COGNIZABLE CLAIM AND, 12 STATE OF CALIFORNIA, ALTERNATIVELY, FOR FAILURE TO EXHAUST 13 et al., ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S 14 Defendants. MOTION TO SUPPLEMENT THE COMPLAINT 15 (ECF Nos. 1, 8) 16 OBJECTIONS, IF ANY, DUE WITHIN 17 THIRTY DAYS 18 Plaintiff, Paul Nivard Beaton, is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis 19 in this civil rights action filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Before the Court for screening is 20 Plaintiff’s Complaint, filed on July 12, 2019. (ECF No. 1.) Plaintiff alleges that Defendants have 21 placed false and inaccurate information in his prison medical records. Also before the Court is 22 Plaintiff’s motion on emergency grounds, filed on July 26, 2019 (ECF No. 8), which the Court 23 construes as a motion to supplement the complaint. The Court recommends that the Complaint 24 (ECF No. 1) and this action be dismissed for failure to exhaust and failure to state a cognizable 25 claim. The Court denies the motion to supplement the Complaint (ECF No. 8). 26 /// 27 28 /// 1 I. SCREENING REQUIREMENT 2 The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a 3 governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The 4 Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are 5 legally “frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or 6 that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. 7 § 1915A(b)(1), (2). As Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis (ECF No. 6), the Court may also 8 screen the complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915. “Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion 9 thereof, that may have been paid, the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court 10 determines that the action or appeal fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.” 28 11 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). 12 Pleadings of pro se plaintiffs “must be held to less stringent standards than formal 13 pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding that 14 pro se complaints should continue to be liberally construed after Iqbal). 15 II. SECTION 1983 16 The Civil Rights Act under which this action was filed provides: 17 Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to 18 be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities 19 secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.... 20 21 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 22 “[Section] 1983 ‘is not itself a source of substantive rights,’ but merely provides ‘a 23 method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.’” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 24 393-94 (1989) (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n.3 (1979)). 25 To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that (1) the defendant acted under 26 color of state law, and (2) the defendant deprived him of rights secured by the Constitution or 27 federal law. Long v. County of Los Angeles, 442 F.3d 1178, 1185 (9th Cir. 2006); see also Marsh 28 v. Cnty. of San Diego, 680 F.3d 1148, 1158 (9th Cir. 2012) (discussing “under color of state 1 law”). A person deprives another of a constitutional right, “within the meaning of § 1983, ‘if he 2 does an affirmative act, participates in another’s affirmative act, or omits to perform an act which 3 he is legally required to do that causes the deprivation of which complaint is made.’” 4 Preschooler II v. Clark Cnty. Sch. Bd. of Trs., 479 F.3d 1175, 1183 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting 5 Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978)). 6 III. PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT 7 A. Summary of the Complaint 8 The Complaint names as defendants the State of California, California Department of 9 Corrections and Rehabilitation (“CDCR”), and Valley State Prison (“VSP”). (ECF No. 1) 10 Plaintiff alleges that his medical records state, under “criminal history,” the following: “murder,” 11 “brain trauma,” and “4th grade education level.” (Id. at 4.) Plaintiff alleges that this information 12 is false, defamatory, slanderous, and libelous. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that these “false slanders 13 subject me to a differential” medical treatment in prison and that because of this allegedly false 14 information in his medical records, once he is released from prison and seeks medical treatment, 15 the “outside” doctors “will treat me wrong.” (Id. at 5, 6.) For relief, Plaintiff seeks a court order 16 requiring CDCR to “stop it, erase[] it, because it’s wrong,” and that all references to “murder, 17 brain trauma, 4th grade,” “must be erased from all CDCR medical records.” (Id. at 7.) 18 B. The Complaint Fails to State a Cognizable § 1983 Claim 19 In general, prison inmates do not have a protected liberty interest in freedom from alleged 20 classification errors where such errors do not cause the inmates to be subjected to “atypical and 21 significant hardship . . . in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” Sandin v. Conner, 22 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995). The same principle applies to claimed due process violations arising 23 from allegedly false information in prison documents, such as medical records. See Hines v. 24 Gomez, 108 F.3d 265, 268-69 (9th Cir. 1997);1 Freeman v. Rideout, 808 F.2d 949, 951 (2d Cir. 25 1986) (Prisoners have “no constitutionally guaranteed immunity from being falsely or wrongly 26 accused of conduct which may result in the deprivation of a protected liberty interest,” so long as 27 28 1 Hines reaffirms, however, that a prisoner may challenge false records if the false records were created in retaliation for a prisoner’s exercise of their protected First Amendment rights. Hines, 108 F.3d at 269. 1 they are “not . . . deprived of a protected liberty interest without due process of law.”). 2 Here, Plaintiff is alleging that his medical records contain false information regarding his 3 criminal history and mental health status. The mere presence of this allegedly false information 4 in Plaintiff’s medical records does not, without more, violate Plaintiff’s constitutional rights. See 5 ibid. Thus, the Complaint fails to state a cognizable claim under § 1983. The Complaint is 6 therefore subject to dismissal for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. 7 Further, as discussed next, Plaintiff’s Complaint is subject to dismissal on the alternative ground 8 of failure to exhaust. 9 C. Plaintiff Failed to Exhaust His Administrative Remedies 10 Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (“PLRA”), “[n]o action shall be brought 11 with respect to prison conditions under [42 U.S.C. § 1983], or any other Federal law, by a 12 prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative 13 remedies as are available are exhausted.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). 14 “The California prison grievance system has three levels of review; a prisoner exhausts 15 administrative remedies by obtaining a decision at each level.” Reyes v. Smith, 810 F.3d 654, 16 657 (9th Cir. 2016) (citing Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3084.1(b) (2011); Harvey v. Jordan, 605 17 F.3d 681, 683 (9th Cir. 2010)); see also Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3084.7(d)(3) (“The third level 18 review constitutes the decision of the Secretary of the California Department of Corrections and 19 Rehabilitation on an appeal, and shall be conducted by a designated representative under the 20 supervision of the third level Appeals Chief or equivalent. The third level of review exhausts 21 administrative remedies. . . .”). Prisoners must submit appeals on a standardized form (CDCR 22 Form 602), attach necessary supporting documentation, and submit the appeal within thirty days 23 of the disputed event. Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, §§ 3084.2, 3084.3(a), 3084.8(b). Further, prisoners 24 are required to exhaust the available administrative remedies prior to filing suit. Jones v. Bock, 25 549 U.S. 199, 211 (2007); McKinney v. Carey, 311 F.3d 1198, 1199-1201 (9th Cir. 2002) (per 26 curiam). 27 The exhaustion requirement applies to all prisoner suits relating to prison life. Porter v. 28 Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 532 (2002). Exhaustion is required regardless of the relief sought by the 1 prisoner and regardless of the relief offered by the process, unless “the relevant administrative 2 procedure lacks authority to provide any relief or to take any action whatsoever in response to a 3 complaint.” Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 736, 741 (2001); see Ross v. Blake, 136 S. Ct. 4 1850, 1857, 1859 (2016). 5 Here, Plaintiff states in the Complaint that he has not exhausted his administrative 6 remedies, stating that administrative remedies “doesn’t exist.” (ECF No. 1 at 5-6.) However, as 7 noted above, California prisons do have a prison grievance system and the requirement of 8 exhaustion of remedies through this system applies to all prisoner suits relating to prison life. See 9 Reyes, 810 F.3d at 657 (California prisons have a grievance system); Jones, 549 U.S. at 211 10 (exhaustion of available administrative remedies is mandatory and unexhausted claims cannot be 11 brought to court); Porter, 534 U.S. at 532 (“the PLRA’s exhaustion requirement applies to all 12 inmate suits about prison life”). Plaintiff’s claims that his CDCR medical records contain false 13 information regarding his criminal history and mental health status and that this allegedly false 14 information is affecting the care he receives, and will receive in the future, relate to prison life. 15 He was therefore required to exhaust his administrative remedies. His Complaint is, accordingly, 16 subject to dismissal both for failure to state a cognizable claim, as discussed above, and 17 alternatively for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. 18 D. Leave to Amend the Complaint Should be Denied 19 If the Court finds that a complaint should be dismissed for failure to state a claim, the 20 Court has discretion to dismiss with or without leave to amend. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 21 1122, 1126-30 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). Leave to amend should be granted if it appears possible 22 that the defects in the complaint could be corrected, especially if a plaintiff is pro se. See id. at 23 1130-31; see also Cato v. United States, 70 F.3d 1103, 1106 (9th Cir. 1995) (“A pro se litigant 24 must be given leave to amend his or her complaint, and some notice of its deficiencies, unless it 25 is absolutely clear that the deficiencies of the complaint could not be cured by amendment.”) 26 (citation omitted). However, if, after careful consideration, it is clear that a complaint cannot be 27 cured by amendment, the Court may dismiss without leave to amend. Cato, 70 F.3d at 1005-06. 