Crabtree v. County of Butte ( 2020 )

1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 7 DARWIN CRABTREE, Case No. 3:19-cv-08058-JD 8 Plaintiff, ORDER RE TRANSFER v. 9 Re: Dkt. Nos. 6, 16 10 COUNTY OF BUTTE, et al., Defendants. 11 12 13 Plaintiff Darwin Crabtree is a resident of Butte County and sues the county and its officers 14 for violations of his constitutional rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state law. Dkt. No. 1; Dkt. 15 No. 8, Ex. 1 at 2. He alleges that he was maliciously prosecuted for sexual abuse of his children 16 by the Butte County District Attorney’s Office on the basis of false accusations coerced by the 17 Butte County Alcohol and Drug Services. He was convicted by a Butte County jury in Superior 18 Court, incarcerated for 9 years, and required to register as a sex offender for 17 more years, after 19 which his conviction was vacated. Butte County is located in the Eastern District of California. 20 The case was initially assigned to a magistrate judge, who ordered Crabtree to show cause 21 why the case should not be transferred to the Eastern District. Dkt. No. 6. Crabtree filed a 22 response, but also declined magistrate judge jurisdiction, which caused the case to be reassigned to 23 the Court. Dkt. Nos. 7, 8, 10. Defendants filed a Rule 12(b)(3) motion to dismiss for improper 24 venue, or in the alternative for transfer under either 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) or 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a). 25 Dkt. No. 16. 26 The Court finds the motion suitable for decision without oral argument pursuant to 27 Civil Local Rule 7-1(b) and vacates the hearing that was set for April 2, 2020. The case is 1 DISCUSSION 2 The facts about this case’s ties to Butte County are not in dispute. The parties also agree 3 that the Eastern District is a proper venue. Dkt. No. 21 at 15 (plaintiff); Dkt. No. 16-1 at 4-5 4 (defendants). They disagree on whether venue is proper and convenient in this District, and what 5 the consequence should be if Crabtree should have sued elsewhere. 6 Dismissal is not warranted under Section 1404 or Section 1406 for inconvenient or 7 improper venue. The relevant standard for both provisions is substantially the same. As the 8 Supreme Court recently recognized in Ritzen Group, Inc. v. Jackson Masonry, LLC, “within the 9 federal court system, when venue is laid in the wrong district, or when the plaintiff chooses an 10 inconvenient forum, transfer rather than dismissal is ordinarily ordered if ‘in the interest of 11 justice.’” 140 S. Ct. 582, 590 n.3 (2020) (quoting 28 U.S.C. §§ 1404(a), 1406); see also PHH 12 Mortg. Corp. v. Barrett, Daffin, Frappier, Treder, & Weiss, LLP, Case No. 15-cv-04711-JD, 2016 13 WL 1588270, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 20, 2016) (reaching same result under Sections 1404 and 14 1406). That standard is amply met in this case because Crabtree represents that his claims would 15 be time-barred if the case were dismissed. Dkt. No. 21 at 15; see PHH Mortg. Corp., 2016 WL 16 1588270, at *2 (recognizing that “case might be time-barred if dismissed” weighs “in favor of 17 transfer”). A transfer, and not a dismissal, is the right result here. 18 Transfer is appropriate because Crabtree’s claims accrued in Butte County. The 19 allegations in the complaint tell a harrowing story of Crabtree’s wrongful conviction in that county 20 on charges that he sexually abused his children. His conviction was vacated after evidence came 21 to light that key accusations against him were coerced and fabricated by the Butte County District 22 Attorney’s Office and employees of Butte County Alcohol and Drug Services. These events all 23 took place in Butte County. Crabtree says he has “spent more than 25 years living a nightmare,” 24 and has sued Butte County and individuals who reside there to redress his injuries. See generally 25 Dkt. No. 1. 26 The factual allegations in the complaint are detailed and compelling. It may well be that 27 Crabtree has a good claim to prosecute. But the case belongs in the Eastern District of California, 1 Crabtree has not established that “a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise 2 to the claim occurred” in the Northern District for venue purposes. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2). The 3 only tie to the Northern District that Crabtree identifies is that he spent “approximately 5 1/3 4 months” in custody at San Quentin, which is within our District. Dkt. No. 21 at 4. While it is 5 undisputed at this point in the case that Crabtree suffered traumatic events there, including being 6 threatened for being a child molester by another prisoner, his brief presence within this District is 7 largely irrelevant to his claims of prosecutorial misconduct and resulting constitutional 8 deprivations. All of those events occurred in Butte County. The complaint does not allege a claim 9 based on his time in San Quentin, and no defendant is affiliated with the prison. 10 None of Crabtree’s arguments suggest a different conclusion. He says that someone at San 11 Quentin recommended Crabtree not receive probation, but that was based on a report “fabricated” 12 in Butte County. Dkt. No. 1 ¶ 117. He puts considerable emphasis on the “locus of injury” as a 13 factor in determining venue, Myers v. Bennett Law Offices, 238 F.3d 1068, 1076 (9th Cir. 2001), 14 but that general proposition is of no help to him here. The “brunt of the harm” in Myers was 15 suffered in the venue where the plaintiff had sued. Id. at 1074, 1076 (citation omitted). That is a 16 far cry from the situation here, where nothing material to the claims in the complaint occurred in 17 this District. 18 An unpublished memorandum by the Ninth Circuit underscores this point. In Smith v. 19 Schmidt, 52 Fed. App’x 11, 12 (9th Cir. 2002), a panel applied Myers to approve the venue of a 20 Section 1983 suit in California against New Jersey prosecutors for providing “documents to the 21 California Department of Correction (‘DOC’) for use” at a parole hearing. It concluded that 22 “[b]ecause Smith alleged that the ‘locus of the injury’ was the parole hearing, which occurred in 23 the Central District of California, venue was proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2).” Id. (citing 24 Myers, 238 F.3d at 1075-76). In contrast, Crabtree’s claims are against Butte County and its 25 officers for falsifying reports, malicious prosecution, coercing testimony, and other misconduct 26 that took place in the Eastern District of California, not at San Quentin. 27 Even if venue were proper in this District, which is not the case, a transfer to the Eastern 1 witnesses, in the interest of justice.” Under this section, “the court may consider: (1) the location 2 || where the relevant agreements were negotiated and executed, (2) the state that is most familiar 3 || with the governing law, (3) the plaintiff's choice of forum, (4) the respective parties’ contacts with 4 || the forum, (5) the contacts relating to the plaintiff's cause of action in the chosen forum, (6) the 5 differences in the costs of litigation in the two forums, (7) the availability of compulsory process 6 || to compel attendance of unwilling non-party witnesses, and (8) the ease of access to sources of 7 proof.” Jones v. GNC Franchising, Inc., 211 F.3d 495, 498-99 (9th Cir. 2000). 8 All the applicable factors count against Crabtree except his choice of forum. The 9 witnesses, documents, and evidence are overwhelmingly located in Butte County. The fact that 10 || Crabtree chose to file here is not enough to put aside the common sense conclusion that efficiency 11 and economy are best served by litigating the claims in the venue where they arose. See PHH 12 Mortg. Grp., 2016 WL 1588270, at *2. 13 The case is transferred to the Eastern District of California. IT IS SO ORDERED. 15 Dated: March 28, 2020 8 JAMES ONATO. Unite States District Judge 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28