Sanders-Hollis v. State of CA, Health and Human Services Agency, Dept. of Social Services ( 2020 )

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 CLARICE SANDERS-HOLLIS, No. 2:19-cv-00092-KJM-DB 12 Plaintiff, 13 v. ORDER 14 STATE OF CALIFORNIA, HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES AGENCY, 15 DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES, et al., 16 Defendants. 17 18 19 Defendant California Department of Social Services1 moves to dismiss plaintiff 20 Clarice Sanders-Hollis’s first amended complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). 21 Mot., ECF No. 23. Plaintiff opposes the motion, Opp’n, ECF No. 25, and defendant has replied, 22 Reply, ECF No. 28. On December 11, 2019, the court submitted the matter without hearing and 23 resolves the motion here. For the reasons stated below, defendant’s motion to dismiss is 24 GRANTED. 25 26 27 1 In its moving papers, defendant notes that plaintiff erroneously names defendant as the State of California, Health and Human Services Agency, rather than its proper name California 28 Department of Social Services. Mot. at 2 n.1. 1 I. DISCUSSION 2 The court assumes the parties’ familiarity with the facts and procedural history of 3 this matter and incorporates by reference its summary of the claims and applicable legal standard 4 under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) articulated in its prior order granting defendant’s 5 motion to dismiss. See Prior Order at 1–2, ECF No. 18. Accordingly, the court proceeds directly 6 to the issues raised in defendant’s motion. 7 A. Exhaustion 8 Defendant’s first motion to dismiss challenged the sufficiency of plaintiff’s 9 original complaint due to a lack of factual support, see ECF No. 3, and the court granted the 10 motion for that reason, see generally Prior Order. Here, defendant contends that plaintiff’s Title 11 VII, ADEA and FEHA claims as currently alleged must be dismissed for failure to plead facts 12 showing exhaustion of administrative remedies. Mot. at 4–6. 13 “Exhausting administrative remedies by filing a timely charge with the EEOC or 14 the appropriate state agency is a statutory pre-requisite for an employee to pursue litigation under 15 both Title VII and the ADEA.” Ramirez v. Kingman Hosp. Inc., 374 F. Supp. 3d 832, 854 (D. 16 Ariz. 2019) (citing Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 47 (1947); 29 U.S.C. 17 § 626(d)(1)); see Garcia v. Los Banos Unified Sch. Dist., 418 F. Supp. 2d 1194, 1214–15 (E.D. 18 Cal. 2006) (“Under California law, the requirement of exhaustion of administrative remedies 19 under FEHA is a jurisdictional prerequisite to resort to the courts.” (citing Johnson v. City of 20 Loma Linda, 24 Cal. 4th 61, 70 (2000)). 21 Here, the court need not address the administrative process by which a claim is 22 adequately exhausted because the first amended complaint is devoid of factual allegations that 23 plaintiff did in fact exhaust her administrative remedies. See generally First Am. Compl. 24 (“FAC”), ECF No. 22. The complaint contains only the bare allegation that plaintiff “has 25 received Right to Sue letters from the California Department of Fair Housing and Employment 26 and U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and has thus exhausted all necessary 27 administrative remedies.” FAC ¶ 24. This conclusory assertion fails to satisfy even the 28 minimum pleading requirements of Rule 8. See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 1 (2007). For example, the complaint fails to state the date on which plaintiff submitted her claims 2 to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and California Department of Fair Housing 3 and Employment, the charge numbers for those claims, or the dates on which she received her 4 right to sue letters from those agencies. Because exhaustion is jurisdictional, the complaint must 5 contain, at a minimum, sufficient detail to assure the court it has jurisdiction to consider the 6 matter before it. See Lyons v. England, 307 F.3d 1092, 1104 (9th Cir. 2002) (“Exhaustion of 7 administrative remedies under Title VII requires that the complainant file a timely charge with the 8 EEOC, thereby allowing the agency time to investigate the charge.” (emphasis added)). The 9 conclusory allegations here provide the court no means of evaluating whether the administrative, 10 and thus jurisdictional, prerequisites of plaintiff’s claims have been satisfied. For this reason, 11 defendant’s motion to dismiss is granted and plaintiff’s Title VII, ADEA and FEHA claims 12 encompassing all nine causes of action are dismissed. 13 B. Leave to Amend 14 Despite the first amended complaint’s lack of detail, plaintiff’s opposition 15 indicates she can cure the ills described above. See Opp’n at 5 (“Plaintiff can easily plead these 16 facts, parties, individuals, the contents and dates of the DFEH/EEOC charges and subsequent 17 events, the contents of dates of the DFEH/EEOC right to sue letters, and any other factual detail 18 required.”). Accordingly, plaintiff is granted one final opportunity to amend. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 19 15(a)(2) (“The court should freely give leave when justice so requires.”). 20 II. CONCLUSION 21 Defendant’s motion to dismiss, ECF No. 23, is GRANTED, and plaintiff is 22 granted one final opportunity to amend. Plaintiff’s second amended complaint shall be filed 23 within twenty-one (21) days of this order. 24 IT IS SO ORDERED. 25 DATED: July 2, 2020. 26 27 28