28 After careful consideration, the Court finds that the Complaint’s allegations against 1 Defendants cannot establish a plausible § 1983 claim as a matter of law and that amendment 2 would accordingly be futile. Plaintiff’s underlying factual allegations are clear. The issue is that 3 the factual circumstances raised in the Complaint do not give rise to a constitutional claim. 4 IV. MOTION TO SUPPLEMENT COMPLAINT 5 A. Summary of Motion to Supplement the Complaint 6 In his proposed supplement to the Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that various individuals 7 and the “ICE Sacramento Field Office” have placed in Plaintiff’s CDCR records “that I’m 8 resident alien which I am not. I am U.S. Citizen.” (ECF No. 8.) Plaintiff alleges that, as a result 9 of this allegedly false information in his CDCR records, there is an Immigrations and Customs 10 Enforcement (“ICE”) hold on him and he is in danger of being wrongly deported. (Id.) Plaintiff 11 alleges that he became a U.S. Citizen on May 8, 1996, in a naturalization ceremony in 12 Sacramento, California. (Id.) Plaintiff also alleges that the false information stating that he is a 13 resident alien was put into his records in retaliation and indicates that this retaliation was in 14 response to his filing of the present action and an “appeal to VSP CDCR 602 on 5/17/2019.” (Id. 15 at 8.) 16 B. Analysis of Motion to Supplement the Complaint 17 Local Rule 220, which applies to “changed pleadings,” including supplemental pleadings 18 filed under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(d), provides: 19 Unless prior approval to the contrary is obtained from the Court, every pleading to which an amendment or supplement is permitted 20 as a matter of right or has been allowed by court order shall be retyped and filed so that it is complete in itself without reference to 21 the prior or superseded pleading. No pleading shall be deemed amended or supplemented until this Rule has been complied with. 22 All changed pleadings shall contain copies of all exhibits referred to in the changed pleading. Permission may be obtained from the 23 Court, if desired, for the removal of any exhibit or exhibits attached to a superseded pleading, in order that the same may be 24 attached to the changed pleading. 25 Local Rule 220. 26 Plaintiff has not provided a single complaint that is complete in itself without reference to 27 any prior or superseded pleading as required under Rule 220. Further, because the Complaint is 28 subject to dismissal for both failure to state a cognizable claim and failure to exhaust, as 1 discussed above, there is no cognizable claim to supplement. 2 Moreover, a review of the allegations in the proposed supplement demonstrates that 3 supplementation is not appropriate here. First, the proposed supplement involves different 4 defendants when compared to the Complaint. Specifically, the Complaint names the State of 5 California, CDCR, and VSP as defendants (ECF No. 1). In contrast, the proposed supplement 6 lists numerous individuals—Captain Waybright, M. Gallardo, M. Martinez, VSP staff, and ICE- 7 Sacramento Field Office (ECF No. 8)—none of whom are named as defendants in the 8 Complaint. 9 Second, the claims raised in the Complaint are different than the claim raised in the 10 proposed supplement. The Complaint alleges that the State of California, CDCR, and VSP 11 placed in Plaintiff’s CDCR medical records allegedly false information regarding Plaintiff’s 12 criminal history and mental health (ECF No. 1). In contrast, the proposed supplement alleges that 13 other individuals have retaliated against Plaintiff by putting allegedly false information regarding 14 Plaintiff’s citizenship into his CDCR records (ECF No. 8). Thus, although both the Complaint 15 and the proposed supplement relate to allegedly false information in CDCR records, the type of 16 allegedly false information in those records differ (criminal history and mental health 17 information in the Complaint versus citizenship status in the proposed supplement); and the type 18 of records at issue also differ (medical records in the Complaint versus general prison records in 19 the proposed supplement). 20 Third, the allegations in the proposed supplement do not state a cognizable claim. As 21 noted previously, false information in prison records that does not cause the inmate to be 22 subjected to atypical and significant hardship in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life 23 does not generally give rise to a cognizable claim. See Sandin, 515 U.S. at 484; Hines, 108 F.3d 24 at 268-69l; Freeman, 808 F.2d at 951. There is, however, an exception to this general rule—a 25 prisoner may challenge false records if the false records were created in retaliation for a 26 prisoner’s exercise of their protected First Amendment rights. Hines, 108 F.3d at 269. 27 To state a claim for retaliation, Plaintiff must allege facts demonstrating “five basic 28 elements: (1) an assertion that a state actor took some adverse action against an inmate 1 (2) because of (3) that prisoner’s protected conduct, and that such action (4) chilled the inmate’s 2 exercise of his First Amendment rights, and (5) the action did not reasonably advance a 3 legitimate correctional goal.” Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 567-68 (9th Cir. 2005) 4 (footnote omitted); accord Wood v. Carter, 668 F.3d 1108, 1114-15 (9th Cir. 2012); Brodheim v. 5 Cry, 584 F.3d 1262, 1269 (9th Cir. 2009). 