(PC) Gaon v. Lau ( 2020 )

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 AMOS GAON, Case No. 1:20-cv-00182-JLT (PC) 12 Plaintiff, FIRST SCREENING ORDER 13 v. (Doc. 1) 14 T. LAU, et al., 21-DAY DEADLINE 15 Defendants. 16 17 Amos Gaon alleges the defendants were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical 18 needs. (Doc. 1.) For the reasons set forth below, Plaintiff fails to state a claim on which relief can 19 be granted. Because he may be able to cure the deficiencies in his pleading, the Court grants 20 Plaintiff leave to file a first amended complaint. 21 I. SCREENING REQUIREMENT 22 The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a 23 governmental entity or an employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court 24 must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are frivolous or 25 malicious, fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seek monetary relief from a 26 defendant immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). The Court should dismiss a complaint 27 if it lacks a cognizable legal theory or fails to allege sufficient facts to support a cognizable legal theory. See Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). 1 II. PLEADING REQUIREMENTS 2 A. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) 3 “Rule 8(a)’s simplified pleading standard applies to all civil actions, with limited 4 exceptions.” Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N. A., 534 U.S. 506, 513 (2002). A complaint must contain 5 “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. 6 Civ. Pro. 8(a)(2). “Such a statement must simply give the defendant fair notice of what the 7 plaintiff's claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 512 (internal 8 quotation marks and citation omitted). 9 Detailed factual allegations are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a 10 cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 11 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). Plaintiff must 12 set forth “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim that is plausible on its face.’” 13 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). Factual allegations are accepted as 14 true, but legal conclusions are not. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). 15 The Court construes pleadings of pro se prisoners liberally and affords them the benefit of 16 any doubt. Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010) (citation omitted). However, “the 17 liberal pleading standard … applies only to a plaintiff’s factual allegations,” not his legal theories. 18 Neitze v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 330 n.9 (1989). Furthermore, “a liberal interpretation of a civil 19 rights complaint may not supply essential elements of the claim that were not initially pled,” 20 Bruns v. Nat'l Credit Union Admin., 122 F.3d 1251, 1257 (9th Cir. 1997) (internal quotation 21 marks and citation omitted), and courts “are not required to indulge unwarranted inferences.” Doe 22 I v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 572 F.3d 677, 681 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and 23 citation omitted). The “sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully” is not sufficient to 24 state a cognizable claim, and “facts that are merely consistent with a defendant’s liability” fall 25 short. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 26 B. Linkage and Causation 27 Section 1983 provides a cause of action for the violation of constitutional or other federal 1 section 1983, a plaintiff must show a causal connection or link between the actions of the 2 defendants and the deprivation alleged to have been suffered by the plaintiff. See Rizzo v. Goode, 3 423 U.S. 362, 373-75 (1976). The Ninth Circuit has held that “[a] person ‘subjects’ another to the 4 deprivation of a constitutional right, within the meaning of section 1983, if he does an affirmative 5 act, participates in another’s affirmative acts, or omits to perform an act which he is legally 6 required to do that causes the deprivation of which complaint is made.” Johnson v. Duffy, 588 7 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978) (citation omitted). 8 III. EXHAUSTION REQUIREMENT 9 The Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) provides that “[n]o action shall be brought with 10 respect to prison conditions under … any other Federal law … by a prisoner confined in any jail, 11 prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are 12 exhausted.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). Exhaustion of administrative remedies is mandatory and 13 “unexhausted claims cannot be brought in court.” Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 211 (2007) 14 (citation omitted). Inmates are required to “complete the administrative review process in 15 accordance with the applicable procedural rules, including deadlines, as a precondition to 16 bringing suit in federal court.” Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 88, 93 (2006). The exhaustion 17 requirement applies to all inmate suits relating to prison life, Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 532 18 (2002), regardless of the relief sought by the prisoner or offered by the administrative process, 19 Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 741 (2001). Generally, failure to exhaust is an affirmative 20 defense that the defendant must plead and prove. Jones, 549 U.S. at 204, 216. However, courts 21 may dismiss a claim if failure to exhaust is clear on the face of the complaint. See Albino v. Baca, 22 747 F.3d 1162, 1166 (9th Cir. 2014). 23 The California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) has an 24 administrative grievance system for prisoners to appeal a departmental decision, action, 25 condition, or policy having an adverse effect on prisoner welfare. Cal. Code Regs., tit. 15, § 26 3084.1. Compliance with section 1997e(a) requires California state prisoners to use CDCR’s 27 grievance process to exhaust their claims before filing suit. See Sapp v. Kimbrell, 623 F.3d 813, 1 IV. DISCUSSION 2 A. Plaintiff’s Allegations 3 Plaintiff alleges the defendants are denying him adequate medical care. (Doc. 1 at 3.) He 4 states that he “has no teeth [and] has requested … dentures and/or liquid diet supplement to 5 sustain himself and has been denied … and told to ‘eat regular foods just let them sit in the mouth 6 longer.’” (Id.) Plaintiff alleges the “defendants are subjecting him to cruel and unusual 7 punishment.” (Id.) 8 B. Claim for Relief 9 1. Deliberate Indifference to Serious Medical Needs 10 “Prison officials violate the Eighth Amendment if they are ‘deliberate[ly] indifferen[t] to 11 [a prisoner’s] serious medical needs.’” Peralta v. Dillard, 744 F.3d 1076, 1081 (9th Cir. 2014) 12 (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976)). “This is true whether the indifference is 13 manifested by prison doctors in their response to the prisoner’s needs or by prison guards in 14 intentionally denying or delaying access to medical care….” Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104-05. “A 15 medical need is serious if failure to treat it will result in significant injury or the unnecessary and 16 wanton infliction of pain.” Peralta, 744 F.3d at 1081 (internal quotation marks and citations 17 omitted). “A prison official is deliberately indifferent to that need if he ‘knows of and disregards 18 an excessive risk to inmate health.’” Id. at 1082 (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 19 (1994)). 20 The test for deliberate indifference is thus two-pronged and has objective and subjective 21 components. See Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1122 (9th Cir. 2012). To establish such a 22 claim, a prisoner must first “show a serious medical need by demonstrating that failure to treat 23 [the] prisoner’s condition could result in further significant injury or the unnecessary and wanton 24 infliction of pain. Second, the plaintiff must show the defendants’ response to the need was 25 deliberately indifferent.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 26 As to the first, objective prong, “[i]ndications that a plaintiff has a serious medical need 27 include ‘[t]he existence of an injury that a reasonable doctor or patient would find important and 1 individual's daily activities; or the existence of chronic and substantial pain.’” Colwell v. 2 Bannister, 763 F.3d 1060, 1066 (9th Cir. 2014) (citation omitted). 3 As to the second, subjective prong, deliberate indifference “describes a state of mind more 4 blameworthy than negligence” and “requires more than ordinary lack of due care for the 5 prisoner’s interests or safety.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 835 (internal quotation marks and citation 6 omitted). Deliberate indifference exists where a prison official “knows that [an] inmate[] face[s] a 7 substantial risk of serious harm and disregards that risk by failing to take reasonable measures to 8 abate it.” Id. at 847. In medical cases, this requires showing, “(a) a purposeful act or failure to 9 respond to a prisoner’s pain or possible medical need and (b) harm caused by the indifference.” 10 Wilhelm, 680 F.3d at 1122 (citation omitted). “A prisoner need not show his harm was 11 substantial; however, such would provide additional support for the inmate’s claim that the 12 defendant was deliberately indifferent to his needs.” Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 13 2006) (citation omitted). 14 “Deliberate indifference is a high legal standard.” Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1060 15 (9th Cir. 2004). “Under this standard, the prison official must not only ‘be aware of facts from 16 which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists,’ but [he] ‘must 17 also draw the inference.’” Id. at 1057 (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837). “If a [prison official] 18 should have been aware of the risk, but was not, then the [official] has not violated the Eighth 19 Amendment, no matter how severe the risk.’” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 20 Plaintiff does not state a cognizable deliberate indifference claim. He provides insufficient 21 facts to show that the defendants knew of a substantial risk of serious harm to him and failed to 22 take reasonable measures to abate it. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 847; Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. 23 Relatedly, Plaintiff does show how each defendants’ actions or failures to act caused the 24 constitutional deprivation of which he complains. See Johnson, 588 F.2d at 743. In his factual 25 allegations, Plaintiff refers to the defendants collectively; it is unclear how each defendant is 26 involved in the incidents underlying this action. (See Doc. 1 at 3.) Plaintiff does not, for example, 27 provide the dates on which he informed each defendant about his medical needs, what he told 1 Plaintiff must provide every defendant with fair notice of the claims against him and the grounds 2 upon which they rest. See Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 512. 3 Also, it is unclear whether Plaintiff exhausted his administrative remedies prior to filing 4 suit. On his complaint, Plaintiff checks a box indicating that no administrative remedies are 5 available at California Correctional Institution. (See Doc. 1 at 1, 3.) But he also checks boxes 6 indicating that he submitted requests for administrative relief. (Id. at 3.) As explained in section 7 III, CDCR has an administrative grievance system for prisoners. Cal. Code Regs., tit. 15, § 8 3084.1. In general, a prisoner must pursue an administrative grievance through the highest level 9 of review to exhaust his claims prior to filing suit in court. See Jones, 549 U.S. at 211, Sapp, 623 10 F.3d at 818; see also Woodford, 548 U.S. at 85-86. 11 V. CONCLUSION AND ORDER 12 For the reasons set forth above, Plaintiff fails to state a claim on which relief can be 13 granted. Because Plaintiff may be able to cure the deficiencies in his pleading, the Court grants 14 him leave to amend his complaint. Within 21 days of the date of service of this order, Plaintiff 15 shall file a first amended complaint curing the deficiencies identified herein. If Plaintiff no longer 16 wishes to pursue this action, he may file a notice of voluntary dismissal. If Plaintiff needs an 17 extension of time to comply with this order, he shall file a motion seeking an extension no later 18 than 21 days from the date of service of this order. 19 Plaintiff is informed that an amended complaint supersedes the original complaint. Lacey 20 v. Maricopa Cty., 693 F.3d 896, 927 (9th Cir. 2012). Thus, an amended complaint must be 21 “complete in itself without reference to the prior or superseded pleading.” Local Rule 220. The 22 Court provides Plaintiff with an opportunity to amend his complaint to cure the deficiencies 23 identified herein. However, he may not change the nature of this suit by adding unrelated claims 24 in an amended complaint. Accordingly, the Court ORDERS: 25 1. Plaintiff is GRANTED leave to file a first amended complaint; 26 2. The Clerk’s Office shall send Plaintiff a civil rights complaint form; and, 27 3. Within 21 days from the date of service of this order, Plaintiff shall file a first 1 alternative, a notice of voluntary dismissal. 2 If Plaintiff fails to comply with this order, the Court will recommend that this action be 3 dismissed for failure to state a claim and to obey a court order. 4 IT IS SO ORDERED. 5 6 Dated: May 26, 2020 /s/ Jennifer L. Thurston UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27