- 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 JOSEPH L. ENNIS, No. 2:18-CV-0816-DMC-P 12 Plaintiff, 13 v. ORDER 14 A. HERRERA, et al., 15 Defendants. 16 17 Plaintiff, a prisoner proceeding pro se, brings this civil rights action pursuant to 18 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Pending before the Court are: (1) plaintiff’s motion to amend complaint (ECF 19 No. 26); (2) plaintiff’s motion for an extension of time to conduct discovery (ECF No. 29); 20 (3) plaintiff’s motion to stay the case (ECF No. 32); and (4) defendants’ motion to modify the 21 scheduling order (ECF No. 33). 22 A. Motion to Amend Complaint 23 This action proceeds on plaintiff’s original civil rights complaint, ECF No. 1. 24 Plaintiff seeks leave to amend because defendants’ response categorized the complaint as 25 “vague.” ECF No. 26, pg. 1. As defendants correctly point out, this is not an adequate 26 justification for granting plaintiff leave to amend. 27 / / / 28 / / / 1 The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide that a party may amend his or her 2 pleading once as a matter of course within 21 days of serving the pleading or, if the pleading is 3 one to which a responsive pleading is required, within 21 days after service of the responsive 4 pleading, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(1)(A), or within 21 days after service of a motion under Rule 5 12(b), (e), or (f) of the rules, whichever time is earlier, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(1)(B). 6 In all other situations, a party’s pleadings may only be amended upon leave of 7 court or stipulation of all the parties. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). Where leave of court to amend 8 is required and sought, the court considers the following factors: (1) whether there is a reasonable 9 relationship between the original and amended pleadings; (2) whether the grant of leave to amend 10 is in the interest of judicial economy and will promote the speedy resolution of the entire 11 controversy; (3) whether there was a delay in seeking leave to amend; (4) whether the grant of 12 leave to amend would delay a trial on the merits of the original claim; and (5) whether the 13 opposing party will be prejudiced by amendment. See Jackson v. Bank of Hawai’i, 902 F.2d 14 1385, 1387 (9th Cir. 1990). Leave to amend should be denied where the proposed amendment is 15 frivolous. See DCD Programs, Ltd. v. Leighton, 833 F.2d 183, 186 (9th Cir. 1987). 16 Here, defendants submitted an answer to plaintiff’s complaint on October 15, 17 2019. See ECF No. 23. However, plaintiff did not attempt to file an amended complaint until 18 February 24, 2020, four months later. Thus, plaintiff’s right to amend once as a matter of course 19 has expired and his complaint may only be amended by leave of this Court. 20 The Court finds that notwithstanding the absence of clearly articulated grounds for 21 an amendment, leave to amend is nonetheless appropriate here. The prejudice arising from an 22 amended pleading at this time is minimal. As ordered herein, discovery will remain open for a 23 period sufficient to address any new issues in an amended pleading. Trial is not imminent. By 24 affording this pro se plaintiff the opportunity to amend now, the court and all parties have a 25 greater opportunity to prepare for and address plaintiff’s actual claims at trial. 26 B. Motion for Extension of Discovery 27 On October 25, 2019, the Court issued its discovery and scheduling order, 28 requiring that all discovery be completed by March 9, 2020. See ECF No. 24. Plaintiff seeks a 45- 1 day extension of the discovery deadline. Good cause appearing therefor, plaintiff’s motion for an 2 extension of time is granted in part and shall be reflected in this order’s modification of the 3 scheduling order. 4 C. Motion to Stay Proceedings 5 Plaintiff states that he has failed to exhaust his complaint because he forgot to 6 submit a “State of California – Department of General Services Government Claim Form” (DGS 7 form). Plaintiff seeks a stay in proceedings until he has submitted a DGS form. 8 Plaintiff’s claims are subject to the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), which 9 requires that a prisoner challenging prison conditions exhaust available administrative remedies 10 before filing suit. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). This requirement is mandatory regardless of the relief 11 sought. See Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 741 (2001) (overruling Rumbles v. Hill, 182 F.3d 12 1064 (9th Cir. 1999)). Because exhaustion must precede the filing of the complaint, compliance 13 with § 1997e(a) is not achieved by exhausting administrative remedies while the lawsuit is 14 pending. See McKinney v. Carey, 311 F.3d 1198, 1199 (9th Cir. 2002). Additionally, "failure to 15 exhaust is an affirmative defense under the PLRA, and . . . inmates are not required to specially 16 plead or demonstrate exhaustion in their complaints." Albino v. Baca, 747 F.3d 1162, 1169 (9th 17 Cir. 2014) (quoting Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 216 (2007)). 18 Here, plaintiff’s motion fails for two reasons. First, as mentioned above, 19 exhaustion must precede the filing of the complaint and cannot be satisfied while the lawsuit is 20 pending. Thus, staying this case to allow plaintiff to submit a DGS form would be futile. Second, 21 exhaustion is an affirmative defense which must be asserted by the defendants and no such 22 defense has yet been asserted. Therefore, granting plaintiff an opportunity to shore up his 23 exhaustion requirements is not a valid reason to stay this case. Therefore, the Court denies 24 plaintiff’s motion to stay the case. 25 D. Motion to Modify Scheduling Order 26 As stated in the Court’s discovery and scheduling order, discovery was due by 27 March 9, 2020 and all dispositive motions must have been filed within 90 days after the discovery 28 cut-off date. See ECF No. 24. Defendants, referencing the unprecedented COVID-19 virus wOASe 2 LO UV OLY PRIN MINING MMVIII OIC EEN AY ST 1 | outbreak, request a modification of the scheduling order to allow additional time to submit a 2 | motion for summary judgement. Good cause appearing therefor, defendants’ motion for an 3 | extension of time is granted and shall be reflected in this order’s modification of the scheduling 4 | order. 5 Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: 6 1. Plaintiff's motion to amend his complaint (ECF No. 26) is GRANTED, and 7 | plaintiff is ordered to file and serve an amended pleading within thirty days of this Order; 8 2. Plaintiff's motion for an extension of time to conduct discovery (ECF No. 29) is 9 | GRANTED and on the Court’s own motion the deadline to complete discovery shall be extended 10 || to a date 120 days following the date on which Defendants serve and file a timely response to the 11 || amended pleading of plaintiff; 12 3. Plaintiff's motion to stay proceedings (ECF No. 32) is DENIED; 13 4. Defendant’s motion to modify the scheduling order (ECF No. 33) is 14 | GRANTED; and 15 5. Discovery shall be completed as ordered herein, within 120 days of the date of 16 | defendants’ timely filing of a pleading responsive to plaintiff's amended complaint, and 17 | dispositive motions shall be filed within 90 days after the close of discovery. 18 19 20 | Dated: June 15, 2020 71 DENNIS M. COTA 27 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 23 24 25 26 27 28
Document Info
Docket Number: 2:18-cv-00816
Filed Date: 6/16/2020
Precedential Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 6/19/2024