6 Here, Plaintiff alleges in the proposed supplement that he is a naturalized U.S. Citizen, 7 and that Captain Waybright, M. Fallardo, A. Martinez, VSP Staff, and the ICE-Sacramento Field 8 Office have placed in Plaintiff’s CDCR records false information stating that Plaintiff is a 9 resident alien and that this was done in retaliation. (ECF No. 8.) Plaintiff also indicates that, as a 10 result, there is an ICE hold on him. The Court will assume, without deciding, that placing false 11 citizenship status in prison records and/or an ICE hold constitutes adverse action because, even 12 with this assumption, Plaintiff has failed to state a cognizable claim for retaliation under § 1983. 13 Specifically, Plaintiff has not alleged facts demonstrating that the specific individuals named in 14 the proposed supplement are the ones who placed or caused to be placed the allegedly false 15 information in Plaintiff’s records, that they did so because of Plaintiff’s engagement in protected 16 conduct,2 and that the placement of this allegedly false information in Plaintiff’s records has 17 chilled Plaintiff’s exercise of his protected First Amendment rights. 18 Moreover, Plaintiff claims that the allegedly false information regarding his citizenship 19 was placed in the CDCR records in retaliation for the filing of this lawsuit and a 602 appeal. 20 (ECF No. 8 at 1 (“it’s a retaliation”); ECF No. 8 at 8 (“as result of me filing this case with this 21 court and because trying to appeal to VSP CDCR 602 on 5/17/2019 . . . it’s a retaliation in 22 collaboration with ICE-Sacramento Field Office”).) However, the attachments to the proposed 23 supplement demonstrate that Plaintiff’s CDCR records have stated, since at least December 24 25 2 In the prison context, not all speech is protected speech, and a prisoner does not have the same First Amendment rights as a non-prisoner. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 545 (1979). “[A] prison inmate retains those 26 First Amendment rights that are not inconsistent with his status as a prisoner or with the legitimate penological objectives of the corrections system.” Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822 (1974). Thus, a prisoner’s claim that he 27 has engaged in protected conduct “must be analyzed in terms of the legitimate policies and goals of the corrections system . . . .” Id. In this context, protected conduct includes, for example, the filing of administrative grievances and 28 initiating civil litigation, and it is therefore impermissible for prison officials to retaliate against prisoners for engaging in these activities. See Rhodes, 408 F.3d at 567. 1 2018, that Plaintiff’s citizenship is “Resident Alien.” (See ECF No. 8 at 2 (Classification 2 Committee Chrono dated December 19, 2018, stating “Citizenship: Resident Alien.”) Thus, the 3 CDCR records could not have been altered in retaliation for Plaintiff’s filing of the present 4 lawsuit, which was filed on July 12, 2019, or in retaliation for Plaintiff’s 602 appeal, which was 5 filed on May 17, 2019.3 6 In sum, Plaintiff’s proposed supplement involves individuals not named in the 7 Complaint, involves a different incident and a different factual basis than the claims raised in the 8 Complaint, and fails to state a cognizable claim. The Court will accordingly deny Plaintiff’s 9 motion to supplement the Complaint. 10 V. ORDER AND RECOMMENDATIONS 11 Based on the foregoing, 12 1. IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff’s motion to supplement the Complaint (ECF No. 8) is 13 DENIED; 14 2. IT IS RECOMMENDED that: 15 a. This action be dismissed, with prejudice and without leave to amend, based on 16 Plaintiff’s failure to state a cognizable claim under § 1983; 17 b. This dismissal be subject to the “three strikes” provision of 28 U.S.C. 18 § 1915(g); 19 c. Alternatively, that this action be dismissed without prejudice for failure to 20 exhaust; and 21 d. The Clerk of the Court be directed to close this case. 22 These findings and recommendations will be submitted to the United States District 23 Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of Title 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within 24 thirty (30) days after being served with these findings and recommendations, Plaintiff may file 25 26 3 The Court also takes judicial notice of Beaton v. State of California, Case No. 1:19-cv-01072-JLT, filed on August 6, 2019. See United States v. Wilson, 631 F.2d 118, 119 (9th Cir. 1980) (The Court may take judicial 27 notice of its own records in other cases). In that case, Plaintiff appears to be raising the same or similar issues that he is raising in his proposed supplement. See Case No. 1:19-cv-01072-JLT, ECF No. 1 (Complaint brought under § 28 1983 in which Plaintiff alleges that defendants are retaliating by falsely claiming that Plaintiff is a resident alien and that this is false because Plaintiff became a U.S. citizen through a naturalization ceremony in May 1996).) 1 || written objections with the Court. The document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate 2 || Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” 3 Plaintiff is advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may result in 4 || the waiver of rights on appeal. Wilkerson v. Wheeler, 772 F.3d 834, 838-39 (9th Cir. 2014) 5 || (citing Baxter v. Sullivan, 923 F.2d 1391, 1394 (9th Cir. 1991)). 6 7 IT IS SO ORDERED. 5 || Dated: _ October 28, 2019 [spe ey —— 9 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 10