Wilmington Savings Fund Society, FSB v. Thompson ( 2019 )

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 WILMINGTON SAVINGS FUND No. 1:19-cv-01753-DAD-JLT SOCIETY, FSB d/b/a CHRISTIANA 12 TRUST, not individually but as trustee for Pretium Mortgage Acquisition Trust 13 ORDER SUA SPONTE REMANDING CASE Plaintiff, TO KERN COUNTY SUPERIOR COURT 14 AND DENYING MOTION TO PROCEED IN v. FORMA PAUPERIS AS MOOT 15 NANCY A. THOMPSON; and DOES 1 to (Doc. Nos. 1, 3) 16 6, inclusive, 17 Defendants. 18 19 20 This is an unlawful detainer action brought under California state law by plaintiff 21 Wilmington Savings Fund Society (“plaintiff”) against defendant Nancy Thompson. On 22 December 17, 2019, defendant removed this case to this federal court from the Kern County 23 Superior Court. (Doc. No. 1.) According to defendant, removal is proper because plaintiff’s 24 unlawful detainer action violates the U.S. Constitution and federal fair housing and anti- 25 discrimination laws. (Id. at 6.) Defendant filed a motion to proceed in forma pauperis on the 26 same date, December 17, 2019. (Doc. No. 3.) 27 A district court has “a duty to establish subject matter jurisdiction over the removed action 28 sua sponte, whether the parties raised the issue or not.” United Investors Life Ins. Co. v. Waddell 1 & Reed, Inc., 360 F.3d 960, 967 (9th Cir. 2004). The removal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1441, is 2 strictly construed against removal jurisdiction. Geographic Expeditions, Inc. v. Estate of Lhotka, 3 599 F.3d 1102, 1107 (9th Cir. 2010); Provincial Gov’t of Marinduque v. Placer Dome, Inc., 582 4 F.3d 1083, 1087 (9th Cir. 2009). It is presumed that a case lies outside the limited jurisdiction of 5 the federal courts, and the burden of establishing the contrary rests upon the party asserting 6 jurisdiction. Geographic Expeditions, 599 F.3d at 1106–07; Hunter v. Philip Morris USA, 582 7 F.3d 1039, 1042 (9th Cir. 2009). In addition, “the existence of federal jurisdiction depends solely 8 on the plaintiff’s claims for relief and not on anticipated defenses to those claims.” ARCO Envtl. 9 Remediation, LLC v. Dep’t of Health & Envtl. Quality, 213 F.3d 1108, 1113 (9th Cir. 2000). 10 “The strong presumption against removal jurisdiction” means that “the court resolves all 11 ambiguity in favor of remand to state court.” Hunter, 582 F.3d at 1042; Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 12 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1992). That is, federal jurisdiction over a removed case “must be rejected 13 if there is any doubt as to the right of removal in the first instance.” Geographic Expeditions, 599 14 F.3d at 1107; Duncan v. Stuetzle, 76 F.3d 1480, 1485 (9th Cir. 1996); Gaus, 980 F.2d at 566. “If 15 at any time prior to judgment it appears that the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the 16 case shall be remanded.” 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c); Gibson v. Chrysler Corp., 261 F.3d 927, 932 (9th 17 Cir. 2001). Remand under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) “is mandatory, not discretionary.” Bruns v. 18 NCUA, 122 F.3d 1251, 1257 (9th Cir. 1997); see also California ex. rel. Lockyer v. Dynegy, Inc., 19 375 F.3d 831, 838 (9th Cir. 2004). Where it appears, as it does here, that the district court lacks 20 subject matter jurisdiction over a removed case, “the case shall be remanded.” 28 U.S.C. 21 § 1447(c). 22 “The presence or absence of federal question jurisdiction is governed by the ‘well-pleaded 23 complaint rule,’ which provides that federal jurisdiction exists only when a federal question is 24 presented on the face of the plaintiff’s properly pleaded complaint.” California v. United States, 25 215 F.3d 1005, 1014 (9th Cir. 2000); see also Dynegy, 375 F.3d at 838; Duncan, 76 F.3d at 1485. 26 Under the well-pleaded complaint rule, courts look to what “necessarily appears in the plaintiff’s 27 statement of his own claim in the bill or declaration, unaided by anything in anticipation of 28 avoidance of defenses which it is thought the defendant may interpose.” California, 215 F.3d at 1 | 1014. Accordingly, “a case may not be removed on the basis of a federal defense . . . even if the 2 | defense is anticipated in the plaintiff's complaint and both parties concede that the federal defense 3 | is the only question truly at issue.” Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987); 4 | Wayne v. DHL Worldwide Express, 294 F.3d 1179, 1183 (9th Cir. 2002); see also Vaden v. 5 | Discover Bank, 556 U.S. 49, 70 (2009) (“It does not suffice to show that a federal question lurks 6 || somewhere inside the parties’ controversy, or that a defense or counterclaim would arise under 7 | federal law.”). 8 Here, defendant has not shown that removal of this action to this federal court is 9 | appropriate. Plaintiff's complaint is a straight-forward unlawful detainer action that is based 10 | entirely on state law. As stated above, defendants rely solely on a contemplated defense that rests 11 on various federal constitutional and statutory grounds in an attempt to establish federal 12 | jurisdiction. Even assuming defendants can assert such a defense, they cannot use that 13 || anticipated defense as the basis for removal because the defensive invocation of federal law 14 | cannot form the basis of this court’s jurisdiction. See Vaden, 556 U.S. at 70; Caterpillar, 482 15 | US. at 392; Wayne, 294 F.3d at 1183; California, 215 F.3d at 1014. 16 Because there is no federal question appearing in plaintiff's complaint, defendants have 17 | failed to properly invoke this court’s jurisdiction. Remand to the Kern County Superior Court is 18 | therefore appropriate and mandatory. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c); Geographic Expeditions, 599 F.3d at 19 1107; Bruns, 122 F.3d at 1257. 20 Accordingly, 21 1. This action is remanded forthwith to the Kern County Superior Court, pursuant to 22 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c), for lack of subject matter jurisdiction; 23 2. Defendant’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis (Doc. No. 3) is denied as moot 24 in light of this order; and 25 3. The Clerk of the Court is respectfully directed to close this action. 26 | IT IS SO ORDERED. me □ Dated: _ December 17, 2019 Yh AL 28 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE